Ex Parte Romano et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 26, 201914467783 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 26, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/467,783 08/25/2014 75158 7590 06/28/2019 Verint Systems, Inc. Meunier Carlin & Curfman, LLC 999 Peachtree Street NE Suite 1300 Atlanta, GA 30309 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Roni Romano UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10171-419US1 3246 EXAMINER MISHRA, RICHA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2674 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/28/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): laaronson@mcciplaw.com KCarroll@mcciplaw.com docketing@mcciplaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RONI ROMANO, Y AIR HORESH, and JEREMIE DREYFUSS Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 1 Technology Center 2600 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, DENISE M. POTHIER, and JOHNNY A. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judges. KUMAR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20. 2 App. Br. 13-16 (Claims Appendix). We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). WeAFFIRM. 3 1 Appellants identify VERINT SYSTEMS LTD. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 3. 2 Claims 8-10, 12, and 17 were previously cancelled. 3 Our Decision refers to the Examiner's Answer mailed April 2, 2018 ("Ans."); Appellants' Appeal Brief filed February 19, 2018 ("App. Br."); the Final Office Action mailed September 28, 2017 ("Final Act."); and the original Specification filed August 25, 2014 ("Spec."). Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Existing automated transcription of audio data often output the transcription in a single text file, devoid of punctuation. Spec. ,r 2. Appellants' Specification describes automatically zoning or segmenting a transcription file to provide concept identification, intent, grammatical relation, and other context. Id. at ,r 8. Appellants' Specification further indicates zoning of the transcript allows later analytics applied to the transcript to be less computationally demanding and produces more accurate results. Id. Exemplary Claim Independent claim 1 exemplifies the claims at issue and reads as follows: 1. A method of zoning a transcription of a recorded call to correlate the recorded call with a particular domain of customer service interaction, the method comprising: [a] separating the transcription of the recorded call into a plurality of utterances, wherein each utterance is a sequence of words spoken by one speaker in a conversation without interference by another speaker or another event; [b] identifying utterances of the plurality of utterances that are shorter than a predetermined minimum threshold number of words as meaning units; [ c] selecting an utterance of the plurality of utterances that is longer than the predetermined minimum threshold number of words for splitting; [ d] splitting the selected utterance into a widow that is twice a maximum utterance threshold number of words; [ e] calculating a probability that each word in the window is a meaning unit boundary; 2 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 [ fJ splitting the window into two new utterances at a word with a maximum calculated probability; [g] identifying at least one of the two utterances that is shorter than a maximum utterance threshold number of words as a meaning unit; [h] repeating the selecting, splitting, calculating, splitting, and identifying for other utterances of the plurality of utterances to iteratively identify meaning units in the transcription of the recorded call; [i] applying speech analytics to identified meaning units to (i) group the identified meaning units into call segments that are related to a specific customer-service-interaction topics and (ii) identify dialog acts related to meaning units in each group that indicate the intention of the speaker; and rn relating the recorded call to the particular domain of customer service interaction according to the applied speech analytics. App. Br. 13-14 (Claims Appendix) (bracketed indicators added). Rejection Claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more. See Final Act. 4--5. Issue on Appeal Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as being directed to a judicial exception, without significantly more? 3 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 ANALYSIS We have considered all of Appellants' arguments and any evidence presented. 4 We highlight and address specific findings and arguments for emphasis in our analysis below. Principles of Law An invention is patent eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: "' [L Jaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"' are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) 4 Appellants argue the rejection of claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 in the Final Office action was improper because of the withdrawal and reassertion of the§ 101 rejection. See App. Br. 7. However, this contention is petitionable and not appealable. See MPEP § 1201. Petitions from any action in the ex parte prosecution of an application which is not subject to appeal must be filed within two months of the mailing date of the action from which relief is requested. See 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.181 ( f). 4 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219--20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes ( Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding of rubber products" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267---68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 ( citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). That said, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. ( citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula 5 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [ abstract idea]."' Id. ( alterations in original) ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. In January 2019, the USPTO published revised guidance on the application of§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance"). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: ( 1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52-54) ("Revised Step 2A- Prong 1 "); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE ("MPEP") §§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)) (Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53-55) ("Revised Step 2A-Prong 2"). 6 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 Only if a claim ( 1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not well-understood, routine, and conventional in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 ("Step 2B"). Examiner's Determination of Patent-Ineligibility Claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 4--5. The Examiner determined that the claims are directed to an abstract idea of recognizing, storing, and classifying data that can be performed entirely in the human mind as a mental process. Id. at 5. The Examiner added that the claims, when considered as a whole, fail to recite an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed subject matter into a patent eligible application. Id. The Examiner further determined the claims fail to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. Id. Based on these determinations, the Examiner concluded that the claims are ineligible under§ 101. Id. Appellants argue that the claimed invention solves a technical problem through an inventive concept using specific steps. App. Br. 10. According to Appellants, the Examiner oversimplifies the claims and fails to 7 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 account for the specific recited limitations that add significantly more to the purported abstract idea to render the claims eligible. Id. at 10-11. Alice Step One To determine whether claim 1 is eligible under § 101, we determine whether the claim as a whole is directed to a judicial exception, namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. To this end, we determine (1) whether claim 1 recites a judicial exception (Revised Step 2A - Prong 1) and, if so, (2) whether the identified judicial exception is integrated into a practical application (Revised Step 2A- Prong 2). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52-55. Revised Step 2A - Prong 1 In Revised Step 2A - Prong 1, we identify the specific limitations of claim 1 that recite a judicial exception, and determine whether the identified limitations fall within certain subject matter groupings, namely (a) mathematical concepts (mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas, and mathematical calculations); (b) certain methods of organizing human activity ( e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions, and managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people); or ( c) mental processes ( e.g., concepts performed in the human mind including an observation, evaluation, judgment, or opinion). See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. We agree with the Examiner (see Final Act. 4--5) that claim 1 recites a judicial exception. The recited judicial exception can be categorized as at least one of certain methods of organizing human activity, mental processes, and a mathematical concept. App. Br. 13-14 (Claims Appendix). 8 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 Claim 1 recites a "method of zoning a transcription of a recorded call to correlate the recorded call with a particular domain of customer service interaction," the method comprising the following steps: "[a] separating the transcription of the recorded call into a plurality of utterances ... "; "[b] identifying utterances ... shorter than a predetermined minimum threshold number of words ... "; "[c] selecting an utterance ... longer than the predetermined minimum threshold number of words ... "; "[d] splitting the selected utterance into a widow that is twice a maximum utterance threshold number of words"; "[ e] calculating a probability that each word in the window is a meaning unit boundary"; "[f] splitting the window into two new utterances at a word with a maximum calculated probability"; "[g] identifying at least one of the two utterances that is shorter than a maximum utterance threshold number of words as a meaning unit"; "[h] repeating the selecting, splitting, calculating, splitting, and identifying for other utterances of the plurality of utterances to iteratively identify meaning units in the transcription of the recorded call"; "[i] applying speech analytics to identified meaning units to (i) group the identified meaning units into call segments that are related to a specific customer-service-interaction topics and (ii) identify dialog acts related to meaning units in each group that indicate the intention of the speaker"; and "Li] relating the recorded call to the particular domain of customer service interaction according to the applied speech analytics." Id. (bracketed indicators added). Steps [a]-Li], under their broadest reasonable interpretation, relate to determining meaningful associations between words in a recorded call' s transcript and analyzing the meaningful associations to relate them to customer service topics. See id.; see also Spec. ,r,r 2, 34--35. As discussed 9 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 infra, steps [ a ]-Li] recite steps that could alternatively be carried out as a mental process, or by a human mind using a pen and paper. For example, "separating the transcription of the recorded call into a plurality of utterances, wherein each utterance is a sequence of words spoken by one speaker in a conversation without interference by another speaker or another event" as recited in step [a], is a process capable of being performed entirely in the mind by a human reading a transcript of a recorded call. For example, when reading a transcript, a person is capable of mentally determining likely beginnings and endings of sentences using verb and subject placement, word meaning, and transitions between words. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under§ 101."); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) ("Phenomena of nature ... mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work." ( emphasis added)). Next, steps [b ]-[ d] and [g] recite steps of counting words and comparing the count to various word count thresholds to separate out subsections of the transcript, well within the practical capabilities of the human mind aided by pen and paper, for example, by marking up the transcript with notations. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("While the Supreme Court has altered the § 101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, we continue to 'treat[] analyzing information by steps people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category."' (brackets in original) (quoting 10 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Furthermore, "calculating a probability that each word in the window is a meaning unit boundary" and "splitting the window into two new utterances" based on the probability as recited in steps [ e ]-[ fJ is also within the practical capabilities of the human mind aided by pen and paper. For example, the Specification defines a "meaning unit" as "the equivalent of a sentence." Spec. ,r 22. The Specification further details that meaning unit probabilities can be based on using a linguistic model to identify "particular words" that signal a change in meaning; such as "wh" words ( e.g., who, what, where, when), which tend to start the beginning of a sentence. See Spec. ,r,r 26-27. The described linguistic model used to identify words can be "generic" including a "dictionary of words combined with statistics on the frequency of occurrences of the words in the dictionary as well as statistics on the frequency of the words in the dictionary in relation to other adjacent words." Spec. ,r 11. The human mind is well versed in reviewing text and deriving meaning therefrom using definitions and typical speech patterns such that steps [ e ]-[ fJ can also be performed entirely in the human mind or with pen/paper assistance. Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F .3d at 1375 ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalkv. Benson."). Furthermore, step [h] merely repeats steps [a]-[g] discussed supra. 11 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 With respect to "applying speech analytics ... to (i) group ... meaning units into call segments that are related to a specific customer- service-interaction topics and (ii) identify dialog acts ... indicat[ing] the intention of the speaker" (emphasis added) recited in step [i], the Specification broadly describes actions taking place in the "speech analytics" step noting "a variety of analyses may be performed in order to identify context, content, or other information from the transcribed audio data." Spec. ,r 13. Furthermore, the Specification does not provide an algorithm or process for grouping meaning units into "call segments" or identifying "dialog acts." Rather, the Specification merely defines these terms using non-limiting examples wherein "dialog acts" indicate "some intention of the speaker or denotes a function or purpose of an utterance" and a "call segment is a set of utterances ... related to a specific topic" and may include "customer detail verification, call reason, problem description ... ". Spec. ,r 22. Steps that broadly recite analyzing text to identify information, determining text purpose, and associate text with a specific topic can all be performed in the human mind with the aid of pen and paper. In addition, the Specification indicates that final step Li] can be performed in the mind of a customer service agent. Id. ("In some embodiments, a category or a user defined labeled predicate is assigned to the data file exemplarily by the customer service agent to identify a domain of the customer service interaction."). Accordingly, steps [a]-Li] recite a mental process that can be performed in the human mind with the aid of pen and paper. For the above reasons, we determine claim 1 recites a mental process, identified as an abstract idea in the Revised Guidance. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. 12 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 Revised Step 2A - Prong 2 Because claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we must determine whether the abstract idea is integrated into a practical application, namely whether the claim applies, relies on, or uses the abstract idea in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the abstract idea, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. To this end, we (1) identify whether there any additional, recited elements beyond the judicial exception, and (2) evaluate those elements individually and collectively to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. See id. at 54--55. The additional elements beyond the above-identified judicial exceptions recited in claim 1 are a "recorded call" and a "transcription of a recorded call." App. Br. 13-14 (Claims Appendix). When considering these elements individually or in combination, we determine they do not integrate the above-identified judicial exceptions into a practical application. The identified additional elements beyond the identified mental process in claim 1 do not reflect an improvement in a computer's functioning or an improvement to other technology or technical field as set forth in MPEP § 2106.05(a) and the Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55. The additional elements "recorded call" and "transcription of the recorded call" do not themselves carry out any of the process steps [ a ]-Li] recited in claim 1. See MPEP § 2106.05(g) ("The term 'extra-solution activity' can be understood as activities incidental to the primary process or product that are merely a nominal or tangential addition to the claim"). Rather, we conclude the additional elements merely act as data input for carrying out the abstract idea recited in steps [a]-Li] such that they constitute extra-solution activity. 13 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 See MPEP § 2106.05(g) ("Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-solution activity. An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data for use in a claimed process"). For example, courts have found data gathering steps to be insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane) ( characterizing data gathering steps as insignificant extra-solution activity), aff'd sub nom., Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). Appellants argue that the claimed invention constitutes patent eligible subject matter because it is directed to an improvement in technology. See App. Br. 9. Specifically, the claimed invention is directed to a particular technology of automated recording/transcription of customer service calls and improves this technology by providing a method that enables speech analytics to be applied to the transcription in order to determine context and meaning. The method uses the inventive concept of zoning that divides the transcript into meaning units that are not too long and not too short for the speech analytics to be effective. Accordingly, Appellant asserts that guidance can be found in McRo, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc. (i.e., McRo) to determine the subject matter eligibility of the claimed invention. Id. (underlining added). We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments (id. at 9--11) that the claimed invention improves the additionally recited elements' functionality, or otherwise changes the way those elements function, such as in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The claims in McRO were directed to lip synchronization and facial expressions of animated characters, and the computerized system in McRO operated by rules whose implementation was not previously available manually. See McRO, 837 F.3d at 1316. In contrast, each of the method 14 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 steps [a]-Li] recited in claim 1 can be performed entirely as a mental process, as discussed supra. The proper guidance for determining patent eligibility for claims reciting limitations that can be performed entirely as a mental process is Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1150 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Like steps [ a ]-Li] of claim 1, the claims at issue in Synopsys did not require employing a computer or any other physical device wherein the claimed method failed to call for any form of computer implementation. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1149. Accordingly, the court in Synopsys distinguished the claims at issue from McRO: Synopsys cannot rely on our decision[] in ... McRQ[J to support the patentability of the Asserted Claims ... [i]n McRO, we similarly held that claims that recited "a specific asserted improvement in computer animation" were not directed to an unpatentable abstract idea ... the Asserted Claims do not involve the use of a computer in any way ... [ and] thus cannot be characterized as an improvement in computer technology. Id. at 1149-50 (citations and footnotes omitted). Similarly, claim 1 's additional elements beyond the above-identified judicial exceptions do not improve the computer itself, or another technology or technical field. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55 (citing MPEP § 2106.05(a)). Rather, steps [a]-Li] of claim I can be performed entirely as a mental process and do not require any physical device outside of presolution activity (i.e., "recorded call" and "transcription of the recorded call"). See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373 ("a method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible ... [ m ]ethods which can be performed entirely in the 15 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 human mind are unpatentable ... because computational methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the types of methods that embody the 'basic tools of scientific and technological work' that are free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.") (quoting Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). Nor do Appellants argue claim 1 's additional elements implement the identified judicial exception with or use the judicial exception in conjunction with a particular machine or a particular transformation. See MPEP §§ 2106.0S(a), 2106.0S(c). In addition, we are not persuaded by Appellants' conclusory assertion that claim 1 is patent eligible because it improves upon tasks humans are capable of performing. See App. Br. 11. We find no language in the claims that implies any speed or accuracy constraint that a human could not attain, necessitating the use of a computer. Furthermore, merely "[ u ]sing a computer to accelerate an ineligible mental process does not make that process patent-eligible." Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (US.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also CLS Bank Int'! v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en bane) ("simply appending generic computer functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility."), aff'd, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). Lastly, Appellants contend the claimed invention does not monopolize or pre-empt the relevant technical field. See App. Br. 10. However, "[ w ]hile preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility" or render a 16 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 claim any less abstract. See Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362---63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract."). For the above-stated reasons, we determine the additional elements recited in independent claim 1 beyond the judicial exceptions, whether considered alone or in combination, do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Alice Step Two, Step 2B Under the Revised Guidance, if a claim: (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, we then look to whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or, simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. On the record before us, Appellants have not shown that the claims add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well- understood, routine, [ and] conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)). We find no reversible error in the Examiner's determination that additional elements, such as a recorded call, are nothing more than generic elements using conventional concepts. See Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 6, 1 7. In fact, the Specification supports the Examiner's finding that additionally recited elements are at best generic computer elements 17 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 performing generic computer functions, by providing non-limiting and exemplary descriptions of generic computer components that are used to carry out recording a call and transcribing a recorded call. Spec. ,r,r 9--10, 14--21. Significantly, Appellants have not asserted that the additional elements "recorded call" and a "transcription of a recorded call" recited in claim 1 constitute non-conventional and non-generic arrangements of known, conventional pieces, which results in an inventive concept. See generally App. Br. Appellants do not argue dependent claims 2-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20 separately with particularity, but assert the rejection of those claims should be withdrawn for at least the same reasons as argued for independent claim I. Id. at 12. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that each of claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20, considered as a whole, is directed to a patent- ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application, and does not include an inventive concept. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner's rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18-20.5 DECISION We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-7, 11, 13-16, and 18 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with 5 To the extent Appellants have not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 18 Appeal2018-006436 Application 14/467,783 this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 19 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation