Ex Parte Sass et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 3, 201712911288 (P.T.A.B. May. 3, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/911,288 10/25/2010 Rami Sass 1100-100218 9862 105987 7590 Sage Patent Group/C A P.O. Box 30789 Raleigh, NC 27622-0789 05/05/2017 EXAMINER MINCARELLI, JAN P ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3689 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/05/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): instructions @ sagepat. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAMI SASS and EHUD AMIRI Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Technology Center 3600 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 The Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Aug. 19, 2014), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 24, 2014), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Oct. 25, 2010), and to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 25, 2014) and Final Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 3, 2014). 2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is CA, Inc. Appeal Br. 1. Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants’ invention “relates generally to computer systems and software, and more particularly to creating, maintaining and evaluating policies.” Spec. 11. Claims 1, 8, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 (Claims App.) is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and is reproduced below: 1. A method for measuring usefulness of one policy of a plurality of policies in an organization having a plurality of entities, comprising: for ones of a plurality of tests: using a test to calculate test results for corresponding ones of the plurality of policies based on current violator entities of the plurality of policies and potential violator entities of the plurality of policies; and determining a policy ranking for the one policy of the plurality of policies based on a first test result of the test results corresponding to the one policy relative to the test results corresponding to other ones of the plurality of policies; and evaluating the one policy based on the policy rankings determined from the plurality of tests, wherein using a test to calculate, determining a policy ranking, and evaluating the policy are performed using at least one processor. REJECTIONS Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. 2 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Claims 1—4, 8—11, and 15—18, and 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Munro (US 2008/0270216 Al, pub. Oct. 30, 2008) and Rivers (US 2011/0145885 Al, pub. June 16, 2011). Claims 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Munro, Rivers, and Judge (US 2007 /0027992 Al, pub. Feb. 1, 2007). Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter. ANALYSIS Written Description - § 112 To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must describe the invention in sufficient detail so ‘“that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the filing date sought,’” In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)), i.e., “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date,” Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Independent claims L 8, and 15 The Examiner rejects independent claims 1,8, and 15 on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to support any of the claimed limitations. Final Act. 3^4. Specifically, the Examiner finds that: (1) regarding the limitation of using a test to calculate 3 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 results, “nothing is disclosed by the [Appellants] regarding what the actual ‘test’ or ‘calculation’ is, or how it might be done by a processor” {id. at 4); (2) regarding the limitation of determining, “nothing in [the Appellants’] specification adequately discloses (and, thus, demonstrates possession of) how the policy ranking is determined, including whether this is done by a person or a processor” {id. at 6); and (3) regarding the limitation of evaluating the policy based on the policy rankings, “nothing in [the Appellants’] specification adequately discloses (and, thus, demonstrates possession of) how the policy ranking is determined, including whether this is done by a person or a processor” {id.). The Examiner further finds that the Specification does not discuss “how Appellants’ invention actually performs ‘calculations’ on policies and their application to groups of individuals (i.e., the application of a rule or law or policy to groups of people is not readily quantifiable).” Ans. 8—9. We note that although the Specification defines the current violators “V” and potential violators “P” as entities and not specifically as numbers, one of skill in the art would have been aware that the variables can be numerical or calculable amounts on which tests can be performed. Thus, we disagree with the Examiner’s interpretation that tests are performed on policies and populations of people {see Ans. 5), but find that the claims recite that the tests are performed for policies based on numerical or calculable values for violators. We are persuaded by the Appellants’ arguments that the Specification provides sufficient support to reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the Appellants had possession of the limitations at the time the present application was filed. Appeal Br. 4—9. The Specification provides that 4 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 “multiple tests, or statistical tools, [can be used] to compute or obtain multiple scores for each policy to reflect the multiple dimensions of the policy’s effectiveness . . . [that] enable[] visualizing the policy effectiveness compared to other policies” (Spec. 121), that these tests qualify a rule and are “assigned a score in the range of 0-100” {id. 122), that the tests determine whether the values deviate from a range, standard deviation, average, populations, percentage, and measurements {id. H 23—27), and that a computer can perform the steps {id. 1137—38). See Appeal Br. 4—7. We agree that the Appellants that it is unnecessary to explain to a skilled artisan how to range scores from 0-100, how to compare a value to a minimum or maximum, how to calculate an average value, how to calculate a standard deviation, and/or how to identify changes in values over time. As such, how different values/results are used is clearly described in the specification to the degree necessary to demonstrate that Appellant possessed the invention at the time the application was filed. Similar logic applies to the “determining a policy ranking” and “evaluating the one policy” recitations in the claims. Id. at 8. Thus, we find that the Specification discusses a processor using tests, determining a policy ranking, and evaluating a policy such as to reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the Appellants had possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written description requirement. Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. 5 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Dependent claims 2, 9, and 16 The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 2, 9, and 16 on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to support “employing processes to trend, benchmark, alert, and improve,” as recited by the claims. Final Act. 7. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not adequately disclose how the policies are trended, benchmarked, alerted, or improved, i.e., the process for doing these functions. Id. Although the Appellants cite to paragraphs 6 and 7 as providing adequate support (Appeal Br. 8), we do not see, and the Appellants do not adequately explain, where or how the Specification provides for the processes used to perform the recited functions. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Specification merely provide for the method and a module to “employ processes to trend, benchmark, alert and improve one or more of the plurality of policies, said employing performed using at least one of the policy rankings, the current violator entities, the potential violator entities, and the test results.” The Specification further provides that the statistical analyses enable trending policy effectiveness and “suggesting possible correction paths to improve policy effectiveness (Spec. 121), that a test can check population trends during which “one could trend the results” {id. 126), and that the database “enables comparison between policies, between parts of the organization and between organizations. These comparisons or benchmark tests can yield useful information about the policies” {id. 129). But there is no description as to how the recited functions are performed, i.e., what process or algorithm is used to trend, benchmark, alert, or improve the policies such as to reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the 6 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Appellants had possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written description requirement. Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Dependent claims 4, 11, and 18 The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 4,11, and 18 on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to support “creating a rule profile,” as recited by the claims. Final Act. 8. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not adequately disclose how the rule profile is being created, i.e., the process for doing so. Id. We note that the Appellants need only demonstrate original descriptive support in the Specification. The Examiner, in asserting that the Specification does not adequately disclose the process for performing these functions, i.e., how to create a rule profile, seemingly confuses written description with enablement, and has not established that the Specification lacks the requisite descriptive support. See, e.g., Lockwood v American Airlines, 107 F.3d. 1565, 1571—72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Specification provides that a repository can include a rule profile (Spec. 128), and “that the rule profile may include the policy, the current violator entities of the policy, the potential violator entities of the policy, the test results, and the policy rankings for the one or more tests” {id. 17). Thus, the Specification provides that a data record of a profile comprising particular information is created. Creating a data record would have been known to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the application was filed such that one of ordinary 7 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 skill in the art would have understood from the Specification that Appellants had possession of creating a profile to satisfy the written description requirement. Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 4, 11, and 18 under 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Dependent claims 5, 12, and 19 The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 5,12, and 19 on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to support “establishing a current violator entities range and a potential violator entities range,” as recited by the claims. Final Act. 8. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not adequately disclose how the ranges are established, i.e., the process for doing so. Id. The Specification provides that the system can set minimum and/or maximum values to current violators (V) and potential violators (P) and a “defined range” from which deviations would be considered suspicious. Spec. H17—18, 23. Thus, the Specification provides that a range is defined for V and P. As discussed above, the Examiner, in asserting that the Specification does not adequately disclose the process for establishing ranges seemingly confuses written description with enablement, and has not established that the Specification lacks the requisite descriptive support. We find one of ordinary skill in the art would have known, at the time the application was filed, the process for defining a range so as to have understood from the Specification that the Appellants had possession of establishing ranges to satisfy the written description requirement. 8 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 5, 12, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Dependent claims 6, 13, 20, and 22—25 The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 6, 13, 20, and 22—25 on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to support “establishing” “means and standard deviations”, “detecting changes,” “performing an extrapolation,” “measuring a ratio,” and setting a policy ranking based on a threshold, as recited by the claims. Final Act. 9—12. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not adequately disclose the process for performing these functions. Id. As discussed above, the Examiner, in asserting that the Specification does not adequately disclose the processes for performing these functions seemingly confuses written description with enablement, and has not established that the Specification lacks the requisite descriptive support. We agree with the Appellants that one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the application was filed, would have known, and understood from the Specification, the processes for “calculating a standard deviation or a mean[,] . . . determining whether a value (e.g., P and/or V) has changed over time[,] . . . extrapolating] data[,] . . . determining] aratio[, and] . . . set[ting] a threshold.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Spec. H 21—29. Thus, we find that the Specification reasonably conveys to one of skill in the art that the Appellants had possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written description requirement. 9 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 6, 13, 20, and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Obviousness - § 103 We are persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1,8, and 15 is in error because the cited prior art does not teach or suggest the limitation of determining a ranking based on the correspondence between the test results, as recited by claim 1 and similarly recited by claims 8 and 15. See Appeal Br. 11—15. The Examiner relies particularly on Rivers for teaching this limitation. Final Act. 17 (citing Rivers H 56, 111, 128, Fig. 12). Specifically, the Examiner finds that Rivers discloses adherence and effectiveness ratings, i.e., rankings, (Final Act. 17), and that “under a broadest reasonable interpretation of this limitation, Rivers meets this limitation because it discloses providing a table of rankings that are based on test results and the rankings are relative to the test policies of other policies” (Ans. 17). Rivers discloses determining an adherence rating and effectiveness rating for policies. Rivers till. The adherence rating is based on a first set of factors including a measured level of compliance with guiding principles underlying a first policy and/or a level of importance of each of the guiding principles underlying the first policy. Id. 1 112. The effectiveness rating is determined based on a second set of factors including determined levels of responsiveness, business operations impact, and/or compliance with laws and regulations for the first policy. Id. ^ 113. A report is generated and displayed that includes the information regarding the ratings (id. 1117) “to 10 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 facilitate comparison and/or evaluation of the one or more policies” (id. 1128, Fig. 12). A numerical rank for the adherence and effectiveness ratings may be included. Id. We find persuasive the Appellants’ argument that “Rivers does not disclose or suggest that any of the scores, data or ranks corresponding to [one policy] are determined in any way based on scores, data or ranks of [the other policies].” Appeal Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 9—10. Although Rivers discloses providing data of adherence and effectiveness ratings for policies to facilitate comparison and evaluation, and that the data may include a “numerical rank” for each policy, we do not see from the face of the reference, and the Examiner does not adequately explain, that the ranks are based on test results relative to the other policies. For example, it is not clear whether the “ranking” is relative to other policies’ results or relative to a defined number/parameter for that policy. Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error on the part of the Examiner, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15 and dependent claims 2—4, 9—11, 16—18, and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, and 20, each of which depends from independent claim 1 or claim 15. Cf. In reFritch, 972 F.2d. 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are nonobvious”). 11 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 Patent-eligible subject matter - § 101 The Appellants argue the claims as a group. See Reply Br. 2—5. We select claim 1 as representative. Claims 2—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). The Court has, thus, made clear that “[phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (emphasis added). Following the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has similarly held that mental processes are not patent-eligible subject matter. Therefore, the court has held that methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are unpatentable not because “there is anything wrong with claiming mental method steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps,” but rather because “methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 12 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent- eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If so, the second step is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination”’ to determine whether the additional elements “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. Here, the Examiner rejects claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 as being directed to an abstract idea, non-statutory subject matter under § 101. Ans. 3. The Examiner finds that the claims are directed towards ‘maintaining and evaluating policies’ (see Appellant’s specification 11), which is considered to be an abstract idea (because policies are ideas of themselves, relating 13 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 to certain methods of organizing human activities, and creating tests to evaluate policies likewise rely on ideas of themselves regarding how to create and evaluate the tests for the policies). Id. The Examiner further finds that the additional elements of the claims “do not offer ‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea itself because the claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of any computer itself, or provide meaningful limitations beyond generally linking an abstract idea to a particular technological environment.” Id. at 4. The Examiner also finds that the “the claims recite or require no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Id. The Appellants appear to argue that claim 1 is not directed to an abstract idea, i.e., step one of the analysis, because “none of the examples [of a fundamental economic principle, method of organizing human activities, an idea itself, and mathematical relationships and formulas,] correspond to the recitations of Claim 1.” Reply Br. 4. We disagree. The Specification provides that the invention relates “particularly to creating, maintaining and evaluating policies.” Spec. 11. Claim 1 is directed to a method for measuring usefulness of a policy by calculating test results, determining ranking based on the results, and evaluating a policy based on the ranking. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). The steps recited in claim 1 involve nothing more than calculating and evaluating data, all steps that can be performed manually. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (“A method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101.”). 14 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 In this regard, the claims are similar to the claims that our reviewing courts have found patent ineligible in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting information and “analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”), Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510, 195 L. Ed. 2d 841 (2016) (using organizational and product group hierarchies to determine a price), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (mathematical algorithm used for adjusting an alarm limit). Here, claim 1 involves nothing more than calculating and evaluating data to create, maintain, and evaluate policies, without any particular inventive technology — an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. The Appellants further argue that the claims amount to significantly more than the abstract idea, i.e., step two of the analysis. Reply Br. 3. We disagree for at least the reasons below. We find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that “measuring usefulness of one policy of a plurality of policies in an organization integrates the building blocks of human ingenuity in a meaningful way” by using a test by calculating test results, determining a policy ranking, and evaluating the policy based on the ranking. Id. These steps are all part of the process of evaluating a policy and simply elaborate on the abstract idea. We note that the steps of the method can all be performed manually, and that the Specification (including the claims) requires only a generic computer to perform the steps. See Spec. ]ff[ 7, 14, 38 (“The system and method of the present disclosure may be implemented and run on a general-purpose 15 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 computer or special-purpose computer system. The computer system may be any type of known or will be known systems.”). The Appellants argue that the claim limitations “go beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment” (Reply Br. 4), but do not adequately show how the claimed steps of using and calculating tests, determining a ranking, and evaluating a policy are done technically such that they cannot be done manually or that they are not routine and conventional functions of a generic computer. See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334 (“the limitations of claim 17 involve arranging a hierarchy of organizational and product groups, storing pricing information, retrieving applicable pricing information, sorting pricing information, eliminating less restrictive pricing information, and determining the price. All of these limitations are well- understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry.”). We further find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that “although the policies themselves may regulate human activities, the claim recitations are directed to significant non-abstract activities performed by a processor including using a test to calculate test results . . . determining a policy ranking.” Reply Br. 3^4. The introduction of a computer to implement an abstract idea is not a patentable application of the abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357—58. The computer implementation here is purely conventional and performs basic functions. See id. at 2359—60. The claims do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself, nor do they effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See id. at 2359. 16 Appeal 2015-001618 Application 12/911,288 For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claim 1, and also of claims 2—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25, which fall with claim 1. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17—20, and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is REVERSED. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. §112, first paragraph, is AFFIRMED. The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are REVERSED. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 17 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation