Ex Parte Mildh et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 4, 2017

13993557 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 4, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/993,557 06/12/2013 Gunnar Mildh 1009-0576 / P32760 US1 5301
7590 12/06/2017
Murphy, Bilak & Homiller/Ericsson
1255 Crescent Green
Suite 200
Cary, NC 27518
EXAMINER
SKRIPNIKOV, ALEX
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2416
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/06/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
official@mbhiplaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GUNNAR MILDH, GABOR FODOR,
TOMAS HEDBERG, and JARI VIKBERG
Appeal 2016-008501
Application 13/993,557
Technology Center 2400
Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
DIXON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appeal 2016-008501
Application 13/993,557
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a rejection of claims
13—26. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
The claims are directed to methods and user equipment for providing
information about a connection state. Claim 13, reproduced below, is
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
13. A method in a first user equipment for providing
information about at least one of a first and a second connection
state, the first connection state being related to a first connection
between the first user equipment and a radio network node, the
second connection state being related to a second connection
between the first user equipment and a second user equipment,
wherein a radio communication system based on Orthogonal
Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) comprises the radio
network node and the first and second user equipments, wherein
the method comprises:
encoding information about at least one of the first and
second connection states into a synchronization signal for
synchronizing the second user equipment to the first user
equipment; and
sending the synchronization signal to at least the second
user equipment, thereby providing information about at least one
of the first and second connection states.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Luo et al.
Jung et al.
Hooli et al
US 2008/0273522 Al
US 2011/0098052 Al
US 2011/0117907 Al
Nov. 6, 2008
Apr. 28,2011
May 19, 2011
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Application 13/993,557
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 13—15, 19—22, and 26 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(e) as being anticipated by Hooli.
Claims 16, 17, 23, and 24 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hooli in view of Jung.
Claims 18 and 25 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Hooli in view of Luo.
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 102
Independent claims 13 and 19
With respect to independent claims 13 and 19, these two independent
claims are directed to “encoding,” and Appellants argue the claims together.
(App. Br. 8). As a result we select independent claim 13 as the
representative claim for the group and address Appellants’ arguments
thereto. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
Appellants argue:
Claims 13 and 19 are directed to techniques in a first user
equipment for providing information about a first and/or second
connection state to a second user equipment. The first
connection state relates to a connection between the first user
equipment and a radio network node (e.g., base station), and the
second connection state relates to a connection between the first
user equipment (e.g., a potential relay terminal) and the second
user equipment.
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Application 13/993,557
(App. Br. 8—9). Appellants further contend “Hooli does not disclose or
suggest techniques for encoding information about a first and/or second
connection state into a synchronization signal, and sending such a
synchronization signal to a second user equipment, as described by the
above steps of claim 13.” (App. Br. 9).
We disagree with Appellants and find the two different RNTI signals
would represent different connection states. Appellants further contend
paragraph 54 “does not provide any additional information regarding the
contents of Hooli’s beacon signal. More particularly, Hooli’s paragraph
[0054] does not disclose that its beacon signal includes any encoded
information about a first and/or second connection state, as described in
claim 13.” (App. Br. 10) (underlining deleted).
Additionally, Appellants argue:
Note that Hooli’s paragraph [0056] merely describes the use of
an RNTI (“RRC idle” or “RRC connected”) for purposes of
terminals identifying each other; there is no suggestion that this
identifier would or could also be used to transmit information
about the connection state between the relay terminal and a base
station.
(App. Br. 11) (emphasis deleted).
Appellants further contend:
Hooli merely discloses that an “RRC idle RNTI” may be used to
identify a terminal when the terminal is idle relative to the base
station, and that an “RRC connected RNTI” may be used when
the terminal is connected to the base station. However, Hooli
does not provide any indication of how or whether the contents
of its “RRC idle RNTI” and “RRC connected RNTI” differ from
one another.
(App. Br. 11) (emphasis deleted).
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Application 13/993,557
Hooli’s mere use of the terms “RRC idle RNTI” and “RRC
connected RNTI” does not disclose that these identifiers contain
different information. In order to disclose the claim 13 aspect of
“encoding information about . . . connection states,” these
identifiers would need to include, either explicitly or implicitly,
information about a connection state. Neither Hooli nor the other
art on the record discloses or suggests that such information is
conveyed in RNTIs.
(App. Br. 12). Appellants dispute whether the RNTIs contain information
regarding the state and Appellants present additional extrinsic evidence
which identify the standard used in the Hooli reference as the 3 GPP
specifications for long-term evolution (LTE) and further contend:
Given the context of Hooli’s disclosure['] and the fact that
Hooli does not describe the contents of its RNTIs, one skilled in
the art would look to the 3 GPP specifications for long-term
evolution (LTE) to provide further detail regarding RNTIs.
Within LTE and its associated specifications, RNTI is
understood to be encoded as a 16-bit value. The RNTI value
does not include any indication of the RNTI type for those RNTIs
that are assigned to individual UEs.[2] See Table 7.1-1 from
3GPP 36.321, which is replicated below, for details.
(App. Br. 12—13) (footnotes deleted). Appellants further contend that
The 3GPP specifications do not explicitly describe an
“RRC idle RNTI” and “RRC connected RNTI,” as disclosed in
Hooli, but individually-assigned RNTIs (e.g., Cell RNTI
(CRNTI), Temporary C-RNTI) are assigned from the range
0x000l-0xFFF3. A reasonable assumption is that Hooli’s “RRC
idle RNTI” and “RRC connected RNTI” might be assigned from
this range. As with the other types of individually-assigned
RNTIs, however, the RNTI value itself does not indicate its type.
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Application 13/993,557
(App. Br. 13) (emphasis added). We note Appellants argue there is error in
the Examiner’s finding of anticipation, but we find Appellants’ additional
evidence regarding 3GPP specifications to be speculative and unavailing.
We find Appellants’ argument to be based upon an assumption that there is
some additional content included into a synchronization signal which may
then be decoded along with the synchronization signal at the other end after
transmission.
Yet, the language of independent claim 13 does not require any
specific information or plural items of contents to be encoded and
transmitted in addition to the claimed information. (See generally Ans. 3—
5). Consequently, we find the signal itself corresponds to a “connection
state” which would be encoded with information and convey the at least one
of the first and second connection states without any additional content
encoded into the signal. As a result, we find two separate signals for two
different states (“RRC idle RNTI” and “RRC connected RNTI”) meets the
language of independent claim 13 regarding the claimed “encoding
information about at least one of. . . .”
We find Appellants’ arguments go beyond the express language of
independent claim 13 which merely requires “encoding information about at
least one of the first and second connection states into a synchronization
signal for synchronizing the second user equipment to the first user
equipment.” Consequently, we disagree with Appellants. We determine
independent claim 13 does not specifically require any additional signal
content in addition to whatever signal content was previously present in a
specific signal, but merely encodes a signal which includes information
about a first and second connection state in a synchronization signal.
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For example, the language of independent claim 13 does not require
any features of a synchronization signal, nor does claim 13 require the
synchronization be performed, the language of claim 13 only requires that
information content is encoded. As a result, we agree with the Examiner the
Li reference discloses encoding information about at least one of the first
and second connection states, and Appellants’ arguments do not show error
in the Examiner’s factual finding or the Examiner’s finding of anticipation
of representative independent claim 13.
Independent claims 20 and 26
With respect to independent claims 20 and 26, directed to “decoding,”
Appellants argue the claims together. (App. Br. 14—16). We select
independent claim 20 as the representative claim for the group and address
Appellants’ arguments thereto. Appellants rely upon similar arguments
advanced with respect to independent claim 13, but regarding decoding a
synchronization signal to “thereby obtaining information about said at least
one of the first and second connection states.” (App. Br. 15).
We note that the language of independent claim 20 does not require
the decoded information to be separate and distinct and provides information
which may be information conveyed merely by the content of one of two
different signals. We further note that the language of independent claim 20
does not use this decoded information regarding the at least one of the first
and second connection states nor is the synchronization signal used to
perform any function. Consequently, merely the content of information is
the proffered distinction. We find Appellants’ argument unavailing and does
not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings or finding of anticipation
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of representative independent claim 20 and independent claim 26 not
separately argued.
Claims 15 and 22
With respect to dependent claims 15 and 22, Appellants merely repeat
the language of the claims and rely upon the arguments advanced with
respect to representative independent claim 13.
We do not find Appellants’ argument to be a separate argument for
patentability. Merely reciting the language of the claim is insufficient. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a
claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of
the claim.”). Merely alleging that the references fail to support an
anticipation rejection is insufficient to persuade us of Examiner error.
Attorney arguments and conclusory statements that are unsupported by
factual evidence are entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d
1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705
(Fed. Cir. 1984); and Ex parte Belinne, No. 2009-004693, slip op. at 7—8
(BPAI Aug. 10, 2009) (informative), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/its/fd09004693.pdf.
Here, we find Appellants’ arguments are conclusory in nature and fail
to address the thrust of the Examiner’s anticipation rejections.
“Argument in the brief does not take the place of evidence in the
record.” In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965) (citing In re Cole,
326 F.2d 769, 773 (CCPA 1964)). This reasoning is applicable here.
On this record, we find Appellants have failed to present substantive
arguments and supporting evidence persuasive of Examiner error. Cf. In re
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Baxter TravenolLabs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court to examine the claims in greater detail than argued by
an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the prior art.”).
Because we did not find error in the Examiner’s finding of
anticipation of independent claim 13, Appellants’ similar reliance thereon
does not show error in the Examiner’s finding of anticipation of dependent
claims 15 and 22.
35U.S.C.§ 103
Claims 16, 17, 23, and 24
Appellants set forth similar arguments advanced with respect to
independent claim 13 throughout the arguments. (App. Br. 17—29). Again,
we find those similar arguments unpersuasive of error in the Examiner’s
factual findings or conclusion of obviousness.
Appellants contend:
Hooli does not disclose or suggest that its RNTI includes any
parameter that identifies a given RNTI as being either an “RRC
idle RNTI” or an “RRC connected RNTI.” Additionally, there
is no other suggestion in Hooli that its beacon signal includes
information regarding the connection state of Hooli’s relay
terminal.
(App. Br. 18). Appellants further contend “there would be no apparent
reason, at least in the art of record, to then send the connection state
information in a master or system information block, as disclosed in Jung.”
(App. Br. 19) (emphasis deleted).
The Examiner maintains:
[t]he motivation for doing so is that master information blocks
contain essential system information needed for a user
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equipment to gain access to a base station (or a hosting user
equipment). (Jung; [0019] and [0020]).[”]
Furthermore, [the] rejection does not propose to perform
repetitive and redundant sending of information. It is clear that
the beacon can be transmitted within master block.
(Ans. 7) (emphasis deleted). We find the Examiner’s position to be
reasonable and find Appellants have not further responded to the rejection of
claims 16 and 17 in the Reply Brief. Consequently, Appellants’ argument
does not show error in the Examiner’s factual finding or conclusion of
obviousness regarding claims 16 and 17.
With respect to dependent claims 23 and 24, Appellants contend the
claims are drawn to techniques, at a second user equipment, that
complement those of claims 16 and 17, and describe the decoding of the
synchronization signal and reception of the master/system information
blocks and Appellants rely upon the reasons provided for claims 16 and 17.
(App. Br. 19-20). We find Appellants’ arguments to be unavailing and do
not show error in the Examiner’s factual findings or conclusion of
obviousness of claims 23 and 24.
Claims 18 and 25
Appellants have not set forth separate arguments for patentability of
claims 18 and 25. Asa result, these claims will fall with their representative
parent independent claims.
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 13—15, 19—22, and 26
based upon anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and the Examiner did not err
in rejecting claims 16—18 and 23—25 based upon obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
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DECISION
For the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims
13—15, 19-22, and 26 as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and we sustain
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 16—18 and 23—25 as obvious under 35
U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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