Ex Parte Raju et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 9, 2017

13368598 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/368,598 02/08/2012 Madhuri Raju 83210723 1784
28395 7590 01/11/2017
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER CHEUNG, MARY DA ZHI WANG
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3665
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/11/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MADHURI RAJU, JOSEPH CARL BEISER, and
GERALD DOUGLAS NEELY
Appeal 2015-005141
Application 13/368,5981
Technology Center 3600
Before ANTON W. FETTING, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.
SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of
claims 15—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
The Specification states that “[t]he illustrative embodiments generally
relate to a method and apparatus for alerting a driver of warning conditions.”
Spec. 11.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Ford Global
Technologies, LLC. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-005141
Application 13/368,598
CLAIMS
Claims 15—20 are on appeal. Claim 15 is the only independent claim
on appeal and recites:
15. A computer-implemented method comprising:
sending route data to a remote server for processing;
responsively receiving one or more geo-fences defining a
perimeter around hazardous environmental conditions along a
route defined by the route data;
monitoring the progress of a vehicle until a boundary of
one of the geo-fences is reached; and
notifying the remote server that the boundary was
reached, including sending vehicle coordinate data.
Br., Claims App. 1.
REJECTIONS2
1. The Examiner rejects claims 15—19 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Breen.3
2. The Examiner rejects claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Breen in view of official notice.
DISCUSSION
Anticipation
With respect to the anticipation rejection, Appellants raise separate
arguments regarding only independent claim 15 and dependent claim 17.
We address each of these claims separately below, and the remaining claims
subject to this rejection, i.e. claim 16, 18, and 19, stand or fall with claim 15.
2 The rejection of claim 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 112 has been withdrawn.
3 Breen, US 2008/0162034 Al, pub. July 3, 2008.
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Application 13/368,598
Claim 15
With respect to claim 15, the Examiner finds that Breen discloses a
method as claimed including sending route data to a central station,
receiving geo-fencing data defining the perimeter of a hazardous
environmental condition, monitoring vehicle progress, and sending
notifications when a boundary has been reached. Final Act. 3^4 (citing
Breen Figs. 2, 3; H 32, 33, 41, 45, 46, 50, 54, 55).
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings with respect to
claim 15, and we are not persuaded of error by Appellants’ arguments, as
discussed below.
First, Appellants argue that the claims require “a fence defining a
perimeter around the condition itself,” which is different than Breen’s
disclosure of “defining a perimeter around a road running through a
condition.” Br. 5. We are not persuaded of a patentable distinction between
the claimed geo-fences and the geo-fences disclosed by Breen. Breen
discloses defining a geo-fence perimeter on a path that traverses an
“excessively windy road.” Breen 142. By defining the perimeter around
this portion of the road, Breen necessarily discloses “defining a parameter
around a hazardous environmental condition” because the condition is only
hazardous from the perspective of the vehicle, which is on the road. Thus, to
the extent Appellants are arguing that the claim requires defining a perimeter
around the entirety of the hazardous condition, Breen discloses just that.
Second, to the extent Appellants argue that none of the other
conditions described in Breen, including a low-height or weight limited
bridge, may be characterized as environmental hazards, we disagree. See
Br. 6—7. We agree with the Examiner that a low bridge, as well other
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Appeal 2015-005141
Application 13/368,598
situations described by Breen, are hazardous environmental conditions under
the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim. In particular, the
Specification does not provide a limiting definition of such conditions and
only generally describes hazards as including, but not limited to, “weather
conditions, allergen conditions, hazardous material or emergency conditions,
etc.” Spec. 133. Further, the Examiner’s interpretation of the claim is
consistent with the ordinary meaning of environmental: “the circumstances,
objects, or conditions by which one is surrounded.” Definition of
Environment, Merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/environment, last visited
Jan. 3, 2017. Finally, we are not persuaded that the Examiner’s
interpretation is overbroad because it “strips the word ‘environmental’ of all
meaning.” Br. 6. Rather, the term environmental still has meaning in that it
refers to the conditions surrounding the vehicle rather than any condition of
the vehicle itself.
Based on the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claim 15. We also
sustain the rejection of claims 16, 18, and 19 for the same reasons.
Claim 17
Claim 17 depends from claim 15, and further requires “wherein the
perimeter defines an area larger than the hazardous condition, such that the
perimeter will be crossed prior to reaching the hazardous condition.” Br.,
Claims App. 1. Appellants argue that “[njothing in Breen actually
demonstrates the size of any hazardous condition,” and the Examiner has not
supported the statement that Breen’s geo-fences are larger than the
hazardous condition. Br. 6. We are not persuaded of error. Breen discloses,
for example, a geo-fence defining a perimeter around a path including a low
bridge, which would necessarily include an area larger than the bridge, i.e.
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Application 13/368,598
the hazardous condition, itself such that an alert is sent before the vehicle
reaches the bridge. See Breen 142. Thus, we are not persuaded of error,
and we sustain the rejection of claim 17.
Obviousness
With respect to claim 20, the Examiner finds and concludes:
As to claim 20, Breen teaches generating geo-fence with
various types of hazardous condition and utilization of the geo­
fence data (1 30-35, 41, 50 and Fig. 3). Breen does not
specifically teach updating and replacing the geo-fence data.
The examiner takes Official Notice it is well known in the art to
update and replace old information with the newly updated
information. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time the invention was made to allow the
geo-fence in Breen’s teaching to include the features of
updating and replacing the outdated geo-fence data for
providing more accurate information.
Final Act. 5. Further, in response to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner
finds that “because road constructions happen very frequently, maps and
geo-fences need to be updated.” Ans. 3^4.
Appellants argue:
The claims define, specifically, how the alleged “new
information” is utilized and how the geo-fence is updated based
on this information. Again, this further supports the contention
that a “bridge” is not an environmental condition as claimed,
and thus Breen does not disclose defining a perimeter around an
environmental condition. A change in the “windy” conditions
in Breen would either result in no perimeter around road 190 or
the persistence of the perimeter around road 190, but there
would be no re-definition of the perimeter around the
environmental condition as claimed, because that simply does
not occur in Breen.
Br. 7.
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Application 13/368,598
We agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary skill would have
found it obvious to update Breen’s geo-fence perimeters based on changing
environmental conditions, including a change in condition based on road
construction, which may be considered a “geographic change in the
hazardous condition” under the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
claim. Appellants’ argument does not persuade us of any error in this
conclusion. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 20.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the rejections of claims 15—
20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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