Ex Parte Rueeck et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 24, 201713498707 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 24, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/498,707 06/12/2012 Gabriel Rueeck TS/HAH 1206 US-PAT 7499 97053 7590 10/26/2017 Hach Company Attention Legal - Patent and Trademark Department 5600 Lindbergh Drive PO Box 389 Loveland, CO 80539 EXAMINER GAKH, YELENA G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1797 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/26/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): uspto@hach.com taschulz@hach.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte GABRIEL RUEECK, HELGA GUTHMANN, JOHANNES BERSSEN, MICHAEL ZIEDRICH, CARSTEN SCHULZ, CLEMENS HANSCHKE, FLORENS ENGEL, DIETMAR ZANGENBERG, MARKUS LENHARD, and THOMAS COEPER Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,7071 Technology Center 1700 Before MICHAEL P. COLAIANNI, AVELYN M. ROSS, and SHELDON M. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judges. McGEE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134, Appellants appeal from the Examiner’s rejection adverse to the patentability of claims 10 and 14—17. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6. We AFFIRM-IN-PART. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Hach Lange GmbH. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 BACKGROUND The subject matter on appeal is directed to a system for photometrically analyzing liquid samples. Spec. 2. Claim 10 is illustrative, is taken from the Claims Appendix of the Appeal Brief, and appears below with key limitations italicized: 10. A liquid analysis system for a photometric determination of an analyte in a liquid sample, the liquid analysis system consisting of. an analyzer comprising, a photometer, an RFID parameter reading device, and a 2D bar code reading device, the 2D bar code reading device being provided separately from the RFID parameter reading device; and a cuvette package comprising an RFID parameter transponder which stores a batch identification and batch-specific reagent data, and a plurality of test cuvettes of one batch, each test cuvette comprising a reagent and a 2D bar code comprising the batch identification, the 2D bar code being configured to be read by the 2D bar code reading device, wherein, the batch identification assigns a cuvette to the cuvette package and to the batch-specific reagent data. REFERENCES The Examiner relies on the following references as evidence of unpatentability: Morris US 2005/0205673 A1 Sept. 22,2005 Dussi US 2009/0124015 A1 May 14,2009 STATEMENT OF THE CASE All claims on appeal are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Dussi in view of Morris. Ans. 3—5. 2 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 Regarding independent claim 10, the Examiner finds that Dussi teaches all the recited elements, except for the limitation requiring each test cuvette to comprise a reagent and a bar code thereon. Id. at 4. The Examiner relies on the teachings of Morris and the level of the skilled artisan to remedy these deficiencies. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have been obvious to the skilled artisan to combine the teachings of Dussi and Morris to arrive at the claimed subject matter “because it would have been easier to transfer reagents into the spectrophotometer directly in the reagent cuvettes, rather than to transfer them from the reagent containers.” Id. The Examiner also concludes that it would have been obvious to substitute Morris’ cuvettes containing simplified individual RFID tags with the recited 2D barcode identifiers because such barcode identifiers were conventional in the art at the time of the invention, and because they were considered to be interchangeable with, and have the same function as, RFID tags. Id. Regarding independent method claims 16 and 17, the Examiner determines that the recited method steps are inherent in the system disclosed in Dussi and Morris. Id. at 5. Appellants present separate arguments for independent claims 10, 16, and 17. Thus, we need only focus on these claims. Claims not argued separately stand or fall accordingly. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). OPINION Claim 10 We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments and are not persuaded that Appellants have identified reversible error. In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365—66 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the Board’s long-held practice of requiring Appellants to identify the alleged error in the Examiner’s 3 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 rejection). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claim 10 based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and rebuttals to arguments expressed by the Examiner in the Final Office Action, Advisory Action, and in the Answer. We add the following comments for emphasis and completeness. We share the Examiner’s view (Ans. 7) that several of Appellants’ arguments against the rejection of this claim attack the separate teachings of the references and do not address the rejection as a whole. App. Br. 11—15. It is well-settled, however, that “[n]on-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references. . . . [The reference] must be read, not in isolation, but for what it fairly teaches in combination with the prior art as a whole.” In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Accordingly, all such arguments that solely focus on the individual reference teachings fail to persuade us of reversible error. Appellants’ arguments (App. Br. 8—9, 11—12, 14) suggesting that claim 10 is “closed” so as to exclude Dussi’s subassemblies are also not persuasive of reversible error. While the recited system may only consist of “an analyzer” and “a cuvette package,” each of the “analyzer” and “cuvette package” limitations recites “comprising” and are, therefore, individually open to additional, un-recited elements. “‘Comprising’ is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.” Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appellants’ contentions (App. Br. 13—16) that the recited reagent is distinct from that disclosed in the prior art are likewise unpersuasive. In this regard, we agree with the Examiner’s determination (Ans. 7), undisputed by 4 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 Appellants (Reply Br. generally) that “it would have been obvious for any routineer in the art to have any reagents in the Dussi-[Morris] system.” Moreover, as correctly observed by the Examiner (Ans. 7), the claims do not limit the reagent to only those which change color when reacted with a specific analyte, nor do they exclude biological reagents. Appellants’ arguments regarding the lack of disclosure in the prior art regarding a barcode comprising batch identification information (App. Br. 8—9, 12—15) also are not well taken. Specifically, Appellants note that “‘[b]atch identification’ relates both the assignment of a test cuvette to a certain batch and the type of cuvette test, i.e., the analyte to be determined or the reagent contained in the test cuvette for that purpose.” App. Br. 13, citing Spec. 111. Regarding the particular reagent contained in the cuvette, however, Morris expressly teaches that “information regarding the contents of the tubes ... is stored in an RFID tag either affixed to or embedded into each of the tubes 300 or . . . into the tube carrier 400.” Morris 149. Regarding the assignment of a cuvette to a certain batch, Appellants urge that Morris’ “simplified RFID then only provides row and column information for the tube’s position in the tube carrier 400.” App. Br. 14 (emphasis added), citing Morris 147. Appellants do not explain, however, how identifying a cuvette’s exact position within a batch of cuvettes does not “assign a cuvette to the cuvette package” as claimed. Moreover, Morris’ disclosure relied on by Appellants merely exemplifies row and column information for associating a particular tube 300 to the tube carrier 400. Morris 147 (“the tube bears a simplified RFID tag or optical indicia that provides, for example, row and column information for the tube’s position in the tube carrier 400” (emphasis added)). Such disclosure in Morris does not limit the type of information that can be used to associate the individual 5 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 tubes 300 to the carrier 400 housing a “batch” of tubes. Therefore, Appellants have not identified reversible error in the Examiner’s well- reasoned determination (Ans. 4—5) that it would have been obvious to use conventional 2D barcodes, known to be interchangeable with RFID tags, on individual cuvettes to store the recited batch identification data thereon, so that the individual cuvettes could be associated with a particular batch. Furthermore, even if we determined that the specific batch identification data recited in claim 10 (i.e., assignment of a cuvette to 1) the cuvette package, and 2) the batch-specific reagent data) would not have been obvious in view of Dussi and Morris, this data appears to be non-functional descriptive material because it does not reconfigure the liquid analysis system to perform a different function than that disclosed in the prior art. In other words, there is no evidence that the batch identification is functionally related to the liquid analysis system because the system photometrically determines an analyte in a liquid sample regardless of the specific reagent data or particular package to which an individual cuvette is assigned. Therefore, because the informational content of the data (i.e., the “batch identification”) is not positively recited as being used to change or affect any function of the liquid analysis system within the broad scope of claim 10, such informational content is non-functional descriptive material and is entitled to no weight in the patentability analysis. See Ex parte Nehls, 88 USPQ2d 1883, 1889 (BPAI 2008) (precedential) (“[T]he nature of the information being manipulated does not lend patentability to an otherwise unpatentable computer-implemented product or process.”); Ex parte Mathias, 84 USPQ2d 1276, 1279 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“[Non functional descriptive material cannot lend patentability to an invention that would have otherwise been anticipated by the prior art.”), affd, 191 Fed. 6 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36); Ex parte Curry, 84 USPQ2d 1272, 1274 (BPAI 2005) (informative) (“Nonfunctional descriptive material cannot render nonobvious an invention that would have otherwise been obvious.”), aff’d, No. 06-1003 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rule 36); see also MPEP §2111.05(111). Finally, we observe that Appellants’ arguments presented in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 3—6) are untimely. Specifically, Appellants present arguments against the Examiner’s proposed combinations and substitutions of Dussi’s system with the teachings of Morris including: 1) the replacement of Dussi’s reagent container with a test cuvette containing the reagent, 2) the attachment of an RFID to the batch, and 3) the addition of a 2D bar code to each cuvette, and assert that such substitutions “would not be ‘obvious for any routineer in the art’ as” proposed by the Examiner. Reply Br. 3. Rather, Appellants urge that the proffered changes “would render Dussi unsatisfactory for its intended purpose” and “would change Dussi’ principle of operation.” Id. We determine, however, Appellants had the opportunity to make such arguments in their Appeal Brief because each of these combinations and substitutions were identified by the Examiner in either the Final Office Action or the Advisory Action. Final Act. 5—6; Adv. Act. 2. Appellants, however, failed to timely present the specific arguments identified on pages 3—6 of the Reply Brief in response to the contested findings and determinations. We, therefore, decline to consider such arguments because Appellants have not explained why these arguments could not have been raised in their Appeal Brief. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“Except as provided for in §§ 41.41, 41.47, and 41.52, any arguments or authorities not included in the appeal brief will be refused consideration by the Board for purposes of the present appeal.”); see also Ex parte Borden, 93 7 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 USPQ2d 1473, 1477 (BPAI 2010) (Informative) (explaining that under the previous rules, which are similar to the current rules, “the reply brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner’s rejections, but were not.”). Moreover, we observe that, even if Appellants’ arguments were timely presented, they would be unpersuasive of reversible error. For example, Appellants’ contention (Reply Br. 5) regarding Dussi’s containers being used “more than once, i.e., for more than one analysis” and that the Examiner’s proffered substitution would render “the Dussi system no longer being able to run multiple tests with the same sample” and “unable to use one reagent for more than one test sample” lacks support in Dussi. Contrary to Appellants’ argument, Dussi’s system may contain “one or more vessels for one or more reagents” and “defines a test” to employ such one or more reagents. Dussi 113 (emphasis added). Dussi’s system, therefore, is not limited to using multiple containers to be used in the performance of multiple tests. “It is well settled that a prior art reference is relevant for all that it teaches to those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 10 for the reasons expressed by the Examiner and above. The rejection of claims 14 and 15, not separately argued, is likewise sustained for the same reasons. Claims 16 and 17 Regarding method claims 16 and 17, the Examiner finds that “the method steps are inherent to the disclosed combined analysis system.” Final Act. 6; Ans. 5. 8 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 Appellants contend, however, that “Dussi. . . teaches numerous additional method steps such as retrieving the contents of a first tag (step 102), checking to determine whether it holds a new protocol (step 104) etc. which are specifically excluded by the use of the ‘consisting of transitional phrase.” App. Br. 14. Although the Examiner does address whether the system claim (claim 10) is closed (Ans. 8), the Examiner fails to respond with any specificity to Appellants’ argument regarding method claims 16 and 17. Ans. 6—8. “[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). “|T]n order to rely on inherency to establish the existence of a claim limitation in the prior art in an obviousness analysis^] the limitation at issue necessarily must be present, or the natural result of the combination of elements explicitly disclosed by the prior art.” PAR Pharm., Inc. v. TWI Pharms, Inc., 773 F.3d 1186, 1195—96 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To properly rely on the doctrine of inherency in a rejection, “the Examiner must provide a basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the determination that the allegedly inherent characteristic necessarily flows from the teachings of the applied prior art.” Ex Parte Levy, 17 USPQ2d 1461, 1464 (BPAI 1990). Once the Examiner so provides, the burden then shifts to the patent applicant to demonstrate otherwise. See In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (CCPA 1977). Applying these concepts to the instant case, the Examiner provides no such basis in fact and/or technical reasoning to reasonably support the 9 Appeal 2016-008305 Application 13/498,707 inherency of the claimed methods.2 Rather, the Examiner asserts that the method steps are inherent and merely provides two paragraphs copied from Dussi for support. Such conclusory assertions do not evince that the recited methods are inherent in Dussi’s disclosure. This is particularly true in view of Appellants’ correct observation that method claims 16 and 17 recite the transitional phrase “consisting of,” thus limiting the number of steps to only those steps recited. On this record, the Examiner fails to explain how the combined disclosure of Dussi and Morris render such methods inherent and, therefore, obvious in view of the disclosed system. It follows that we reverse the Examiner’s rejection of these claims. SUMMARY The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 10, 14, and 15 is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 16 and 17 is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 2 Our reviewing court has recognized the appropriateness of determining that later-claimed method steps may be inherent in the prior art based on the earlier disclosure of a product that is the natural result of the claimed method. See In re King, 801 F.2d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We recognize that the particular factual scenario in King dealt with inherency with respect to an anticipation rejection. We do not, however, understand King to exclude situations such as the one here where the underlying rejection is based on obviousness. 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation