Ex Parte Saunders et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 17, 201713831593 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 17, 2017) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/831,593 03/15/2013 Michael W. Saunders ZYNGP070.C6.1 8454 101444 7590 03/20/2017 MPG, LLP and Zynga Inc. 710 Lakeway Drive, Suite 200 Sunnyvale, CA 94085 EXAMINER JAKOVAC, RYAN J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2445 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/20/2017 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte MICHAEL W. SAUNDERS, ROLF E. CARLSON, and WILLIAM D. MILLER ____________________ Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,5931 Technology Center 2400 ____________________ Before HUNG H. BUI, JOSEPH P. LENTIVECH, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. BUI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1–20, which are all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.2 1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Zynga Inc. App. Br. 1. 2 Our Decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed January 13, 2016 (“App. Br.”); Reply Brief filed July 14, 2016 (“Reply Br.”); Examiner’s Answer mailed May 13, 2016 (“Ans.”); Final Office Action mailed August 13, 2015 (“Final Act.”); and original Specification filed March 15, 2013 (“Spec.”). Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ Invention Appellants’ invention relates to a gaming system that verifies the identity and geographic location of a user’s remote device, via a remote network, in a regulated remote gaming environment. Abstract. According to Appellants, the geographic location of the user’s remote device can be identified in several ways, including (1) whether the user’s remote device is part of a cable TV network provided through a digital home communications terminal (DHCT), such as a set-top box (STB), (2) whether the user’s remote device is equipped with a GPS system to provide the geographic location of the remote device, and (3) whether the remote network is a mobile telephone network providing the geographic location of the user’s remote device (caller’s mobile phone). Spec. ¶¶ 52, 56, 61, Figures 1, 10. Representative Claim Claims 1, 11, and 19 are independent. Representative claim 1 is reproduced below with disputed limitations in italics: 1. A method, which is computer-implemented, comprising operations of: receiving a password over a network from a user of a remote device for a gaming system for a gambling game; authenticating the user using the password; receiving an age from the user and determining that the user is of age to gamble on the gambling game, based on data stored in a database for the gaming system; determining a location of the remote device, wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT); and verifying that the location of the remote device is within a jurisdiction that allows use of the gaming system by persons of age to gamble. App. Br. 13 (Claims App’x). Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 3 Examiner’s Rejections and References (1) Claims 1, 3–11, and 13–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rowe et al. (US 2005/0005127 A1; published Jan. 6, 2005; “Rowe”) and ST-Denis (US 2001/0039210 A1; published Nov. 8, 2001). Final Act. 5–8. (2) Claims 2, 12, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rowe, ST-Denis, and Official Notice. Final Act. 9–10. Issue on Appeal Based on Appellants’ arguments, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the prior art teaches or suggests the disputed limitation: “wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT),” as recited in independent claim 1 and, similarly recited in claims 11 and 19. App. Br. 6–12; Reply Br. 6–8. ANALYSIS In support of the rejection of independent claim 1, and similarly, claims 11 and 19, the Examiner finds Rowe teaches most aspects of Appellants’ claimed method including: (1) “receiving a password over a network from a user of a remote device” and “authenticating the user using the password” (Final Act 6 (citing Rowe ¶¶ 7, 12–14, 43, 48–49)); (2) “receiving an age from the user and determining that the user is of age to gamble on the gambling game” (Final Act. 6 (citing Rowe ¶¶ 740, 44)); and (3) “determining a location of the remote device” and “verifying that the Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 4 location of the remote device is within a jurisdiction that allows use of the gaming system by persons of age to gamble.” (Final Act. 6 (citing Rowe ¶¶ 7, 63, 66)). The Examiner acknowledges Rowe does not explicitly teach, but relies on ST-Denis for teaching: “wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT), [such as, for example, a set-top box ‘STB’]” shown in St. Denis’ Figure 1, to support the conclusion of obviousness. Final Act. 6 (citing ST-Denis ¶¶ 8, 10, 37–38, 43, 48, 65, 72–74; Figure 1). Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s factual findings regarding Rowe. Nor do Appellants dispute the Examiner’s rationale for combining Rowe and ST-Denis. Instead, Appellants contend neither Rowe nor ST- Denis teaches or suggests the disputed limitation: “determining a location of the remote device, wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT), [such as, for example, a set-top box ‘STB’]” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 11 and 19. App. Br. 6–12; Reply Br. 6–8. In particular, Appellants acknowledge ST-Denis teaches (1) means for “determining the physical location of the end user” and (2) ST-Denis’ Figure 1 shows an ISP (Internet Service Provider) or an IAP (Internet Access Provider) to provide end users with a set-top box (STB) to access remote gaming. App. Br. 9–11 (citing ST-Denis ¶¶ 8, 10, 37–38, 42–43, 48, 65, 72– 73, Fig. 1). ST-Denis’ Figure 1 is reproduced below with additional markings for illustration. Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 5 ST-Denis’ Figure 1 shows end users provided with PC 38 and set-top box (STB) 50 to access remote gaming, via the Internet. However, Appellants argue ST-Denis’ disclosure that “determining the physical location of the end user” is performed “by identifying the location of the end user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Access Service Provider (ASP)” and, as such, does not teach “using the known geographic location of the set top box or any other DHCT.” Id. at 9, 11. In other words, Appellants argue “[ST-Denis] expressly describes determining the location of an end user on the basis of the location of the ISP (i.e., 54 in Figure 1), rather than on the basis of the set-top box (i.e., 50 in Figure 1).” Reply Br. 7. We do not find Appellants’ arguments persuasive. Instead, we find the Examiner provides a comprehensive response to Appellants’ arguments supported by a preponderance of evidence. Ans. 4–6. As such, we adopt the Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 6 Examiner’s findings and explanations. Id. For additional emphasis, we note Appellants’ claims 1, 11, and 19 are broadly-worded and simply recite “determining a location of the remote device, wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT).” Appellants’ claimed “digital home communication terminal (DHCT)” can be interpreted in light of Appellants’ Specification to encompass any remote device, including, for example, a set- top box (STB), a mobile phone, or other devices having a GPS system used to identify the geographic location of end users. Spec. ¶ 56, 61. As recognized by Appellants, ST-Denis teaches “determining the geographic location of end users” “by identifying the location of the end user’s Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Access Service Provider (ASP).” App. Br. 8–9; Reply Br. 7. However, ST-Denis also teaches that the ISP/ASP, shown in Figure 3, can also verify the location of a remote device (such as a cellular phone). ST-Denis ¶¶ 73–74. As such, we find ST-Denis teaches the disputed limitation: “determining a location of the remote device . . . based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT),” as recited in Appellants’ claims 1, 11, and 19. Separately, we note Appellants’ claims 1, 11, and 19 do not distinguish over Rowe alone. In addition to the features relied upon by the Examiner, Rowe also discloses Appellants’ claimed “determining a location of the remote device, wherein the determination of location is based on the known geographic location of a digital home communications terminal (DHCT)” in the context of an IP address assigned to an end user’s remote device/computer 24, shown in Figures 1, 3–5. Rowe ¶¶ 33–34. For Appeal 2016-007269 Application 13/831,593 7 example, according to Rowe, “the game server 20 utilizes the IP address of the patron’s customer to locate the patron’s computer.” Rowe ¶ 63. Regardless, a disclosure such as Rowe that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102 typically renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in all but rare cases. See In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402 (CCPA 1974); cf. Cohesive Tech., Inc. v. Water Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are separate conditions of patentability”). Therefore, on this record, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 11, and 19 and their respective dependent claims 2–10, 12–18, and 20. CONCLUSION On the record before us, we conclude Appellants have not demonstrated the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION As such, we AFFIRM the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation