Ex Parte Powell

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 31, 2019

14815452 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/815,452 07/31/2015
31894 7590 01/31/2019
OKAMOTO & BENEDICTO, LLP
P.O. BOX 641330
SAN JOSE, CA 95164
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mat Rob Powell
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
10033.027400 1067
EXAMINER
EDWARDS, LINGLAN E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2491
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2019 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAT ROB POWELL
Appeal2018-003876
Application 14/815,452 1
Technology Center 2400
Before CARL W. WHITEHEAD JR., IRVINE. BRANCH, and
JOHN R. KENNY, Administrative Patent Judges.
BRANCH, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of
claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-20, which are all of the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Trend Micro,
Incorporated. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2018-003876
Application 14/815,452
Technology
The application relates to ransomware remediation. Spec. Abstract.
Illustrative Claim
Claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-20 are pending; of these, claims 1, 8,
and 15 are independent. Claim 1 is reproduced below for reference:
1. A method for remediating a ransomware infection, the
method comprising:
monitoring network traffic of a plurality of network users
for a data signature;
detecting the data signature in a network traffic of a
network user of the plurality of network users, the data
signature indicating that the network user has been infected by a
ransomware application;
in response to detecting the data signature in the network
traffic of the network user, extracting an encryption key from
the network traffic of the network user[;]
storing the encryption key with an identifier of the
network user;
retrieving the encryption key using the identifier of the
network user; and
decrypting at least one file of the network user using the
encryption key.
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Appeal2018-003876
Application 14/815,452
References and Re} ections2' 3
Claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement.
Final Act. 7.
Claims 1, 3---6, 8, 10-13, 15, and 17-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ I03(a) as unpatentable over Niemela (US 2013/0067576 Al; Mar. 14,
2013) and Scoggins (US 2006/0212933 Al; Sept. 21, 2006). Final Act. 8-
14.
Claims 7 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I03(a) as
unpatentable over Niemela, Scoggins, and Tock (US 2015/0135317 Al;
May 14, 2015). Final Act. 14--15.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejections in light of Appellant's
arguments. We have considered in this Decision only those arguments
Appellant actually raised in the Briefs. Any other arguments Appellant
could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We adopt the Examiner's findings
and conclusions as our own, to the extent consistent with our analysis herein.
2 Rather than repeat the Examiner's positions and Appellant's arguments in
their entirety, we refer to the above mentioned Appeal Brief filed November
28, 2017 ("App. Br."), as well as the following documents for their
respective details: the Final Action mailed September 26, 2017 ("Final
Act."), the Examiner's Answer mailed January 4, 2018 ("Ans."), and
Appellant's Reply Brief filed February 27, 2018 ("Reply Br.").
3 The Examiner withdrew a 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, rejection of
claims 10-14. Ans. 7-8.
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Appeal2018-003876
Application 14/815,452
Rejection of claims 1, 3---8, 10---15, and 17-20 under 35 U.S. C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the enablement requirement
The Examiner contends the claims fail to comply with the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because the
Specification does not explain how "'extracting an encryption key from the
network traffic of the network user'" can be achieved. Final Act. 7.
For an enablement rejection, the PTO must "set[] forth a reasonable
explanation as to why it believes that the scope of protection provided by
that claim is not adequately enabled by the description of the invention." In
re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561---62 (Fed. Cir. 1993). "[T]o be enabling, the
specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and
use the full scope of the claimed invention without 'undue
experimentation."' Id. at 1561. Some experimentation, even a considerable
amount, is not "undue" if, e.g., it is merely routine, or if the Specification
provides a reasonable amount of guidance as to the direction in which the
experimentation should proceed. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir.
1988). The following factors are relevant in determining whether undue
experimentation would have been required to make and use an invention:
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of
direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of
working examples, ( 4) the nature of the invention, ( 5) the state
of the prior art, ( 6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of
the claims.
Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. It is not necessary for an Examiner to review all
Wands factors, as long as it is evident that the Examiner's analysis is at least
reasonably based on some of the factors. In re Hillis, 484 Fed. App'x 491,
495 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (unpublished); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm.
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Application 14/815,452
Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not necessary that a court
review all the Wands factors to find a disclosure enabling. They are
illustrative, not mandatory.").
Appellant argues that "the [S]pecification provides for a signature
repository for storage of ransom ware signatures to account for different
known ransomware." App. Br. 4 (citing Spec. ,r 32 ("[D]ata signature may
be detected by comparing its structure to at least one ransomware signature,
which may be stored in ransomware signature repository 202 of ransom ware
remediator 200 of FIG. 2.")).
We do not find the Examiner to have specifically addressed the
Wands factors. See Final Act. 7; Ans. 4--5. Nor do we find the Examiner to
have responded to Appellant's argument that enabling support may be found
at least at paragraph 32 of the Specification. Accordingly, on this record we
are persuaded of error, and we do not sustain the Examiner's rejection.
Rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
The Examiner finds Niemela discloses the subject matter of claim 1,
except that, although "Niemela teaches obtaining/extracting and storing
information for de-obfuscation in order to restore infected files[, it] does not
explicitly disclose such information being [an] 'encryption key."' Final Act.
10. The Examiner finds "Scoggins disclose[ s] security parameters such as
security keys may be obtained by intercepting network traffic data." Id.
The Examiner concludes "it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art ... , to modify the system of Niemela to incorporate the
extracting key from intercepted traffic data as disclosed by Scoggins, in
order to restor[e] ransomware affected files modified via encryption." Id.
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Application 14/815,452
Appellant argues error for several reasons under four headings: 1)
"running Niemela' s method in multiple devices will result in separate
instances of the method, but does not necessarily result [in] monitoring of
network traffic of a plurality of network users in a single" (Reply Br. 3; see
also App. Br. 4--5); 2) "the combination of Niemela and Scoggins does not
teach or suggest where to obtain the encryption key employed by the ransom
ware application" and Scoggins is non-analogous art (Reply Br. 3--4; see
also App. Br. 5-7); 3) "Because Niemela discloses ransomware detection
and remediation for a particular network device, there is no objective reason
in Niemela to store encryption keys with an identifier of an infected network
user" (App. Br. 8); and 4) "the combination of Niemela and Scoggins does
not disclose retrieving an encryption key using an identifier of the network
user." Id. at 4--8.
Appellant's arguments under the first heading are unpersuasive of
error because the claim does not require implementation of the method in a
single device. We agree with the Examiner that Niemela discloses
monitoring of multiple devices for malware. Ans. 6 ( citing Niemela ,r,r 1, 6,
57), which is sufficient to meet the "monitoring network traffic of a plurality
of network users for a data signature" limitation.
Appellant's arguments under the second heading are unpersuasive for
the reasons stated by the Examiner. Id. at 9-10. In particular, Appellant's
arguments against the references individually (App. Br. 5-7) do not
undermine the Examiner's case as to what the combined teachings of the
references would have taught or suggested to one of skill in the art. Ans. 9-
10. Further, Appellant does not convince us that Scoggins in non-analogous
art. See App. Br. 6 ("Scoggins is not analogous art in that it does not pertain
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Application 14/815,452
to combating malware."). It has been held that a prior art reference must
either be in the field of Applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably
pertinent to the particular problem with which the applicant was concerned,
in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention.
See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). With respect to this
argument, we agree with the Examiner that "Niemela and Scoggins are
analogous art because they are both directed to the general field of network
communication and data security." Ans. 10. Appellant's arguments in the
Reply Brief do not squarely rebut the Examiner's finding. See Reply Br. 3-
4 ("Scoggins requires advance knowledge of a particular network traffic that
would carry the encryption key.").
Appellant's argument under the third heading, supra, that "there is no
objective reason in Niemela to store encryption keys with an identifier of an
infected network user" is unpersuasive. First, Appellant does not
persuasively establish the absence of any "objective reason." Moreover,
Appellant's argument does not overcome the Examiner's findings that
Niemela is applicable to multi-user systems, and Niemela discloses storing
both de-obfuscation information and information for restoring user access
rights in a database. Ans. 11 ( citing Niemela ,r,r 42, 43).
Similarly, Appellant's argument under the fourth heading that "there
is no objective reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to retrieve an
encryption key using the identifier of a network user in the combination of
Niemela and Scoggins" (Reply Br. 5) is unpersuasive because it does not
overcome the Examiner's findings. Specifically, the Examiner cites
Niemela's disclosure that "the computer device may be configured to
request support from a server in network in restoration [including,] sending a
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Application 14/815,452
file to the server where the restoration is accomplished[ after which the]
restored file is returned to the computer device." Niemela ,r 42; Ans. 12.
For the foregoing reasons, we are unpersuaded of error in the
Examiner's rejection of claim 1. We sustain the rejection.
Rejection of claim 3-6, 15, and 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
Claims 3---6 depend from claim 1. Appellant argues these claims
based on claim 1. App. Br. 8. We sustain the rejection of these claims. We
also sustain the rejection of independent claim 15 and claims 17-20, which
depend therefrom, because Appellant argues these claims based on claim 1.
Id. at 8-9. Appellant also argues the rejection of claim 7 based on
arguments presented for claim 1. Id. at 8. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claim 7.
Rejection of claims 8 and 10---14 under 35 U.S. C. § 103 (a)
Claim 8 recites "memory storing an infection log" and "stor[ing] the
encryption key in the infection log." The Examiner finds "'infection log' is
interpreted as stored data related to and used for malware detection," and
finds Niemela to disclose as infection log. Ans. 13-14.
Appellant argues Niemela does not disclose "storing an encryption
key along with the identifier of a network user that has been infected by
ransomware." App. Br. 9.
Appellant argues claim 8 for the same reasons as claim 1, argued
under the third heading, which we find unpersuasive for the reasons
discussed above. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 8 and of
claims 10-14, which depend, therefore, and which Appellant argues on the
same bases.
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Application 14/815,452
DECISION
For the reasons above, we reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1, 3-8, 10-15, and 17-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, but
we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject these claims as obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 4I.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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