Ex Parte Rasmusson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 2, 2015

12127462 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 2, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/127,462 05/27/2008 Jim Rasmusson 4015-6087 / P25258-US2 8502
24112 7590 07/02/2015
COATS & BENNETT, PLLC
1400 Crescent Green, Suite 300
Cary, NC 27518
EXAMINER
CRADDOCK, ROBERT J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2618
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/02/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte JIM RASMUSSON, TOMAS AKENINE-MOLLER,
PETRIK CLARBERG, JON HASSELGREN, and
JACOB MUNKBERG
____________________

Appeal 2013-003706
Application 12/127,462
Technology Center 2600
____________________

Before JOHN F. HORVATH, WILLIAM M. FINK, and
JOHN A. HUDALLA, Administrative Patent Judges.

FINK, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–18. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 The real party in interest is identified as Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson.
App. Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to storing compressed first image array
tiles for use as a texture to be decompressed and applied to one or more
primitives in a second image array. Abstract.2 Claims 1 and 12 are the
independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative of Appellants’
invention and is reproduced below with disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A method of processing three-dimensional (3D) graphics
data, comprising:
updating one or more tiles of a first image array with graphics
data;
compressing the one or more tiles, using a real-time buffer
compression algorithm, to obtain compressed image array
tiles;
storing the compressed image array tiles for subsequent use as a
texture; and
during real-time rendering of a second image array:
retrieving the compressed image array tiles,
decompressing the compressed image array tiles using a
decompression algorithm corresponding to the buffer
compression algorithm, and
applying the decompressed image array tiles as a texture map
to at least a first primitive in the second image array.

App. Br. 22.

2 Our decision refers to Appellants’ Appeal Brief filed October 9, 2012
(“App. Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 23, 2012 (“Ans.”);
Appellants’ Reply Brief filed January 23, 2013 (“Reply Br.”); the Final
Office Action mailed May 9, 2012 (“Final Act.”); and the original
Specification filed May 27, 2008 (“Spec.”).
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Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
as indefinite for failure to particularly point out and distinctly claim the
subject matter which the applicants regard as the invention.
Claims 1, 2, 6–9, 11, 12, and 14–17 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nielsen (US 2001/0019331
Al; September 6, 2001) and Barcena (US 2002/0190997 Al; December 19,
2002).
Claim 3 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nielsen, Barcena, and Penna (US 5,784,064; July 21,
1998).
Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Nielsen, Barcena, and Fowler (US 2008/0225049 Al;
September 18, 2008).
Claims 5, 10, 13, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Nielsen, Barcena, and Goris (US 6,157,743;
December 5, 2000).
Based on Appellants’ arguments, the issues on appeal are:
I. Whether the term “real-time” in Appellants’ claims 1, 5, 8, 9,
12, 16, and 17 is indefinite;
II. Whether the combination of Nielsen and Barcena teaches or
suggests A) the limitations of claim 1; B) the limitations of
claim 6; C) the limitations of claim 8; and D) the limitations of
claim 9.

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ANALYSIS
I. Rejection of claims 1–18 under § 112, second paragraph

We have reviewed Appellants’ arguments contending the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 1–18 as indefinite, as well as the Examiner’s
response to Appellants’ arguments. The test for indefiniteness is whether
“those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the claim is
read in light of the specification.” Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel
Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). We
concur with Appellants’ conclusion that the term “real-time,” as recited in
claims 1, 5, 8, 9, 12, 16, and 17 has a well-understood meaning in the
context of the claims, i.e., without meaningful delay. App. Br. 6.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under § 112, second
paragraph.

II. Rejection of claims 1–18 under § 103

A. Claims 1–5, 7, 12, 13, and 15

In rejecting Appellants’ independent claim 1, the Examiner relies on
the combination of Nielsen and Barcena. Final Act. 9–10. Specifically, the
Examiner finds Nielsen teaches the limitations of claim 1, “but doesn’t
explicitly disclose [applying] a texture map to at least a first primitive,
however this is well known and expected in the art.” Id. at 10 (citing
Barcena ¶ 32).
Appellants dispute the Examiner’s finding that Nielsen’s tiles, which
are, e.g., 128x128 pixels in size, teach or suggest the recited “tiles,” which,
Appellants further contend, comprises a “small number of pixels, such as
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4x4 or 8x8 pixels.” App. Br. 10; see also Reply Br. 5. According to
Appellants, paragraph 23 of the Specification expressly defines “tile” as the
smallest unit retrieved from memory for processing by the graphics
processing unit. App. Br. 11. Appellants further contend a person of
ordinary skill in the art would not think tiles of the size described in Nielsen
could be processed in a “‘real-time’ manner,” as the claims require. Id. at
11–12.
We are not persuaded by these arguments. Claim terms are given the
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. In re
Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Although claims are interpreted in light of the specification, “limitations are
not to be read into the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988
F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Here, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that the tiles described in
Nielsen are within the scope of the recited “tiles.” Appellants’ Specification
indicates that 4x4 or 8x8 tile sizes are exemplary and provides no express
definition for the term “tile.” Spec. ¶ 23. Rather, Appellants’ Specification
simply indicates an image frame may be divided into small blocks or tiles.
Id. Similarly, Nielsen teaches that its images are divided into relatively
smaller tiles of 1/64th of the overall image size. Nielsen ¶ 38 (describing a
1024x1024 pixel image divided into 64 tiles of 128x128 pixels each).
Nielsen also states the described invention is well suited to using tiles of
other sizes. Id. ¶ 8. Regarding Appellants’ argument that a person of
ordinary skill would have considered the tiles described in Nielsen to be
unsuitable for real-time processing, we disagree. Appellants do not direct us
to evidence rebutting the Examiner’s finding that Nielsen teaches real-time
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processing. See Final Act. 9–10. We note, for example, cited paragraph 40
of Nielsen describes the invention as suitable for “video conferencing,”
which we further note is a necessarily real-time process.
In addition, Appellants’ contend the combination of Nielsen and
Barcena fail to teach or suggest “applying decompressed image array tiles as
a texture map to at least a first primitive in the second image array,” as claim
1 recites. App. Br. 14-15; Reply Br. 5–6. According to Appellants, “only a
stored decompressed image in Nielsen can be used as a texture map. That
is, Nielsen decompresses the image before rendering, and leaves the
decompressed image in the memory for subsequent use during rendering.”
App. Br. 14 (citing Nielsen ¶ 40).
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument. Initially, we note
claim 1 does not preclude “storing” the decompressed image tiles during the
processing of using the decompressed image tiles as a texture map, nor do
we read such a limitation into the claims. See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex
Products, Inc., 415 F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing open-ended
claiming as not excluding additional elements). Moreover, to the extent
Appellants’ contention is that Nielsen’s tiles, which are described as being
decompressed before being “used . . . as a texture map by [the] rendering
engine” (¶ 40), are not therefore decompressed during real-time rendering,
as the claim requires, we disagree. The claim does not require
decompression within a “rendering engine,” but rather real-time rendering
that includes decompression. As discussed supra, Nielsen describes a real-
time rendering process that includes decompressing an image and applying
the decompressed image as a texture map. See also Nielsen ¶¶ 39–40.
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Appellants also contend the combination of Nielsen and Barcena fails
to teach or suggest “storing the compressed image array tiles for subsequent
use as a texture.” App. Br. 15–16. However, as the Examiner points out,
and Appellants do not rebut in reply, “Nielsen’s [ ] decompressed tiles were
in fact compressed tiles prior to being decompressed tiles.” Ans. 28; see
also Nielsen ¶ 40. Moreover, because Nielsen’s decompressed tiles are used
as a texture, we agree the compressed tiles from which the decompressed
tiles originate are “subsequently used as a texture,” as claim 1 requires.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 over the combination of Nielsen and Barcena, and we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection. Appellants contend claim 12 recites similar language
and therefore is patentable for similar reasons. App. Br. 16. Thus, we
sustain the rejection of claim 12, as well as the rejections of dependent
claims 2–5, 7, 13, and 15, for which Appellants do not present separate
patentability arguments. See id. at 16, 20.

B. Claims 6 and 14

In disputing the Examiner’s rejection of claims 6 and 14, Appellants
contend Nielsen is different in two respects. App. Br. 17. First, Appellants
contend Nielsen does not teach or suggest storing one or more tiles in a
unified cache, as the claims require, because “the claimed tiles, which are
relatively small, are not the same thing as an incoming video stream.” Id.
We disagree. Nielsen describes storing the incoming compressed video
stream in unified system memory 202 in the form of tiles (¶¶ 34, 40), which,
as discussed supra, are the recited tiles of the claims.
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Second, Appellants contend “Nielsen does not store the incoming
compressed video data stream ‘during the updating,’ as claimed in claims 6
and 14.” App. Br. 17. Rather, Appellants contend Nielsen describes the
incoming data is decompressed prior to any updating. Id. (quoting ¶ 40).
We disagree. The cited passage of Neilson does not state the compressed
video stream is decompressed prior to updating. Moreover, as discussed in
the previous paragraph, Nielsen stores the incoming compressed data stream
in a unified cache memory in the form of tiles, which the Examiner finds
includes updating the tiles. Ans. 5. In the absence of sufficient rebuttal, we
are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 6 and 14, and
therefore sustain the Examiner’s rejection.

C. Claims 8 and 16

In disputing the Examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 16, Appellants
argue the Examiner improperly took official notice that “it is known in the
art to pick from two or more algorithms” because the claim recites “selecting
a real-time buffer compression algorithm from a plurality of such algorithms
that are available based on whether a current rendering operation is for later
use as a texture or for immediate viewing. Spec., ¶ [0040].” App. Br. 30.
Appellants also contend the official notice is without proof. Id.
We disagree. Claim 8 and the disputed portion of claim 16 do not
recite anything more than selecting a real-time buffer compression algorithm
from two or more available buffer compression algorithms. App. Br. 23
(claim 8). As such, the Examiner’s use of official notice fully addresses the
relevant claim limitation. See Final Act. 12. To adequately traverse this
finding, Appellants must “stat[e] why the noticed fact is not considered to be
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common knowledge or well known in the art.” MPEP § 2144.03(C). An
adequate rebuttal must contain sufficient information or argument to create
on its face a reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances justifying the
Examiner’s notice of what is well known to one of ordinary skill in the art.
See In re Boon, 439 F.2d 724, 728 (CCPA 1971). Consequently, simply
stating the Examiner’s finding is without proof, as Appellants do here, is not
sufficient to traverse the Examiner’s notice. We therefore sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 8 and 16.

D. Claims 9–11, 17, and 18

In disputing the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 17, Appellants
argue the Examiner erred in finding the “functions” of claims 9 and 17 are
performed during real-time rendering, as the claims require. App. Br. 19
(citing Final Act. 12). However, as discussed supra, we are not persuaded
Nielsen’s description of storing a compressed video stream as tiles,
decompressing the tiles, and applying the decompressed tiles to an image, is
not part of the real-time rendering process disclosed in, for example,
Nielsen’s video conference application. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 9 and 17 over Nielsen and Barcena.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 17, as well as
the rejections of claims 10 and 11, which depend from claim 9 and are not
separately argued, and the rejection of claim 18 which depends from claim
17 and is not separately argued.

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DECISION
We reverse the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–18 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
We affirm the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1–18 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim before us on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is
affirmed. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED
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