Ex Parte Perkins et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 28, 2016

13346841 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/346,841 01/10/2012 William Paul Perkins 83179731 1075
28395 7590 11/30/2016
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER KISWANTO, NICHOLAS
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3667
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WILLIAM PAUL PERKINS, MING LANG KUANG, and
SHUNSUKE OKUBO
Appeal 2015-0028751
Application 13/346,8412
Technology Center 3600
Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—16, and 18—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Sept. 29, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Dec. 5, 2014), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Nov. 26, 2014) and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Sept. 3, 2013).
2 Appellants identify Ford Global Technologies, LLC., as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-002875
Application 13/346,841
We REVERSE.
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention “relates to path-dependent control of
plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.” Spec. 1.
Claims 1, 9, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative:
1. A method comprising:
operating an engine of a vehicle below peak efficiency
while the engine is capable of operating at peak efficiency to
output from the engine, while a battery of the vehicle is supplying
power in response to a demanded power, only the difference in
power between (i) the demanded power and (ii) the power which
the battery can deliver, when the demanded power exceeds the
power which the battery can deliver.
REJECTION
Claims 1, 3—9, 11—16, and 18—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Fleming (US 2011/0190968 Al, pub. Aug. 4,
2011), Sugimoto (US 2012/0046814 Al, pub. Feb. 23, 2012), and Lasson
(US 6,500,089 B2, iss. Dec. 31, 2002).
ANALYSIS
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) at least because the
combination of Fleming, Sugimoto, and Lasson fails to disclose or suggest
operating an engine of a vehicle below peak efficiency
while the engine is capable of operating at peak efficiency to
output from the engine, while a battery of the vehicle is supplying
power in response to a demanded power, only the difference in
power between (i) the demanded power and (ii) the power which
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Application 13/346,841
the battery can deliver, when the demanded power exceeds the
power which the battery can deliver,
as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 9 and 16. App. Br. 5—7;
see also Reply Br. 2—5.
In rejecting claims 1, 9, and 16, the Examiner relies on Fleming as
disclosing
operating an engine of the vehicle below peak efficiency while
the engine is capable of operating at peak efficiency to output
from the engine only the difference in power between the
demanded power and the power which the battery can deliver
when the demanded power exceeds the power which the battery
can deliver.
Final Act. 3 (citing Fleming || 27—29). We disagree that Fleming discloses
operating an engine in this manner.
Fleming is directed to a more efficient operation of plug-in electric
vehicles. Fleming 12. As shown with reference to Figure 1 of Fleming,
automobile 100 includes energy conversion units 102, 132 connected to
energy storage unit 104. Id. 124, Fig. 1. Energy storage unit 104 receives
energy from one or more of energy conversion units 102 and stores the
energy. Id. The stored energy then can be used to power electronic devices
122 within automobile 100 and/or move automobile 100. Id. In particular,
the energy conversion unit 102 and/or energy storage unit 104 can operate in
various modes, such as a charge depletion mode or a charge sustaining
mode. Id. 125. In the charge depletion mode, energy conversion unit 102
does not provide energy to energy storage unit 104, thereby depleting the
state of charge (“SOC”) of energy unit 104. Id. Tffl 25—26.
At paragraphs 27—29, Fleming describes examples of moving an
automobile 100 that draws 15 kW of energy in the charge depletion mode
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Application 13/346,841
and charge sustaining unit, respectively. In the charge depleting mode,
15 kW of energy is drawn from energy storage unit 104 to move the car, and
no energy is generated by the operation of the engine and/or generator. Id.
127. In contrast, in the charge sustaining mode, the engine and generator
maintain the SOC of the energy storage unit 104 within a predetermined
range. Id. 129. Thus, the engine and generator may generate only the
15 kW necessary to move automobile 100 or they may generate 21 kW to
increase the SOC by an additional 6 kW.
Although the Examiner is correct that Fleming at paragraph 29
describes that the vehicle engine may operate below peak efficiency in the
charge sustaining mode (see Ans. 4), the battery is not supplying any power
while in this mode, as required by the claim language. Conversely, in the
charge depleting mode described at paragraph 27 of Fleming, the engine is
not operating, as required by the claim language. In other words, contrary to
the Examiner’s finding (see Final Act. 3), Fleming does not describe or
suggest affecting engine operation based on battery power while the battery
is supplying power, as required by the language recited in claim 1, and
similarly recited in claims 9 and 16.
The Examiner acknowledges that Fleming does not describe
outputting from the engine, while the battery is supplying power
in response to the demanded power, only the difference in power
between the demanded power and the power which the battery
can deliver with the demanded power exceeds the power which
the battery can deliver.
Final Act. 3. And the Examiner relies on Sugimoto to disclose “outputting
from the engine, while the battery is supplying power in response to the
demanded power, the difference in power.” Id. (citing Sugimoto 161). We
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Application 13/346,841
have reviewed the cited portion of Sugimoto. Yet we fail to see anything
that adequately supports this finding.
Sugimoto describes a plug-in hybrid vehicle equipped with an
electronic control unit (“ECU”). Sugimoto 126. A selection switch
connected to the ECU enables a user to select between a charge depleting
(“CD”) mode and a charge sustain (“CS”) mode. Id. 137. In the CS mode,
conservation of the vehicle’s battery electric power is prioritized. Id. | 54.
In contrast, in the CD mode, consumption of the battery’s electric power is
prioritized. Id. | 53. Because driving of the engine is not permitted in the
CD mode, Sugimoto describes at paragraph 61 restricting engine start if the
user’s demands exceeds the available battery power. We fail to see how,
and the Examiner does not adequately explain how, Sugimoto’s description
regarding restricting a start of an engine in the CD mode discloses or
suggests the Examiner’s finding that Sugimoto teaches “outputting from the
engine ... the difference in power” (Final Act. 3), particularly where
Sugimoto’s engine does not operate during the CD mode.
In the Answer, the Examiner maintains that Sugimoto is only relied on
for its description of outputting from the engine when the demanded power
exceeds the power that the battery can deliver. Ans. 4—5. At paragraph 64,
Sugimoto describes that if the SOC falls below a threshold value during the
CD mode, then the mode changes to the CS mode and remains in the CS
mode during the trip even if the SOC rises to the threshold value. However,
Sugimoto’s description of outputting power from the engine when the SOC
falls below a threshold value nonetheless fails to account for the operation
being “below peak efficiency” and for “only the difference in power
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between a demanded power and the power which the battery can deliver
while the battery is supplying power,” as required by the claims.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 9, and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 3—8, 11—15,
and 18-20. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which
they depend are nonobvious.”).
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—9, 11—16, and 18—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
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