Ex Parte LoboDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJan 30, 201711991861 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/991,861 03/02/2009 Nativadade Albert Lobo PAT 82858W-2 1853 132251 7590 (BLG/Core Wireless/27921) Borden Ladner Gervais LLP World Exchange Plaza 100 Queen Street, Suite 1300 Ottawa, ON KIP 1J9 CANADA EXAMINER SMITH, PAULINHO E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2129 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/01/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ipinfo@blg.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte NATIVADADE ALBERT LOBO Appeal 2016-004095 Application 11/991,861 Technology Center 2100 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and ALEX S. YAP, Administrative Patent Judges. YAP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-24, and 26—31,2 which are all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. (App. Br. 3.) 2 Claims 2, 9, 10, 17, and 25 were cancelled previously. (See id. at 10 14.) Appeal 2016-004095 Application 11/991,861 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellant’s disclosed invention relates “to detecting presence/absence of an information signal.” (Mar. 12, 2008 Specification (“Spec.”) p. 1,11. 7- 8.) Claim 1 is illustrative, and is reproduced below: 1. A method for detecting a presence of an information signal comprising: receiving inputs, wherein the inputs are power values; updating a latest mean of the inputs based on at least the received inputs; determining an expected variance in a mean of the inputs based on an assumed statistical distribution of the power values, the expected variance being based on at least the latest mean of the inputs; determining a range of probable values for the mean of the inputs based on the mean of the inputs and the determined expected variance in the mean of the inputs; and testing, using the determined expected variance of the received inputs, a first hypothesis that the inputs include an information signal to detect a presence of the information signal by determining whether the range of probable values for the mean of the inputs lies above a first threshold. Prior Art and Rejections on Appeal The following table lists the prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the claims on appeal: Wilson et al. (“Wilson”) US 5,323,337 June 21,1994 Dubuc et al. (“Dubuc”) US 7,428,270 B1 Sept. 23,2008 Barkat et al., Signal Detection and Estimation, Artech House Inc., 2nd ed. pp. 101-115 (2005) (“Barkat”). 2 Appeal 2016-004095 Application 11/991,861 Claims 1, 22, 23, 26, and 27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, as failing to comply with the definiteness requirement. (See Final Office Action (mailed Dec. 19, 2014) (“Final Act.”) 2-3.) Claims 1, 3—8, 11—16, 18—20, 22—24, and 26—31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wilson in view of Dubuc. (See Final Act. 4—23.) Claim 21 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Wilson, in view of Dubuc, and further in view of Barkat. (See Final Act. 23-24.) ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions. Indefiniteness Rejection The Examiner finds that claims 1, 22, 23, 26, and 27 fail to comply with the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph because: The claims state that “determining an expected variance for the mean of the inputs”, but fail to define what expected variance, what equation or calculation is used to determine expected variance, and how expected variance is different from variance. It could mean expected variance is equal to, a multiple of, divided by some number, or any possible math operations performed on actual variance. In the interest of compact prosecution and using the broadest reasonable interpretation, examiner interprets the limitation to mean that expected variance is the same as or equal to the variance. 3 Appeal 2016-004095 Application 11/991,861 (Final Act. 2; see id. at 3 (stating other reasons why the claims are indefinite); see also Ans. 4—5 (maintaining the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.) Appellant does not address these specific findings in the briefs. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 22, 23, 26, and 27 as failing to comply with the definiteness requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph. Although the Examiner has not listed dependent claims 3-8, 11-16, 18-20, 24, and 28-31, it is clear that the Examiner also intended to reject these claims under 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, because these claims depend from either independent claim 1 or independent claim 27. Therefore, we also sustain the 35 U.S.C. §112, second paragraph, rejection of claims 3-8, 11-16, 18-20, 24, and 28-31. Prior Art Rejections The Examiner finds claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-20, 22-24, and 26-31 unpatentable over Wilson in view of Dubuc (see Final Act. 4—23) and claim 21 unpatentable over Wilson, in view of Dubuc, and further in view of Barkat (see Final Act. 23-24). Based on the above discussion, however, the prior art rejections of claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-24, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). In view of the indefmiteness of claims 1, 3—8, 11—16, 18—24, and 26—31, which are all the claims on appeal as discussed supra, we do not review the Examiner’s § 103 rejections. Such a review would require us to engage in speculation and conjecture to determine the scope of the claimed invention. This we decline to do. See In re Steele, 305 F.2d 859, 862 (CCPA 1962) (A prior art rejection cannot be sustained if the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art would have to make speculative assumptions concerning the meaning of claim language.); see 4 Appeal 2016-004095 Application 11/991,861 also In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970) (“If no reasonably definite meaning can be ascribed to certain terms in the claim, the subject matter does not become obvious-the claim becomes indefinite.”). Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-24, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). DECISION We affirm the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-24, and 26-31 for failing to comply with the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. §112. We reverse the decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1, 3-8, 11-16, 18-24, and 26-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 5 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation