Ex Parte MichaelisDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 9, 201812104840 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 9, 2018) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/104,840 04/17/2008 Oliver MICHAELIS QC071088 4578 12371 7590 03/13/2018 Mnnrv rre.issle.r Olrk & T owe P P /OT TAT POMM EXAMINER 4000 Legato Road, Suite 310 Fairfax, VA 22033 REINHARDT, RICHARD G ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3682 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/13/2018 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): meo.docket@mg-ip.com meo@mg-ip.com ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte OLIVER MICHAELIS Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,8401 Technology Center 3600 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and MATTHEW S. MEYERS, Administrative Patent Judges. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision on appeal under 35U.S.C. § 134 from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—96. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is QUALCOMM Incorporated. (Appeal Br. 3.) Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s claimed “invention relates generally to electronic coupons, and more specifically to distribution and personalization of electronic coupons.” (Spec. 12.) Claims 1, 20, 31, 41, 50, 59, 69, 79, and 88 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is illustrative. It recites: 1. A method of operating a server configured to distribute and personalize electronic coupons (E-Coupons), comprising: transmitting a generic E-Coupon identifier to a group of mobile devices, the generic E-Coupon identifier identifying an E-Coupon type that is not personalized to the group of mobile devices; receiving, from a given mobile device in the group of mobile devices, the generic E-Coupon identifier along with a request for a redeemable E-Coupon; creating a personalized redeemable E-Coupon that corresponds to the identified E-Coupon type based at least in part on the generic E-Coupon identifier; and transmitting the personalized redeemable E-Coupon. REJECTIONS Claims 1—96 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non- statutory subject matter. Claims 1—96 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as unpatentable for failing to comply with the written description requirement. Claims 1-6, 13, 15-23, 27, 29, 31-33, 37-39, 41^13, 48, 50-52, 59- 62, 69-71, 73, 79—81, 83, 88, and 93—96 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Liu (US 2008/0154714 Al, pub. June 26, 2008). Claims 7, 14, 28, 30, 40, 47, 49, 57, 58, 91, and 92 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu and Official Notice. 2 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 Claims 8, 53, 63, 72, and 82 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu and Sakamura (US 2004/0158490 Al, pub. Aug. 12, 2004.) Claims 10-12, 24, 34, 44^46, 54—56, 89, and 90 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu and Darko Kirovski & Henrique S. Malvar, Spread-Spectrum Watermarking of Audio Signals, 51 IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 1020—33 (2003) (hereinafter “Kirovski”). Claims 25, 26, 35, and 36 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu, Kirovski, and Digital Watermarking Alliance — Frequently Asked Questions, https://web.archive.org/web/20061019121150/http://www.digitalwatermarki ngalliance.org/faqs.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). Claims 9, 64—67, 74—77, and 84—86 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu and Wanninger (US 2005/0004840 Al, pub. Jan. 6, 2005). Claims 68, 78, and 87 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable in view of Liu, Wanninger, and Main (US 2008/0077484 Al, pub. Mar. 27, 2008). ANALYSIS The §101 rejection In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set out in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural 3 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. If the claims are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the second step of the framework is applied to determine if “the elements of the claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2357 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 79). With regard to step one of the Alice framework, the Examiner determines that “claim 1 include[s] an abstract idea. Specifically, providing a coupon ID, personalizing a coupon, and sending it to a user is a method of organizing human activities and a fundamental economic concept.” (Final Action 3.) Additionally, the Examiner determines that the method essentially recites transmitting a generic e-coupon identifier, receiving a request for an e-coupon, creating a personalized e-coupon, and transmitting it which is a method of organizing human activities, a fundamental economic concept, and an idea of itself. . . . Furthermore, receiving requests for coupons, personalizing coupons, and transmitting coupons has been common in the marketplace for decades and is a fundamental economic concept. Finally, the claim language is excessively broad and does not articulate any particular or concrete step. (Answer 4—5.) Appellant disagrees and argues “that the independent claims do not recite ‘providing a coupon ID, personalizing a coupon, and sending it to a user’” and that “this appears to be the Office’s attempt to paraphrase the claims so as to make them appear more like an abstract idea.” (Appeal 4 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 Br. 9.) Appellant further argues that in the Answer, the Examiner “asserts a new alleged abstract idea.” (Reply Br. 2.) Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Thus, although we consider the claim as a whole, the “directed to” inquiry focuses on the claim’s “character as a whole.” The Specification provides evidence as to what the claimed invention is directed. In this case, the Specification discloses that the “invention relates generally to electronic coupons, and more specifically to distribution and personalization of electronic coupons.” (Spec. 12.) Claim 1 recites “transmitting a generic E-Coupon identifier,” “receiving ... a request for a redeemable E-Coupon,” “creating a personalized . . . E-Coupon,” and “transmitting the . . . E-Coupon.” Although we and the Examiner describe, at different levels of abstraction, to what the claims are directed, it is recognized that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” See id. at 1241. In this case, as in Alice, we need not labor to delimit the precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category. It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction in the level of abstraction between the concept of “customizing web page content as a function of navigation 5 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 history and information known about the user,” Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2015), and transmitting data, receiving a response, and transmitting customized content (an E-Coupon) as a function of the information received from the user. Both are squarely within the realm of “abstract ideas” as the Court has used that term. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Appellant further argues that the claims are not directed to an abstract idea because “the claims do not seek to preempt all of the numerous ways one may create a personalized coupon.” (Appeal Br. 10.) We do not find this argument persuasive of error. Preemption is not a separate test. To be clear, the proper focus is not preemption per se, for some measure of preemption is intrinsic in the statutory right granted with every patent to exclude competitors, for a limited time, from practicing the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154. Rather, the animating concern is that claims should not be coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea; a patent-eligible claim must include one or more substantive limitations that, in the words of the Supreme Court, add “significantly more” to the basic principle, with the result that the claim covers significantly less. See Mayo 132 S. Ct. at 1294 [566 U.S. at 72-73], CLS Bank Inti v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Lourie, J., concurring), affd, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Moreover, “[w]here a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). In other words, “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, 6 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id. In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for an ‘ “inventive concept” ’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—73). Appellant argues that the claimed steps are “not ‘well-understood, routine and conventional’ in the field of the alleged abstract idea.” (Appeal Br. 11.) Specifically, Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in finding “that the ‘Applicant is using known technology implemented in known ways.’” (Appeal Br. 12.) But Appellant does not persuasively argue how the claimed invention is using technology in a way that is not known. Using a conventional computer to perform an abstract business practice does not make the claim patent-eligible. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The introduction of a computer into the claim does not alter the analysis at step two. [T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply if ” is not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea “ ‘to a particular technological environment.’ ” Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to “implement]” an abstract idea 7 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 “on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern that undergirds our §101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea ... on a generic computer.” Id. at 2359. They do not. Claim 1 relates to a method for transmitting data, receiving data, analyzing/processing data, and transmitting data. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step is purely conventional. Transmitting data, receiving data, and analyzing/processing data are basic computer functions. Moreover, the Specification discloses that the invention can be implemented using generic computer components. (See, e.g., Spec. ]ff[ 28—29.) In short, each step does no more than require a generic computer to perform routine computer functions. Considered as an ordered combination, the computer components of Appellant’s method add nothing that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. The claim does not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead, the claim at issue amounts to nothing significantly more than an instruction to transmit, receive, analyze/process data, and transmit data using a generic 8 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 computer. That is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent- eligible invention. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2360. Nonetheless, Appellant seeks to analogize the present claims to those in DDR Holdings. Appellant argues that DDR Holdings “establishes that claims related to a problem specific to a particular technically [sic] (i.e., the Internet) is sufficient to render the claims patent-eligible under Part 2 of the Mayo /Alice framework.” (Appeal Br. 12.) But unlike the claims here, the claims in DDR Holdings “specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.’ '’ DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258 (emphasis added). In other words, the invention claimed in DDR Holdings does more than “simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional activity.” See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259. In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under § 101. Claims 2—96 are not separately argued and, therefore, fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). The £ 112, first varasravh, rejection The Examiner finds that “[t]he claims recite the negative limitation ‘an E-Coupon type that is not personalized to the group of mobile devices’” and that although “Applicant points to paragraph 0061 for support,” the “Examiner can find no express support for the negative limitation in this paragraph or elsewhere in the specification.” (Final Action 6.) 9 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 Appellant disagrees and cites to paragraphs 5 and 61 of the Specification. (Appeal Br. 13.) In relevant part, paragraph 5 discloses that “[a] generic E-Coupon identifier may be sent to a mobile device to retrieve consumer and device specific data. Using this data the E-Coupon can be personalized and distributed to the consumer.” (Spec. 1 5.) Appellant argues that “[b]y implication, this means that the generic E-Coupon ID was not itself personalized to the mobile device as ‘consumer and device specific data’ is used to conduct the personalization after the generic E-Coupon ID is distributed.” (Appeal Br. 13.) The written description must “convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.'1'’ Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563—64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). In relevant part, claim 1 recites “transmitting a generic E-Coupon identifier to a group of mobile devices, the generic E-Coupon identifier identifying an E-Coupon type that is not personalized to the group of mobile devices.” (Emphasis added.) We note that the language “the generic E-Coupon identifier identifying an E-Coupon type that is not personalized to the group of mobile devices,” was added to the claim by amendment. (See Amendment filed Nov. 5, 2014 at 2.) The Specification discloses that [a] generic E-Coupon ID 206 may be a symbol or data that indicates a particular type of coupon that can be received or an address to an E-Coupon Manager 212 that the mobile device 210 can contact to receive an E-Coupon, but not a specific coupon that can be redeemed. 10 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 (Spec. 1 61.) Appellant argues that “[i]n context, the generic E-Coupon ID does not identity a particular coupon because the ‘generic’ E-Coupon ID has not yet been personalized.” (Appeal Br. 13.) But, as the Examiner points out, and we agree, “Appellant seems to be arguing that the ‘E-Coupon type’ is the same as the ‘E-Coupon’ itself.” (Answer 8.) The Specification discloses that [a] generic E-Coupon identifier may be sent to a mobile device to retrieve consumer and device specific data. Using this data the E-Coupon can be personalized and distributed to the consumer. Such consumer specific data may include consumer location, time, consumer behavior, consumer environment, consumer purchase history, and/or mobile device specifications. (Spec. 15.) Although, as noted above, Appellant points us to a disclosure in the Specification regarding personalization of an E-Coupon, Appellant does not point us to any disclosure in the Specification regarding either personalizing or not personalizing an E-Coupon type. More particularly, Appellant does not point us to any disclosure in the Specification of an E- Coupon identifier that identifies “an E-Coupon type that is not personalized,” as recited in, e.g., claim 1. In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the written description conveys with reasonable clarity that the inventor was in possession of the claimed invention as of the filing date. Nor are we persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that claims 1—96 fail to comply with the written description requirement of § 112, first paragraph. 11 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 The § 102(e) rejection Appellant argues that [w]ith respect to independent claims 1, 20, 31, 41, 50 and 88, the generic E-Coupon is transmitted ‘to a group of mobile devices’. This does not occur in Liu because the identified enterprises provided to the mobile device at 506 are individually targeted to that specific mobile device by virtue of being tailored to the goods and/or services that are reported to be of interest to the mobile device .... (Appeal Br. 17.)2 As an initial matter, we note that claim 1 recites “transmitting a generic E-Coupon identifier” and not “transmitting a generic E-Coupon.” Thus, Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Regardless, the Specification does not explicitly provide definitions for the terms “generic E-Coupon identifier,” “E-Coupon type,” or “personalized redeemable E-Coupon,” all as recited in claim 1. Appellant argues that a reasonable definition of “generic” in context with the subject application is “not personalized”. It is unclear how one of ordinary skill in the art upon review of the subject application could reach a different conclusion. The Office’s hypothetical scenarios where “[o]ne can come up with situations where an identifier could be generic but be personalized, depending on how one interprets “not personalized” in the context of the claim” stretches credibility.... 2 On page 21 of the Appeal Brief, Appellant indicates that these arguments also apply to independent claims 59 and 69. However, Appellant makes no mention of independent claim 79. Regardless, we consider these arguments as also applying to claim 79. 12 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 (Id. at 14.) In other words, Appellant argues that, properly interpreted, a coupon or coupon identifier cannot be both personalized and generic. But the Specification discloses that information known to a communications provider can be used “to enable the delivery of personalized generic E-Coupons.” (Spec. 149, emphasis added.) Thus, the Specification refutes Appellant’s proffered interpretation. (See also Answer 11.) To construe these terms, we look to the Specification. It discloses that [a] generic E-Coupon ID 206 may be a symbol or data that indicates a particular type of coupon that can be received or an address to an E-Coupon Manager 212 that the mobile device 210 can contact to receive an E-Coupon, but not a specific coupon that can be redeemed. (Spec. 161.) The Specification further discloses that E-Coupons may be personalized based on, for example, a) location (with high accuracy); b) time; c) consumer purchase history, d) consumer behavior and interests, and e) mobile device specification. Each of these criteria are described separately in the following paragraphs, but may also be combined or considered as a whole to even more closely personalize coupons (Id. at 152.) Liu discloses an “e-coupon provider [that] can . . . notify, or assist in notifying, a user that he or she is nearby an enterprise that the user has indicated that they want to shop at, or that sells a good or service the user has indicated they want to buy.” (Liu 139.) Liu further discloses that a user-commanded location-based reminder request is sent from a user’s mobile communication device to the e-coupon provider (500) .... The provider identifies enterprises that are named in, or that sell the good or service identified in, the request (504). However, in this case, the e-coupon provider sends the identities 13 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 and locations of the identified enterprises, along with a list of the goods and services they sell, to the mobile communication device (506). The mobile communication device receives this information (508) and uses the last-ascertained current location to determine if it is nearby . . . one of the identified enterprises (510). . . . [WJhenever it is determined that the mobile communication device is proximate to one of the identified enterprises, the device generates the aforementioned notice and informs the user of a nearby enterprise that was named in, or which sells the good or service identified in, the location-based reminder request (514). The mobile communication device then sends an e-coupon request to the e-coupon provider requesting one or more e-coupons corresponding to the identified enterprises (516). The e-coupon provider receives the e-coupon request (518) and generates e-coupon(s) associated with the identified enterprises (520), which could be for the desired good or service. The e-coupon(s) are then sent to the mobile communication device (522) .... (Id. 141; see also Answer 14—17.) With regard to the claim limitation “transmitting a generic E-Coupon identifier to a group of mobile devices, the generic E-Coupon identifier identifying an E-Coupon type that is not personalized to the group of mobile devices,” the Examiner finds that “there is no claim language indicating that the identifier has to be disseminated to every mobile device simultaneously.” (Answer 16.) The Examiner also finds that Liu discloses that “whenever a mobile device that indicated electronics [as a good the user has indicated they want to buy] goes near the enterprise, that mobile device will receive the identifier, (see Liu, paragraphs 0039-0041).” (Id.) The Examiner further finds that “any mobile device that is part of the group (devices that indicated electronics) will all receive the same enterprise identifier from that enterprise when the device goes within the enterprise’s proximity.” (Id.) Additionally, “while the enterprise identifier may be unique to that 14 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 enterprise, the identifier is still generic because the same identifier for that enterprise is transmitted and used by all of the mobile devices in that group.” (Id.) Appellant argues that “[i]t is unclear how a list of enterprises that is specifically tailored to the goods and/or services that are reported to be of interest to the mobile device in the request of 500-502 of Liu can be interpreted as generic.” (Reply Br. 11.) “The list of enterprises is personalized in Liu because it is customized and filtered based on user- specific data.” (Id. at 12.) We find that the Examiner has the better position. Appellant does not persuasively argue why sending the same information to different devices in a group, e.g., a group of devices that have indicated “electronics” as a good to buy, is not transmitting a generic identifier to the devices. Additionally, as discussed above, a coupon ID may be both generic and personalized, e.g., personalized by location near the enterprise. Appellant also argues that “Liu’s teachings can certainly be used with multiple devices, but each of these multiple devices would need to send their own ‘user-commanded location-based reminder request’ at 500 of FIG. 5, and each of these multiple devices would receive their own personalized list of enterprises at 508 of FIG. 5.” (Id.) Therefore, Appellant argues, “there is no basis for a single execution of FIG. 5 to be expanded to group implementations.” (Id.) “The fact that the same information is sent to different users does not necessarily make the information non-personalized.” (Id. at 13.) Again, we find that the Examiner has the better position. Regardless of whether the information is “non-personalized,” the claim does not recite a 15 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 “non-personalized E-Coupon identifier,” rather, the claim recites “a generic E-Coupon identifier.” For the reasons discussed above, we do not find Appellant’s argument persuasive of error. Additionally, we agree with the Examiner that the claim language does not recite disseminating to every mobile device simultaneously. Appellant further argues that “the enterprise identifier in Liu merely identifies the enterprise, and does not identify ‘an E-Coupon type’ that is used to create ‘a personalized redeemable E-Coupon that corresponds to the identified E-Coupon type’ as recited in [the] independent claim[s].” (Id. at 14.) Specifically, Appellant argues that “the mere enterprise identifiers do not specify any type of ‘E-Coupon type’.” (Id.) We are not persuaded of error. The Examiner finds, [f]or instance, if the enterprise is Best Buy, then the enterprise identifier is the identifier for Best Buy. The mobile device will receive the enterprise identifier for enterprises that sell a particular good or service. For instance, a mobile device will receive the identifier for Best Buy if the device indicated electronics. (Answer 17; see also Final Action 9.) Appellant does not proffer a claim construction for “E-Coupon type.” Nor does the Specification disclose an explicit definition for the term. However, as discussed above, the Specification discloses that “[a] generic E-Coupon ID 206 may be a symbol or data that indicates a particular type of coupon that can be received . . ., but not a specific coupon that can be redeemed.” (Spec. 161.) Applying a broadest reasonable interpretation to the term “E-Coupon type,” we determine that a coupon identifier for an enterprise, e.g., identifying Best Buy, identifies an “E-Coupon type,” that is, a coupon for Best Buy is a type 16 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 of coupon. Therefore, we are not persuaded that Liu does not disclose identifying an E-Coupon type. In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under § 102(e). Independent claims 20, 31, 41, 50, 59, 69, 79, and 88 are not separately argued and fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv). With regard to dependent claims, Appellant argues that “these claims recite additional subject matter, which is not believed suggested by the cited art.” (Appeal Br. 21.) We do not find this argument persuasive of error. For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims 2—6, 13, 15—19, 21— 23, 27, 29, 32, 33, 37-39, 42, 43, 48, 51, 52, 60-62, 70, 71, 73, 80, 81, 83, and 93—96. The rejections under § 103(a) With regard to the rejections under § 103(a), Appellant argues that the art cited in addition to Liu do[es] not cure the deficiencies of Liu as discussed above with respect to independent claims 1, 20, 41, 50, 59, 69 and 88. As such, dependent claims 7-12, 14, 24-26, 28, 30, 34-36, 40, 44- 47, 49, 53-58, 63-67, 72, 74-77, 82, 84-86 and 89-91 are likewise allowable by virtue of their dependence upon one of the above-noted independent claims. (Appeal Br. 21.)3 For the reasons discussed above, we do not find this argument persuasive of error. 3 Appellant makes no mention of dependent claims 68, 78, 87, and 92. Regardless, we consider these arguments as also applying to these claims. 17 Appeal 2016-001221 Application 12/104,840 DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—96 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 20, 31, 41, 50, 59, 69, 79, and 88 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—6, 13, 15—23, 27, 29, 31—33, 37-39, 41—43, 48, 50-52, 59-62, 69-71, 73, 79-81, 83, 88, and 93-96 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) is affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 7—12, 14, 24—26, 28, 30, 34—36, 40, 4AA7, 49, 53-58, 63-68, 72, 74—78, 82, 8^U87, and 89-92 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 18 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation