Ex Parte McNeill et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 25, 2016

13939862 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 25, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
13/939,862 07 /11/2013 Matthew C. McNeill
26629 7590 10/27/2016
ZIOLKOWSKI PATENT SOLUTIONS GROUP, SC (ZPS)
136 S WISCONSIN ST
PORT WASHINGTON, WI 53074
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
RTHT2020.009 9802
EXAMINER
JIANG, YONG HANG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/27/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
info@zpspatents.com
sml@zpspatents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MATTHEW C. McNEILL, KYLE E. NELSON, and
RICHARD A. HORTON
Appeal2015-005507
Application 13/939,862
Technology Center 2600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KARA L. SZPONDOWSKI, and
MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of
claims 1-7, 9-11, and 13-17, all pending claims of the application. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
Appeal2015-005507
Application 13/939,862
STATEMENT OF THE INVENTION
According to Appellants, the claims are directed to a trailer stand
monitoring system (Abstract). Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative
of the claimed subject matter:
1. A trailer support for use in a distribution center having at least
one dock for exchanging materials with a respective trailer
compnsmg:
a stand to support the trailer when a tractor is detached
from the trailer;
a sensor in communication with a central processing
center to determine whether the trailer stand is properly engaged
and supporting the trailer; and
an interlock that is initially engaged in a locked position to
prevent dock component activation and disengaged when the
sensor determines that the trailer support is engaged to the trailer
to allow dock component activation.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Rennick
Trickle
Reynard
Paff
Tice
us 4, 122,629
us 5,047,748
US 2003/0199996 Al
US 6,665,004 Bl
US 2004/0196152 Al
REJECTIONS
Oct. 31, 1978
Sep. 10, 1991
Oct. 23, 2003
Dec. 16, 2003
Oct. 7, 2004
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (b) as being indefinite
for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter
which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the inventor (Final Act. 3-
4).
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Claims 1-3 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick and Trickle (Final Act. 5---6).
Claims 4---6 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick, Trickle, and Paff (Final Act. 6-7).
Claims 7 and 17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick and Reynard (Final Act. 7-9).
Claim 9 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Trickle (Final Act. 9).
Claim 10 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Paff (Final Act. 9-10).
Claims 11, 15, and 16 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Tice (Final Act. 10-11).
Claims 13 and 14 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being
unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, Tice, and Paff (Final Act. 11-12).
We have only considered those arguments that Appellants actually
raised in the Briefs. Arguments Appellants could have made but chose not
to make in the Briefs have not been considered and are deemed to be
waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
ISSUES
3 5 U.S. C. § 112, second paragraph: Claim 9
The Examiner rejects claim 9 for reciting dependence on claim 8,
which has been cancelled (Final Act. 3--4). Appellants submitted an
amendment on August 13, 2014, correcting the dependence and amending
the claims (After-Final Arndt. 7). The Examiner entered the amendment to
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the claims (Advisory Act. 1, if 7). Thus, we consider this rejection
withdrawn.
With respect to the remaining rejections, we disagree with Appellants'
conclusions and adopt as our own: ( 1) the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken; and (2) the
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Answer in response to the Appeal
Brief. With respect to the claims argued by Appellants, we highlight and
address specific findings and arguments for emphasis as follows.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 1-3
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 1-3, is not
obvious over Rennick and Trickle (App. Br. 2-5). The issue presented by
the arguments is:
Issue 1: Has the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Rennick and Trickle teaches or suggests "an interlock that is initially
engaged in a locked position to prevent dock component activation and
disengaged when the sensor determines that the trailer support is engaged to
the trailer to allow dock component activation," as recited in claim 1
(emphasis added)?
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue the combination of Rennick and Trickle
would result in a dock including a trailer stand support having a
stand to support the trailer when a tractor is detached from the
trailer, a sensor to determine if the trailer is engaged with the
trailer stand, and a safety gate that is automatically opened when
the sensor determines the trailer stand is engaged to the trailer
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(App. Br. 4 ). According to Appellants, Rennick teaches the switch
transitions to a closed position when the jack is engaged with the truck and
that transition automatically activates the motor and opens the gate (id.).
This is consistent with the Examiner's finding that Rennick teaches the
switch on the jack is closed only when the jack is properly engaged with the
truck, and once properly engaged, energizing the motor and lifting of the
gate (Ans. 3; Rennick 5:24--29). Thus, we find Rennick teaches "an
interlock that is initially engaged in a locked position to prevent dock
component activation and disengaged when the sensor determines that the
trailer support is engaged to the trailer," as recited in claim 1.
Appellants next contend the combination of Rennick's and Trickle's
teaching is different from claim 1 because the combination automatically
opens the safety gate whereas claim 1 recites disengaging the interlock to
allow dock component activation (App. Br. 4). Appellants further contend
"blind automatic operation" does not teach the interlock requiring operator
intervention to activate dock components to comply with protocols, as taught
by claim 1 (id.); however, Appellants are arguing limitations not recited in
the claim. Indeed, the claim does not recite operator intervention or
compliance with protocols.
Appellants further argue a significant distinction exists between
automatically opening and allowing something to open by disengaging an
interlock (App. Br. 4). According to Appellants, an ordinarily skilled artisan
would recognize locking a gate is a separate and subsequent step to closing a
gate (id.). Appellants assert Rennick's teaching of turning on the motor in
response to the sensor, to automatically activate a safety gate does not teach
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"allowing" the motor to tum on in response to the sensor (Reply Br. 2).
Appellants contend
[i]n particular, when a dock door is automatically opened there
is no further step required to open the door. However, when a
dock door is allowed to be opened, another step is required, e.g.,
opening the door. That is, the operator still decides when to open
the dock door after the interlock has been disengaged
(Reply Br. 4).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Initially, we note
the disputed recitation "to allow dock component activation" is a statement
of intended use. More specifically, the recited "to allow dock activation"
language does not add a structural limitation to the claimed system or
method. Moreover, as the Examiner finds, we determine Rennick teaches
the disputed limitation. Although Appellants claim the remaining limitation
"to allow dock component activation" is not taught, we agree with the
Examiner that to energize the motor, Rennick must allow dock component
activation. We additionally note Appellants' arguments are to make an
automatic process a manual one - requiring an operator to decide when to
open the dock door after the interlock has been disengaged. We are not
persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Instead, we agree with the Examiner
that the safety gate must be unlocked or disengaged first and further, are
unpersuaded an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it uniquely
challenging or beyond their skill to replace an automatic process of deciding
to open the dock door after the interlock has been disengaged with a human
deciding to open the dock door.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Rennick and Trickle teaches or suggests the limitations as
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recited in independent claim 1 and dependent claims 2 and 3, not separately
argued. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-3 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Rennick and Trickle.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 4-6
Claims 4---6 were not argued separately (App. Br. 5); therefore, these
claims fall with independent claim 1 from which they depend. Therefore, we
sustain the rejection of claims 4---6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 7and17
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 7 and 1 7, is not
obvious over Rennick and Reynard (App. Br. 5-8). The issues presented by
the arguments are:
Issue 2: Has the Examiner improperly combined the teachings and
suggestions of Rennick and Reynard?
Issue 3: Has the Examiner erred in concluding the combination of
Rennick and Reynard teaches or suggests "communicating the electronic
determination of trailer support to allow an operator to operate a dock door"
and "sending feedback of the electronic determination to an equipment
operator, a supervisor, and a central processing center," as recited in
independent claim 7 and commensurately recited dependent claim 17?
ANALYSIS
Appellants' argument, that Rennick does not teach "electronic
determination of trailer support to allow an operator to operate a dock door"
(App. Br. 8) is not persuasive for the reasons set forth above with respect to
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claim 1. Initially, we note the recitation of "to allow an operator to operate a
dock door" is a statement of intended use which does not add a structural
limitation to the claimed system or method. Moreover, the recitation does
not require the "operator" physically open the door; rather, such control
could be performed automatically by the operator. Nonetheless, we agree
with the Examiner that this limitation is taught or suggested by the teachings
and suggestions of Rennick and Reynard (Ans. 4). Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Rennick and
Reynard teaches or suggests "communicating the electronic determination of
trailer support to allow an operator to operate a dock door" and "sending
feedback of the electronic determination to an equipment operator, a
supervisor, and a central processing center," as recited in claim 7.
Appellants additionally argue an ordinarily skilled artisan would not
have combined the teachings and suggestions of Rennick and Reynard (App.
Br. 6). More specifically, Appellants argue an ordinarily skilled artisan
would not have combined Rennick's automatic opening of the dock door
with Reynard's indicator light which notifies the operator when it is safe to
open the dock door because the dock door would already be opening (App.
Br. 6). Thus, according to Appellants, an ordinarily skilled artisan would
not have been motivated to combine the teachings of Rennick and Reynard
(id.). Moreover, Appellants contend, the Examiner's proffered motivation is
not directed to "'controlling the operation of docking station components so
as to promote adherence to operation protocol and lower the potential for
incidents' by allowing an operator to operate a dock door once there has
been an electronic determination of trailer support" - a proactive error
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prevention system; rather, the Examiner's articulated motivation is to react
to an existing fault (id. at 7).
We agree with the Examiner that an ordinarily skilled artisan would
have been motivated to modify Rennick to include an indicator light as
taught by Reynard. As noted by the Examiner, Reynard teaches a system
including electronic sensors that determine the engagement of a trailer to
allow an operator to operate a dock door (Ans. 4 (citing Reynard i-fi-19, 91)).
Indeed, Reynard teaches when the truck or trailer is effectively restrained, a
light is illuminated to indicate the dock is ready to use (Reynard i1 9). We
agree with the Examiner that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have been
motivated to combine the teachings of Rennick and Reynard to "[a]llow[] an
operator to manually control the operations of the dock component in
addition to automatic dock component operations" (Ans. 4). Thus, we find
allowing for manual operation as the Examiner sets forth, would "control[]
the operation of docking station components," to which Appellants argue the
present invention is directed (App. Br. 7). The Examiner has articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning. Appellants' argument that
Rennick does not disclose manually operating the system and the references
do not support the Examiner's articulated motivation (Reply Br. 4-5), are
not persuasive as
"there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness" ....
[H]owever, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can
take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of
ordinary skill in the art would employ.
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KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)(quoting Jn re Kahn,
441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). Here, Appellants have not proffered
sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us an ordinarily skilled artisan
would not have taken the inferences and creative steps to arrive at the
invention as recited in claim 1.
Appellants further argue Rennick teaches "automatically energizing a
motor and opening the dock door in response to an electronic determination
of a sensor that may be positioned on a trailer jack" (App. Br. 7). According
to Appellants, Reynard fails to teach preventing the dock door from
automatically opening in response to a sensor as taught by Rennick and, as a
result, the combination would communicate an electronic determination of
trailer support to automatically open a dock door and send feedback to the
indicator light (id. at 7-8).
We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments. Initially, we note
the Examiner relied on Rennick to teach or at least suggest "electronically
determining whether the trailer stand is properly engaged and supporting the
trailer" (Final Act. 7-8). Appellants seem to be arguing Reynard's system
would not be incorporated into the system of Rennick. However, the
Examiner relies on Reynard for the specific teaching of communicating the
electronic determination of trailer support and sending feedback as recited,
not to combine the entire system of Reynard with Rennick.
[T]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of a
secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the
structure of the primary reference; nor is it that the claimed
invention must be expressly suggested in any one or all of the
references. Rather, the test is what the combined teachings of
the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill in
the art.
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In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425(CCPA198 l)o
Moreover, we conclude that such combination is no more than a
simple arrangement of old elements, with each performing the same function
it had been known to perform, yielding no more than one would expect from
such an arrangement. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 406. Nor do we find combining
the teachings of Reynard with the system of Rennick would have been
"uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art" or
"represented an unobvious step over the prior art." See Leapfrog Enters.,
Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR,
550 U.S. at 418-19).
We are further not persuaded the combination would "render the
reference inoperable for its own stated objection and intended purpose," as
argued by Appellants (App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 6). Both Rennick and Reynard
are directed to docks and loading dock equipment (Rennick, 1:5-8). We are
not persuaded combining the communicating and sending feedback into
Rennick's system would render the system of Rennick inoperable or not
provide a safe docking system. More specifically, we are not persuaded
communicating and sending feedback would prevent operation of Rennick' s
apparatus for use with a loading dock. Furthermore, we note Reynard
teaches both an automatically and a manually operated door (Reynard i-f 91 ).
This finding further supports our determination that changing an
automatically operated dock door to a manually operated door would have
been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Rennick and Reynard teaches or suggests "communicating
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the electronic determination of trailer support to allow an operator to operate
a dock door" and "sending feedback of the electronic determination to an
equipment operator, a supervisor, and a central processing center," as recited
in claim 7. We further are unpersuaded the Examiner improperly combined
the teachings and suggestions of Rennick and Reynard. Therefore, we
sustain the rejection of claim 7 and claim 17 argued on the basis of claim 7,
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Rennick and Reynard.
35U.S.C.§103(a): Claims 11, 15, and 16
Appellants contend their invention as recited in claims 11, 15, and 16,
is not obvious over Rennick, Reynard, and Tice (App. Br. 8-11). The issues
presented by the arguments are:
Issue 4: Has the Examiner erred by improperly combining the
teachings of Rennick and Reynard?
Issue 5: Has the Examiner erred in concluding the combination of
Rennick, Reynard, and Tice teaches or suggests "a central processing center
configured to monitor the plurality of trailer support stands," as recited in
claim 11?
Issue 6: Has the Examiner improperly combined the teachings and
suggestions of Rennick, Reynard, and Tice?
ANALYSIS
Appellants' initial argument is that set forth for claim 7, and
specifically, that Rennick fails to teach "notifying an operator when it is safe
to open the door" because Rennick teaches automatically opening the door
(App. Br. 10 (citing Rennick, 2: 35-56), whereas Reynard teaches using an
indicator light for notification (App. Br. 10 (citing Reynard i-fi-139, 43, 57,
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7 4) ). Thus, according to Appellants, an ordinarily skilled artisan would not
have combined the teachings and suggestions of Rennick and Reynard
because no need exists to notify the operator that it is safe to open the dock
door when the dock door automatically opens without input from the
operator (App. Br. 10). Initially, we note Appellants are arguing limitations
not recited in claim 11. More specifically, claim 11 does not recite
notification when it is safe to open the door. Instead, claim 11 recites
sensors configured to monitor a trailer support and generate wireless
feedback and one of an operator, a supervisor, and a storage medium,
receiving the wireless feedback. Furthermore, as set forth above with
respect to claim 7, we are unpersuaded by Appellants' arguments that an
ordinarily skilled artisan would not have combined the teachings and
suggestions of Rennick and Reynard.
Appellants additionally argue none of the references teaches "a central
processing center configured to monitor the plurality of trailer support
stands," as recited in claim 11 (App. Br. 10). More specifically, Appellants
contend Reynard teaches a control panel that controls the loading dock
equipment of a specific dock that, according to Appellants, would result in a
separate control panel located at each dock, but not a central processor that
receives information from each dock (id. at 10-11).
The Examiner finds providing a central processor configured to
monitor the plurality of trailer support stands is a mere duplication of parts
and thus, would have been obvious to an ordinarily skilled artisan (Ans. 5;
Final Act. 12). We agree with the Examiner that duplicating the single
loading dock of Reynard would have been obvious (Ans. 5). We further
agree with the Examiner that combining all the status signals into one central
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processing center would have been obvious (id.). Appellants' argument is
directed toward the Examiner's finding that duplicating the single loading
dock would have been obvious (Reply Br. 8). However, Appellants have not
proffered sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us modifying the
control panel to receive all the signals from the plurality of loading docks to
have one central processing center would not have been obvious to an
ordinarily skilled artisan. Appellants have not defined explicitly the term
"central processing center" and thus, even duplicating the control panels and
placing all of them in a central location teaches a central processing center
when taking a broad, but reasonable interpretation in light of Appellants'
Specification.
Appellants further argue an ordinarily skilled artisan would not have
been motivated to modify the control panel to communicate with
components of another dock because it only controls components of its
specific dock (App. Br. 11 ). We are not persuaded by Appellants'
arguments. The Examiner has articulated motivation with rational
underpinning - to send the wireless status feedback from each trailer
support stand sensor to the equipment operator (Final Act. 10-11 ).
Moreover, Reynard does not preclude the control panels from being in the
same location. Reynard specifically teaches "each piece of dock equipment
has sufficient limit switches or sensors which send signals to the controller
to indicate the state of equipment" (Reynard i-f 91 (emphasis added)). Thus,
Reynard teaches the controller receives feedback from several pieces of
dock equipment, which includes from at least one trailer support stand. We
determine an ordinarily skilled artisan would have found it obvious that a
controller receiving signals from multiple pieces of equipment can also
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receive signals from multiple pieces of equipment, such as a plurality of
trailer support stands. Thus, Reynard teaches or at least suggests "a central
processing center configured to monitor the plurality of trailer support
stands," as recited in claim 11. We are further not persuaded the Examiner
has improperly combined the teachings and suggestions of Rennick,
Reynard, and Tice. Claims 15 and 16 were not separately argued and thus,
these claims fall with independent claim 11.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 11, 15, and 16 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Rennick, Reynard, and Tice.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a): Claims 9, 10, 13, and 14
Dependent claims 9, 10, 13, and 14 were not argued separately (App.
Br. 12). Thus, for the reasons set forth above, these claims fall with their
independent claims 7 and 11, respectively.
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Rennick and Trickle is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 4---6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Rennick, Trickle, and Paff is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Rennick and Reynard is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Trickle is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Paff is affirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 11, 15, and 16 under 3 5 U.S. C.
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§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, and Tice is atlirmed.
The Examiner's rejection of claims 13 and 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Rennick, Reynard, Tice, and Paff is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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