Ex Parte SAKAINO et al

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 27, 2019

14081952 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/081,952 11/15/2013 27562 7590 03/29/2019 NIXON & V ANDERHYE, P.C. 901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11 TH FLOOR ARLINGTON, VA 22203 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Masamichi SAKAINO UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. RYM-6077-2 5685 EXAMINER BOWEN, RICHARD L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2165 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/29/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com pair_nixon@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte MASAMICHI SAKAINO, HISATOSHI TAKEUCHI, and ZENTA ANDOH Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 1 Technology Center 2100 Before JASON V. MORGAN, HUNG H. BUI, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from the Examiner's final rejection of claims 1-14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellants' Brief ("App. Br.") identifies NINTENDO CO., LTD. and HAL LABORATORY, INC. as the real parties in interest. App. Br. 3. Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellants' invention relates to searching data sets in a database. Spec. 2. The data sets are records in a database relating to avatar images for users of a system. Spec. 3. The avatar images may be "a representation of a whole body image of a human," and may be defined by users by selecting certain attributes, shown in Figure 1, for their attribute image. Spec. 3. Figure 1 is reproduced below: USER NAME GENDER FAVORITE SPECIAL HAIRSTYLE SPECTACLES COLOR YAMADA MALE NO NO 5 10 BLACK MARIA GRISMAN FEMALE NO NO 13 0 RED KEIKO FEMALE YES NO 28 0 BLUE ICHIRO SUZUKI MALE NO NO 7 25 GREEN AMANDA FEMALE NO NO 19 0 WHITE JOHN BRIGHTMAN MALE NO YES 11 6 BLUE In the example depicted in Figure 1, the user-definable attributes may include attributes such as user name, gender, hairstyle, spectacles, or color. Spec. 3. Appellants describe a search capability which allows users to search for avatars by user name as the default attribute. Spec. 4; Spec. Fig 2. Thus, in the example of a typical search, "after a search key 'Yamada' is input into search window [ ], data sets of user images whose attribute item 'user name' [includes] the name 'Yamada' are extracted as a result." Spec. 5. Appellants' invention also utilizes a second database, referred to as a "keyword database," which "stores data sets, each of which includes a group 2 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 of keywords, an attribute item corresponding to the group of keywords, and a value of the attribute item. Spec. 9, Fig. 8. The keyword database, an example of which is depicted in Figure 8, stores groups of keywords that are associated with specific attributes values. Id. For example, the keywords "man," "boy," "male," and "gentleman" are associated with the "gender" attribute and the value "male" for the gender attribute. Id. Similarly, the group of keywords including "red," "cherry," "carmine," "ruby," and "scarlet" are associated with the "color" attribute and the value "red" for the color attribute. Id. The claimed invention is directed to using both the first and second database to search for images (e.g., avatars). The first database, which stores the image data, is searched to find data sets (e.g., database records) having attribute values which match the inputted search term. The second keyword database is searched to determine whether the submitted search term is in the second, keyword database. If the submitted search term is in the second, keyword database, the first database is also searched to find a data set that matches the attribute value from the keyword database. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. An information-processing device comprising: a memory; a first accessor configured to access a first database storing data sets, each of the data sets corresponding to an image having a plurality of image attributes and including values categorized in a plurality of attribute items, each of the image attributes being represented by a value of one of the plurality of attribute items; a second accessor configured to access a second database storing a group of keywords including at least one keyword, an 3 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 attribute item corresponding to the group of keywords, and a value corresponding to the group of keywords; and an extractor configured, when a keyword input for a search is included in the second database, to extract from the first database, as a result of the search, at least one data set corresponding to a value of an attribute item in the second database corresponding to the input keyword and another data set, a value of another attribute item of the another data set includes the input keyword. App. Br. 21 (Claims Appendix). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Johnson Ueno Warner Roulland Brown Nayar Bodd US 7,810,119 B2 US 2003/0088641 Al US 2007/0150856 Al US 2009/0310152 Al US 2010/0106707 Al US 2011/0243461 Al US 2013/0024459 Al REJECTIONS Oct. 5, 2010 May 8, 2003 Jun.28,2007 Dec. 1 7, 2009 Apr. 29, 2010 Oct. 6, 2011 Jan.24,2013 Claims 1-3 and 8-12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Nayar, and Bodd. Final Act. 4--12. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Nayar, Bodd, and Roulland. Final Act. 12-13. Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Nayar, Bodd, and Ueno. Final Act. 13-15. Claims 6 and 7 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ I03(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Nayar, Bodd, and Johnson. Final Act. 15-18. 4 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Brown, Nayar, Bodd, and Warner. Final Act. 18-20. ISSUES First Issue: Has the Examiner erred in determining the limitation an extractor configured, when a keyword input for a search is included in the second database, to extract from the first database, as a result of the search, at least one data set corresponding to a value of an attribute item in the second database corresponding to the input keyword and another data set, a value of another attribute item of the another data set includes the input keyword, as recited in claim 1, is taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious by the cited prior art? Second Issue: Has the Examiner erred in determining Warner teaches, suggests, or otherwise renders obvious the limitations recited in claims 13 and 14? ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellants' arguments set forth in the Appeal Brief and the Reply Brief. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. We adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3-20) and (2) the findings, reasons, and explanations set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner's Answer in response to Appellants' Brief (Ans. 2-5) and concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following for emphasis. 5 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 First Issue The Examiner rejects claim 1 as obvious over the combined teachings of Brown, Nayar, and Bodd. Final Act. 4. More specifically, the Examiner finds that Brown teaches the "first accessor" limitation because it describes "indexing and searching according to attributes of a person." Final Act. 7 ( citing Brown ,r,r 28, 29, 34, and 35, Figs. 3--4); see also Final Act. 5. The Examiner further finds that Brown teaches selecting data sets based on attributes of a person, but does not teach the "second accessor" limitation or the "extractor" limitation of claim 1. For the "second accessor" limitation, which relates to the use of the keyword database to expand the search, the Examiner finds "it [was] known in the art of searching that users do not always know the best word to apply to find a search," (Final Act. 7) citing Nayar's use of "a 'dictionary' which maps users terms to attributes." Nayar ,r 43. With respect to the "extractor" limitation, which executes the expanded search when the search term finds a match in the second, keyword database, the Examiner finds Bodd demonstrates that "it [was] known in the art of searching to allow users to quickly enter a search term and have results provided across all fields." Final Act. 8. The Examiner concludes "it would have been obvious ... to further incorporate a free text query function as disclosed in Bodd to the Brown- Nayar combination to further enhance the user's experience by allowing the user to further search the records by retrieving records having keywords contained anywhere within the records." Final Act. 8. In the Answer, the Examiner further explains that "[t]hrough the combination of references, applying Bodd to the Brown-Nayar combination would apply the search to both the fileds or database as disclosed in Brown (and also Nayar), along 6 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 with the dictionary as disclosed in Nayar to produce the results recited in Applicant's independent claims." Ans. 4. Appellants argue the rejection of claim 1 is in error because the combination ofBrown, Nayar, and Bodd does not disclose or suggest "extracting two sets of documents based on a search term for different fields via different searching mechanisms respectively." App. Br. 13. In particular, Appellants argue Bodd merely teaches searching multiple fields in a database, and does not teach the use of any second database as claimed. App. Br. 14--15. Likewise, Appellants argue Nayar does not teach "the claimed 'second database storing a group of keywords including at least one keyword, an attribute item corresponding to the group of keywords, and a value corresponding to the group of keywords."' App. Br. 15 see also Reply Br. 2-3. Appellants also argue that Nayar is additionally deficient because Nayar only "discloses extracting images based on multiple attributes via the same searching mechanism - searching images corresponding to the identified attribute in the 'dictionary,' instead of the claimed two different searching mechanisms." App. Br. 16; see also Reply Br. 3 (arguing Bodd also fails to disclose "two different searching mechanisms"). According to Appellants, because Nayar does not teach two different searching mechanisms which produce two different data sets, Nayar, like Bodd, also fails to teach the "extractor" limitation of claim 1. App. Br. 16. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments because these arguments attack Bodd and Nayar individually, and do not address why their combined teachings fail to render obvious the "extractor" limitation of claim 1. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,425 (CCPA 1981) (holding that one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the 7 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 rejection is based on combinations of references). Brown teaches a database search system which allows a user to search for an image of a person according to a set of attributes of that person. See Brown ,r,r 2 8-29, 3 5. As explained by the Examiner, "Nayar was introduced to show that it [was] known to use a separate database or dictionary to help searchers that may not know the exact term to enter into a database." Ans. 3 ( citing Nayar ,r 43). We agree with the Examiner that Nayar's description in paragraph 43 teaches the "second accessor" limitation because, as explained by the Examiner, "[ s ]imilar to Appellant's figure 8 and second database required by the claim, multiple terms to attributes can be used, such as 'man,' 'not female,' along with many others, can all be mapped to a single attribute, such as 'gender-male."' Ans. 3. Thus, the Examiner properly relies on Nayar to show that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known that a separate database/dictionary would be effective to map user-entered terms to synonymous attributes in a searched image database ( such as the image database taught by Brown) even if the terms do not identically match. The Examiner introduces Bodd to show that it was known in the art to retrieve multiple datasets from a single inputted search by expanding the search to include additional fields. As explained by the Examiner, a person of ordinary skill in the ar, would have known from Bodd that a single search term could be used to retrieve multiple datasets by expanding the search across multiple attributes. With this understanding, the ordinarily skilled artisan would have appreciated that Brown's image searching process could be improved by applying the search term to both Brown's first database and then by broadening the search by also applying the search term to a dictionary as taught by Nayar-which would map the inputted term to 8 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 specific attributes. Using the terms and attributes returned by the dictionary mapping, the skilled artisan would have then known to expand the search on Brown's content database to include the mapped terms and attributes retrieved from Nayar's dictionary, again as taught by Bodd. Appellants' arguments place great emphasis on a lack of "two different searching mechanisms" in the prior art. However, Appellants' claims do not recite "two different searching mechanisms." Rather, the claims merely recite "a first accessor" and "a second accessor." The term "accessor" does not appear in the Specification, and Appellants point to only a single "accessing unit 131" as support in the Specification for the recited "first accessor" and "second accessor." App. Br. 5 (Summary of Claims Subject Matter). Thus, when viewed in light of the Specification, there "first accessor" and the "second accessor" may be part of a single searching mechanism, and there is no requirements that the prior art disclose "two different searching mechanisms." Appellants' arguments also attack the references individually but do not address the combination made by the Examiner. For example, Appellants argue that Bodd is silent with respect to the use of any second database as claimed. However, the Examiner relies on Nayar, and not on Bodd, to supply a second database. Ans. 3 ("Nayar shows multiple attributes, along with the inclusion of a second database to expand the search to multiple fields."). Appellants also argue Bodd does not "teach or suggest that two sets of documents are extracted based on the search term for two different fields via two different searching mechanisms, respectively." App. Br. 14. However, as we discussed above, the claims do not require two different searching mechanisms. Moreover, the Examiner properly relies on 9 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 the combined teachings of Brown, Nayar, and Bodd, and not on Bodd alone as teaching this functionality. For these reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred in concluding the claim 1 is obvious. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a). Second Issue Claim 13 depends from claim 1, and recites "wherein the extracted at least one data set and the another data set are displayed in a manner in which they can be distinguished from each other." App. Br. 25 (Claims Appendix). Claim 14 recites similar limitations, except that the datasets "cannot be distinguished from each other." In rejecting claims 13-14, the Examiner introduces Warner, finding that it demonstrates that it was "known in the art to allow search results to be distinguishable or indistinguishable from one another." Final Act. 18 ( citing Warner ,r 63). Appellants contend the Examiner has erred, arguing that "[s]ince none of the references teaches extracting the 'one data set' and 'another data set' as claimed, none of the references teaches the claimed 'one data set' and 'another data set' are displayed in a manner in which they can or cannot be distinguished from each other." App. Br. 18. With specific reference to Warner, Appellants argue Warner teaches distinguishing the sources of the result sets, but not the data sets extract from different searching mechanisms, as claimed. App. Br. 18-19. According to Appellants, the claims require the data sets to be obtained from the same source, while Warner obtains different data sets from different sources. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. The standard for determining whether a claim is obvious is "an expansive and flexible 10 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 approach." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,415 (2007). Warner teaches the use of federated searches in which "[ f]ederated search results could be merged before presentation, or presented in a manner to distinguish the sources of the results." Warner ,r 63. The Examiner acknowledges that distinguishing the source of the results is not identical to the distinguishing of data sets collected from the same data source. Ans. 5. We agree with the Examiner, however, that the teachings Warner, demonstrate that it was known in the art to distinguish query results obtained in different ways. Possessing this knowledge, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have appreciated that the display of two data sets taught by Brown, Nayar, and Bodd could benefit from distinguishing the data sets ( as provided in claim 13). As explained by the Examiner, a skilled artisan would have seen the benefit of "illustrat[ing] the reason or manner in which the search results are retrieved if certain attributes are deemed more important over other attributes." Final Act. 19. Similarly, and with respect to the limitation in claim 14 that the data sets are indistinguishable, we also agree with the Examiner that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have perceived a benefit in avoiding distinctions in the results so that all data sets are treated equally irrespective of how they were obtained. Id. Appellants do not provide any explanation for why the Examiner's reasoning is insufficient to support the conclusion of obviousness. Without such an explanation, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in concluding claims 13 and 14 would have been obvious in view of the cited references. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 13 and 14, and the remaining claims, which Appellants do not argue separately. 11 Appeal2018-004519 Application 14/081,952 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1-14. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 12