Ex Parte LEMPHERS et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardDec 19, 201713830077 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/830,077 03/14/2013 David Jonathan LEMPHERS 034250-0437006 1756 909 7590 Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP PO Box 10500 McLean, VA 22102 EXAMINER BRADY, MARIE P. ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3681 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/21/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docket_ip@pillsburylaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte DAVID JONATHAN LEMPHERS, SHREYAS KARNIK, CHRISTOPHER COUHAULT, and ALEXANDROS SUVACIOGLU Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 Technology Center 3600 Before ANTON W. FETTING, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and AMEE A. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judges. SHAH, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL1 The Appellants2 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 21—40. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Aug. 25, 2015), Reply Br. (“Reply Br.,” filed Jan. 20, 2016), and Specification (“Spec.,” filed Mar. 14, 2013), and to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Nov. 20, 2015) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Mar. 25, 2015). 2 According to the Appellants, the real party in interest is RetailMeNot, Inc. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Appellants’ invention “relates generally to the field of online shopping, data manipulation, and publication of online deals and coupons” and, more particularly, to “generat[ing] online electronic deal summaries in a clear and useful manner.” Spec. Tflf 1, 13. Claims 21 and 31 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 21 (Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.)) is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal, and is reproduced below: 21. A method, comprising: sending, by one or more processors, to an affiliate network server, via the Internet, an application program interface request for primary deal content, the primary deal content describing a deal or coupon, wherein the affiliate network server hosts deals or coupons provided by a plurality of advertisers for electronic distribution to consumers via a plurality of publishers; receiving, by one or more processors, via the Internet, responsive primary deal content from the affiliate network server; parsing, by one or more processors, deal data from the received primary deal content, the deal data including structured data describing a plurality of attributes of the deal or coupon; composing, by one or more processors, a request to a third party web server for secondary deal content, the request including keywords about the deal or coupon, the third party web server being a different server from the affiliate network server from which the primary deal content was received; sending, by one or more processors, via the Internet, the composed request for secondary deal content to the third party web server; receiving, by one or more processors, via the Internet, responsive secondary deal content from the third party web 2 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 server, wherein the secondary deal content includes an image or text relating to the deal or coupon; and storing, with one or more processors, a deal summary, wherein the deal summary includes both at least some of the deal data from the affiliate network server and at least some of the image or text from the third party web server. THE REJECTION Claims 21—40 stand rejected under 35U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-statutory subject matter.3 ANALYSIS Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patent may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” The Supreme Court has “long held that this provision contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Inti, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting Assn for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework, set forth previously in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75—77 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at 3 The rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112 of claims 29 and 39 has been previously withdrawn. See Advisory Action mailed June 3, 2015. 3 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 76—79) (emphasis added). If so, the second step is to consider the elements of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination”’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘“transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78-79). In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—73). The Court acknowledged in Mayo, that “all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71. We, therefore, look to whether the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea, and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Turning to the first step of the Alice framework, the Examiner determines that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of preparing online detailed deal summaries, a fundamental economic practice. Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 3^4. The Examiner considers “[a]ll claims and all claim elements” (Ans. 3) and clearly indicates the abstract idea. As such, we do not find persuasive of Examiner error the Appellants’ argument that “the Examiner has not adequately specified an abstract idea to which the claims are directed.” Appeal Br. 7; see also id. at 6. 4 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 Independent claim 21 recites a method comprising the steps of sending a request for data describing a primary deal, receiving responsive primary deal data, parsing the data, composing a request for data describing a secondary deal, sending the composed request, receiving responsive secondary deal data, and storing deal summary data. Appeal Br. 13 (Claims App.)). Independent claim 31 recites a system comprising a processor and memory with instructions for the processor to execute the method of claim 21. Id. at 16. Dependent claims 22—30 and 32 40 recite limitations elaborating the method of claim 21, and executed in claim 31, by further defining the location/owner of the third party web server, further defining the steps of sending the request for secondary deal data, receiving responsive secondary deal data, and storing the deal summary data, and further defining the secondary deal data. Id. at 13—18. The Specification provides that the invention “relates generally to the field of online shopping, data manipulation, and publication of online deals and coupons.” Spec. 11. Thus, we determine that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of creating and storing online deal summaries, an idea of itself and method of organizing human activity.4 We find unpersuasive the Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner’s rejection is in error because the Examiner has not established that providing details summaries is a fundamental economic practice. Reply Br. 3; see also Appeal Br. 8. We are aware of no controlling authority that requires that 4 We note that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Board’s “slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. 5 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 “[t]he claims must be compared to an abstract idea recognized by courts” (Appeal Br. 7) or other evidence to support a determination that a claim is directed to an abstract idea or a fundamental economic practice. There is also no controlling authority that requires that the Examiner’s analysis refer to the actual claim language (see id. at 6—7) in determining that the claims are directed to an abstract idea.5 See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355—57; see also Enfish, 822 F.3dat 1335 (the directed to inquiry considers the claims in light of the Specification and on “their character as a whole”). Nonetheless, we note that the abstract idea here is similar to ones our reviewing court has deemed ineligible. See Elec. Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d. 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (collecting, analyzing, and displaying information, including when limited to particular content), In re TLI Communications LLC Patent Litigation, 823 F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“classifying and storing digital images in an organized manner”), Evolutionary Intelligence LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 677 F. App'x 679, 680 (Fed. Cir. 2017), cert, denied, No. 17-609, 2017 WF 4811478 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2017) (“selecting and sorting information by user interest or subject matter”), and Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. CNN Interactive Grp., Inc., 558 F. App'x 988, 992 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (organizing, storing, and transmitting information is well-established abstract idea). Here, the claims involve 5 We note that Office guidelines are not legal requirements, and regardless of how closely the Examiner adheres to such guidelines (or not), we still must heed the precedent set by our controlling courts. Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Erielndem. Co., No. 2017-1147, 2017 WF 5041460, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 3, 2017); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The MPEP and Guidelines ‘are not binding on this court’”); MPEP, Foreword (“The Manual does not have the force of law or the force of the rules in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations”). 6 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 nothing more than sending, receiving, parsing, composing, and storing data of a specific content and/or from a specific source without any particular inventive technology — an abstract idea. See Electric Power, 830 F.3d at 1354. We find also unpersuasive of Examiner error the Appellants’ argument that “the claims are patent eligible for the reasons articulated by the Federal Circuit in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., Appeal No. 2013-1505, (Fed. Cir. Dec. 5, 2014).” Appeal Br. 8; see also Reply Br. 4. In DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257, the Federal Circuit determined that the claims addressed the problem of retaining website visitors who, if adhering to the routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol, would be transported instantly away from a host’s website after clicking on an advertisement and activating a hyperlink. The Federal Circuit, thus, held that the claims were directed to statutory subject matter because they claim a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257. The court cautioned that “not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent,” and noted that in the claims at issue in DDR Holdings, the computer network was not “operating in its normal, expected manner.” Id. at 1258. In contrast, there is no indication here that the claimed invention claims a solution “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” Although the Appellants argue that “[t]he claimed technique solves problems that arise when affiliate network server data feeds are leveraged to find and extract supplemental content from third party servers” (Appeal 7 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 Br. 8), the Appellants do not identify what specific problems that “have no analog in the pre-Internet world” (id.) are being addressed. The Specification discusses that differences between networks from which publishers can access content include quality, content and structure, freshness, reliability, technical accessibility, commission structure and terms, and uptime. Spec. 19. Prior art systems “place[] the burden of sorting, verifying and curating the data on the publishers,” which can be costly. Id. 111. Asa consequence, publishers may not sort, optimize, enhance, or verily content. Id. Further, prior art systems do not consider the plurality of networks and natures of commissions. Id. 112. Thus, the invention meets publishers’ priorities, such as “maximizing commissions,” “reducing payout scheduling, and favoring advertisers and affiliate network with whom the publishers have a good relationship.” Id. 113. The prior art problems of cost, optimization, enhancements, veracity, and commission payouts are not technical problems, but business problems that existed prior to the Internet. Although the field of the invention is the Internet, the problems are not one unique to the Internet or computers. Turning to the second step of the Alice framework, we find supported and adopt the Examiner’s determination that the elements of the claims do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea because they are “no more than: (i) mere instructions to implement the idea on a computer, and/or (ii) recitation of generic computer structure that serves to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities previously known to the pertinent industry.” Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 7. The Specification supports this view in describing a generic computer with a processor, input/output component, and memory/storage 8 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 module, generic computer servers, and a generic network. See Spec. Tflf 34, 37—42. The Appellants do not provide adequate evidence to the contrary. And there is no further specification of particular technology for performing the steps. See Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1263; see also Enfish, 822 F.3d. at 1336 (focusing on whether the claim is “an improvement to the computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.”). We are not persuaded by the Appellants’ arguments that the claims are significantly more than the abstract idea because the “ordered combination of elements adds significantly more to the alleged abstract idea of ‘preparing a detailed deal summary.’” Appeal Br. 9; see also Reply Br. 5. To the extent the Appellants argue that the Examiner does not establish a prima facie case because the Examiner does not “establish that the claim elements, as an ordered combination, fail to add significantly more to the alleged abstract idea” {id.), the Federal Circuit has held that the USPTO carries its procedural burden of establishing a prima facie case when its rejection satisfies the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 132 by notifying the applicant of the reasons for rejection, “together with such information and references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of [the] application.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here we find that the Examiner has set forth the statutory basis of the rejection in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice requirement of § 132 as to why the claims are patent-ineligible. Id.; see also Chester v. Miller, 906 F.2d 1574, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Section 132 “is violated when a rejection is so uninformative that it 9 Appeal 2016-003127 Application 13/830,077 prevents the applicant from recognizing and seeking to counter the grounds for rejection”). To the extent the Appellants argue that, when considering the elements of the claims as an ordered combination, they transform the claims into a patent-eligible application (see Appeal Br. 9-10), we disagree. As noted above, the Specification supports the view that the steps of sending, receiving, parsing, composing, and storing data are performed by generic components operating in their ordinary capacities. As the Appellants note, “one can prepare a deal detailed deal summary, with a computer, without interfacing with a third party web server.” Id. at 10. The Appellants do not show how adding a third web server improves the technology or the functioning of the processor or server itself or leads to the processor operating in a technically unconventional manner. Thus, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims 21—40. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21—40 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation