Ex Parte Leydon et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 31, 201713185892 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/185,892 07/19/2011 Krispin J. Leydon 0260320 3225 63649 7590 04/04/2017 DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC. C/O FARJAMI & FARJAMI LLP 26522 LA ALAMEDA AVENUE, SUITE 360 MISSION VIEJO, CA 92691 EXAMINER GUTIERREZ, ANDRES E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2141 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/04/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing @ farj ami. com farj amidocketing @ yahoo, com ITarj ami @ farj ami. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KRISPIN J. LEYDON, DOUGLAS E. LESAN, MATTHEW F. SCHNITTKER, and DALE ROGER BECK Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,8921 Technology Center 2100 Before JUSTIN BUSCH, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and SCOTT E. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judges. BAIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—5, 9-15, and 19-24, which constitute all of the claims pending in the application. Claims 6—8 and 16—18 have been canceled. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 Appellants identify Disney Enterprises, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of The Walt Disney Company, as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2. Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Claimed Invention Appellants’ claimed invention relates to a compact graphical user interface (“GUI”) for the flexible filtering of data in searches, including “non-text” data. Spec. 1. Claims 1, 11, and 21 are independent. Claim 1 is illustrative of the subject matter of the appeal and reads as follows, with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics: 1. A method for providing a compact graphical user interface for executing a content search, the method comprising: showing a search interface on a display device for filtering a content set by a plurality of domains including a first non-textual domain, wherein the search interface comprises a menu to display the plurality of domains for a selection by a user, wherein each content in the content set includes a color border; in response to the selection of the first non-textual domain by the user, receiving and displaying, within the search interface, a first non-textual graphical representation of a color set of the first non textual domain; receiving a first color selected by the user from the color set of the first non-textual graphical representation; filtering the content set using the first color to obtain a search result including the content having the color border that matches the first color, and displaying the search result on the display device. App. Br. 16 (Claims App.). Rejections on Appeal Claims 1—5, 9-15, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Cutrell et al. (US 2007/0005576 Al; published Jan. 4, 2007) (“Cutrell”), Gokturk et al. (US 2010/0166339 Al; published July 1, 2 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 2010) (“Gokturk”), and Lee et al. (US 2011/0320441 Al; published Dec. 29, 2011) (“Lee”). Final Act. A-8. Claims 21—24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Cutrell and Rosenberg et al. (US 2008/0140717 Al; published June 12, 2008) (“Rosenberg”). Final Act. 9—11. ANALYSIS We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments presented in this appeal. Arguments Appellants could have made but chose not to make in the Briefs are deemed waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41,37(c)(l)(iv). With respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 21—24, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner erred on the record before us. With respect to the obviousness rejections of the remaining claims, however, we agree with the Examiner’s findings and conclusions and adopt them as our own. We provide the following to highlight and address specific arguments. Claims 1—5, 9—15, 19, and 20 Appellants argue claims 1—5, 9-15, 19, and 20 as a group, App. Br. 7, and we choose claim 1 as representative of the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41,37(c)(l)(iv). Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding the prior art teaches “wherein each content in the content set includes a color border,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 7; Reply Br. 2—3. We disagree. The Examiner relies on the combination of Cutrell, Gokturk, and Lee as teaching the disputed limitation. Ans. 10—11. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Cutrell teaches a search engine user interface (“UI”) providing search functions for “a plurality of types of file metadata and types of file 3 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 content (Picture, music and sounds, video).” Ans. 10 (citing Cutrell Fig. 5); see also Cutrell 173. The Examiner further finds the “color” and “border” elements in Gokturk and Lee, respectively. Ans. 10—11. We discern no error in these findings. Gokturk teaches a “color picker” function in a search query, to allow a user selection of color. Gokturk Fig. 17, 253—54; Ans. 10. Lee teaches filtering search results “according to one or more presentation adjustments,” including “border style.” Lee 147; Ans. 11. All three references are, as the Examiner finds, in the same field of endeavor (“search/querying a database to retrieve results”) and directed to the same objective or problem of improving customization and precision of search. Ans. 11—12; see Innovention Toys LLC v. MGA Entm ’tine., 637 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Appellants’ argument, in essence, relies upon identifying alleged shortcomings in each of the three references individually. App. Br. 7—11; see also Ans. 11. One cannot, however, “show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where ... the rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1,2 We, therefore, sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 1, and sustain the obviousness rejections of claims 2—5, 9—15, 19, and 20 grouped therewith. 2 Appellants’ related argument, that the prior art fails to teach filtering content to obtain a result “having the color border that matches the first color,” App. Br. 11, does not persuade us of error for the same reasons as the foregoing. 4 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 Claims 21—24 Independent claim 21, in contrast to claim 1, recites the additional elements of a “graphical representation of a sound set” and “<2 first sound selected by the user from the sound set.” App. Br. 20 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The “first sound” is utilized to filter the search; specifically, claim 21 recites “filtering the content set using the first sound to obtain a search result.” Id. Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding claim 21 obvious over Cutrell and Rosenberg, because neither reference (nor the combination) teaches filtering a search using sound. App. Br. 12—14. Rather, Appellants argue, at most the prior art teaches filtering search using descriptions or metadata corresponding to sound, which may correspond to the limitation “graphical representation of a sound set” but not the limitation a “first sound.” Id. (emphasis added). On the record before us, we are persuaded by Appellants’ argument. The Examiner relies on Cutrell as teaching the ability to filter search results, and specifically, to allow a user to specify results as “music and sounds.” Ans. 13 (citing Cutrell Fig. 5,173). As the Examiner acknowledges, however, “the search queries] described in Cutrell are text based” (i.e., describing sound), not relying on “a first sound” itself, and “therefore [the] [EJxaminer used Rosenberg to teach the ability of using actual sound” to obtain a search result. Ans. 13 (emphasis added). Rosenberg teaches a “personalized audio system” in which users can customize music broadcast “stations” corresponding to their personal tastes. Ans. 13. The Examiner relies on Figure 7 of Rosenberg, id., reproduced below. 5 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 700 SELECT ONE OR MORE MUSIC CHANNELS: B ROCK iH) JAZZ ill BLUES jxj ALTERNATIVE □ COUNTRY □ TOP 40 .702 DONE 706 FIG.7 Figure 7 illustrates a GUI that permits a user to activate predefined music channels or create new channels based on genres listed in the GUI. Rosenberg || 23, 54—60. Text box 702 lists audio channels including “Rock,” “Jazz,” “Blues,” and others, and button 704 permits a user to “create [a] new channel.” Id. According to the Examiner, the various genres shown in Figure 7 (and described in the accompanying text) are “sounds.” Ans. 13. Because the user can search for the specific genres, the Examiner finds Rosenberg teaches “sound filtering,” or search based on sound. Id. The Examiner notes that Appellants’ own Specification includes drawings depicting a user interface having “bass, treble, [and] alto” selections, which the Examiner describes as “measurements of a range of sound” like Rosenberg’s genres. Id. (citing Spec. Fig. 2f). The Examiner’s finding, however, appears to conflate the limitation “graphical representation of a sound set” with the separate limitation “a first 6 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 sound. . . from the sound set.” App. Br. 20 (Claims App.). Rosenberg’s Figure 7, like Appellants’ Figure 2f, teaches a “graphical representation of a sound set,” and when a user makes a selection on Figure 7, “receiving a first sound.” The Examiner does not identify on this record, however, any teaching in Rosenberg of “using the first sound” to “obtain a search result,” as recited in claim 21. App. Br. 14. Nor do we find Appellants’ Specification inconsistent with Appellants’ position that “a first sound” refers to sound itself, not a graphical representation or description thereof. See Spec. 13 (describing Figure 2f as allowing a “selection of sound samples”).3 For the foregoing reasons, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21, and its dependent claims 22—24 which include the disputed limitation, as obvious over Cutrell and Rosenberg. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—5, 9—15, 19, and 20. We reverse the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21—24. 3 We do not interpret the Examiner’s Answer as asserting that filtering by genre or description of sound is all Appellants’ Specification describes or enables regarding the disputed limitation, and there is no rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 on the record before us. Ans. 13. The Examiner may further consider this issue, if relevant, in the event of further prosecution. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02. 7 Appeal 2016-007491 Application 13/185,892 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation