Ex Parte Mosier et alDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJun 25, 201914149705 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 25, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR 14/149,705 01/07/2014 Charles F. Mosier III 33649 7590 06/25/2019 Mr. Christopher John Rourk Jackson Walker LLP 2323 ROSS A VENUE SUITE 600 DALLAS, TX 75201 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 138737.00025 5852 EXAMINER HEIN, DEVIN C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3686 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/25/2019 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte CHARLES F. MOSIER III, CHAMINDA GUN ARA TNE, and MATTHEW HEILMAN Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Technology Center 3600 Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOV AN, Administrative Patent Judges. DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims 1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. The claims are directed to a method and "electronic medical record system with automated health care services evaluation" for enabling "a doctor to order tests, services or other procedures from within a patient's electronic medical record and to receive the results of the tests, services or other procedures directly within the patient's electronic medical record." (Spec. ,r,r 1, 32). Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system for processing medical data comprising: an order processing system operating on a first processor and configured to generate a physician worklist for a patient profile of an electronic medical records system, to receive an order generated from within the patient profile of the electronic medical records system, to generate an order message, and to generate an entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction; a health services system operating on a second processor and configured to receive the order message from the first processor over an open network and to process the order message to identify an alternate identification field and one or more health services provider fields and to generate an insurance services provider request as a function of the alternate identification field and to transmit the insurance services provider request to an insurance services provider system; and 1 Appellants indicate that MEDECISION is the real party in interest. (App. Br. 4). 2 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 an insurance services interface system configured to receive a response message from the insurance services provider system and to transmit the response message to the order processing system. (App. Br. 17(Claims Appendix)). REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Lamb et al. ("Lamb") Dvorak et al. ("Dvorak") Tipimeni Gunn Ringold US 2005/0209885 Al US 2006/0080620 Al US 2010/0088119 Al US 2011/0119088 Al US 8,762,163 Bl REJECTIONS The Examiner made the following rejections: Sept. 22, 2005 Apr. 13, 2006 Apr. 08, 2010 May 19, 2011 June 24, 2014 Claims 1-20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Claims 1-3 and 5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § I02(a)(l) as anticipated by Lamb. Claim 4 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Gunn. 3 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Claims 6-16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Dvorak. Claim 17 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Tipimeni. Claim 19 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Dvorak, and further in view of Tipimeni. Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Ringold. Claim 20 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Lamb in view of Dvorak, and further in view of Ringold. ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection of Claims 1-20 An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: "' [l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas'" are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court's two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Banklnt'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217-18 (2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75-77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is "directed to." See Alice, 573 U.S. at 218-19 ("On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of 4 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk."); see also Bilski v. Kappas, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) ("Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners' application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk."). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219-20; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594--95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as "molding rubber products" (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191 ); "tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores" (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267- 68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that "[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula." Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 ("We view respondents' claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula."). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim "seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract ... is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, ... and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment." Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 ("It is now 5 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."). If the claim is "directed to" an abstract idea, we tum to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where "we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A claim that recites an abstract idea must include 'additional features' to ensure 'that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea]."' Id. ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). "[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[ s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention." Id. The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of § 101. USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("Revised Guidance"). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application ("Prong Two") (see MPEP § 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}- (h)) (9th ed. 2018). Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: 6 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or ( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Revised Guidance. Appellants argue claims 1-20 together. (App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 2). We select independent claim 1 as the representative claim for the group and address Appellants' § 101 arguments thereto. Claims 2-20 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) (2017). Revised Guidance Step 1 Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites "[a] system for processing medical data." Appellants do not argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree with the Examiner's conclusion because claim 1 falls within the machine category. (Non-Final Act. 3). Revised Guidance Step 2A-Prong One (Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception?) Under Step 2A, Prong One of the Revised Guidance, we determine whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain 7 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). See Revised Guidance. The Examiner determines that independent claim 1 is directed to: [p ]rocessing a medical order to identify information [which] is data recognition and storage .... [t]ransmitting the medical order to an insurance provider [which] is using categories to organize store and transmit information .... [and] [g]enerating a worklist entry for the order and updating the worklist entry based on a response from the insurance provider regarding the order [which] is collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis. (Non-Final Act. 3--4; Ans. 3). The Examiner finds claim 1 is therefore directed to an abstract idea analogous or similar to abstract ideas identified by the courts in Content Extraction, Cyberfone, and Electric Power Group. (Non-Final Act. 3--4 (citing Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App'x 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Electric Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016))). Appellants contend the Examiner erred in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter because the claims are not directed to an abstract idea and the Examiner oversimplified the claims. (App. Br. 9; Reply Br. 2). Appellants argue the claims are not directed to an abstract idea but, rather, provide a technical, "useful and practical solution directed to a real problem [how to manage medical data reliably and privately] associated with network centric technology and management of medical data." (App. Br. 9). Appellants further argue the 8 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 "Examiner has failed to cite evidence to support" the abstract idea determination. (Reply Br. 2). Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. Although the Specification mentions a computerized arrangement for expediting medical insurance requests and approvals by insurance providers (see Spec. ,r,r 2, 32), claim 1 is not directed to such a detailed computerized arrangement or to a technical solution for managing medical data "privately" using "network centric technology" as Appellants argue (see App. Br. 9). Claim 1 recites two processors, a first one (for an order processing system) generating "an order message" and "an entry in the physician worklist," the second one(for a health services system) processing the order message to identify "an alternate identification field" and "one or more health services provider fields" and transmit a generated "insurance services provider request" to an insurance services provider system for receiving "a response message from the insurance services provider system." Claim 1 does not specify the contents of the "physician worklist" or of the "entry in the physician worklist," and does not specify what data (if any) might be present in the "alternate identification field" and "health services provider field." Claim 1 also does not address a privacy problem as Appellants assert (see App. Br. 9), as the claim merely recites first and second processors communicating "over an open network." Although claims are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations from the Specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993). More specifically, representative claim 1 recites the following limitations: (1) generating "a physician worklist for a patient profile of an electronic medical records system," receiving "an order generated from 9 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 within the patient profile of the electronic medical records system," and generating "an order message" and "an entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction;" (2) receiving and processing the order message "to identify an alternate identification field and one or more health services provider fields and to generate an insurance services provider request as a function of the alternate identification field and to transmit the insurance services provider request to an insurance services provider system;" and (3) receiving and transmitting "a response message from the insurance services provider system." (App. Br. 17 (Claims Appendix)). These limitations, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite exchanging information with a medical insurer to assess medical insurance eligibility. For example, the recited limitation (1) describes manipulating patient information to generate a medical order using "a physician worklist" and generate a message ("order message") concerning the order, which are activities that would ordinarily take place when a doctor orders medical services for a patient. The recited limitations (2) and (3) describe analyzing the order message to identify the message's contents, generate a request for insurance approval, and receive the insurer's response, which are activities that would ordinarily take place when the doctor's office contacts the patient's insurer to obtain approval or authorization for prescribed medical services. (Spec. ,r 2). Thus, Appellants' system processes medical data to determine patients' medical insurance eligibility. Insurance claim processing involves determining whether a medical claim would be allowed or denied, and determining the patients' financial burden for prescribed medical 10 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 procedures, which is a known economic practice in our system of commerce ( e.g., an economic practice typically performed by medical establishments, such as hospitals and doctors' offices }-similar to concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas. See Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344--45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (determining "system claims ... [that] only contain generalized software components arranged to implement an abstract concept [ of generating insurance-policy- related tasks based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a computer" to be patent-ineligible); In re Salwan, 681 F.App'x 938, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (claims for organizing patient health information, transferring patient health information to a patient network, and billing insurance companies held patent-ineligible); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1270, 1278, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (method and system claims for managing a stable value protected life insurance policy by performing calculations and manipulating the results held patent-ineligible). We therefore conclude representative claim 1 recites a fundamental economic practice, which is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the Revised Guidance as a judicial exception of an abstract idea. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 ( describing an abstract idea category of"[ c ]ertain methods of organizing human activity-fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk)"). Thus, representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea. We further note limitations ( 1 }-(3) of claim 1 recite steps readily performable by a human being ( e.g., by a medical professional using patient data to call or otherwise exchange information with the patient's insurer to 11 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 assess the patient's insurance eligibility for particular medical procedures). Thus, we conclude limitations (1 }-(3) in claim 1 also recite concepts that can be performed mentally and manually in the human mind, which is another abstract idea identified in the Revised Guidance. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 54; CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2011) ("[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under§ 101."). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 ("That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson."). Thus, representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea for the alternative reason. In conclusion, representative claim 1, and grouped independent claims 6 and 14, not separately argued, recite abstract ideas comprising mental processes or a fundamental economic practice. As further recognized by the Examiner, claim 1 recites collecting, analyzing, transmitting, and receiving data, similar to other claims (involving data collection and analysis) identified by the courts as directed to abstract ideas. (Non-Final Act. 3--4; Ans. 3; see Electric Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1353 (holding that "collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain results of the collection and analysis" are "a familiar class of claims 'directed to' a patent ineligible concept"); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347 (claims were "drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 12 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 2) recognizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) storing that recognized data in a memory")). We are not persuaded by Appellants' additional argument that the Examiner's § 101 rejection is defective because the "Examiner has failed to cite evidence to support" the abstract idea determination, in contradiction with "the Supreme Court's observation in Alice and Bilski regarding long prevalent concepts [which] were supported by evidence in the form of non- patent literature." (Reply Br. 2). First, we do not read Bilski and Alice as establishing a rule that evidence (such as non-patent literature) always is required to demonstrate a claim recites an abstract idea. Second, we note patent eligibility is a question of law that is reviewable de nova. Dealertrack, 674 F.3d at 1333 ("Whether a patent claim is drawn to patent- eligible subject matter is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo.") (quoting SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int'! Trade Comm'n, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). In this case, we are compelled to conclude that claim 1, and grouped claims 6 and 14, recites an abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice and method of organizing human activity. Third, the record in this case includes citations to publications showing that determining medical insurance eligibility and processing insurance claims is a known economic practice and method of organizing human activity associated with medical establishments. See Lamb ( cited by the Examiner in the present Non-Final Action dated January 11, 2017) ,r,r 5---6 (explaining that "[i]nefficiency in communication among healthcare referrers, healthcare specialty providers, insurance specialists, and any other relevant parties directly translates into inefficiency in the provision of patient care"), 14 ( describing a "referral order management system" that "enables significant reduction of ad hoc or 13 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 manual communications among specialty service providers, referrers, and patients in order to set up and complete the required specialty services"), 59 ( discussing the use of "business rules for routing events" and processing medical orders, thus evidencing the long prevalent use of "business rules" for organizing work on medical orders), 69 ( explaining that the referral order management system "lightens medical staff workload by automating a scheduling procedure"). Thus, we do not find Appellants' argument persuasive. In conclusion, representative claim 1, and grouped claims 6 and 14, not separately argued, recite an abstract idea. Revised Guidance Step 2A~Prong Two (Integration into a Practical Application) Under Step 2A, Prong Two of the Revised Guidance, we discern no additional element ( or combination of elements) recited in Appellants' representative claim 1 that integrates the judicial exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54--55 ("Prong Two"). For example, Appellants' claimed additional elements ("an order processing system," "a health services system," "an electronic medical records system," "a first processor," "a second processor," "an open network," and "an insurance services interface system") do not: ( 1) improve the functioning of a computer or other technology; (2) are not applied with any particular machine (except for generic processors); (3) do not effect a transformation of a particular article to a different state; and ( 4) are not applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to 14 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 a particular technological environment, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h). Appellants' claim 1 does not describe technological improvements, and is not directed to an improvement in computer-related technology or network technology. (Ans. 4, 6; Non-Final Act. 27). Nor have Appellants demonstrated that the claim recites a specific improvement to the way computers operate or to the way computers store and retrieve data in memory. See Enfzsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The additional elements in claim 1 are broadly claimed to cover processors and a network that are recited in such a general, generic, and functional manner that the claim fails to capture how the claimed system's functionality is improved when processing medical data, or how the claimed system "provides a technical solution to [a] network centric problem." (See App. Br. 9). Appellants' claim 1, unlike claims found non-abstract in prior cases, uses generic computer technology to perform data retrieval, analysis, and transmission, does not recite an improvement to a particular computer technology. See, e.g., McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314--15 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding claims not abstract because they "focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer animation"). Thus, claim 1 's hardware elements do not evince integration into a practical application. Rather, Appellants' claimed invention uses existing technology to process medical orders and insurance authorization requests, where the functions performed by the claimed processors automate data processing operations that can be performed by humans manually ( e.g., using pen, paper, and telephones). (Ans. 4, 6). See Bancorp, 687 F.3d at 15 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 1278 ("[T]he fact that the required calculations could be performed more efficiently via a computer does not materially alter the patent eligibility of the claimed subject matter."); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("Adding routine additional steps such as ... use of the Internet does not transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter."). Thus, claim 1 does not integrate the judicial exception into a practical app li cation. For these reasons, we determine representative claim 1, and grouped claims 6 and 14, are directed to a judicial exception-namely, the abstract idea of processing medical data to determine medical insurance eligibility, which is a fundamental economic practice and data manipulation performable by a human being mentally and manually in the human mind- that does not integrate a practical application. Revised Guidance Step 2B (Inventive Concept) Under the Revised Guidance, only if a claim ( 1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or ( 4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. 16 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Here, the Examiner maintains "the claims do not include additional limitations that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception because the claims recite processes that are routine and well-understood in the art of healthcare communication systems." (Ans. 4). The Examiner finds "the applicant is taking the well-understood process of placing an order, routing the order, creating a worklist entry for the order and updating the worklist entry based on the status of the order and implementing it on a computer" having "[g]eneric computer structure" and "perform[ing] generic computer functions." (Id.). Appellants contend the Examiner erred because claim 1 recites significantly more than a judicial exception for the reasons that: (1) "the system claimed is directed to a network computing system" that provides "a network centric solution" to "the real problem of managing medical data reliable[ sic] and privately" (App. Br. 9); and (2) the Examiner has not provided any documentary evidence that would support a finding of "routine and well-understood" process steps (Reply Br. 2). Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. Under Federal Circuit precedent, an "inventive concept" under Alice step 2 and the Revised Guidance can be established by showing, for example, that the patent claims: ( 1) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, e.g., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks" (see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); (2) transform the abstract idea into "a particular, practical application of that abstract idea," e.g., "installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end- users, with customizable filtering features specific to 17 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 each end user" (see Bascom Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016)); or (3) "entail[] an unconventional technological solution ([ e.g.,] enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem ([e.g.,] massive record flows [that] previously required massive databases)" and "improve the performance of the system itself' (see Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Similarly, as recognized by the Revised Guidance, an "inventive concept" under Alice step 2 can also be evaluated based on whether an additional element or combination of elements: (1) "[ a ]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which is indicative that an inventive concept may be present;" or (2) "simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception, which is indicative that an inventive concept may not be present." See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56. In this case, however, we find no element or combination of elements recited in Appellants' representative claim 1 that contains any "inventive concept" or adds anything "significantly more" to transform the abstract concept into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 573 U.S. at 222. For example, Appellants' claimed invention does not recite additional elements that are rooted in computer technology, as the claims in DDR Holdings. In DDR, the Federal Circuit found patent-eligible claims under section 101 because DDR 's claims: (1) do not merely recite "the performance of some 18 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 business practice known from the pre-Internet world" previously disclosed in Bilski and Alice; but instead (2) provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. Likewise, the Federal Circuit also found Amdocs' claims patent-eligible under section 101 because like DDR, Amdocs' claims "entail[] an unconventional technological solution ( enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases)" and "improve the performance of the system itself." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302. In contrast to DD R and Amdocs, Appellants' Specification and claims describe processing medical data to determine patients' medical insurance eligibility and potential medical costs, which is a fundamental economic practice and data analysis and manipulation performable by a human being mentally and manually in the human mind somewhere in the. (Non-Final Act. 3--4). Appellants' claimed processing of an order message to determine medical insurance eligibility does not provide a technical solution to a technical problem unique to the Internet, i.e., a "solution ... necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. Appellants argue "the system claimed is directed to a network computing system" that provides "a network centric solution" for managing medical data (see App. Br. 9), but claim 1 merely recites a generic "open network" connecting two generic processors without any specific technical 19 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 detail on how the data processing steps are performed. Thus, Appellants' purported "technical solution" (see App. Br. 9) requires only general purpose technology operating in its ordinary and conventional capacities. Appellants have not demonstrated their claimed network, processors, and systems are able to performfunctions that are not merely generic, as the claims in DDR. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. Nor does Appellants' invention entail, like Amdocs, any "unconventional technological solution ( enhancing data in a distributed fashion) to a technological problem (massive record flows which previously required massive databases)" and "improve the performance of the system itself." Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1300, 1302. Instead, the solution proposed by Appellants manipulates medical information using generic "processors" as tools to expedite data processing. (Ans. 4). "[T]he use of generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface" to perform conventional computer functions "do not alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter." FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("relying on a computer to perform routine tasks more quickly or more accurately is insufficient to render a claim patent eligible"). Additionally, the "problem of managing medical data reliable[ sic] and privately" (see App. Br. 9) is a business/medical problem that existed prior to the Internet. We also are not persuaded that the Examiner provides no evidence of "routine and well-understood" processes "in the art of healthcare communication systems" as Appellants advocate. (See Reply Br. 2). 20 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Instead, the Examiner has identified conventional computerized techniques for processing medical orders to assess medical insurance eligibility. 2 Further, Appellants' Specification describes generic computing elements performing generic data processing and transmission functions. (Ans. 5 (citing Spec. ,r,r 9-10); Non-Final Act. 5; see also Spec. ,r 19). As our reviewing court has observed, "after Alice, there can remain no doubt: recitation of generic computer limitations does not make an otherwise ineligible claim patent-eligible." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1256 (citing Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358). Because Appellants' representative claim 1 is directed to a patent- ineligible abstract concept and does not recite something "significantly more" under the second step of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of representative claim 1, and grouped independent claims 6 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. No separate arguments are presented for dependent claims 2-5, 7-13, and 15-20, which fall with independent claims 1 and 6. 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). We, therefore, sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 2-5, 7-13, and 15-20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 Rejection of Claims 1, 2, and 5 Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Lamb discloses all the limitations of independent claim 1. (App. Br. 9-11). Specifically, Appellants contend Lamb does not disclose "an order processing system 2 For example, the Examiner has identified Lamb as disclosing computerized techniques for processing medical data and orders, and exchanging information with insurers to assess patients' medical insurance eligibility. (See Lamb Figs. 1---6, Abstract). 21 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 operating on a first processor" and "a health services system operating on a second processor," the order processing system generating "a physician worklist" and "an entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction," as claimed. (App. Br. 11, 17; Reply Br. 3). Rather, Appellants argue, Lamb merely discloses a remote provider system 110 and specialty department system 130 creating an order harvested by a centralized order management system 190. (App. Br. 11 (citing Lamb ,r,r 23-25)). Appellants argue Lamb's orders and "different data structures, i.e. the order and patient record" do not teach the claimed "physician worklist"; and since "Lamb simply does not teach the physician's worklist ... there cannot be [in Lamb] an entry made in the physician's worklist without user interaction" as claimed. (App. Br. 11; Reply Br. 3). Appellants further argue Lamb does not disclose that "generation [ of a physician worklist] and entry [in the physician worklist] are based on patient profile," and Lamb further does not disclose an "alternative identification field from an order message," "one or more health service provider fields [that] can be obtained from an order message," and "service provider(s) response message," as required by claim 1. (App. Br. 10-11 ). Appellants argue their invention discloses "providing service provider information in an order message ... as opposed to having to retrieve from a database store, which is what Lamb teaches." (App. Br. 11 (citing Lamb ,r,r 33-34, Figs. 2-3)). We do not agree. We agree with and adopt the Examiner's findings as our own. (Non- Final Act. 6-8; Ans. 6-8). Particularly, we agree with the Examiner that Lamb's referral order management system 190----including data store 220 and engines 210,230, and 250, but not engine 240 in Lamb's Figure 2- 22 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 discloses the claimed order processing system operating on a first processor; and Lamb's eligibility and preauthorization engine 240 discloses the claimed health services system operating on a second processor. (Ans. 7 (citing Lamb ,r,r 30-34, 37-38, 41--43, Figs. 2-3); Non-Final Act. 6-7 ("a health services system operating on a second processor (Fig. 2, element 240 [of Lamb], which may be a third party system")); see Lamb ,r 42 ("Although in the preferred embodiment of the present invention, engine 240 is a part of the referral order management system 190, other embodiments of the present invention may use third party subsystems for performing the functionality of engine 240") (emphasis added)). Appellants' arguments have not addressed these specific findings by the Examiner, as Appellants merely discuss Lamb's remote provider system 110 and specialty department system 130 providing an order to system 190. (See App. Br. 11 ). We also agree with the Examiner that Lamb's order processing system is configured to generate "a physician worklist for a patient profile," as recited in claim 1. (Non-Final Act. 6-7). We note Appellants' arguments again do not address the Examiner's specific findings that Lamb's "orders stored in the data store 220 in association with a patient profile and with an associated pre-authorization flag" disclose the claimed "physician worklist." (Non-Final Act. 7). Rather, Appellants' arguments assert "[t]he Office wants to equate an order with a physician worklist." (See App. Br. 11 ). The Examiner's Answer further clarifies that as discussed in the previous rejection and as shown and disclosed in figs. 2 and 3, associated paragraphs and paragraphs [0033]- [0034] and [0037]-[0038], the orders of Lamb are stored in a database [220] and associated with patient records. It is the collection of orders associate[ d] with the corresponding patient records (profiles) which are construed as a physician worklist as 23 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 the stored orders require further action (work) and multiple orders (a list) may be stored. Under broadest reasonable interpretation a collection of pending order[ s] for a physician associated with patient records in database can be construed as a physician worklist in a patient profile. (Ans. 7 (emphasis added)). We agree with the Examiner's findings. Particularly, Lamb's order processing system (referral order management system 190 including data store 220 and engines 210,230, and 250) holds medical "[ o ]rders 340 ... stored in association with patient records [320]." (See Lamb ,r 38 (emphasis added), Figs. 2-3). Lamb also discloses the order processing system interfaces with end-users of a referring provider's office (110) where the "end-users of system 110 can be physicians." (See Lamb ,r 23). Thus, Lamb's collection of medical orders associated with corresponding patient profiles discloses the claimed "physician worklist for a patient profile" generated by the order processing system. Appellants respond that the Examiner's combination of "two different data structures, i.e. the order and patient record"-that are "formatted and ... organized as an order data structure and a patient record data structure"-is "not a physician's worklist" as claimed, and "[o]nly the Applicants['] specification teaches a physician's worklist." (Reply Br. 3). We remain unpersuaded by Appellants' argument because Appellants' Specification does not provide an explicit and exclusive definition of the claimed term "physician worklist," and does not exclude a collection of data structures from a "physician worklist." The Specification merely provides 24 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 discussion of non-limiting examples of physician worklists. (See Spec. i-f 13). 3 Appellants also argue Lamb does not disclose an order processing system generating "an entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction" as recited in claim 1. (Reply Br. 3; App. Br. 11 ). We do not agree. Appellants' arguments do not address the Examiner's findings that Lamb's generating and storing orders and associations ( with respect to patient records in data store 220 of order processing system 190) discloses generating an entry in the physician worklist without user interaction, as claimed. (Ans. 7-8 (citing Lamb ,r,r 33-34, 37-38, 41--42, 60-62); Non-Final Act. 6-7 (citing Lamb Figs. 2-3)). Appellants further argue Lamb does not disclose an "alternative identification field from an order message," "one or more health service provider fields [that] can be obtained from an order message," and "service provider(s) response message," as required by claim 1. (App. Br. 10-11). Appellants' arguments, however, do not address the Examiner's specific findings that Lamb generates notifications and requests, which disclose "an order message ... transmitted to the eligibility and preauthorization engine [240] which identifies an order ID (alternate identification field) and a medical procedure ID (health services provider field)," as required by claim 1. (Ans. 8 (citing Lamb ,r,r 33-34, 37-38, 41--42, 60-62); Non-Final Act. 7- 3 Appellants' Specification broadly describes "[p ]hysicians work list system 116 is configured to generate a list of work items for a physician," where "[i]n one exemplary embodiment, physicians work list system 116 can generate one or more user selectable displays and controls" that "allow a user to view pending work items, completed work items, cancelled work items or other suitable data, and to perform one or more associated functions, such as to request an update." (See Spec. ,r 13). 25 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 8; see Lamb ,r,r 41--42 ( describing notifications received by engine 240), 62 (describing new order notifications received by engine 240)). We agree with the Examiner's findings that Lamb discloses the claimed "order message" that identifies "an alternate identification field and one or more health services provider fields." As the Examiner further finds, Lamb discloses the claimed "response message" received by an insurance services interface system (Lamb's communication engine 250) from an insurance services provider system. (Ans. 8; Non-Final Act. 8 ( citing Lamb ,r,r 65---66, Fig. 2)). Appellants' arguments have not addressed these specific findings by the Examiner. Thus, for the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner's anticipation rejection of independent claim 1, and dependent claims 2 and 5 not separately argued. (App. Br. 9). 35 U.S.C. § 102 Rejection of Claim 3 Claim 3 depends from claim 1, and further recites: the health services system further comprises a search by alternate identification system configured to receive the order message, to identify a predetermined data field in the order message and to look up format data and address data associated with a data value that is stored in the predetermined data field. Appellants contend "[t]he claim recites that the format data and address data can be found, i.e. looked up, using a data value that is stored in the predetermined data field of the order message" and "[ n Jo where in the passage cited [(i.e., Lamb's paragraphs 42 and 60 cited by Examiner's Non- Final Action)] is this feature taught or suggested." (App. Br. 12). 26 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 The Examiner's Answer additionally cites to Lamb's paragraphs 43, 61, and 62, noting that "the thrust and rationale of the [anticipation] rejection has not changed as a result of the paragraph citation corrections listen herein." (Ans. 8 (citing Lamb ,r,r 42--43, 60-62)). Particularly, the Examiner finds Lamb's "order ID in the order message" discloses the claimed "data value that is stored in the predetermined data field," and Lamb's "order ID in the order message is used to look up format data and address data associated with the order ID," where Lamb's looked-up "insurance carrier" discloses the claimed looked-up "address data," and Lamb's data on "whether electronic requests are permitted'' discloses the claimed looked-up "format data." (Ans. 8; Non-Final Act. 9). We agree with the Examiner's findings. Lamb's engine 240 (claimed health services system) identifies an order ID in an order message and uses the order ID "to determine the patient insurance carrier," "determine[] whether the patient's insurance carrier requires preauthorization for the procedure indicated in the order," and "determine[] ... whether the insurance carrier supports an electronic request for pre-authorization." (See Lamb ,r 62). Engine 240 then "communicates ... the request for preauthorization .... includ[ing] ... insurance carrier." (Id.). Thus, Lamb's looked-up "insurance carrier" information includes a way to contact the insurer, e.g., via electronic request, thereby disclosing the claimed "address data"; and Lamb's determination of "whether the insurance carrier supports an electronic request for pre-authorization" discloses the broadly claimed "format data." (Id.). Appellants' arguments have not addressed these findings by the Examiner. 27 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Accordingly, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claim 3. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 3. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of Claim 4 Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further recites: the health services system further comprises a search provider by national provider identifier system configured to receive the order message, to identify a plurality of predetermined data fields in the order message and to look up national provider identifier data associated with data values that are stored in the plurality of predetermined data fields. Appellants contend claim 4 requires "an NPI [(National Provider Identifier)] ... to [be] identified for a particular order," which is different from Gunn that "does not look up NPI data" but rather "teaches that the NPI is already known and information is being passed to the known NPI database." (App. Br. 12 (citing Gunn ,r,r 70-71); Reply Br. 3). Appellants' arguments are not persuasive because, as the Examiner finds, "Gunn teaches looking up national provider identifier [ (NPI)] data associate[d] with data values of an order/profile." (Ans. 9; Non-Final Act. 11 (citing Gunn ,r,r 70-71, 84, Fig. IC)). Particularly, Gunn's Figure IC discloses a healthcare exchange system that receives customer requests and includes an "XChange Rules Engine [that] may request to look up organization, provider . . . from NP! Database." (See Gunn ,r,r 70-71 (emphasis added), Fig. IC (step 4)). In response, the "NP! Database may send a response regarding the organization, provider ... back to XChange Rules Engine." (See Gunn ,r 71 (emphasis added), Fig. IC (step 5)). Gunn's 28 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 "provider" may be "any doctor's office, doctor's practice, clinic, hospital, lab, pharmacy" holding an "entity profile [that] may include any National Provider Identifier (NPI)." (See Gunn ,r,r 37, 59). Thus, Gunn teaches looking up national provider identifier data as recited in claim 4. (Ans. 9; Non-Final Act. 11). Accordingly, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's § 103 rejection of claim 4. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 4. 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejection of Claim 6-16 With respect to independent claim 6, Appellants argue: (i) "Lamb does not teach D 1" ( where "D 1: electronically generating an order from the user interface from within a records system operating on a first processor and transmitting the order to a health services system over an open network"); (ii) "Lamb never mentions or suggests that one or more health service provider fields can be obtained from an order message" and does not teach that "an insurance services provider" and a "plurality of physicians can be identified from an order"; and (iii) "[t]he Office has also failed to show where Lamb teaches D3" ( where "D3: automatically generating a physician's work list entry associated with a patient account as a function of the order at the health services system and transmitting the physician's work list entry from the health services system to the electronic medical records system over the open network"), as Lamb does not teach "a physician worklist" or a "worklist entry ... automatically generated and transmitted to the records system." (App. Br. 13-14). 29 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Appellants' arguments are unpersuasive because they do not address the Examiner's specific findings as to the combined teachings of Lamb and Dvorak. For example, Appellants argue "Lamb does not teach DI" (where D 1 is "electronically generating an order from the user interface from within a records system operating on a first processor and transmitting the order to a health services system over an open network," see App. Br. 13-14), but Appellants do not address the Examiner's findings that: (i) Lamb teaches "a health services system" and "electronically generating an order from the patient account screen user interface," (ii) Dvorak teaches "that it was old and well known in the art to generate an order from a patient account in an electronic medical records system and to transmit the order to a health services system over a network to store," and (iii) it would have been "obvious to separate the electronic medical records system for order generation and the health services system ( order management system of Lamb) to provide efficient order entry." (See Non-Final Act. 11-14 (citing Lamb ,r,r 24--26, 32-33, 60, Fig. 4; Dvorak ,r,r 3--4, 19-21, 27, Fig. 1); Ans. 10). Appellants further argue "Lamb does not teach plurality of physicians can be identified from an order" and "Lamb does not teach D2" (i.e., "processing the order at the health services system to identify an insurance services provider and a plurality of physicians associated with the order," see App. Br. 13-14), but Appellants do not address the Examiner's findings that Lamb's paragraphs 32-34, 46--49, and 60 teach processing an order to identify an insurance services provider and a plurality of physicians associated with the order. (See Non-Final Act. 12; Ans. 10). Appellants' also argue "[t]he Office has also failed to show where Lamb teaches D3" (i.e., "automatically generating a physician's work list entry associated 30 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 with a patient account as a function of the order at the health services system and transmitting the physician's work list entry from the health services system to the electronic medical records system over the open network," see App. Br. 13-14), without addressing the Examiner's findings as to the combined teachings of Lamb and Dvorak with respect to claimed limitation D3. (See Non-Final Act. 12-14; Ans. 10). We find the Examiner has provided reasoned explanations in the rejection of claim 6 and in response to Appellants' arguments. (Non-Final Act. 11-14; Ans. 10). Appellants generally disagree without specifically addressing the Examiner's findings and rationale to combine the teachings of the two references. Merely alleging that the references fail to support an obviousness rejection is insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error. Attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7-8 (BP AI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at https ://www. uspto. gov/ sites/ default/files/ip/boards/bpai/ decisions/inform/f dO 9004693.pdf. Appellants' also reiterate arguments presented against claim 1 ("Lamb never mentions or suggests that one or more health service provider fields can be obtained from an order message," see App. Br. 14), however, claim 6 does not recite that health service provider fields can be obtained from an order message. We are also not persuaded by Appellants' arguments regarding the "physician worklist" and an automatically generated "worklist entry." (See 31 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 App. Br. 14; Reply Br. 3--4). As discussed supra with respect to claim 1, we agree with the Examiner that Lamb's collection of medical orders associated with corresponding patient profiles teaches the claimed physician worklist, and Lamb's generating and storing orders and associations (with respect to patient records in data store 220) teaches the claimed electronically generating a worklist entry without user interaction. Accordingly, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's § 103 rejection of claim 6. Therefore, we sustain the Examiner's § 103 rejection of independent claim 6, independent claim 14 argued together with claim 6, and dependent claims 7-13, 15, and 16, not separately argued. (App. Br. 12). 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections of Claims 17 and 19 Claim 17 depends from claim 1, and further recites: the order processing system is configured to receive an approval response message from the insurance services provider system and to delete the entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction. Appellants contend the cited portion of Tipimeni (i.e., paragraph 74) does not teach or suggest the claimed "delet[ing] the entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction"; rather, Tipimeni merely discloses that "a file is automatically removed from a folder," and Tipimeni' s "removal and the automatic removal of approved documents from a folder in no way means a deleted file or document." (App. Br. 14-- 15; Reply Br. 4). Appellants further argue "[a]utomatic is never mentioned with respect to the actual delete function [ of Tipimeni]" and thus Tipimeni does not teach the claimed "without user interaction." (Reply Br. 4). 32 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. Initially, we note Appellants' argument that the claimed deleting ''from an electronic system" is not the same as Tipimeni' s removal is not commensurate with the scope of claim 17. (Reply Br. 4 ( emphasis added)). Claim 17 merely recites deleting the entry in the physician worklist, which does not preclude removing a document or listing from a list or folder as taught by Tipimeni. (See Tipimeni ,r 74 (describing "[a]pproved documents ... [are] removed from the Pending Approval list" and "a document may be removed from the Pending Approval mail folder automatically")). The broadly claimed "entry" does not exclude Tipimeni's documents, and the broadly claimed "physician worklist" does not exclude email folders (such as Tipimeni's Pending Approval mail folder). We therefore agree with the Examiner that Tipimeni' s document removal from a folder teaches the claimed deletion because Tipimeni's removal deletes the document from that folder. (Non- Final Act. 23). We also agree with the Examiner that "under broadest reasonable interpretation, 'delete the entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile without user interaction' can be construed as the not requir[ing] a user to manually 'delete' the entry." (Ans. 10 (emphasis added)). Such entry deletion "without user interaction" is taught by Tipimeni' s automatic removal of a document from the Pending Approval mail folder after the document has been viewed by the authorized provider. (See Tipimeni ,r 74 ("Significantly, a document may be removed from the Pending Approval mail folder automatically when the authorized provider reviews the document in viewing the patient record"); Ans. 10-11 ). 33 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 As Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17, we sustain the Examiner's§ 103 rejection of claim 17, and claim 19 argued together with claim 17. (App. Br. 15). 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections of Claims 18 and 20 Claim 18 depends from claim 1, and further recites: the order processing system is configured to receive a denied response message from the insurance services provider system and to add a second entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile containing a reason for denial, without user interaction. Appellants contend "neither Lamb or[ sic] Ringold teach adding a second entry in the physician worklist of the patient profile." (App. Br. 15). The Examiner finds Lamb's "[u]pdating the stored order with denial response flags is adding an entry to the physician worklist," and therefore "Lamb teaches receiving a denial response and adding a second entry to the worklist" as claimed. (Ans. 11 (citing Lamb ,r,r 65---68); Non-Final Act. 24-- 25). We agree with the Examiner's reasonable findings, which are supported by Lamb. (See Lamb ,r,r 64 ("If the insurance carrier reimburses for the procedure for the diagnosis indicated in the order, then the 'required ABN' flag in orders 310 is set ... to FALSE. In the alternative, the 'required ABN' flag is set to TRUE for this order"), 67 ("The [insurer's] response may include ... a flag indicating whether the procedure will be reimbursed"). Appellants' arguments have not addressed these findings by the Examiner. Accordingly, Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claim 18. Therefore, we sustain the 34 Appeal2018-003061 Application 14/149,705 Examiner's § 103 rejection of claim 18, and claim 20 argued together with claim 18. (App. Br. 16). CONCLUSIONS The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-20 based upon a lack of patent eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, claims 1-3 and 5 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l), and claims 4 and 6-20 based upon obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION For the above reasons, we AFFIRM (1) the Examiner's patent eligibility rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, (2) the Examiner's anticipation rejection of claims 1-3 and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l), and (3) the Examiner's obviousness rejection of claims 4 and 6-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 35 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation