Ex Parte ShahDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 27, 201714672005 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/672,005 03/27/2015 Dipak J. Shah H26036C5-1161.1191106 7200 90545 7590 HONEY WET ,T ,/STW Patent Services 115 Tabor Road P.O. Box 377 MORRIS PLAINS, NJ 07950 12/29/2017 EXAMINER LOPEZ ALVAREZ, OLVIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2125 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/29/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): patentservices-us @ honey well, com Honeywell.USPTO@STWiplaw.com sherry, vallabh @honeywell.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DIPAK J. SHAH Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,0051 Technology Center 2100 Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, DANIEL J. GALLIGAN, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-20, which are all of the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Honeywell International, Inc. (App. Br. 3). Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER According to Appellant, the claims are directed to remotely setting a thermostat by using a hand-held personal data assistant (PDA) to set temperature information, synchronizing the PDA information with a personal computer, and then the personal computer setting the thermostat temperature information (Spec. 7:5-7, Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is exemplary of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer for use in controlling a thermostat that is separate from and remotely located from the computer, using a remotely located mobile handheld computing unit, the computer comprising: an interface for operatively communicating with a remotely located mobile handheld computing unit and for also operatively communicating with a separate and remotely located thermostat; a controller operatively coupled to the interface, the controller configured to: send a temperature setting of the remotely located thermostat to the remotely located mobile handheld computing unit via the interface; receive from the mobile handheld computing unit a changed temperature setting via the interface; and send one or more instructions to the remotely located thermostat to implement the changed temperature setting. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Brown Naughton US 5,761,083 US 6,020,881 June 2, 1998 Feb. 1,2000 2 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 Sharood US 2001/0025349 A1 Sept. 27, 2001 Lennox Engineering Data, L Connection Network, Bulletin #210277 (2000) (hereinafter “Lennox”). REJECTIONS Claims 1-5, 7-12, and 14-19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown (Final Act. 5-19). Claims 6, 13, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Lennox {id. at 19-21). Claim 15 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood {id. at 21-22). Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejections and the issues raised by Appellant. Arguments not made are waived. See MPEP § 1205.02; 37 C.F.R. §§ 41.37(c)(l)(iv) and 41.39(a)(1). ISSUES Appellant contends the invention as recited in independent claims 1, 7, and 14, is patentable over Naughton and Brown (App. Br. 7-18).2 The issues presented by the arguments are: Issue 1: Has the Examiner shown the combination of Naughton and Brown teaches or suggests [a] computer for use in controlling a thermostat that is separate from and remotely located from the computer comprising ... a controller . . . configured to: 2 Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief for the positions of Appellant and the Final Office Action and Answer for the positions of the Examiner. 3 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 send a temperature setting of the remotely located thermostat to the remotely located mobile handheld computing unit. . . receive from [a] mobile handheld computing unit a changed temperature setting . . . and send one or more instructions to the remotely located thermostat to implement the changed temperature setting, as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 7 and 14? Issue 2: Did the Examiner improperly combine Naughton and Brown? ANALYSIS Issue 1 Appellant contends the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Naughton, and Brown teaches or suggests the limitations identified above, as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 7 and 14 (App. Br. 8-10, 16-17; Reply Br. 2-6). Specifically, Appellant argues Naughton teaches that “CPU 403 (which the Examiner is attempting to equate with the computer of claim 1) is not separate or remotely located from the thermostat 150” (App. Br. 10; see Reply Br. 2-5). Appellant further argues “Brown does not appear to actually teach a middle computer that transmits settings received from a remote computer or laptop to a remote thermostat, or [that performs] the other functions” claimed (Reply Br. 6). Additionally, Appellant argues “neither reference teaches or suggests the claimed computer that communicates with both a remote mobile handheld computing unit AND the thermostat” (Reply Br. 6; see App. Br. 12, 15). We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds (Final Act. 5-8; Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 4-5), and we agree, Naughton teaches a “remote device, such as 4 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 thermostat 150 .. . transmits information ... to [a] hand-held display device 170. .. . The transmitted information may also include a device driver object that is used to control the new remote device . . . .” using the hand-held display device 170 (Naughton 7:29-38; see id. 26:25-27:16, Figs 18a-18d, 22a-22d). The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Brown teaches “a middle computer/controller to transmit settings received from a remote center computer ... to a remote thermostat controller” (Ans. 6 (emphasis removed); Adv. Act. 2; see Final Act. 8 (citing Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37, Figs. 2, 3B)). In particular, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Brown teaches remote command center computers 22, 24 communicate temperature setting information to an intermediary scheduler/controller computer 30 and intermediary scheduler/controller computer 30 in turn controls HVAC controller 34 to set the temperature of programmable thermostat 42 (Ans. 9-10; see Brown 16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16). Appellant’s argument that Naughton does not teach a computer which is “separate or remotely located from [its] thermostat 150” (App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 2-5) does not address the Examiner’s finding that Brown teaches scheduler/controller computer 30 is separate from programmable thermostat 42 (Ans. 6, 9-10; Adv. Act. 2; see Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37, Figs. 1, 2, 16). Further, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “Brown does not appear to actually teach a middle computer” (Reply Br. 6). Brown teaches that scheduler/controller computer 30 is an intermediary, i.e., “middle,” computer which relays data, e.g., temperature setting information, between remote command center computers 22, 24 and remotely controlled 5 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 appliances, e.g., programmable thermostat 42 (Brown 10:34-37, 14:34-37, 16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16; see id. 3:44-56). Additionally, Appellant’s argument that “neither reference teaches or suggests the claimed computer that communicates with both a remote mobile handheld computing unit AND the thermostat,” i.e., the intermediary computer both sends and receives data (Reply Br. 6; see App. Br. 12, 15) inappropriately attacks the references individually when the rejection is based on the combination references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). In particular, Appellant does not address the Examiner’s finding that Naughton’s thermostat, which sends data to and receives data from a remote device, and Brown’s intermediary computer, which relays data between a thermostat and a remote device, teach, in combination, a thermostat which both sends and receives data to a remote device via an intermediary computer (Ans. 5-7, 10; Adv. Act. 3). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding combination of Naughton and Brown teaches or suggests the disputed limitations recited in claims 1, 7, and 14. Issue 2 Appellant contends the Examiner improperly combined Naughton and Brown (App. Br. 10-18; Reply Br. 6-8). Specifically, Appellant argues the “Examiner has not provided any rational reason for inserting the computer of Brown in-between the hand-held computer of Naughton and the thermostat of Naughton, and then to perform the specific functions recited” (App. Br. 11; see id. at 12-14). Appellant further argues “removing [Naughton’s] CPU 403 from [Naughton’s] thermostat 150 and locating it remotely” would 6 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 “render the system of Naughton inoperable as the CPU 403 is required for the thermostat 150 to function for its intended purpose” (Reply Br. 6). Additionally, Appellant argues the Examiner uses Appellant’s “[Specification as a roadmap for combining Naughton and Brown” (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 7). We are not persuaded. As discussed supra, we agree with the Examiner’s findings that Naughton teaches a thermostat that sends and receives data to/from a remote device (Naughton 7:29-38; 26:25-27:16, Figs. 18a-18d, 22a-22d), that Brown teaches an intermediary computer which relays data between a thermostat and a remote device (Brown 10:34- 37, 14:34-37, 16:36-39, 28:66-29:52, Figs. 1, 2, 16), and that the combination of Naughton and Brown teaches a thermostat which sends and receives data to a remote device via an intermediary computer (Ans. 5-7, 10; Adv. Act. 3). We further agree with the Examiner’s findings that one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated to combine Naughton and Brown in order to use an intermediary computer to relay data between a remote device and a thermostat appliance when the thermostat appliance does “not have the intelligence” or “the space to accommodate a gateway” for “receiving and sending” data from the remote device (Ans. 7-8). Additionally, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that using an intermediary computer to relay data between a remote device and appliances, e.g., “thermostats, coffeemakers, [and] TVs,” that are controlled by that remote device would “reduce cost and space by having a single entry point (gateway)” for relaying data (Ans. 7-8; Adv. Act. 2-3). That is, using the intermediary computer as a communication gateway “is cheaper than adding the [communication] technology . . . and [communication] 7 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 capabilities to each appliance” to be remotely controlled (Ans. 7-8; Adv. Act. 2-3). Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner’s rationale for using an intermediary computer to relay data between a thermostat and a remote computer is insufficient because “Naughton already teaches a single secondary remote computer (hand-held computer 170) to receive and transmit [the] data of multiple appliances” (App. Br. 12-13; Reply Br. 7; see App. Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 8) are not persuasive. Appellant’s arguments are directed to appliances that include the ability to directly communicate with remote computers, but the Examiner’s rationale is applied to appliances that do not have the ability to communicate with remote computers (see Ans. 7-8). Indeed, Brown teaches thermostats and other appliances that do not have the ability to directly communicate with remote computers (see Brown 3:44-50, 10:8-16, 26-37, Fig. 2). Moreover, Appellant’s arguments do not persuasively address the Examiner’s finding that using an intermediary computer to communicate data between appliances and a remote device is “cheaper” than providing each appliance with the ability to communicate directly with the remote device (Ans. 7-8). Appellant’s remaining arguments are also unpersuasive. Appellant’s arguments that the “Examiner has not provided any rational reason [ing]” for the combination (App. Br. 11-12; Reply Br. 7) does not address the Examiner’s articulated rationale for the combination, discussed supra. Further, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner’s combination “render[s] the system of Naughton inoperable as the CPU 403 is required for the thermostat 150 to function for its intended purpose” (Reply Br. 6) is not persuasive because the Examiner’s combination does not remove or prevent 8 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 processor 403 from controlling thermostat 150 (see Ans. 7-8). Additionally, Appellant’s argument that the Examiner uses Appellant’s “[Specification as a roadmap for combining Naughton and Brown” (App. Br. 13; Reply Br. 7) is not persuasive. The Examiner has articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning, i.e., providing remote control capabilities for appliances that do not support remote control capability and reducing costs by controlling multiple appliances using a single communication gateway (Ans. 7-8; Adv. Act. 2-3). Moreover, we are persuaded combining the teachings of Naughton and Brown would have been within the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner improperly combined Naughton and Brown. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 7, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown. It follows, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-5, 8-12, and 15-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown, the rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Lennox, and the rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood, for which Appellant offers no additional persuasive arguments for patentability (see App. Br. 16, 18-19). DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-5, 7-12, and 14-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Naughton and Brown is affirmed. 9 Appeal 2017-007635 Application 14/672,005 The Examiner’s rejection of claims 6, 13, and 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Lennox is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claim 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Naughton, and Sharood is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation