Ex Parte Shah

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 27, 2017

14672005 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/672,005 03/27/2015 Dipak J. Shah H26036C5-1161.1191106 7200
90545 7590
HONEY WET ,T ,/STW
Patent Services
115 Tabor Road
P.O. Box 377
MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950
12/29/2017 EXAMINER
LOPEZ ALVAREZ, OLVIN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2125
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/29/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patentservices-us @ honey well, com
Honeywell.USPTO@STWiplaw.com
sherry, vallabh @honeywell.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DIPAK J. SHAH
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,0051
Technology Center 2100
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1-20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Honeywell
International, Inc. (App. Br. 3).
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
According to Appellant, the claims are directed to remotely setting a
thermostat by using a hand-held personal data assistant (PDA) to set
temperature information, synchronizing the PDA information with a
personal computer, and then the personal computer setting the thermostat
temperature information (Spec. 7:5-7, Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced
below, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer for use in controlling a thermostat that is
separate from and remotely located from the computer, using a
remotely located mobile handheld computing unit, the
computer comprising:
an interface for operatively communicating with a
remotely located mobile handheld computing unit and for also
operatively communicating with a separate and remotely
located thermostat;
a controller operatively coupled to the interface, the
controller configured to:
send a temperature setting of the remotely located
thermostat to the remotely located mobile handheld
computing unit via the interface;
receive from the mobile handheld computing unit a
changed temperature setting via the interface; and
send one or more instructions to the remotely
located thermostat to implement the changed temperature
setting.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Brown
Naughton
US 5,761,083
US 6,020,881
June 2, 1998
Feb. 1,2000
2
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
Sharood US 2001/0025349 A1 Sept. 27, 2001
Lennox Engineering Data, L Connection Network, Bulletin #210277
(2000) (hereinafter “Lennox”).
REJECTIONS
Claims 1-5, 7-12, and 14-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown (Final Act. 5-19).
Claims 6, 13, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Lennox {id. at 19-21).
Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood {id. at 21-22).
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and
the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP
§ 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and 41.39(a)(1).
ISSUES
Appellant contends the invention as recited in independent claims 1,
7, and 14, is patentable over Naughton and Brown (App. Br. 7-18).2 The
issues presented by the arguments are:
Issue 1: Has the Examiner shown the combination of Naughton and
Brown teaches or suggests
[a] computer for use in controlling a thermostat that is separate
from and remotely located from the computer comprising ... a
controller . . . configured to:
2 Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief and
Reply Brief for the positions of Appellant and the Final Office Action and
Answer for the positions of the Examiner.
3
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
send a temperature setting of the remotely located
thermostat to the remotely located mobile handheld
computing unit. . .
receive from [a] mobile handheld computing unit a
changed temperature setting . . . and
send one or more instructions to the remotely located
thermostat to implement the changed temperature setting,
as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 7 and 14?
Issue 2: Did the Examiner improperly combine Naughton and
Brown?
ANALYSIS
Issue 1
Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Naughton, and Brown teaches or suggests the limitations identified above, as
recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 7 and 14 (App. Br. 8-10,
16-17; Reply Br. 2-6). Specifically, Appellant argues Naughton teaches
that “CPU 403 (which the Examiner is attempting to equate with the
computer of claim 1) is not separate or remotely located from the thermostat
150” (App. Br. 10; see Reply Br. 2-5). Appellant further argues “Brown
does not appear to actually teach a middle computer that transmits settings
received from a remote computer or laptop to a remote thermostat, or [that
performs] the other functions” claimed (Reply Br. 6). Additionally,
Appellant argues “neither reference teaches or suggests the claimed
computer that communicates with both a remote mobile handheld
computing unit AND the thermostat” (Reply Br. 6; see App. Br. 12, 15).
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Final Act. 5-8; Adv.
Act. 2; Ans. 4-5), and we agree, Naughton teaches a “remote device, such as
4
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
thermostat 150 .. . transmits information ... to [a] hand-held display device
170. .. . The transmitted information may also include a device driver object
that is used to control the new remote device . . . .” using the hand-held
display device 170 (Naughton 7:29-38; see id. 26:25-27:16, Figs 18a-18d,
22a-22d). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Brown teaches “a
middle computer/controller to transmit settings received from a remote
center computer ... to a remote thermostat controller” (Ans. 6 (emphasis
removed); Adv. Act. 2; see Final Act. 8 (citing Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37,
Figs. 2, 3B)). In particular, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that
Brown teaches remote command center computers 22, 24 communicate
temperature setting information to an intermediary scheduler/controller
computer 30 and intermediary scheduler/controller computer 30 in turn
controls HVAC controller 34 to set the temperature of programmable
thermostat 42 (Ans. 9-10; see Brown 16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16).
Appellant’s argument that Naughton does not teach a computer which
is “separate or remotely located from [its] thermostat 150” (App. Br. 10;
Reply Br. 2-5) does not address the Examiner’s finding that Brown teaches
scheduler/controller computer 30 is separate from programmable thermostat
42 (Ans. 6, 9-10; Adv. Act. 2; see Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37, Figs. 1, 2,
16).
Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “Brown
does not appear to actually teach a middle computer” (Reply Br. 6). Brown
teaches that scheduler/controller computer 30 is an intermediary, i.e.,
“middle,” computer which relays data, e.g., temperature setting information,
between remote command center computers 22, 24 and remotely controlled
5
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
appliances, e.g., programmable thermostat 42 (Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37,
16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16; see id. 3:44-56).
Additionally, Appellant’s argument that “neither reference teaches or
suggests the claimed computer that communicates with both a remote
mobile handheld computing unit AND the thermostat,” i.e., the intermediary
computer both sends and receives data (Reply Br. 6; see App. Br. 12, 15)
inappropriately attacks the references individually when the rejection is
based on the combination references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426
(CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). In particular, Appellant does not address
the Examiner’s finding that Naughton’s thermostat, which sends data to and
receives data from a remote device, and Brown’s intermediary computer,
which relays data between a thermostat and a remote device, teach, in
combination, a thermostat which both sends and receives data to a remote
device via an intermediary computer (Ans. 5-7, 10; Adv. Act. 3).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
combination of Naughton and Brown teaches or suggests the disputed
limitations recited in claims 1, 7, and 14.
Issue 2
Appellant contends the Examiner improperly combined Naughton and
Brown (App. Br. 10-18; Reply Br. 6-8). Specifically, Appellant argues the
“Examiner has not provided any rational reason for inserting the computer of
Brown in-between the hand-held computer of Naughton and the thermostat
of Naughton, and then to perform the specific functions recited” (App.
Br. 11; see id. at 12-14). Appellant further argues “removing [Naughton’s]
CPU 403 from [Naughton’s] thermostat 150 and locating it remotely” would
6
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
“render the system of Naughton inoperable as the CPU 403 is required for
the thermostat 150 to function for its intended purpose” (Reply Br. 6).
Additionally, Appellant argues the Examiner uses Appellant’s
“[Specification as a roadmap for combining Naughton and Brown” (App.
Br. 13; Reply Br. 7).
We are not persuaded. As discussed supra, we agree with the
Examiner’s findings that Naughton teaches a thermostat that sends and
receives data to/from a remote device (Naughton 7:29-38; 26:25-27:16,
Figs. 18a-18d, 22a-22d), that Brown teaches an intermediary computer
which relays data between a thermostat and a remote device (Brown 10:34-
37, 14:34-37, 16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16), and that the
combination of Naughton and Brown teaches a thermostat which sends and
receives data to a remote device via an intermediary computer (Ans. 5-7, 10;
Adv. Act. 3). We further agree with the Examiner’s findings that one of
ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Naughton
and Brown in order to use an intermediary computer to relay data between a
remote device and a thermostat appliance when the thermostat appliance
does “not have the intelligence” or “the space to accommodate a gateway”
for “receiving and sending” data from the remote device (Ans. 7-8).
Additionally, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that using an
intermediary computer to relay data between a remote device and
appliances, e.g., “thermostats, coffeemakers, [and] TVs,” that are controlled
by that remote device would “reduce cost and space by having a single entry
point (gateway)” for relaying data (Ans. 7-8; Adv. Act. 2-3). That is, using
the intermediary computer as a communication gateway “is cheaper than
adding the [communication] technology . . . and [communication]
7
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
capabilities to each appliance” to be remotely controlled (Ans. 7-8; Adv.
Act. 2-3).
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s rationale for using an
intermediary computer to relay data between a thermostat and a remote
computer is insufficient because “Naughton already teaches a single
secondary remote computer (hand-held computer 170) to receive and
transmit [the] data of multiple appliances” (App. Br. 12-13; Reply Br. 7; see
App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 8) are not persuasive. Appellant’s
arguments are directed to appliances that include the ability to directly
communicate with remote computers, but the Examiner’s rationale is applied
to appliances that do not have the ability to communicate with remote
computers (see Ans. 7-8). Indeed, Brown teaches thermostats and other
appliances that do not have the ability to directly communicate with remote
computers (see Brown 3:44-50, 10:8-16, 26-37, Fig. 2). Moreover,
Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address the Examiner’s finding
that using an intermediary computer to communicate data between
appliances and a remote device is “cheaper” than providing each appliance
with the ability to communicate directly with the remote device (Ans. 7-8).
Appellant’s remaining arguments are also unpersuasive. Appellant’s
arguments that the “Examiner has not provided any rational reason [ing]” for
the combination (App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 7) does not address the
Examiner’s articulated rationale for the combination, discussed supra.
Further, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s combination “render[s]
the system of Naughton inoperable as the CPU 403 is required for the
thermostat 150 to function for its intended purpose” (Reply Br. 6) is not
persuasive because the Examiner’s combination does not remove or prevent
8
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
processor 403 from controlling thermostat 150 (see Ans. 7-8). Additionally,
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner uses Appellant’s “[Specification as
a roadmap for combining Naughton and Brown” (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 7)
is not persuasive. The Examiner has articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning, i.e., providing remote control capabilities for
appliances that do not support remote control capability and reducing costs
by controlling multiple appliances using a single communication gateway
(Ans. 7-8; Adv. Act. 2-3). Moreover, we are persuaded combining the
teachings of Naughton and Brown would have been within the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner improperly
combined Naughton and Brown. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of
claims 1, 7, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Naughton and Brown. It follows, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 2-5, 8-12, and 15-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Naughton and Brown, the rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and
Lennox, and the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood, for which Appellant
offers no additional persuasive arguments for patentability (see App. Br. 16,
18-19).
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5, 7-12, and 14-19 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown is
affirmed.
9
Appeal 2017-007635
Application 14/672,005
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Lennox is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
10