Ex Parte Perkins

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 12, 2014

11853206 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 12, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/853,206 09/11/2007 William Paul Perkins 81157352 2645 28395 7590 11/12/2014 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FGTL 1000 TOWN CENTER 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 EXAMINER RUBY, TRAVIS C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3744 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/12/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte WILLIAM PAUL PERKINS ____________ Appeal 2012-0115101 Application 11/853,206 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BIBHU R. MOHANTY, and PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judges. HOFFMANN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of claims 1, 2, and 4–10.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellant identifies Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the real party in interest. See Appeal Br. 1. 2 Our decision references Appellant’s Specification (“Spec.,” filed Sept. 11, 2007), Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Feb. 27, 2012), and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Aug. 6, 2012), as well as the Examiner’s Answer (“Answer,” mailed June 7, 2012). Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 According to the Specification, Appellant’s invention “relates to automotive climate systems and methods of controlling the same.” Spec. 1, ll. 7–8. Claims 1 and 8 are the only independent claims under appeal. We reproduce below claim 1 as representative of the claims on appeal. 1. A climate system for a vehicle including a cabin, the system comprising: an electrically powered climate unit configured to alter a temperature associated with the cabin; an energy storage unit configured to provide electrical power for the electrically powered climate unit and to provide motive power for the vehicle; a receiver configured to receive a signal generated remote from the vehicle; and a controller configured to issue a command, in response to the signal, to provide electrical power from the energy storage unit to the electrically powered climate unit. REJECTIONS AND PRIOR ART The Examiner rejects the claims as follows: claims 1, 2, 4, and 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Nakamura (US 2005/0234604 A1, publ. Oct. 20, 2005); claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Nakamura and Umebayashi (US 2004/0194479 A1, publ. Oct. 7, 2004); claims 8–10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Nakamura and Grieve (US 2006/0219448 A1, publ. Oct. 5, 2006); and claim 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Nakamura and Moore (US 5,908,077, iss. June 1, 1999). Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 ANALYSIS Anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, and 6, obviousness rejection of claim 5, and obviousness rejection of claim 7 Appellant argues claims 2 and 4–7 that depend from independent claim 1, with claim 1. Appeal Br. 4–5. Thus, inasmuch as we sustain the rejection of claim 1 for the below reasons, we also sustain the rejections of the dependent claims. Claim 1 requires, “an energy storage unit configured to provide electrical power for the electrically powered climate unit and to provide motive power for the vehicle.” Appeal Br., Claims App. (emphasis added). The Examiner states that battery 14 of Nakamura teaches the claimed energy storage unit. See Answer 5. Appellant argues, however, that Nakamura’s battery 14 does not provide the claimed motive power. See Appeal Br. 3–4. Specifically, Appellant argues: Nakamura’s vehicle is caused to move by operation of a conventional internal combustion engine. . . . . Providing power to start the engine is not the same as providing motive power for the vehicle: power provided to start the engine does just that — start the engine. Moreover, the Examiner’s assertion that a battery of a conventionally powered (internal combustion engine) vehicle is configured to provide motive power for the vehicle is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of terminology in this art area. By definition, a battery of a conventionally powered (internal combustion engine) vehicle is not configured to provide motive power for the vehicle. Hence, Nakamura’s battery is not configured to provide motive power for the vehicle. Id. We disagree with Appellant, and agree with the Examiner that Nakamura’s battery 14, which Appellant concedes, “[p]rovid[es] power to start the engine,” Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 teaches the claim limitation of “provid[ing] motive power for the vehicle.” See Answer 9–10. First, we note that Appellant submits only attorney argument that “[p]roviding power to start the engine is not the same as providing motive power for the vehicle,” “the Examiner’s assertion that a battery of a conventionally powered (internal combustion engine) vehicle is configured to provide motive power for the vehicle is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of terminology in this art area,” and “[b]y definition, a battery of a conventionally powered (internal combustion engine) vehicle is not configured to provide motive power for the vehicle.” Appeal Br. 3. Appellant does not submit any evidence sufficient to establish these assertions. The Examiner states that, “[o]ne of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that a broad and reasonable interpretation of motive power would encompass the initial starting of a vehicle to allow the vehicle to move. [In Nakamura, a] battery supplies the power to start a vehicle and to allow the vehicle to continue to move.” Answer 9–10. We agree. We note that Appellant does not point to anything in the Specification or claims that defines the term “motive power.” Nor does Appellant point to anything that precludes the term “motive power” from including a battery that supplies power to start a vehicle, as taught by Nakamura. Further, we note that the dictionary definition of “motive power” includes “1. an agency (such as water or steam) used to impart motion esp. to machinery.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011). As found by the Examiner (see Answer 9–10), and as conceded by Appellant (see Appeal Br. 3–4; see also Reply Br. 1–2), Nakamura’s battery 14 imparts motion to an internal combustion engine by starting the engine. Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 Thus, based on the foregoing, we sustain the anticipation rejection of claims 1, 2, 4, and 6, as well as the obviousness rejections of claim 5 and 7. Obviousness rejection of claims 8–10 Appellant argues claims 9 and 10 that depend from independent claim 8, with claim 8. Appeal Br. 5. Thus, inasmuch as we sustain the rejection of claim 8 for the below reasons, we also sustain the rejection of the dependent claims. Claim 8 requires, “a power system configured to receive electrical power from an external power outlet.” Appeal Br., Claims App. The Examiner states that Nakamura’s battery 14 teaches limitations of the claimed power system (see Answer 7), but concedes that Nakamura does not teach that battery 14 may receive power from an external power source (see id. at 8). The Examiner finds that, “Grieve teaches a hybrid electric vehicle battery (120) that is connected (162) to an external docking station (160; i.e.[,] external power outlet) to receive electrical energy and power the batteries and electrical devices in the vehicle (Paragraph 28, 29),” and concludes: In view of Grieves’ teaching, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of invention to modify the vehicle of Nakamura to receive electrical power from an external power outlet as this allows for the air conditioner to operate without fear of draining the battery charge since the external power outlet would supply continual power to the battery and electrical power system. Id. We agree with the Examiner’s conclusion that it would have been obvious to combine the references to result in the limitations of claim 8. In KSR, the Supreme Court emphasized “the need for caution in granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). The Supreme Court reaffirmed that “[t]he combination of Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” Id. at 417. In this case, the Examiner is simply substituting Grieve’s known automotive battery for Nakamura’s known automotive battery. See Answer 11. Appellant does not point to anything that indicates Grieve’s battery is not suitable for the purpose served by Nakamura’s battery (e.g., starting an internal combustion engine). Further, we do not agree with Appellant’s argument that using Grieve’s battery would necessitate modifying Nakamura to “become[] a plug-in vehicle.” Appeal Br. 4. We also do not agree with Appellant that, “[t]he Examiner’s proposed modification to instead power Nakamura’s air-conditioning system with power from a power outlet would render Nakamura’s battery residual charge inference unit 9 useless — impermissibly altering Nakamura’s principle of operation. MPEP 2143.01 VI.” Id. at 5. Appellant does not submit any evidence tending to establish either that Nakamura’s principle of operation involves use of a battery residual charge inference unit, or that use of Grieve’s battery would render the unit useless. Appellant’s further arguments are similarly unpersuasive, amounting to conjecture as to the likely actions one of ordinary skill in the art would have taken when engineering the system. See id. Based on the foregoing, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claims 8–10. DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, and 4–10 under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103(a) are AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2012-011510 Application 11/853,206 AFFIRMED llw