Ex Parte O et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 9, 201411695816 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2014) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/695,816 04/03/2007 Sean Patrick O'Neal 16356.1052 (DC-12174) 3327 27683 7590 01/10/2014 HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP IP Section 2323 Victory Avenue Suite 700 Dallas, TX 75219 EXAMINER RICHER, JONI ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2611 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/10/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte SEAN PATRICK O’NEAL, LAWRENCE EDWARD KNEPPER, and REYNOLD L. LIAO ____________ Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 Technology Center 2600 ____________ Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 1-20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). 1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Dell Computer Corporation. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 2 We affirm-in-part and institute a new ground of rejection within the provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2011). STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ disclosure “relates generally to information handling systems, and more particularly to graphics processing for an information handling system.” Spec. ¶ [0001]. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows: 1. A graphics processing system for displaying an image, the system comprising: a first graphics processor that is coupled to a primary display video link; and a second graphics processor that is coupled to the first graphics processor and to at least one secondary display video link; wherein the first graphics processor and the second graphics processors are operable to receive image data related to an image; and in response to determining that at least one secondary display device is deployed, the first graphics processor is operable to process a first portion of the image data and send a first portion image signal over the primary display video link, and the second graphics processor is operable to process a second portion of the image data and send a second portion image signal over the at least one secondary display video link, wherein the first portion image signal and the second portion image signal are displayable to provide a continuous view of the image; and in response to determining that at least one secondary display device is not deployed, the first graphics processor and the second graphics processor are operable to combine processing power to process the Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 3 image data and send an image signal over the primary display video link. The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims: Slobodzian US 3,941,926 Mar. 2, 1976 Searls US 2003/0006942 A1 Jan. 9, 2003 Wilk US 6,643,124 B1 Nov. 4, 2003 Ranganathan US 6,912,664 B2 June 28, 2005 Van Dongen US 2007/0052615 A1 Mar. 8, 2007 Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen and Searls. Ans. 5-9. Claims 3, 6, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Wilk. Ans. 9-10. Claims 7 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Wilk, and Slobodzian. Ans. 10-12. Claims 8, 9, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Ranganathan. Ans. 13-14. Claims 10 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Ranganathan, and Wilk. Ans. 14. Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Ranganathan, Wilk, and Slobodzian. Ans. 15. Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Briefs (“App. Br.” filed June 9, 2011; “Reply Br.” filed Aug. 23, 2011) and the Answer (“Ans.” mailed July 25, 2011) for the respective positions of Appellants and the Examiner. Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii). Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 4 ISSUES The issues presented by Appellants arguments are as follows: Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “the first graphics processor and the second graphics processors are operable to receive image data related to an image,” as recited in claim 1? Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “the first portion image signal and the second portion image signal are displayable to provide a continuous view of the image,” as recited in claim 1? Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest in response to determining that at least one secondary display device is deployed, the first graphics processor is operable to process a first portion of the image data and send a first portion image signal over the primary display video link, and the second graphics processor is operable to process a second portion of the image data and send a second portion image signal over the at least one secondary display video link, . . .; and in response to determining that at least one secondary display device is not deployed, the first graphics processor and the second graphics processor are operable to combine processing power to process the image data and send an image signal over the primary display video link, as recited in claim 1? Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “a primary display device coupled to the primary display video link and a first secondary display device coupled to the at least one secondary display video link,” as recited in claim 2? Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 5 Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest a first secondary display device and “a second secondary display device coupled to the at least one secondary display video link, . . . operable to process the second portion of the image data and send the second portion image signal over the at least one secondary display video link to the first secondary display device and the second secondary display device,” as recited in claim 4? Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “a chassis that houses a first graphics processor and a second graphics processor,” as recited in claim 15? ANALYSIS Claim 1 Appellants contend that the host computing device 406 and the video auxiliary display device 210 of Van Dongen do not receive image data related to an image. Rather, at most, the host computing device 406 receives image data related to an image and then outputs an image display (of the image) and the video auxiliary display device 210 receives state information related to a program and then outputs a state display (e.g., the color that indicates the program state.) App. Br. 7. We are unpersuaded of error. A pertinent dictionary definition of “image” is “4 a: a . . . visible representation.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 578 (10th ed. 1999). We construe “image” broadly, but reasonably, to encompass any visible representation, and, in particular any visible representation on a display device. We construe “image data” to encompass data that effects or affects the display of an image on a display device. We find nothing in the Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 6 Specification that is inconsistent with this construction, or that leads us to a narrower construction. As found by the Examiner (Ans. 5-6), Van Dongen teaches a main display screen that displays an image (i.e., a visible representation) received from a first graphics processor and receives processed state information from a second graphics processor (video auxiliary display device 210) that affects the image displayed on the main display screen, such as by “show[ing]. . . a certain color or the like that indicates a certain program state. . .” (Van Dongen, ¶ [0045]). Thus, the state information effects or affects a visible representation of the state on the main display screen, and is, therefore, “image data.” Appellants argue that Van Dongen does not teach that the second processor receives “image data” because Van Dongen does not teach that “the first portion image signal and the second portion image signal are displayable to provide a continuous view of the image,” as recited in claim 1. Appellants further explain as follows: Searls does not remedy the deficiencies of Van Dongen for this claim element. There simply is no way for the state information received by the video auxiliary display device 210 and the image data received by the host computing device 406 in Van Dongen to be displayable to provide a “continuous view of the image”, because these two piece of information are not related to an image in a way that would ever allow such functionality. Reply Br. 4. However, as pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 16-17) the Examiner relies on Searls, not Van Dongen, to teach or suggest first and second portion image signals that result in the display of a continuous image across the main display and the secondary display (see Searls, claim 7). Such an Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 7 argument does not address the combination of references articulated by the Examiner, and is unpersuasive. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Furthermore, [t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in the art. Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 (citations omitted; emphasis added). In view of the above, we are unpersuaded of error. Appellants contend that [b]ecause the host computing device 406 and the video auxiliary display device 210 of Van Dongen do not each receive image data related to an image . . . , they cannot process different portions of that image data to send different image signals over different display video links, or combine processing power to process the image data to send an image signal over the same display video link, as recited by [claim 1]. App. Br. 8. We are unpersuaded of error. As explained by the Examiner (Ans. 17), Van Dongen (see Van Dongen, ¶¶ [0002], [0031], [0032], [0034], [0045]; Figs. 2, 4) teaches processing different portions of image data, as construed supra, to send different image signals over different video links, i.e., the data, signal, and link for the main display screen 464 of Van Dongen’s host computing device 406, and the data, signals, and links, for Van Dongen’s auxiliary displays 210. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 8 [a] first graphics processor is operable to process a first portion of the image data and send a first portion image signal over the primary display video link, and [a] second graphics processor is operable to process a second portion of the image data and send a second portion image signal over the at least one secondary display video link, as recited in claim 1. Van Dongen further teaches (see Ans. 17) that the portions of the image data processed by both processors are sent as an image signal over a single video link. [T]he main display screen 464 itself can at times work as an auxiliary display to convey state, e.g., the screen may be configured to show (or occasionally show) a certain color or the like that indicates a certain program state when otherwise the screen 464 would be in a screen saver mode or turned off. Van Dongen, ¶ [0045]. We note that one of ordinary skill in the art would have known that in screen saver mode, a video display may present images. Accordingly, in the screen saver mode taught by Van Dongen’s example, the displayed image would result from a combination of the screen saver signal from screen saver data input to the graphics processor of Van Dongen’s host computing device 406 and the state data, which we have found, supra, to be image data input to the graphics processors for Van Dongen’s auxiliary displays. Thus, Van Dongen teaches “combin[ing] processing power to process the image data and send an image signal over the primary display video link,” as recited in claim 1. Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 9 Claim 2 In addition to the argument made for claim 1, from which claim 2 depends, Appellants contend that because Van Dongen teaches “the host computing system 206 and the video auxiliary display device 210 send image signals for display on the same display device. . .” (App. Br. 9), it does not teach or suggest sending the image signals for display on “multiple display devices as recited by dependent [sic] claims 2-7, 8-14, and 16-20” (id.).2 This contention is unpersuasive because, as discussed supra, Van Dongen also teaches sending image signals for display on auxiliary display devices 202, 210 (see Van Dongen Fig. 2). Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 2. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 2, and claims 3, 5, 8-10, and 12, which were argued together with claim 2. Claim 4 In addition to the argument made for claim 2, from which claim 4 depends, Appellants contend that neither Van Dongen nor Searls teach a second secondary display device as recited in claim 4. App. Br. 9. The Examiner relies on Van Dongen’s auxiliary displays 202 (see Van Dongen, Fig. 2) to teach the first and second secondary display devices. (Ans. 7, 17). We are unpersuaded of error. We note that Van Dongen identifies that there may be more than one auxiliary display (Van Dongen, Fig, 2 (“Auxiliary Display(s)” (emphasis added))). Accordingly, Van Dongen teaches or suggests a second secondary (i.e., auxiliary) display device. 2 Claim 8 is an independent claim incorporating limitations similar to those of claim 2 and claim 1, from which claim 2 depends. Compare App. Br. 13- 14 with App. Br. 12. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 10 For emphasis we note that in light of Searls’s teaching of a secondary display device (Searls’s “auxiliary display,” see Searls, claim 7), we find that providing a second secondary display device is no more than a duplication of parts. Such a duplication of parts has no patentable significance where, as here, no new and unexpected result is produced. See In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669, 671 (CCPA 1960). Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 4. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 4, and claims 6, 7, and 11-14, which were argued together with claims 2 and 4. Claim 15 In addition to the contentions discussed supra regarding claim 1, Appellants contend as follows: As can be seen in Fig. 2 of Van Dongen, element 206 is a “host computing device” and element 210 is an “auxiliary display device” that are connected together through an interface 212. The Applicants submit that this disclosure, along with the commonly understood meaning of an "auxiliary device", would indicate to one of skill in the art that the components included in elements 206 and 210 of Van Dongen are not housed in the same chassis. App. Br. 10. The Examiner takes the position that the Appellants do not clearly disclose the processors as being in the same chassis and do not clearly disclose what is meant by the same chassis. See Ans. 18-19.3 Therefore, the Examiner finds mounting the processors in displays within the same chassis would be met, for example, by mounting the processors within the housings of the displays 138, 142, 146 (see Spec. Figs. 3, 3A). See Ans. 18-19. 3 We note that the Examiner has not entered a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first or second paragraph. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 11 Appellants argue (Reply Br. 5), and we agree, that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand from Appellants’ disclosure, that the graphics processors are located in the base chassis to which the display chasses are affixed (see Spec. Figs. 3, 3A). We note that the displays identifies by the Examiner are physically attached to the base chassis. See id. Even accepting arguendo the Examiner’s interpretation that, in view of Appellants’ Specification, mounting the processors in the displays would result in “a chassis that houses a first graphics processor and a second graphics processor,” as recited in claim 15, we are persuaded of error. Although we are not persuaded that Van Dongen discloses that the first and second processors are in the different chasses, as asserted by Appellants (see App. Br. 9-10), we find that the passages of Van Dongen cited by the Examiner (Van Dongen, ¶¶ [0031], [0034], [0045]; Fig. 2) are at best silent as to the physical mounting of the first and second processors in a common chassis, and in particular as to whether Van Dongen’s Auxiliary Display Device 210 is integrated with, affixed to, or otherwise physically a part of host computing device 206 (see Van Dongen, Figs. 1, 2, 4). Appellants have persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 15. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 15 or of claims 16-20, which depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 15. NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION WITHIN 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 are rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen and Searls. Except as discussed above regarding the limitation of claim 15, from which Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 12 claims 16, 18, and 19 directly or indirectly depend, reciting “a chassis that houses a first graphics processor and a second graphics processor,” we adopt the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 5-9) regarding claim 15, 16, 18, and 19 (including the relevant findings regarding claims 1, 4, and 5) as our own. We find that integrating the first and second graphics processors in a single chassis is merely a matter of obvious engineering choice, see In re Larson, 340 F.2d 965, 968, (CCPA 1965), where, as here, the integration does not require insight that was contrary to the understandings and expectations of the prior art, cf. Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Claim 17 Claim 17 is rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Wilk. Except as discussed above regarding claim 15, from which claim 17 indirectly depends, we adopt the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 9-10) regarding claim 17 (including the relevant findings regarding claim 3) as our own. We further adopt our findings and conclusion made in entering a new ground of rejection for claim 15. Claim 20 Claim 20 is rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Wilk, and Slobodzian. Except as discussed above regarding claim 15, from which claim 20 indirectly depends, we adopt the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 10-12) regarding claim 20 (including the relevant findings regarding claim 7) as our own. We further adopt our findings and conclusion made in entering a new ground of rejection for claim 15. Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 13 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-14 is affirmed. The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 15-20 is reversed. We enter new grounds of rejection for claims 15-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding will be remanded to the examiner. . . . (2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b). No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) Appeal 2011-013051 Application 11/695,816 14 tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation