Ex Parte Rofougaran

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 31, 2012

11536123 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/536,123 09/28/2006 Ahmadreza Rofougaran 0250352 8558 25700 7590 10/31/2012 FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP 26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360 MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691 EXAMINER CHANG, JOSEPH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2817 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/31/2012 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ________________ Ex parte AHMADREZA ROFOUGARAN ________________ Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 Technology Center 2800 ________________ Before SCOTT R. BOALICK, ERIC B. CHEN, and JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL SUMMARY Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-33, all the claims pending in the application. App. Br. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 1, 2, 11-13, 22-24, and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Harrer (US 6,091,304; issued July 18, 2000; filed Sep. 22, 1998). Ans. 3-4. Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 2 Claims 1-33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Harrer, Nieri (US 6,838,951 B1; issued Jan. 4, 2005; filed June 3, 2003), Kim (US 6,836,193 B1; issued Dec. 28, 2004; filed Dec. 20, 2002), Duncan (US 6,426,680 B1; issued July 30, 2002; filed May 26, 2000), Takahashi (US 7,259,638 B2; issued Aug. 21, 2007; filed Sep. 8, 2005), and Yin (US 6,909,332 B2; issued June 21, 2005; filed Aug. 12, 2003). Ans. 4-5. We affirm-in-part. STATEMENT OF CASE Appellant’s invention relates to a local oscillator (LO) generator architecture for multi-band wireless systems. Spec. [002]. Claim 1 is illustrative and reproduced below with the key disputed limitations emphasized: 1. A method for generating timing signals, the method comprising: in a multi-standard wireless communication system that processes a plurality of RF signals located in different frequency bands using a single VCO, selecting from a plurality of frequencies, a frequency of oscillation of a signal generated by said single VCO by configuring at least one of the following: a capacitor circuit and a varactor circuit; and in response to said selecting, generating, utilizing said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz. Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 3 CONTENTIONS1 The Examiner finds that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin teach all recited claim limitations of claim 1, except the specific recited frequency ranges. Ans. 5. The Examiner further states: As one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that such frequency ranges are wireless communication system standard frequency ranges, and as suggested by references that the VCO may be tuned to desired frequency ranges, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to tune the VCO so that it can be used within the frequency ranges for the wireless communication frequency standard. Ans. 5; see also Ans. 4-5, 7. Appellant argues that the combination of Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi and Yin does not teach or disclose ‘generating, utilizing said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz[,] and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz,’ as is recited in claim 1. App. Br. 17. Appellant further argues that “the Examiner has provided no evidence of the existence of a VCO circuit, which may be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards,” and that Takahashi teaches away from a VCO that can be tuned to every frequency range 1 Rather than repeat the Examiner’s positions and Appellant’s arguments in their entirety, we refer to the following documents for their respective details: the Appeal Brief (App. Br.) filed June 1, 2009; the Examiner’s Answer (Ans.) mailed September 2, 2009; and the Reply Brief (Reply Br.) filed October 30, 2009. Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 4 specified by multiple communication standards. App. Br. 19-20; see also App. Br. 16-23; Reply Br. 7-8. ISSUE Under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), has the Examiner erred by finding that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin collectively teach “generating, utilizing said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz” as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS Regarding claim 1, we agree with the Examiner’s position that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin collectively teach all claim limitations. Although the Examiner acknowledges that the cited art does not disclose the specific frequency ranges recited in claim 1, the Examiner nonetheless rationally explains why the claimed invention would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 5. Appellant argues that the cited art does not teach “generating, utilizing said single VCO, a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of frequency ranges comprising 850 MHz to 1 GHz, 1.7 GHz to 2.1 GHz, 2.4 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and 4.9 GHz to 5.9 GHz” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 17. However, the Examiner explains that one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that such frequency ranges are wireless communication system standard frequency ranges, and that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 5 tune the VCO so that it can be used within wireless communication system standard frequency ranges. Ans. 5. Further, the claims do not recite that the VCO circuit may be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards as Appellant argues (App. Br. 19). Whether the VCO may be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards is irrelevant to the language of the claims at issue; the claims recite that the VCO is utilized to generate a local oscillator signal having a frequency within a plurality of specified frequency ranges. Finally, with regard to Appellant’s argument (App. Br. 19-20) that Takahashi teaches away from a VCO that can be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards, as explained above, the claims do not recite that the VCO circuit may be tuned to every frequency range specified by multiple communication standards. Appellant has not provided any persuasive rebuttal or persuasive explanation as to why the Examiner’s explanation is insufficient. Weighing Appellant’s arguments against the Examiner’s specific and detailed findings, we conclude Appellant has not shown error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection based on Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin regarding claim 1. We therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, as well as claims 2, 3, 5, 11-14, 16, 22-25, 27, and 33, which are not separately argued. We also agree with the Examiner’s position, with regard to claims 4, 6, 15, 17, 26, and 28, that Harrer, Nieri, Kim, Duncan, Takahashi, and Yin collectively teach all claim limitations. Ans. 4-5, 7-8. Appellant argues (App. Br. 24-26) that the cited art does not support the Examiner’s assertions Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 6 that the VCO may be tuned to desired frequency ranges, and refers to Appellant’s arguments for claim 1. As previously discussed with respect to claim 1, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s explanation is insufficient, and accordingly, are not persuaded that the Examiner has erred in rejecting claims 4, 6, 15, 17, 26, and 28. We therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 6, 15, 17, 26, and 28. With regard to claims 7, 9, 18, 20, 29, and 31, the Examiner did not clearly map the recited limitations to the cited art, or otherwise explain why the recited limitations would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Ans. 4-5. The Examiner did not squarely address Appellant’s specific arguments in this regard (App. Br. 28-32) in the Response to Arguments section of the Answer (see Ans. 5-9) or elsewhere. The Examiner has not shown that the cited art meets the recited limitations. We therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 7, 9, 18, 20, 29, and 31, as well as claims 8, 10, 19, 21, 30, and 32, which depend therefrom. Our review of the Examiner’s obvious rejection of claims 1-33 (Ans. 4-5) is dispositive of our review of the adverse decision of the Examiner. Accordingly, we do not reach the Examiner’s anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 11-13, 22-24, and 33. Ans. 3-4. DECISION The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1-6, 11-17, 22-28, and 33 is affirmed. The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7-10, 18-21, and 29-32 is reversed. Appeal 2010-004018 Application 11/536,123 7 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv) (2010). AFFIRMED-IN-PART rwk