Ex Parte Lejdstrom et al

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 25, 2019

11724313 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 11/724,313 03/15/2007 23117 7590 02/27/2019 NIXON & V ANDERHYE, PC 901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11 TH FLOOR ARLINGTON, VA 22203 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Bengt Lejdstrom UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. JRL-4010-60 1871 EXAMINER EBERSMAN, BRUCE I ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3692 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/27/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com pair_nixon@firsttofile.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte BENGT LEJDSTROM, OSKAR SANDER, and JOHAN SODERQVIST Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 Technology Center 3600 Before PHILLIP J. KAUFFMAN, AMBER L. HAGY, and MICHAEL M. BARRY, Administrative Patent Judges. HAGY, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 134(a) from the Examiner's Final Rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7-11, and 17-27, which are all of the pending claims. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 6(b ). We affirm. 1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Nasdaq Technology AB. (App. Br. 3.) 2 By way of an amendment dated December 15, 2015, Appellants canceled claims 2, 4, 6, and 12. By way of an amendment dated February 27, 2014, Appellants canceled claims 13-16. Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Introduction Appellants' described and claimed invention relates generally to a "securities settlement system." (Spec. 1.) By way of background, Appellants' Specification notes that "[ t ]ransactions between market participants require matching and settlement," and further notes that "[t]rade matching and confirmation prepare transactions for settlement according to applicable settlement rules." (Id.) The Specification states that "[ a ]n overall object and purpose of the securities settlement system (SSS) is to increase the flow of successful trades, by minimizing the demands for liquidity of cash especially." (Id. at 2.) The Specification describes that this purpose can be achieved by "[g]rouping trades and aggregating the obligation to be cleared for each user." (Id.) The Specification also states that the system ensures that all trades in the selected group of trades can be cleared by employing "a set of algorithms in order to determine a minimum [number] of trades to be removed from the group in order to obtain a group in which all trades are clearable." (Id. at 2-3.) Representative Claim Claims 1, 5, and 10 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A computer-implemented securities settlement system for clearing matched trades for securities, comprising: a computer-implemented input processor configured to receive signals including trade information corresponding to matched trades for securities matched in a securities trading system, where each matched trade for a security includes a participant trader, a counterparticipant trader, a security volume 2 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 to be traded, and a price associated with the matched trade for a security, and configured to convert each matched trade for a security into a settlement obligation group, a settlement obligation group including a list of debit and credit obligations for each trader associated with the matched trade for a security to be settled simultaneously for multiple traders; a computer-implemented selector configured to select a set of multiple settlement obligation groups to be cleared; a computer-implemented aggregated clearing processor configured to determine an aggregated obligation to be cleared for each trader associated with the selected set of settlement obligation groups; a computer-implemented settlement processor configured to settle the selected set of settlement obligation groups when the aggregated obligation is cleared by the aggregated clearing processor for every trader associated with the selected set of settlement obligation groups; a register configured to indicate each trader's obligation limit; and a comparator configured to compare each trader's aggregated obligation with the trader's obligation limit; wherein the computer-implemented selector is configured to: modify the selected set of settlement obligation groups to provide a new selected set of settlement obligation groups when the aggregated obligation is not cleared by the computer implemented aggregated clearing processor for every trader associated with the selected set of settlement obligation groups; when a trader's obligation limit does not meet the trader's aggregated obligation, modify the selected set of settlement obligation groups to arrive at the new selected set of settlement obligation groups where all obligations can be met by all traders associated with the new selected set of settlement obligation groups; and modify the selected set of settlement obligation groups in iterative fashion to determine a minimum number of settlement 3 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 obligation groups required to be removed from the selected set of settlement obligation groups in order to meet the aggregated obligation for all traders associated with the new selected set of settlement obligation groups. REJECTION Claims 1, 3, 5, 7-11, and 17-27 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter (abstract idea). ANALYSIS 1. Principles of Law Under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpretedÂ§ 101 to include an implicit exception: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int 'l, 573 U.S. 208,216 (2014) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012), "for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. For example, abstract ideas include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an idea of itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 218-20. The 4 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 "directed to" inquiry asks not whether "the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept," but instead whether, "considered in light of the specification, ... 'their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter."' Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). In that regard, we determine whether the claims "focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology" or are "directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If, at the first stage of the Alice analysis, we conclude that the claim is not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, it is considered patent eligible under Â§ 101 and the inquiry ends. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016). If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims "individually and 'as an ordered combination"' to determine whether there are additional elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). In other words, the second step is to "search for an "'inventive concept"'-i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Id. at 217-18 (brackets in original) ( quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea "'cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment' or adding 'insignificant 5 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 postsolution activity."' Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-11 (2010) (internal citation omitted). The Patent and Trademark Office (the "Office") recently published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50-57 (Jan. 7, 2019) ("2019 PEG"). Under the 2019 PEG, the Office first looks to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see MPEP Â§ 2106.05(a}-(c), (e}-(h)). 3 See 2019 PEG at 52, 54--55. Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception, and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, does the Office then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not "well-understood, routine, conventional" in the field (see MPEP Â§ 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 2019 PEG at 56. We follow this framework in our analysis herein. 3 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018). 6 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 2. Appellants' Arguments4 Appellants contend the claims are eligible under the first step of Alice because they are not directed to an abstract idea. (See App. Br. 12-15.) More specifically, Appellants contend "the claims are directed to an improved computer-implemented securities settlement system for clearing matched trades for securities in a faster and more efficient way than in conventional computer-implemented securities settlement systems." (Id. at 14.) Appellants characterize the claims as employing "new uses of a known machine" (id. at 10; Reply Br. 3--4), and insist that "several different computers or processors are used in combination in a new way to improve the technical operation of electronic trading exchanges" (App. Br. 10). Appellants further argue their claims do not merely recite implementation of an abstract idea in software because they recite "structure": A person of ordinary skill in the art of computer- implemented securities settlement systems would have understood from the specification and figures that the function block diagrams in Figures 10 and 11 represent a computer or processor implementation which is not and cannot be surely software. The independent claims also recite a register and a comparator which are additional structure. (App. Br. 13.) Citing the Federal Circuit's decision in Eefzsh, 5 Appellants argue "[ t ]he claims in this application improve computer functionality in a 4 Appellants argue all pending claims (claims 1, 3, 5, 7-11, and 17-27) as group, focusing on independent claim 1. (See App. Br. 10-19.) We consider claim 1 to be representative of the claimed subject matter on appeal and, therefore, we decide the rejection of all pending claims on the basis of representative claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. Â§ 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). 5 Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335. 7 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 computer-implemented securities settlement system that recites specific components performing detailed functions that specify how the matched trades are cleared in a new, detailed, and inventive way." (App. Br. 15.) With regard to Alice step two, Appellants argue that "[ e ]ven a cursory review of claim 1 reveals that many detailed technical features are recited in addition to the idea of trading and clearing respective obligations," namely, "a computer-implemented input processor, a computer-implemented selector, a computer-implemented aggregated clearing processor, a computer-implemented settlement processor, a register, and a comparator, each of which is configured to perform specific-rather than generic- operations." (Id. at 16.) Appellants insist that the "specifically-recited, computer-implemented elements" cannot be dismissed as "generic." (Id. at 18 (citing Hulu LLC v. iMTX Strategic LLC, Case CBM2015-00147 (PTAB Nov. 30, 2015)); see also Reply Br. 5.) Appellants argue that these recitations confirm that their claimed invention is "rooted in computer technology." (App. Br. 16-17.) Citing the Federal Circuit's decision in DDR Holdings, 6 Appellants argue that even claims directed to solving a business challenge are patent eligible if the solution is rooted in computer technology. (Id. at 17.) Building on their premise that the claims are "directed to a very particular technical implementation for performing 'trading and clearing respective obligations,"' Appellants also argue "the risk of preemption in this case is minimized." (Id. at 18; see also Reply Br. 7-8.) Relatedly, Appellants argue "[t]he fact that the Examiner withdrew all prior art 6 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 8 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 rejections is clear evidence that the claims contain an inventive concept." (App. Br. 19.) 3. Analysis a. Step One of Alice Prong 1: Whether Claims Recite an Abstract Idea Contrary to Appellants' contention that the "rejection fails to perform the two-part analysis required under Alice and Mayo" (App. Br. 12), the Examiner does perform that analysis. In particular, the Examiner finds the claims are directed to the "settlement of securities trades," and further finds "[t]rading and clearing respective obligations is a fundamental economic practice in view of Alice v. CLS Bank where hedging with generic computers was found to be a fundamental economic practice." (Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 10-11, 15.) Thus, the Examiner concludes the claims are directed to an abstract idea ( step one), and further finds that the claims do not recite significantly more because the elements recited beyond the abstract idea are "generic computing equipment" (step two). (Final Act. 3.) We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites a fundamental economic practice (i.e., "clearing matched trades for securities"), which the Office Guidance identifies as a "certain method[] of organizing human activity"-that is, an abstract idea. See 2019 PEG at 52. We disagree with Appellants' assertion that the Examiner's framing the abstract idea as "trading and clearing respective obligations" overgeneralizes the claimed invention at too high a level of abstraction. (App. Br. 14.) Indeed, such a characterization echoes the Supreme Court's characterization of the claims before it in Alice, in which the Court discerned that the claims----despite a lengthy recitation of detailed limitations-were properly characterized as 9 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 "drawn to the abstract idea of intermediated settlement." Alice, 573 U.S. at 218. Moreover, the Examiner did not merely consider a high-level characterization of the claims in concluding they are directed to an abstract idea, but instead reviewed the entirety of the claims. (See Final Act. 4.) Consistent with the Examiner's analysis, we conclude claim 1 recites limitations of receiving "trade information corresponding to matched trades for securities" (that is, data identifying the securities to be traded, including the identity of the security, the identity of the trader, a price, and a volume); "select[ing] a set of multiple settlement obligation groups to be cleared" (grouping the securities trades for clearing); "determin[ing] an aggregated obligation to be cleared for each trader" (grouping the trades to determine a net amount for each trader); "settl[ing] the selected set of settlement obligation groups" ( completing the trades); and several steps directed to "modify[ing] the settlement obligation groups" as needed to result in obligations that can be cleared for every trader. (See App. Br. 22-23 (Claims App'x); see also Final Act. 4.) We agree with the Examiner that the aforementioned recited steps are steps of a fundamental economic practice-that is, settlement of securities trades, which is a certain method of organizing human activity and, thus, is an abstract idea. (See Final Act. 2--4); see also 2019 PEG at 52. Consistent with the Examiner's conclusions, and contrary to Appellants' argument that claim 1 is not similar to any idea previously found to be abstract, we see no meaningful difference between Appellants' claims and similar claims that courts have determined are directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (holding the concept of intermediated settlement is an 10 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 abstract idea directed to a "fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce" (citation omitted)); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing cases where contractual relations at issue constituted fundamental economic practices, and noting that forming or manipulating economic relations may involve an abstract idea); OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("automatic pricing method and apparatus for use in electronic commerce"); Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'! Ass 'n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that claims directed to "the mere formation and manipulation of economic relations" and "the performance of certain financial transactions" have been held to involve abstract ideas); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims reciting a method of using advertising as an exchange or currency are directed to an abstract idea). Although Appellants heavily emphasize that their claimed invention is "computer-implemented" (App. Br. 13-15), this fact does not impart patent- eligibility to the claims, as the recitation of "computer-implemented" merely amounts to a statement to use a computing system to process the securities settlement transactions. As the Supreme Court has explained, "if a patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to 'implemen[t]' an abstract idea 'on ... a computer,' that addition cannot impart patent eligibility." Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 84). In summary, under prong 1 of Step 2A in accordance with the 2019 PEG, we agree with the Examiner's conclusions that the claims recite an abstract idea in the form of a fundamental economic practice. We tum now to prong 2. 11 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 Prong 2: Whether the Claims Integrate the Abstract Idea Into a Practical Application 7 In accordance with prong 2 of Step 2A of the 2019 PEG, the claims are evaluated to determine whether they recite additional elements beyond the abstract idea, and, if so, the additional elements are evaluated to determine whether they integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. 2019 PEG at 54. The 2019 PEG at page 55 provides the following exemplary considerations of whether an additional element: â€¢ "reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field"; â€¢ "applies or uses a judicial exception to effect a particular treatment or prophylaxis for a disease or medical condition"; â€¢ "implements a judicial exception with, or uses a judicial exception in conjunction with, a particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim"; â€¢ "effects a transformation or reduction of a particular article [ or thing] to a different state or thing"; or â€¢ "applies or uses the judicial exception in some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a particular technological environment." 7 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly evaluated under the second step of Alice (Step 2B of Office Guidance as identified in the 2019 PEG). Solely for purposes of maintaining consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under the first step of Alice (Step 2A of Office Guidance as identified in the 2019 PEG). See 2019 PEG at 54--55. 12 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 The 2019 PEG also highlights certain examples in which courts have held that "a judicial exception has not been integrated into a practical application," such as where the claims "merely use[] a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea" or the additional element adds "insignificant extra- solution activity" to the abstract idea. 2019 PEG at 55 ( emphasis added). Here, consistent with the Examiner's findings, we find the claims do not include an improvement to another technology or technical field, a treatment for a medical condition, an improvement to the functioning of the computer itself, a transformation of an article, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. (See Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 10-11, 15.) Rather, the claims merely recite limitations that are instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer and require no more than generic computer components ( such as a memory and a processor) to perform generic functions. (See Final Act. 3, 5.) Thus, the focus of the claims is not on an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain abstract ideas that use computers as tools. (See id.) In arguing that their claims are directed to an improvement to computer-related technology or an improvement in a technological field (see App. Br. 14), Appellants provide no persuasive arguments, and cite no evidence (such as by reference to their Specification), that their claimed invention requires any specialized technology or relies upon technological improvements. Rather, Appellants essentially concede that their invention is practiced on conventional hardware, as Appellants repeatedly assert that their claims are patent-eligible as "new uses of a known machine." (Id. at 10, 12, 14 ( emphasis added).) That Appellants' invention contemplates 13 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 known computer hardware is underscored by the fact that, although the claims are to a "computer-implemented" system, Appellants' Specification provides no technological details regarding the underlying computer components, as the Examiner aptly notes. (See Final Act. 3, 5; Ans. 10.) Thus, Appellants' argued improvement (i.e., a "faster and more efficient way" of "clearing matched trades for securities" (App. Br. 14)) is not due to any improvement in the underlying technology, but instead is an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic practice of clearing trades in securities transactions by grouping the transactions to aggregate the obligations. We are also not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims are similar to the claims in DDR Holdings. (App. Br. 17.) In DDR Holdings, the disputed claims solved an Internet-specific problem (i.e., third- party merchants luring a host website's visitor traffic away from the host website in response to clicking on a merchant's advertisement link displayed on the host site) with an Internet-based solution (i.e., generating a composite web page displaying product information from the third-party merchant, but retaining the host website's "look and feel") that was "necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257-58. That is not the case here. Instead, consistent with the Examiner's findings, the claims merely recite an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic practice of clearing trades in securities transactions. (See Final Act. 3.) 14 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 We are also not persuaded that Appellants' claims are similar to the claims inBASCOM. 8 (See App. Br. 19.) In BASCOM, our reviewing court noted that an inventive concept can be found in a non-conventional and non- generic arrangement of known, conventional pieces. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. However, the claims before us are distinguishable from those in BASCOM. In BASCOM, the system claims were directed to a "content filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an Internet computer network," which the court held were directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1348--49. The court further held the claims included an inventive concept in the ordered combination of system components, including a local client computer and a remote ISP server connected to the client computer and Internet computer network providing for "the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user." Id. at 1350. As noted above, Appellants have failed to establish that their claims include a similar or analogous arrangement or "ordered combination" of components. Instead, Appellants rely on the absence of prior-art rejections as evidence that the claimed invention is non-conventional and non-generic. (See App. Br. 19.) However, this argument conflates the standards of novelty under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102 and non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) with the requirements of patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. A lack of prior art does not direct a claim towards statutory subject matter. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he 'novelty' of any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance 8 BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 15 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the Â§ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981). We are also not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the claims are similar to the claims in Amdocs. 9 (Reply Br. 7.) Unlike the claims in that case, which provided an "unconventional technological solution ... to a technological problem" that "improve[ d] the performance of the system itself' (Amdocs, 841 F.3d at 1302), Appellants' claims merely recite an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic practice of clearing trades in securities transactions, as previously described. In their Reply Brief, Appellants raise a new argument that "[t]he claimed computer-implemented securities settlement system is also improved using new data structures defined by settlement obligation groups and sets of settlement obligation groups as specifically set forth in the claims." (Reply Br. 4 ( emphasis added); see also id. at 5 ("A settlement obligation group is a specifically defined data structure including a list of debit and credit obligations for each trader .... ").) We find nothing in the Examiner's Answer that would have prompted this new argument raised by Appellants for the first time in the Reply Brief. Rather, the Examiner's stated reasoning in the Final Action is identical to the reasoning stated in the Answer. Therefore, Appellants' new argument regarding new "data structures" is not entitled to our consideration. Optivus Tech., Inc. v. Ion Beam Applications S.A., 469 F.3d 978, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ( argument raised for the first time in the reply brief that could have 9 Amdocs (Israel) Ltd v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 16 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 been raised in the opening brief is waived); accord Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1473-74 (BPAI 2010) (informative opinion) (absent a showing of good cause, the Board is not required to address an argument newly presented in the reply brief that could have been presented in the principal brief on appeal). Nevertheless, even considering that argument, we are not persuaded of Examiner error. Appellants provide no persuasive arguments or evidence to support the contention that grouping the selected data ( a "list of debit and credit obligations for each trader associated with the matched trade for a security to be settled simultaneously for multiple traders") results in a "new data structure" as opposed to a standard data structure with possibly novel content. Appellants do not, for example, persuasively argue or demonstrate that this alleged data structure is a "specific type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data in memory." Cf Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1338 (addressing claims reciting a "self-referential table"). Thus, we conclude the claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. Accordingly, we conclude the claims are directed to an abstract idea in step one of the Alice analysis. b. Step Two of Alice Regarding step two of the Alice analysis, the Examiner finds the elements of the claims, when considered individually or in combination, do not recite significantly more than the abstract idea. (See Final Act. 2-3.) With respect to whether the claims recite elements that are well-understood, routine, and conventional, the Examiner further finds the combination of elements in the claims other than the abstract idea amount to no more than a 17 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 recitation of "generic computing equipment such as 'processors' or 'selectors."' (Id. at 3.) The Examiner further notes that the Specification lacks particular disclosure regarding the recited "processor[ s ]" that "would assist in making the elements further technological." (Id. at 5.) In other words, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that the lack of specific disclosure in the Specification as to any of the computer components supports the finding that such components are generic and not specialized technology that could lend inventive weight. (See id.; see also Ans. 10.) As also noted supra, this finding is also supported by Appellants' repeated characterization of their invention as a "new use[] of a known machine." (App. Br. 10, 12; Reply Br. 4.) We are also not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that the absence of any prior-art rejections under 35 U.S.C. Â§Â§ 102 and/or 103 is evidence that the steps recited in the claims are not well-understood, routine, or conventional. (See App. Br. 19.) As previously described, this argument conflates the standards of novelty under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 102 and non- obviousness under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 103(a) with the requirements ofpatent- eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. Thus, although our reviewing court has held that "[ t ]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact" (see Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), we determine that Appellants' arguments are insufficient to raise an issue of fact requiring the Examiner to present additional evidence showing that any aspect of the claims is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art. The other relevant considerations regarding whether the claims are directed to something significantly more than an abstract idea have 18 Appeal2017-004876 Application 11/724,313 previously been discussed with respect to the first step of Alice. Thus, we conclude the claims are not directed to something significantly more than the abstract idea. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. For the same reasons, we also sustain the rejection of claims 3, 5, 7-11, and 17-27, which are not separately argued, under 35 U.S.C. Â§ 101. DECISION For the above reasons, the Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 3, 5, 7-11, and 17-27 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. Â§ 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED 19