Ex Parte Mao et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2017

12621745 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
1576-1618 3059
EXAMINER
HAWN, PATRICK D
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3631
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/621,745 11/19/2009
10800 7590 03/31/2017
Maginot, Moore & Beck LLP
One Indiana Square, Suite 2200
Indianapolis, IN 46204
Wei Mao
03/31/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte WEI MAO and LUKAS MARTI
Appeal 2014-006319
Application 12/621,745
Technology Center 3600
Before GEORGE R. HOSKINS, BRANDON J. WARNER, and
ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges.
WARNER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wei Mao and Lukas Marti (“Appellants”)1 appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—4, 6—9, and 16—27,
which are all the pending claims. Br. 5. We have jurisdiction over the
appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Robert Bosch
GmbH. Br. 3.
Appeal 2014-006319
Application 12/621,745
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants’ disclosed invention “relates generally to automotive
electronics such as automotive location systems and, more particularly, to
the integrity of location information associated automotive location systems
including satellite navigation systems, dead reckoning systems, and/or map
data.” Spec. 11. Claims 1, 16, and 21 are independent. Claim 1,
reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of the subject matter
on appeal.
1. A method of operating an automotive location estimation
system in an automobile, the method comprising:
ascertaining a satellite-based position estimation using a
global navigation satellite system device;
ascertaining a dead reckoning position estimation using a
dead reckoning system;
determining a location estimation by combining the
satellite position estimation and the dead reckoning position
estimation;
determining a map-matching position by performing map
matching using data associated with at least one of the satellite-
based position and the dead reckoning position in connection
with a map including a plurality of map features;
determining an integrity of the location estimation by
comparing a test statistic calculated by evaluating the map­
matching position and the location estimation with a decision
threshold based upon a predetermined location estimation
accuracy specification;
providing, if the test statistic is less than the decision
threshold, the location estimation; and
providing, if the test statistic is greater than the decision
threshold, an indication that the integrity of the location
estimation does not satisfy the predetermined location
estimation accuracy specification, the indication including a
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Application 12/621,745
warning communicated to a driver of the automobile that an
automotive application configured to provide a driver assistance
function based at least in part upon the location estimation:
should not be relied upon;
is not available; and/or
may be operating with degraded performance.
EVIDENCE
The Examiner relies on the following evidence in rejecting the claims
on appeal:
Hilb
Pasturel
Yamada
Hernandez
US 2002/0077731 A1
US 2004/0220733 A1
US 2007/0198177 A1
EP 2 101 148 A1
June 20, 2002
Nov. 4, 2004
Aug. 23, 2007
Sept. 16, 2009
REJECTIONS
The following rejections are before us for review:2
I. Claims 1—4, 8, 9, 16-23, 26, and 27 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yamada and
Hilb. Final Act. 4—6.
II. Claims 6 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Yamada, Hilb, and Hernandez. Id.
at 6.
2 We note that a rejection of claims 1—4, 6—9, and 16—27 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite, has been withdrawn
by the Examiner and thus is not before us for review as part of the instant
appeal. Ans. 2; see Final Act. 2—3.
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Application 12/621,745
III. Claims 7 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Yamada, Hilb, and Pasturel. Id. at 6—7.
ANALYSIS
Rejection I— Claims 1—4, 8, 9, 16—23, 26, and 27 as unpatentable
over Yamada and Hilb
Claims 1—4, 8, and 9
Regarding independent claim 1, Appellants argue that Yamada does
not disclose warning a driver about an automotive application as claimed.
See Br. 10-11. This argument does not apprise us of error, as it is not
responsive to the rejection articulated by the Examiner, which acknowledges
this shortcoming and relies on Hilb—not Yamada—for teaching a warning
about data reliability being communicated to an operator of the vehicle. See
Final Act. 5 (citing Hilb 115); Ans. 2-4.
Appellants also argue that the Examiner’s reliance on Yamada is
misplaced because “the reliability degree of the map data of Yamada is akin
to the test statistic recited by claim 1,” and “Yamada does not disclose that
[its] reliability degree of the map data is compared to a decision threshold to
decide whether to send the information to center 5, as required by claim 1.”
Br. 11. This argument is not persuasive. As the Examiner explains in the
Answer, “the test statistic [of claim 1 ] is the amendment amount. . . which
corresponds to the difference between the determined absolute position of
the vehicle and the on-map position of the vehicle based on stored road
maps.” Ans. 3 (citing Yamada ^fl[ 24, 27). The Examiner finds that Yamada
discloses “comparing this test statistic (amendment amount) to a
predetermined reference value which corresponds to the claimed decision
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Application 12/621,745
threshold,” and “taking action if this test statistic (amendment amount) is
greater than the decision threshold (reference value).” Id. (citing Yamada
27, 28). These findings are supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. See Yamada H 24—32, Fig. 2 (determining if an amendment
amount is larger than a predetermined reference value is used to decide
whether to start storing travel track conditions). Further, Appellants do not
submit a Reply Brief to assert any error with the Examiner’s explanation,
and thus do not apprise us of error.
Appellants do not dispute the finding relied on from Hilb, but instead
contend that Hilb is non-analogous art because “[o]ne skilled in the art of
determining the geographical coordinates of an automobile would not be
likely to look to the art of determining the altitude of an aircraft.” Br. 11.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ contention. Initially, we note that the
two-prong test to define the scope of analogous prior art is (1) “whether the
art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed,”
and (2) even “if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s
endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343,
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). Here, we agree with the
Examiner that Hilb falls within the reasonably identified field of navigation
signals, albeit for different specific vehicles (aircraft versus automobile).
See Ans. 4. Moreover, we also agree with the Examiner that the teachings of
Hilb relied on in the rejection relate to “an analogous problem to that with
which [Appellants are] concerned”—namely, “comparing . . . navigation
signal data . . . with an independent position reading; calculating the
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difference between the two; and comparing the difference to a margin of
error.” Id.
Aside from noting a difference in the specific vehicle operated,
Appellants do not explain any difference in the problem faced or the
disclosed solution thereto (warning an operator of the vehicle about data
quality that falls outside a threshold, which therefore should not be relied
upon). Thus, Appellants’ bare assertion that Hilb is non-analogous art does
not apprise us of error in the rejection presented.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
independent claim 1, and of dependent claims 2-4, 8, and 9, for which
Appellants do not present any separate arguments, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Yamada and Hilb.
Claim 27
Regarding dependent claim 27, Appellants additionally argue that the
claimed method is distinguished in that it requires “a standalone automotive
application,” whereas Yamada communicates with a remote system. Br. 11.
The Examiner responds by explaining that Appellants do not delineate any
boundaries of what a “standalone” application would require, and that “one
of ordinary skill in the art would consider the display unit / display of
navigation maps of Yamada to be a standalone automotive application.”
Ans. 4—5. In other words, we understand the Examiner’s position to be that
a system may be considered “standalone” (e.g., in-vehicle) despite including
communication with other remote systems, which is a broad, but reasonable,
interpretation of the claim. Appellants do not direct us to any disclosure in
their Specification that would require a more limited construction of
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“standalone.” See Br. 11. Further, Appellants do not submit a Reply Brief
to assert any error with the Examiner’s explanation, and thus do not apprise
us of error.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
claim 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yamada and
Hilb.
Claims 16—20
Regarding independent claim 16, Appellants do not set forth any
additional substantive arguments separate from the arguments discussed
supra', instead stating that the claim “recites subject matter substantially
similar to the subject matter of claim 1,” and expressly relying on “the
reasons given above.” Br. 12. Thus, for the same reasons that Appellants’
arguments do not apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 1, Appellants
also do not apprise us of error in the rejection of independent claim 16.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
independent claim 16, and of dependent claims 17—20, for which Appellants
do not present any separate arguments, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Yamada and Hilb.
Claims 21—23 and 26
Regarding independent claim 21, Appellants do not set forth any
additional substantive arguments separate from the arguments discussed
supra', instead stating that the claim “recites subject matter substantially
similar to the subject matter of claim 1,” and expressly relying on “the
reasons given above.” Br. 12. Thus, for the same reasons that Appellants’
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arguments do not apprise us of error in the rejection of claim 1, Appellants
also do not apprise us of error in the rejection of independent claim 21.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
independent claim 21, and of dependent claims 22, 23, and 26, for which
Appellants do not present any separate arguments, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Yamada and Hilb.
Rejection II— Claims 6 and 24 as unpatentable over
Yamada, Hilb, and Hernandez
With respect to the rejection of these claims, Appellants do not set
forth any additional substantive arguments separate from the arguments
discussed supra', instead expressly relying on their dependency from
independent claims 1 and 21, respectively. See Br. 13. Thus, for the same
reasons that Appellants’ arguments do not apprise us of error in the rejection
of the independent claims, Appellants also do not apprise us of error in the
rejection of these dependent claims.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
dependent claims 6 and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamada, Hilb, and Hernandez.
Rejection III— Claims 7 and 25 as unpatentable over
Yamada, Hilb, and Pasturel
With respect to the rejection of these claims, Appellants do not set
forth any additional substantive arguments separate from the arguments
discussed supra', instead expressly relying on their dependency from
independent claims 1 and 21, respectively. See Br. 13. Thus, for the same
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reasons that Appellants’ arguments do not apprise us of error in the rejection
of the independent claims, Appellants also do not apprise us of error in the
rejection of these dependent claims.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we sustain the rejection of
dependent claims 7 and 25 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable
over Yamada, Hilb, and Pasturel.
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—4, 8, 9,
16—23, 26, and 27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over
Yamada and Hilb.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 6 and 24 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yamada, Hilb, and
Hernandez.
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 7 and 25 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Yamada, Hilb, and Pasturel.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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