Ex Parte Leydon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2017

13185892 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/185,892 07/19/2011 Krispin J. Leydon 0260320 3225
63649 7590 04/04/2017
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.
C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP
26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360
MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691
EXAMINER
GUTIERREZ, ANDRES E
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2141
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/04/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KRISPIN J. LEYDON, DOUGLAS E. LESAN,
MATTHEW F. SCHNITTKER, and DALE ROGER BECK
Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,8921
Technology Center 2100
Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and SCOTT E. BAIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—5, 9-15, and 19-24, which constitute all of the
claims pending in the application. Claims 6—8 and 16—18 have been
canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 Appellants identify Disney Enterprises, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
The Walt Disney Company, as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,892
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Claimed Invention
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a compact graphical user
interface (“GUI”) for the flexible filtering of data in searches, including
“non-text” data. Spec. 1. Claims 1, 11, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the subject matter of the appeal and reads as follows, with the
disputed limitations emphasized in italics:
1. A method for providing a compact graphical user
interface for executing a content search, the method
comprising:
showing a search interface on a display device for filtering a
content set by a plurality of domains including a first non-textual
domain, wherein the search interface comprises a menu to display the
plurality of domains for a selection by a user, wherein each content in
the content set includes a color border;
in response to the selection of the first non-textual domain by
the user, receiving and displaying, within the search interface, a first
non-textual graphical representation of a color set of the first non­
textual domain;
receiving a first color selected by the user from the color set of
the first non-textual graphical representation;
filtering the content set using the first color to obtain a search
result including the content having the color border that matches the
first color, and
displaying the search result on the display device.
App. Br. 16 (Claims App.).
Rejections on Appeal
Claims 1—5, 9-15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Cutrell et al. (US 2007/0005576 Al; published Jan. 4,
2007) (“Cutrell”), Gokturk et al. (US 2010/0166339 Al; published July 1,
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Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,892
2010) (“Gokturk”), and Lee et al. (US 2011/0320441 Al; published Dec. 29,
2011) (“Lee”). Final Act. A-8.
Claims 21—24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over Cutrell and Rosenberg et al. (US 2008/0140717 Al; published June 12,
2008) (“Rosenberg”). Final Act. 9—11.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments Appellants could have made
but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41,37(c)(l)(iv). With respect to the obviousness rejection of claims
21—24, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred
on the record before us. With respect to the obviousness rejections of the
remaining claims, however, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and
conclusions and adopt them as our own. We provide the following to
highlight and address specific arguments.
Claims 1—5, 9—15, 19, and 20
Appellants argue claims 1—5, 9-15, 19, and 20 as a group, App. Br. 7,
and we choose claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41,37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the
prior art teaches “wherein each content in the content set includes a color
border,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 2—3. We disagree.
The Examiner relies on the combination of Cutrell, Gokturk, and Lee
as teaching the disputed limitation. Ans. 10—11. The Examiner finds, and
we agree, Cutrell teaches a search engine user interface (“UI”) providing
search functions for “a plurality of types of file metadata and types of file
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Application 13/185,892
content (Picture, music and sounds, video).” Ans. 10 (citing Cutrell Fig. 5);
see also Cutrell 173. The Examiner further finds the “color” and “border”
elements in Gokturk and Lee, respectively. Ans. 10—11. We discern no
error in these findings. Gokturk teaches a “color picker” function in a search
query, to allow a user selection of color. Gokturk Fig. 17, 253—54; Ans.
10. Lee teaches filtering search results “according to one or more
presentation adjustments,” including “border style.” Lee 147; Ans. 11. All
three references are, as the Examiner finds, in the same field of endeavor
(“search/querying a database to retrieve results”) and directed to the same
objective or problem of improving customization and precision of search.
Ans. 11—12; see Innovention Toys LLC v. MGA Entm ’tine., 637 F.3d 1314,
1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Appellants’ argument, in essence, relies upon identifying alleged
shortcomings in each of the three references individually. App. Br. 7—11;
see also Ans. 11. One cannot, however, “show non-obviousness by
attacking references individually where ... the rejections are based on
combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981).
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1,2
We, therefore, sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 1, and
sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 2—5, 9—15, 19, and 20 grouped
therewith.
2 Appellants’ related argument, that the prior art fails to teach filtering
content to obtain a result “having the color border that matches the first
color,” App. Br. 11, does not persuade us of error for the same reasons as the
foregoing.
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Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,892
Claims 21—24
Independent claim 21, in contrast to claim 1, recites the additional
elements of a “graphical representation of a sound set” and “<2 first sound
selected by the user from the sound set.” App. Br. 20 (Claims App.)
(emphasis added). The “first sound” is utilized to filter the search;
specifically, claim 21 recites “filtering the content set using the first sound to
obtain a search result.” Id. Appellants contend the Examiner erred in
finding claim 21 obvious over Cutrell and Rosenberg, because neither
reference (nor the combination) teaches filtering a search using sound. App.
Br. 12—14. Rather, Appellants argue, at most the prior art teaches filtering
search using descriptions or metadata corresponding to sound, which may
correspond to the limitation “graphical representation of a sound set” but not
the limitation a “first sound.” Id. (emphasis added). On the record before
us, we are persuaded by Appellants’ argument.
The Examiner relies on Cutrell as teaching the ability to filter search
results, and specifically, to allow a user to specify results as “music and
sounds.” Ans. 13 (citing Cutrell Fig. 5,173). As the Examiner
acknowledges, however, “the search queries] described in Cutrell are text
based” (i.e., describing sound), not relying on “a first sound” itself, and
“therefore [the] [EJxaminer used Rosenberg to teach the ability of using
actual sound” to obtain a search result. Ans. 13 (emphasis added).
Rosenberg teaches a “personalized audio system” in which users can
customize music broadcast “stations” corresponding to their personal tastes.
Ans. 13. The Examiner relies on Figure 7 of Rosenberg, id., reproduced
below.
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Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,892
700
SELECT ONE OR MORE MUSIC CHANNELS:
B ROCK
iH) JAZZ
ill BLUES
jxj ALTERNATIVE
□ COUNTRY
□ TOP 40
.702
DONE
706
FIG.7
Figure 7 illustrates a GUI that permits a user to activate predefined music
channels or create new channels based on genres listed in the GUI.
Rosenberg || 23, 54—60. Text box 702 lists audio channels including
“Rock,” “Jazz,” “Blues,” and others, and button 704 permits a user to
“create [a] new channel.” Id. According to the Examiner, the various
genres shown in Figure 7 (and described in the accompanying text) are
“sounds.” Ans. 13. Because the user can search for the specific genres, the
Examiner finds Rosenberg teaches “sound filtering,” or search based on
sound. Id. The Examiner notes that Appellants’ own Specification includes
drawings depicting a user interface having “bass, treble, [and] alto”
selections, which the Examiner describes as “measurements of a range of
sound” like Rosenberg’s genres. Id. (citing Spec. Fig. 2f).
The Examiner’s finding, however, appears to conflate the limitation
“graphical representation of a sound set” with the separate limitation “a first
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Application 13/185,892
sound. . . from the sound set.” App. Br. 20 (Claims App.). Rosenberg’s
Figure 7, like Appellants’ Figure 2f, teaches a “graphical representation of a
sound set,” and when a user makes a selection on Figure 7, “receiving a first
sound.” The Examiner does not identify on this record, however, any
teaching in Rosenberg of “using the first sound” to “obtain a search result,”
as recited in claim 21. App. Br. 14. Nor do we find Appellants’
Specification inconsistent with Appellants’ position that “a first sound”
refers to sound itself, not a graphical representation or description thereof.
See Spec. 13 (describing Figure 2f as allowing a “selection of sound
samples”).3
For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claim 21, and its dependent claims 22—24 which include the disputed
limitation, as obvious over Cutrell and Rosenberg.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—5, 9—15, 19,
and 20.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21—24.
3 We do not interpret the Examiner’s Answer as asserting that filtering by
genre or description of sound is all Appellants’ Specification describes or
enables regarding the disputed limitation, and there is no rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 112 on the record before us. Ans. 13. The Examiner may further
consider this issue, if relevant, in the event of further prosecution. Although
the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no
inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual
of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02.
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Appeal 2016-007491
Application 13/185,892
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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