Ex Parte Reid et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 14, 2016

13384348 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/384,348 01/17/2012 W. Scott Reid
24737 7590 11/16/2016
PHILIPS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & STANDARDS
465 Columbus A venue
Suite 340
Valhalla, NY 10595
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
2009P00743WOUS 7031
EXAMINER
TOMASZEWSKI, MICHAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/16/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
marianne.fox@philips.com
debbie.henn@philips.com
patti. demichele@Philips.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte W. SCOTT REID and BRIAND. GROSS
Appeal2014-009896 1
Application 13/384,3482
Technology Center 3600
Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 2-21. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision references Appellants' Appeal Brief ("App. Br.," filed
April 14, 2014) and Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed August 19, 2014), and
the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed June 20, 2014), and Final Office
Action ("Final Act.," mailed November 15, 2013).
2 Appellants identify Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. as the real party
in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2014-009896
Application 13/384,348
CLAIMED fNVENTION
Appellants' claimed invention "relates to a network, system, or
method for electronically determining whether rooms or equipment in a
health care environment are clean or dirty" (Spec. 1, 11. 2--4).
Claims 4 and 12 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 4,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
4. A room monitoring system, comprising:
a plurality of in-room units which collect information
relating to a clean or dirty status of a plurality of patient rooms
and/or equipment in the rooms, wherein the in-room units each
include:
one or more sensors positioned in the room and
configured to measure cleanliness of the patient room
and/ or equipment in the room;
a monitoring station which receives clean or dirty status
information from the in-room units and determines which
rooms are clean, and ready for a patient, which are dirty
and in need of cleaning, and which are occupied.
REJECTIONS
Claims 2, 4, 5, 8-13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Reeder et al. (WO 03/014871 A2, pub. Feb. 20, 2003)
(hereinafter "Reeder") and Swart et al. (US 2009/0276239 Al, pub. Nov. 5,
2009) (hereinafter "Swart").
Claims 3 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Reeder, Swart, and Rosow et al. (US 2003/0074222 Al, pub. Apr. 17,
2003) (hereinafter "Rosow").
Claims 6, 7, 14, 17, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Reeder, Swart, and Downing (US 6,647,765 B2,
iss. Nov. 18, 2003).
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Appeal2014-009896
Application 13/384,348
Claims 19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Reeder, Swart, and Jang (US 5,869,007, iss. Feb. 9, 1999).
Claim 21 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over
Reeder, Swart, Downing, and Jang.
ANALYSIS
Independent Claim 4 and Dependent Claims 2, 5, and 8-11
We are persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because neither
Reeder nor Swart, alone or in combination, discloses or suggests "a plurality
of in-room units ... wherein the in-room units each include: one or more
sensors positioned in the room and configured to measure cleanliness of the
patient room and/or equipment in the room," as recited in claim 4 (App.
Br. 7-9; see also Reply Br. 2-3).
Reeder is directed to a patient point-of-care computer system, and
discloses a monitor 2014, at page 46, line 8 through page 47, line 3, cited by
the Examiner (Final Act. 3), which includes a sensor 2011 (or a plurality of
sensors 2011) for detecting badges or tags worn by caregivers, patients, etc.,
or mounted onto equipment, supplies, files, etc., and a camera 2015 for
providing video input to a client device 2006. Reeder discloses that client
device 2006 detects and identifies individuals, e.g., the cleaning staff, as
they come within the range of sensor 2011, and may display a message
requiring the staff member to activate a displayed icon to indicate that the
room cleaning procedure is complete (Reeder 46, 11. 20-27). The client
device, alternatively, may employ business logic that assumes, if a member
of the cleaning staff remains within the range of sensor 2011 for at least a
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Appeal2014-009896
Application 13/384,348
pre-determined time period (e.g., 15 minutes), that the room cleaning
procedure is complete (id. at 46, 11. 29--32).
The Examiner relies on Reeder as disclosing in-room units that
include one or more sensors configured to measure cleanliness of the patient
room, as recited in claim 4 (Final Act. 3 (citing Reeder 46, 1. 8--47, 1. 3; 59,
11. 1-30; Figs. 129--132)). However, we agree with Appellants that relying
on a cleaning staff member to activate a cleaning complete icon or a
processor to measure a time that a member of the cleaning staff is near a
sensor does not constitute "one or more sensors positioned in the room and
configured to measure cleanliness of the patient room," as called for in
claim 4 (App. Br. 7-8; Reply Br. 2).
The Examiner asserts in the Answer that Swart explicitly teaches
measuring the cleanliness of equipment in the room and discloses the use of
"photo luminescent or chemiluminescent indicators (i.e., sensors) positioned
in rooms, on surfaces, on equipment, etc. to validate a room, a surface,
equipment, and the like, has been cleaned" (Ans. 4 (citing Swart i-f 75)). Yet
Swart merely describes that a photoluminescent or chemiluminescent can be
applied to a high touch surface, e.g., a sink, toilet seat, toilet handle, in a
patient room prior to cleaning; the high touch surface can then be inspected
with a black light after cleaning to determine if the indicator was disturbed
by the cleaning process (see Swart i-fi-175, 93-94). Swart discloses that
"[t]raining would be provided to hospital personal on what constitutes a
'passing' or 'failing' result" (see id. i-f 94) and, thus, makes clear that the
cleanliness of the high touch surface is determined by a human being, i.e.,
that the determination is a manual process.
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Appeal2014-009896
Application 13/384,348
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection
of independent claim 4 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
also do not sustain the rejection of dependent claims 2, 5, and 8-11.
Cf In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("dependent claims
are nonobvious if the independent claims from which they depend are
nonobvious").
Independent Claim 12 and Dependent Claims 13 and 15
Independent claim 12 includes language substantially similar to the
language of claim 4 and stands rejected based on substantially the same
rationale applied with respect to claim 4 (see Final Act. 5). Therefore, we do
not sustain the Examiner's rejection of independent claim 12, and claims 13
and 15, which depend therefrom, for the same reasons set forth above with
respect to independent claim 4.
Dependent Claims 3, 6, 7, 14, and 16-21
Each of claims 3, 6, 7, 14, and 16-21 depends, directly or indirectly,
from one of independent claims 4 and 12. The rejections of claims 3, 6, 7,
14, and 16-21 do not cure the deficiency in the Examiner's rejection of
independent claims 4 and 12. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner's
rejections of claims 3, 6, 7, 14, and 16-21 for substantially the same reasons
set forth above with respect to the independent claims.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejections of claims 2-21under35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
are reversed.
REVERSED
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