Ex Parte O et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 9, 2014

11695816 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/695,816 04/03/2007 Sean Patrick O'Neal 16356.1052 (DC-12174) 3327
27683 7590 01/10/2014
HAYNES AND BOONE, LLP
IP Section
2323 Victory Avenue
Suite 700
Dallas, TX 75219
EXAMINER
RICHER, JONI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2611
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/10/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte SEAN PATRICK O’NEAL,
LAWRENCE EDWARD KNEPPER, and
REYNOLD L. LIAO
____________

Appeal 2011-013051
Application 11/695,816
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1-20, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Dell Computer
Corporation. App. Br. 1.
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We affirm-in-part and institute a new ground of rejection within the
provisions of 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) (2011).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ disclosure “relates generally to information handling
systems, and more particularly to graphics processing for an information
handling system.” Spec. ¶ [0001]. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as
follows:
1. A graphics processing system for displaying an image,
the system comprising:
a first graphics processor that is coupled to a
primary display video link; and
a second graphics processor that is coupled to the
first graphics processor and to at least one secondary
display video link;
wherein the first graphics processor and the second
graphics processors are operable to receive image data
related to an image; and
in response to determining that at least one
secondary display device is deployed, the first graphics
processor is operable to process a first portion of the
image data and send a first portion image signal over the
primary display video link, and the second graphics
processor is operable to process a second portion of the
image data and send a second portion image signal over
the at least one secondary display video link, wherein the
first portion image signal and the second portion image
signal are displayable to provide a continuous view of the
image; and
in response to determining that at least one
secondary display device is not deployed, the first
graphics processor and the second graphics processor are
operable to combine processing power to process the
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image data and send an image signal over the primary
display video link.
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
Slobodzian US 3,941,926 Mar. 2, 1976
Searls US 2003/0006942 A1 Jan. 9, 2003
Wilk US 6,643,124 B1 Nov. 4, 2003
Ranganathan US 6,912,664 B2 June 28, 2005
Van Dongen US 2007/0052615 A1 Mar. 8, 2007
Claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 18, and 19 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen and Searls. Ans. 5-9.
Claims 3, 6, and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Wilk. Ans. 9-10.
Claims 7 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Wilk, and Slobodzian. Ans. 10-12.
Claims 8, 9, 11, and 12 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Ranganathan. Ans. 13-14.
Claims 10 and 13 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Ranganathan, and Wilk. Ans. 14.
Claim 14 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Van Dongen, Searls, Ranganathan, Wilk, and Slobodzian. Ans. 15.
Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Briefs (“App.
Br.” filed June 9, 2011; “Reply Br.” filed Aug. 23, 2011) and the Answer
(“Ans.” mailed July 25, 2011) for the respective positions of Appellants and
the Examiner. Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been
considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the
Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).
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ISSUES
The issues presented by Appellants arguments are as follows:
Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “the
first graphics processor and the second graphics processors are operable to
receive image data related to an image,” as recited in claim 1?
Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “the
first portion image signal and the second portion image signal are
displayable to provide a continuous view of the image,” as recited in claim
1?
Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest
in response to determining that at least one secondary
display device is deployed, the first graphics processor is
operable to process a first portion of the image data and send a
first portion image signal over the primary display video link,
and the second graphics processor is operable to process a
second portion of the image data and send a second portion
image signal over the at least one secondary display video link,
. . .; and
in response to determining that at least one secondary
display device is not deployed, the first graphics processor and
the second graphics processor are operable to combine
processing power to process the image data and send an image
signal over the primary display video link,
as recited in claim 1?
Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “a
primary display device coupled to the primary display video link and a first
secondary display device coupled to the at least one secondary display video
link,” as recited in claim 2?
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Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest a
first secondary display device and “a second secondary display device
coupled to the at least one secondary display video link, . . . operable to
process the second portion of the image data and send the second portion
image signal over the at least one secondary display video link to the first
secondary display device and the second secondary display device,” as
recited in claim 4?
Does Van Dongen, when combined with Searls, teach or suggest “a
chassis that houses a first graphics processor and a second graphics
processor,” as recited in claim 15?

ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Appellants contend
that the host computing device 406 and the video auxiliary
display device 210 of Van Dongen do not receive image data
related to an image. Rather, at most, the host computing device
406 receives image data related to an image and then outputs an
image display (of the image) and the video auxiliary display
device 210 receives state information related to a program and
then outputs a state display (e.g., the color that indicates the
program state.)
App. Br. 7. We are unpersuaded of error.
A pertinent dictionary definition of “image” is “4 a: a . . . visible
representation.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 578 (10th
ed. 1999). We construe “image” broadly, but reasonably, to encompass any
visible representation, and, in particular any visible representation on a
display device. We construe “image data” to encompass data that effects or
affects the display of an image on a display device. We find nothing in the
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Specification that is inconsistent with this construction, or that leads us to a
narrower construction.
As found by the Examiner (Ans. 5-6), Van Dongen teaches a main
display screen that displays an image (i.e., a visible representation) received
from a first graphics processor and receives processed state information
from a second graphics processor (video auxiliary display device 210) that
affects the image displayed on the main display screen, such as by
“show[ing]. . . a certain color or the like that indicates a certain program
state. . .” (Van Dongen, ¶ [0045]). Thus, the state information effects or
affects a visible representation of the state on the main display screen, and is,
therefore, “image data.”
Appellants argue that Van Dongen does not teach that the second
processor receives “image data” because Van Dongen does not teach that
“the first portion image signal and the second portion image signal are
displayable to provide a continuous view of the image,” as recited in claim
1. Appellants further explain as follows:
Searls does not remedy the deficiencies of Van Dongen for this
claim element. There simply is no way for the state
information received by the video auxiliary display device 210
and the image data received by the host computing device 406
in Van Dongen to be displayable to provide a “continuous view
of the image”, because these two piece of information are not
related to an image in a way that would ever allow such
functionality.
Reply Br. 4.
However, as pointed out by the Examiner (Ans. 16-17) the Examiner
relies on Searls, not Van Dongen, to teach or suggest first and second
portion image signals that result in the display of a continuous image across
the main display and the secondary display (see Searls, claim 7). Such an
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argument does not address the combination of references articulated by the
Examiner, and is unpersuasive. “[O]ne cannot show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where, as here, the rejections are based on
combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Furthermore,
[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.
Keller, 642 F.2d at 425 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In view of the above, we are unpersuaded of error.
Appellants contend that
[b]ecause the host computing device 406 and the video
auxiliary display device 210 of Van Dongen do not each receive
image data related to an image . . . , they cannot process
different portions of that image data to send different image
signals over different display video links, or combine
processing power to process the image data to send an image
signal over the same display video link, as recited by [claim 1].
App. Br. 8. We are unpersuaded of error.
As explained by the Examiner (Ans. 17), Van Dongen (see Van
Dongen, ¶¶ [0002], [0031], [0032], [0034], [0045]; Figs. 2, 4) teaches
processing different portions of image data, as construed supra, to send
different image signals over different video links, i.e., the data, signal, and
link for the main display screen 464 of Van Dongen’s host computing device
406, and the data, signals, and links, for Van Dongen’s auxiliary displays
210.
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[a] first graphics processor is operable to process a first portion
of the image data and send a first portion image signal over the
primary display video link, and [a] second graphics processor is
operable to process a second portion of the image data and send
a second portion image signal over the at least one secondary
display video link,
as recited in claim 1.
Van Dongen further teaches (see Ans. 17) that the portions of the
image data processed by both processors are sent as an image signal over a
single video link.
[T]he main display screen 464 itself can at times work as an
auxiliary display to convey state, e.g., the screen may be
configured to show (or occasionally show) a certain color or the
like that indicates a certain program state when otherwise the
screen 464 would be in a screen saver mode or turned off.
Van Dongen, ¶ [0045]. We note that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have known that in screen saver mode, a video display may present images.
Accordingly, in the screen saver mode taught by Van Dongen’s example, the
displayed image would result from a combination of the screen saver signal
from screen saver data input to the graphics processor of Van Dongen’s host
computing device 406 and the state data, which we have found, supra, to be
image data input to the graphics processors for Van Dongen’s auxiliary
displays. Thus, Van Dongen teaches “combin[ing] processing power to
process the image data and send an image signal over the primary display
video link,” as recited in claim 1.
Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1.
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Claim 2
In addition to the argument made for claim 1, from which claim 2
depends, Appellants contend that because Van Dongen teaches “the host
computing system 206 and the video auxiliary display device 210 send
image signals for display on the same display device. . .” (App. Br. 9), it
does not teach or suggest sending the image signals for display on “multiple
display devices as recited by dependent [sic] claims 2-7, 8-14, and 16-20”
(id.).2 This contention is unpersuasive because, as discussed supra, Van
Dongen also teaches sending image signals for display on auxiliary display
devices 202, 210 (see Van Dongen Fig. 2).
Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 2.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 2, and claims 3, 5, 8-10, and
12, which were argued together with claim 2.
Claim 4
In addition to the argument made for claim 2, from which claim 4
depends, Appellants contend that neither Van Dongen nor Searls teach a
second secondary display device as recited in claim 4. App. Br. 9. The
Examiner relies on Van Dongen’s auxiliary displays 202 (see Van Dongen,
Fig. 2) to teach the first and second secondary display devices. (Ans. 7, 17).
We are unpersuaded of error. We note that Van Dongen identifies that there
may be more than one auxiliary display (Van Dongen, Fig, 2 (“Auxiliary
Display(s)” (emphasis added))). Accordingly, Van Dongen teaches or
suggests a second secondary (i.e., auxiliary) display device.

2 Claim 8 is an independent claim incorporating limitations similar to those
of claim 2 and claim 1, from which claim 2 depends. Compare App. Br. 13-
14 with App. Br. 12.
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For emphasis we note that in light of Searls’s teaching of a secondary
display device (Searls’s “auxiliary display,” see Searls, claim 7), we find
that providing a second secondary display device is no more than a
duplication of parts. Such a duplication of parts has no patentable
significance where, as here, no new and unexpected result is produced. See
In re Harza, 274 F.2d 669, 671 (CCPA 1960).
Appellants have not persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 4.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 4, and claims 6, 7, and 11-14,
which were argued together with claims 2 and 4.
Claim 15
In addition to the contentions discussed supra regarding claim 1,
Appellants contend as follows:
As can be seen in Fig. 2 of Van Dongen, element 206 is a
“host computing device” and element 210 is an “auxiliary
display device” that are connected together through an interface
212. The Applicants submit that this disclosure, along with the
commonly understood meaning of an "auxiliary device", would
indicate to one of skill in the art that the components included
in elements 206 and 210 of Van Dongen are not housed in the
same chassis.
App. Br. 10.
The Examiner takes the position that the Appellants do not clearly
disclose the processors as being in the same chassis and do not clearly
disclose what is meant by the same chassis. See Ans. 18-19.3 Therefore, the
Examiner finds mounting the processors in displays within the same chassis
would be met, for example, by mounting the processors within the housings
of the displays 138, 142, 146 (see Spec. Figs. 3, 3A). See Ans. 18-19.

3 We note that the Examiner has not entered a rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first or second paragraph.
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Appellants argue (Reply Br. 5), and we agree, that one of ordinary
skill in the art would understand from Appellants’ disclosure, that the
graphics processors are located in the base chassis to which the display
chasses are affixed (see Spec. Figs. 3, 3A). We note that the displays
identifies by the Examiner are physically attached to the base chassis. See
id. Even accepting arguendo the Examiner’s interpretation that, in view of
Appellants’ Specification, mounting the processors in the displays would
result in “a chassis that houses a first graphics processor and a second
graphics processor,” as recited in claim 15, we are persuaded of error.
Although we are not persuaded that Van Dongen discloses that the
first and second processors are in the different chasses, as asserted by
Appellants (see App. Br. 9-10), we find that the passages of Van Dongen
cited by the Examiner (Van Dongen, ¶¶ [0031], [0034], [0045]; Fig. 2) are at
best silent as to the physical mounting of the first and second processors in a
common chassis, and in particular as to whether Van Dongen’s Auxiliary
Display Device 210 is integrated with, affixed to, or otherwise physically a
part of host computing device 206 (see Van Dongen, Figs. 1, 2, 4).
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the rejection of claim 15.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 15 or of claims 16-20,
which depend, directly or indirectly, from claim 15.

NEW GROUNDS OF REJECTION WITHIN 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19
Claims 15, 16, 18, and 19 are rejected on a new ground of rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen and Searls.
Except as discussed above regarding the limitation of claim 15, from which
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claims 16, 18, and 19 directly or indirectly depend, reciting “a chassis that
houses a first graphics processor and a second graphics processor,” we adopt
the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 5-9) regarding claim 15, 16, 18, and 19
(including the relevant findings regarding claims 1, 4, and 5) as our own.
We find that integrating the first and second graphics processors in a
single chassis is merely a matter of obvious engineering choice, see In re
Larson, 340 F.2d 965, 968, (CCPA 1965), where, as here, the integration
does not require insight that was contrary to the understandings and
expectations of the prior art, cf. Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 785
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
Claim 17
Claim 17 is rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, and Wilk. Except as
discussed above regarding claim 15, from which claim 17 indirectly
depends, we adopt the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 9-10) regarding claim 17
(including the relevant findings regarding claim 3) as our own. We further
adopt our findings and conclusion made in entering a new ground of
rejection for claim 15.
Claim 20
Claim 20 is rejected on a new ground of rejection under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 (a) as unpatentable over Van Dongen, Searls, Wilk, and Slobodzian.
Except as discussed above regarding claim 15, from which claim 20
indirectly depends, we adopt the Examiner’s findings (Ans. 10-12) regarding
claim 20 (including the relevant findings regarding claim 7) as our own. We
further adopt our findings and conclusion made in entering a new ground of
rejection for claim 15.
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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-14 is affirmed.
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 15-20 is reversed.
We enter new grounds of rejection for claims 15-20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
This decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). Section 41.50(b) provides that “[a] new ground of rejection . . .
shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Section 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN TWO
MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise one of
the following two options with respect to the new ground of rejection to
avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record.
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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