Ex Parte Sass et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 3, 2017

12911288 (P.T.A.B. May. 3, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/911,288 10/25/2010 Rami Sass 1100-100218 9862
105987 7590
Sage Patent Group/C A
P.O. Box 30789
Raleigh, NC 27622-0789
05/05/2017 EXAMINER
MINCARELLI, JAN P
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/05/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
instructions @ sagepat. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte RAMI SASS and EHUD AMIRI
Appeal 2015-001618
Application 12/911,288
Technology Center 3600
Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges.
SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL1
The Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
final decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief
(“Appeal Br.,” filed Aug. 19, 2014), Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Nov. 24,
2014), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Oct. 25, 2010), and to the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 25, 2014) and Final Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 3, 2014).
2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is CA, Inc. Appeal
Br. 1.
Appeal 2015-001618
Application 12/911,288
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellants’ invention “relates generally to computer systems and
software, and more particularly to creating, maintaining and evaluating
policies.” Spec. 11.
Claims 1, 8, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
(Claims App.) is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and is
reproduced below:
1. A method for measuring usefulness of one policy of a
plurality of policies in an organization having a plurality of
entities, comprising:
for ones of a plurality of tests:
using a test to calculate test results for
corresponding ones of the plurality of policies based on
current violator entities of the plurality of policies and
potential violator entities of the plurality of policies; and
determining a policy ranking for the one policy of
the plurality of policies based on a first test result of the
test results corresponding to the one policy relative to the
test results corresponding to other ones of the plurality of
policies; and
evaluating the one policy based on the policy rankings
determined from the plurality of tests,
wherein using a test to calculate, determining a policy
ranking, and evaluating the policy are performed using at least
one processor.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement.
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Claims 1—4, 8—11, and 15—18, and 22—25 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Munro
(US 2008/0270216 Al, pub. Oct. 30, 2008) and Rivers
(US 2011/0145885 Al, pub. June 16, 2011).
Claims 5, 6, 12, 13, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Munro, Rivers, and Judge
(US 2007 /0027992 Al, pub. Feb. 1, 2007).
Claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.
ANALYSIS
Written Description - § 112
To satisfy the written description requirement, the specification must
describe the invention in sufficient detail so ‘“that one skilled in the art can
clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed invention as of the
filing date sought,’” In re Alonso, 545 F.3d 1015, 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1997)), i.e., “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date,” Ariad Pharm.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Independent claims L 8, and 15
The Examiner rejects independent claims 1,8, and 15 on the ground
that the Specification does not provide a written description disclosure to
support any of the claimed limitations. Final Act. 3^4. Specifically, the
Examiner finds that: (1) regarding the limitation of using a test to calculate
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results, “nothing is disclosed by the [Appellants] regarding what the actual
‘test’ or ‘calculation’ is, or how it might be done by a processor” {id. at 4);
(2) regarding the limitation of determining, “nothing in [the Appellants’]
specification adequately discloses (and, thus, demonstrates possession of)
how the policy ranking is determined, including whether this is done by a
person or a processor” {id. at 6); and (3) regarding the limitation of
evaluating the policy based on the policy rankings, “nothing in [the
Appellants’] specification adequately discloses (and, thus, demonstrates
possession of) how the policy ranking is determined, including whether this
is done by a person or a processor” {id.). The Examiner further finds that the
Specification does not discuss “how Appellants’ invention actually performs
‘calculations’ on policies and their application to groups of individuals (i.e.,
the application of a rule or law or policy to groups of people is not readily
quantifiable).” Ans. 8—9.
We note that although the Specification defines the current violators
“V” and potential violators “P” as entities and not specifically as numbers,
one of skill in the art would have been aware that the variables can be
numerical or calculable amounts on which tests can be performed. Thus, we
disagree with the Examiner’s interpretation that tests are performed on
policies and populations of people {see Ans. 5), but find that the claims
recite that the tests are performed for policies based on numerical or
calculable values for violators.
We are persuaded by the Appellants’ arguments that the Specification
provides sufficient support to reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that
the Appellants had possession of the limitations at the time the present
application was filed. Appeal Br. 4—9. The Specification provides that
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“multiple tests, or statistical tools, [can be used] to compute or obtain
multiple scores for each policy to reflect the multiple dimensions of the
policy’s effectiveness . . . [that] enable[] visualizing the policy effectiveness
compared to other policies” (Spec. 121), that these tests qualify a rule and
are “assigned a score in the range of 0-100” {id. 122), that the tests
determine whether the values deviate from a range, standard deviation,
average, populations, percentage, and measurements {id. H 23—27), and that
a computer can perform the steps {id. 1137—38). See Appeal Br. 4—7. We
agree that the Appellants that
it is unnecessary to explain to a skilled artisan how to range
scores from 0-100, how to compare a value to a minimum or
maximum, how to calculate an average value, how to calculate a
standard deviation, and/or how to identify changes in values over
time. As such, how different values/results are used is clearly
described in the specification to the degree necessary to
demonstrate that Appellant possessed the invention at the time
the application was filed.
Similar logic applies to the “determining a policy ranking”
and “evaluating the one policy” recitations in the claims.
Id. at 8. Thus, we find that the Specification discusses a processor using
tests, determining a policy ranking, and evaluating a policy such as to
reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the Appellants had
possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written description
requirement.
Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s
rejection, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 8, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
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Dependent claims 2, 9, and 16
The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 2, 9, and 16 on the
ground that the Specification does not provide a written description
disclosure to support “employing processes to trend, benchmark, alert, and
improve,” as recited by the claims. Final Act. 7. Specifically, the Examiner
finds that the Specification does not adequately disclose how the policies are
trended, benchmarked, alerted, or improved, i.e., the process for doing these
functions. Id.
Although the Appellants cite to paragraphs 6 and 7 as providing
adequate support (Appeal Br. 8), we do not see, and the Appellants do not
adequately explain, where or how the Specification provides for the
processes used to perform the recited functions. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
Specification merely provide for the method and a module to “employ
processes to trend, benchmark, alert and improve one or more of the
plurality of policies, said employing performed using at least one of the
policy rankings, the current violator entities, the potential violator entities,
and the test results.” The Specification further provides that the statistical
analyses enable trending policy effectiveness and “suggesting possible
correction paths to improve policy effectiveness (Spec. 121), that a test can
check population trends during which “one could trend the results” {id.
126), and that the database “enables comparison between policies, between
parts of the organization and between organizations. These comparisons or
benchmark tests can yield useful information about the policies” {id. 129).
But there is no description as to how the recited functions are performed,
i.e., what process or algorithm is used to trend, benchmark, alert, or improve
the policies such as to reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the
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Appellants had possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written
description requirement.
Thus, we are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2, 9, and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Dependent claims 4, 11, and 18
The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 4,11, and 18 on the
ground that the Specification does not provide a written description
disclosure to support “creating a rule profile,” as recited by the claims. Final
Act. 8. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not
adequately disclose how the rule profile is being created, i.e., the process for
doing so. Id.
We note that the Appellants need only demonstrate original
descriptive support in the Specification. The Examiner, in asserting that the
Specification does not adequately disclose the process for performing these
functions, i.e., how to create a rule profile, seemingly confuses written
description with enablement, and has not established that the Specification
lacks the requisite descriptive support. See, e.g., Lockwood v American
Airlines, 107 F.3d. 1565, 1571—72 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The Specification
provides that a repository can include a rule profile (Spec. 128), and “that
the rule profile may include the policy, the current violator entities of the
policy, the potential violator entities of the policy, the test results, and the
policy rankings for the one or more tests” {id. 17). Thus, the Specification
provides that a data record of a profile comprising particular information is
created. Creating a data record would have been known to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time the application was filed such that one of ordinary
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skill in the art would have understood from the Specification that Appellants
had possession of creating a profile to satisfy the written description
requirement.
Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 4, 11, and 18
under 35U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Dependent claims 5, 12, and 19
The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 5,12, and 19 on the
ground that the Specification does not provide a written description
disclosure to support “establishing a current violator entities range and a
potential violator entities range,” as recited by the claims. Final Act. 8.
Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does not adequately
disclose how the ranges are established, i.e., the process for doing so. Id.
The Specification provides that the system can set minimum and/or
maximum values to current violators (V) and potential violators (P) and a
“defined range” from which deviations would be considered suspicious.
Spec. H17—18, 23. Thus, the Specification provides that a range is defined
for V and P. As discussed above, the Examiner, in asserting that the
Specification does not adequately disclose the process for establishing
ranges seemingly confuses written description with enablement, and has not
established that the Specification lacks the requisite descriptive support. We
find one of ordinary skill in the art would have known, at the time the
application was filed, the process for defining a range so as to have
understood from the Specification that the Appellants had possession of
establishing ranges to satisfy the written description requirement.
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Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 5, 12, and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Dependent claims 6, 13, 20, and 22—25
The Examiner further rejects dependent claims 6, 13, 20, and 22—25
on the ground that the Specification does not provide a written description
disclosure to support “establishing” “means and standard deviations”,
“detecting changes,” “performing an extrapolation,” “measuring a ratio,”
and setting a policy ranking based on a threshold, as recited by the claims.
Final Act. 9—12. Specifically, the Examiner finds that the Specification does
not adequately disclose the process for performing these functions. Id.
As discussed above, the Examiner, in asserting that the Specification
does not adequately disclose the processes for performing these functions
seemingly confuses written description with enablement, and has not
established that the Specification lacks the requisite descriptive support. We
agree with the Appellants that one of ordinary skill in the art, at the time the
application was filed, would have known, and understood from the
Specification, the processes for “calculating a standard deviation or a
mean[,] . . . determining whether a value (e.g., P and/or V) has changed over
time[,] . . . extrapolating] data[,] . . . determining] aratio[, and] . . .
set[ting] a threshold.” Appeal Br. 9; see also Spec. H 21—29. Thus, we find
that the Specification reasonably conveys to one of skill in the art that the
Appellants had possession of the claimed invention to satisfy the written
description requirement.
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Therefore, we are persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejection, and
we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 6, 13, 20,
and 22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Obviousness - § 103
We are persuaded by the Appellants’ argument that the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claims 1,8, and 15 is in error because the cited
prior art does not teach or suggest the limitation of determining a ranking
based on the correspondence between the test results, as recited by claim 1
and similarly recited by claims 8 and 15. See Appeal Br. 11—15.
The Examiner relies particularly on Rivers for teaching this limitation.
Final Act. 17 (citing Rivers H 56, 111, 128, Fig. 12). Specifically, the
Examiner finds that Rivers discloses adherence and effectiveness ratings,
i.e., rankings, (Final Act. 17), and that “under a broadest reasonable
interpretation of this limitation, Rivers meets this limitation because it
discloses providing a table of rankings that are based on test results and the
rankings are relative to the test policies of other policies” (Ans. 17).
Rivers discloses determining an adherence rating and effectiveness
rating for policies. Rivers till. The adherence rating is based on a first set
of factors including a measured level of compliance with guiding principles
underlying a first policy and/or a level of importance of each of the guiding
principles underlying the first policy. Id. 1 112. The effectiveness rating is
determined based on a second set of factors including determined levels of
responsiveness, business operations impact, and/or compliance with laws
and regulations for the first policy. Id. ^ 113. A report is generated and
displayed that includes the information regarding the ratings (id. 1117) “to
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facilitate comparison and/or evaluation of the one or more policies” (id.
1128, Fig. 12). A numerical rank for the adherence and effectiveness
ratings may be included. Id.
We find persuasive the Appellants’ argument that “Rivers does not
disclose or suggest that any of the scores, data or ranks corresponding to
[one policy] are determined in any way based on scores, data or ranks of [the
other policies].” Appeal Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 9—10. Although Rivers
discloses providing data of adherence and effectiveness ratings for policies
to facilitate comparison and evaluation, and that the data may include a
“numerical rank” for each policy, we do not see from the face of the
reference, and the Examiner does not adequately explain, that the ranks are
based on test results relative to the other policies. For example, it is not
clear whether the “ranking” is relative to other policies’ results or relative to
a defined number/parameter for that policy.
Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error on the part of the
Examiner, and we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 1, 8, and 15 and dependent claims 2—4, 9—11, 16—18, and 22—25
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. We also do not sustain the rejection of claims 5, 6,
12, 13, 19, and 20, each of which depends from independent claim 1 or
claim 15. Cf. In reFritch, 972 F.2d. 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which
they depend are nonobvious”).
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Patent-eligible subject matter - § 101
The Appellants argue the claims as a group. See Reply Br. 2—5. We
select claim 1 as representative. Claims 2—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 stand
or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that
this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116
(2013)). The Court has, thus, made clear that “[phenomena of nature,
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts
are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological
work.” Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (emphasis added).
Following the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has similarly held
that mental processes are not patent-eligible subject matter. Therefore, the
court has held that methods which can be performed entirely in the human
mind are unpatentable not because “there is anything wrong with claiming
mental method steps as part of a process containing non-mental steps,” but
rather because “methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind
are the types of methods that embody the ‘basic tools of scientific and
technological work’ that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set
forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are
directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If so, the second
step is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an
ordered combination”’ to determine whether the additional elements
“‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id.
(citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1298). In other words, the second step is to
“search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of
elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id.
(alteration in original) (citing Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The Court
acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level embody, use,
reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether the claims
focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology
or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea, and
merely invoke generic processes and machinery.
Here, the Examiner rejects claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25 as
being directed to an abstract idea, non-statutory subject matter under § 101.
Ans. 3. The Examiner finds that the claims are
directed towards ‘maintaining and evaluating policies’ (see
Appellant’s specification 11), which is considered to be an
abstract idea (because policies are ideas of themselves, relating
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to certain methods of organizing human activities, and creating
tests to evaluate policies likewise rely on ideas of themselves
regarding how to create and evaluate the tests for the policies).
Id. The Examiner further finds that the additional elements of the claims
“do not offer ‘significantly more’ than the abstract idea itself because the
claims do not recite an improvement to another technology or technical
field, an improvement to the functioning of any computer itself, or provide
meaningful limitations beyond generally linking an abstract idea to a
particular technological environment.” Id. at 4. The Examiner also finds
that the “the claims recite or require no more than a generic computer to
perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and
conventional activities previously known to the industry.” Id.
The Appellants appear to argue that claim 1 is not directed to an
abstract idea, i.e., step one of the analysis, because “none of the examples
[of a fundamental economic principle, method of organizing human
activities, an idea itself, and mathematical relationships and formulas,]
correspond to the recitations of Claim 1.” Reply Br. 4. We disagree. The
Specification provides that the invention relates “particularly to creating,
maintaining and evaluating policies.” Spec. 11. Claim 1 is directed to a
method for measuring usefulness of a policy by calculating test results,
determining ranking based on the results, and evaluating a policy based on
the ranking. Appeal Br. 17 (Claims App.). The steps recited in claim 1
involve nothing more than calculating and evaluating data, all steps that can
be performed manually. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 (“A method
that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and
is not patent-eligible under § 101.”).
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In this regard, the claims are similar to the claims that our reviewing
courts have found patent ineligible in Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A.,
830 F.3d 1350, 1353—54 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting information and
“analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by
mathematical algorithms, without more, [are] essentially mental processes
within the abstract-idea category.”), Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am.,
Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert, denied, 136 S. Ct. 2510,
195 L. Ed. 2d 841 (2016) (using organizational and product group
hierarchies to determine a price), and Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978)
(mathematical algorithm used for adjusting an alarm limit). Here, claim 1
involves nothing more than calculating and evaluating data to create,
maintain, and evaluate policies, without any particular inventive technology
— an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354.
The Appellants further argue that the claims amount to significantly
more than the abstract idea, i.e., step two of the analysis. Reply Br. 3. We
disagree for at least the reasons below.
We find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that “measuring
usefulness of one policy of a plurality of policies in an organization
integrates the building blocks of human ingenuity in a meaningful way” by
using a test by calculating test results, determining a policy ranking, and
evaluating the policy based on the ranking. Id. These steps are all part of
the process of evaluating a policy and simply elaborate on the abstract idea.
We note that the steps of the method can all be performed manually, and that
the Specification (including the claims) requires only a generic computer to
perform the steps. See Spec. ]ff[ 7, 14, 38 (“The system and method of the
present disclosure may be implemented and run on a general-purpose
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computer or special-purpose computer system. The computer system may
be any type of known or will be known systems.”). The Appellants argue
that the claim limitations “go beyond generally linking the use of an abstract
idea to a particular technological environment” (Reply Br. 4), but do not
adequately show how the claimed steps of using and calculating tests,
determining a ranking, and evaluating a policy are done technically such that
they cannot be done manually or that they are not routine and conventional
functions of a generic computer. See Versata, 793 F.3d at 1334 (“the
limitations of claim 17 involve arranging a hierarchy of organizational and
product groups, storing pricing information, retrieving applicable pricing
information, sorting pricing information, eliminating less restrictive pricing
information, and determining the price. All of these limitations are well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry.”).
We further find unpersuasive the Appellants’ argument that “although
the policies themselves may regulate human activities, the claim recitations
are directed to significant non-abstract activities performed by a processor
including using a test to calculate test results . . . determining a policy
ranking.” Reply Br. 3^4. The introduction of a computer to implement an
abstract idea is not a patentable application of the abstract idea. Alice,
134 S. Ct. at 2357—58. The computer implementation here is purely
conventional and performs basic functions. See id. at 2359—60. The claims
do not purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself, nor do they
effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. See id.
at 2359.
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For at least the reasons above, we are not persuaded of Examiner error
in the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claim 1, and also of
claims 2—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25, which fall with claim 1.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—6, 8, 10-13, 15, 17—20, and
22—25 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is REVERSED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, first paragraph, is AFFIRMED.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) are REVERSED.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 8—13, 15—20, and 22—25
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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