Ex Parte Perez Villar et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardSep 17, 201814457084 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 17, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/457,084 08/11/2014 120226 7590 09/19/2018 Patterson & Sheridan - The Boeing Company c/o Patterson & Sheridan, LLP 24 GREENWAY PLAZA, SUITE 1600 Houston, TX 77046 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Victor Perez Villar UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13-1135-US-NP 0177US 4534 EXAMINER DAGER, JONATHAN M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3663 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/19/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): P AIR_eofficeaction@pattersonsheridan.com PatentAdmin@boeing.com PSDocketing@pattersonsheridan.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte VICTOR PEREZ VILLAR, ENRIQUE CASADO, IV AN MAZA, and FERNANDO CABALLERO Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457 ,084 1 Technology Center 3600 Before EDWARD A. BROWN, FRANCES L. IPPOLITO, and PAUL J. KORNICZKY, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's decision rejecting claims 1, 5-12, and 16-26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Nichols (US 2005/0197749 Al, published Sept. 8, 2005) and Feigh (US 2010/0286859 Al, published Nov. 11, 2010). 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 The Boeing Company ("Appellant") is the applicant, as provided by 3 7 C.F .R. § 1.46, and is identified as the real party in interest. Br. 3. 2 Claims 2--4 and 13-15 are cancelled. Br. 11-12 (Claims App.). Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1, 10, and 18 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. A method for commanding a payload of an aircraft, the method comprising: receiving a plurality of trajectory events which comprise trajectory information of the aircraft; generating and storing a plurality of payload commands using statements of payload intent, wherein the statements of payload intent comprises an operation statement and an execution interval, and wherein the execution interval is defined by a beginning trigger and an end trigger; and synchronizing each one of the stored payload commands with at least one of the plurality of trajectory events, wherein the beginning trigger and the end trigger are further associated with at least one of the plurality of trajectory events. Br. 11 (Claims App.). ANALYSIS Appellant argues claims 1, 5-12, and 16-26 collectively. Br. 7-10. We select claim 1 as representative; and claims 5-12 and 16-26 stand or fall with claim 1. See 3 7 C.F .R. § 41.3 7 ( c )( 1 )(iv). For claim 1, the Examiner finds that Nichols discloses generating payload commands using statements of payload intent ("ACRMs transformed to sensor commands for gathering surveillance data"), wherein the statements of payload intent comprise an operation statement and an execution interval ("time parameter"); and synchronizing each payload command with at least one of the trajectory events ("synchronizing sensor collection plan with flight path data"), wherein triggers are associated with at least one of the trajectory events ("sensor imaging triggered when aircraft 2 Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 in optimal position"). Final Act. 2-3 (citing Nichols ,r,r 11, 22-24). The Examiner explains, although Nichols discloses a timing constraint (i.e., a trigger) associated with imaging a target during a mission, it is unascertainable from Nichols' disclosure if there are beginning triggers and end triggers in the execution interval. Id. at 3. The Examiner finds that Feigh teaches specifying an operation interval for video surveillance data as a function of a specified time period, that is, an execution interval with a beginning trigger and an end trigger. Id. (citing Feigh ,r,r 32-34). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to modify Nichols' method in view of this teaching in Feigh to use the execution interval to provide multiple images of a selected target. Id. Appellant contends Nichols and Feigh do not disclose "generating ... payload commands using statements of payload intent ... comprising ... an execution interval ... defined by a beginning trigger and an end trigger" and "synchronizing each one of the stored payload commands with at least one of the plurality of trajectory events, wherein the beginning trigger and the end trigger are further associated with at least one of the plurality of trajectory events," as recited in claim 1. Br. 7. In this regard, Appellant contends Nichols does not tie the "image acquisition time" to trajectory events of an aircraft (id. at 8), and neither Nichols nor Feigh discloses beginning and end triggers for an execution interval for a payload and associating those triggers with trajectory events (id. at 9). The Examiner disagrees with these contentions. Regarding Nichols, the Examiner submits that the disclosed temporal, location, and posture constraints are "trajectory events." Ans. 4--5. The Examiner further 3 Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 submits, "[t]rajectory events, as claimed, is a very broad phrase encompassing virtually any event regarding the UA V while in use." Id. at 6. We note Appellant's Specification describes that "trajectory events" "comprise trajectory information of the aircraft." See Spec. 4, 11. 15-16. The trajectory events may be defined, for example, by "a predefined location." See id. at 5, 11. 3-8. Appellant's contentions do not persuade us that Nichols fails to tie the "image acquisition time" to a trajectory event of an aircraft, such as "a predefined location." Br. 8. As explained by the Examiner, in Nichols, the constraints "act as a trigger in an execution interval designed to gather images of one of a plurality of targets," and "when the posture, location, mechanical orientation of the sensor, and timing of [the] UA Vis correct, the selected sensor will be triggered, and at least one image will be taken of the target." Ans. 4--5. Feigh discloses: In an exemplary embodiment, the flight plan generation process 400 continues by identifying any timing constraints for the flight plan (task 404). For example, the flight plan generation process 400 may be configured to a user to identify one or more timing constraints for each identified surveillance target. For example, the user may designate that a first surveillance target (e.g., object 304) should be observed and/or viewed at a specified time or within a specified time period (e.g., "before 10:00 AM" or "between 10:00 AM and 10:05 AM''). Feigh ,r 33 (emphasis added). Appellant contends that the described temporal constraints (e.g., "between 10:00AM and 10:05 AM") do not correspond to an execution interval with a beginning trigger and an end trigger, but instead, Feigh uses these time constraints (image viewing times) to generate a flight plan and not to set beginning and end triggers. Br. 9. 4 Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 The Examiner responds: Given the broadest reasonable definition of the contested triggers and interval as claimed, Feigh clearly teaches an execution interval (10:00-10:05 AM, or borders of a defined geographical region) with a beginning trigger (10:00 AM, or beginning of region to be imaged) and an end trigger (10:05AM, or end of region to be imaged) in which a target is to be imaged. Ans. 5 ( emphasis added). Appellant's Specification describes, "[t]he execution interval defines the interval of the CPS by initial and end triggers that may be defined for each flight segment of the aircraft with the payload on-board or defined for any other aircraft state variable." Spec. 12, 11. 10-15. Regarding the terms "beginning trigger" and "end trigger," the Specification describes, for example, "a fixed trigger (34) refers to a specified time instant for starting or ending an execution interval." Id. at 12, 11. 18-20. The Specification also describes, for example, a "floating trigger (35) depends upon an aircraft state variable such as speed or altitude reaching a certain value to cause an execution interval to start or end." Id. at 12, 11. 20-22. Accordingly, the Specification does not appear to limit the "beginning trigger" or "end trigger" to a specified starting time or ending time in an execution interval, or to a specific "aircraft state variable." Regarding the claimed method, claim 1 does not recite that the beginning trigger or the ending trigger is a specific type of trigger. In that regard, the Examiner notes that the claimed triggers do not specifically recite "a turning on/off of a payload" or "require activation/deactivation of the payload." Ans. 6. Further, it is reasonable to interpret "within a specified time period" in Feigh as disclosing, or suggesting, to both begin and end observing and/or 5 Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 viewing of a surveillance target "between 10:00 AM and 10:05 AM." Appellant does not apprise us of any error in the Examiner's position that Feigh teaches an execution interval of 10:00 AM to 10:05 AM, or "borders of a defined geographical region," where the execution interval has "a beginning trigger (10: 00 AM, or beginning of region to be imaged) and an end trigger (10:05AM, or end of region to be imaged) in which a target is to be imaged." Ans. 5. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Appellant that Feigh fails to disclose, or suggest, an "execution interval" having a "beginning trigger" and an "end trigger," as claimed. Additionally, the Examiner submits that "[a]ny disclosure that defines an execution interval with a beginning and an end associated with a payload command and trajectory events teaches the contested elements of claim 1" and "Feigh teaches a payload is commanded over a defined interval to surveil a target or region." Ans. 6. Appellant's contentions do not persuade us that the applied combination fails to tie the "specified time period" during which a surveillance target is observed and/or viewed to a trajectory event of an aircraft, for example, the aircraft's location. Thus, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner's determination that the combination meets the claim limitation of "the beginning trigger and the end trigger are further associated with at least one of the plurality of trajectory events." Thus, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and of claims 5-12, and 16- 26, which are not separately argued, as unpatentable over Nichols and Feigh. DECISION We affirm the rejection of claims 1, 5-12, and 16-26. 6 Appeal2018-000923 Application 14/457,084 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED 7 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation