Ex Parte Leber

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 24, 2019

13401748 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2019)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/401,748 02/21/2012
22830 7590 01/28/2019
CARR & FERRELL LLP
120 CONSTITUTION DRIVE
MENLO PARK, CA 94025
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Mike Leber
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
PA5919US 1524
EXAMINER
MAGUIRE, LINDSAY M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/28/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patdocket@carrferrell.com
j samson@carrferrell.com
smather@carrf errell. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MIKE LEBER
Appeal 2017-011338
Application 13/401,748 1
Technology Center 3600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, ALLEN R. MacDONALD, and
JOHN P. PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judges.
PINKERTON, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's
Final Rejection of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. Claims 7 and 19 are cancelled. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We affirm.
1 The real party in interest identified by Appellant is Hurricane Electric.
App. Br. 3.
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Application 13/401,748
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant's described and claimed invention relates generally to the
facilitation of secure financial transactions. See Spec. ,r 1. 2
Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
1. A method for facilitating at least a portion of a secure
electronic financial transaction, the method comprising:
prior to receiving an electronic transaction request,
defining a transaction template that comprises a set of established
transaction specifications that define contents of acceptable
digital instruments, the digital instrument further comprising
payment instructions that define how payments to payees are
authorized, wherein only electronic transaction requests that
correspond to the transaction template are available for
authorization;
generating a unique payee identifier that represents a
payee;
combining, by a payor device, the unique payee identifier
with a digital instrument that has been digitally singed 3 to create
a secure instrument that cannot be surreptitiously presented to an
electronic transaction processing system by any other party;
receiving an electronic transaction request from the payor
device over a secure application programming interface, the
electronic transaction request comprising the unique payee
identifier and the secure instrument that has been digitally signed
by at least one payor, the digital signature being encrypted using
an encryption type that is selected by a payment processor;
2 Our Decision refers to the Final Office Action mailed June 30, 2016
("Final Act."), Appellant's Appeal Brief filed April 27, 2017 ("App. Br.")
and Reply Brief filed September 6, 2017 ("Reply Br."), the Examiner's
Answer mailed July 10, 2017, and the original Specification filed February
21, 2012 ("Spec.").
3 This appears to be a typographical error, and we interpret "singed" as
"signed" in order to preserve validity of the claim.
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verifying an identity of at least one of the payor and the
payee using a digital security protocol;
verifying the digital signature using the selected
encryption type;
comparing the electronic transaction request to the
transaction template; and
authorizing a payment to the payee according to payment
instructions included in the secure instrument if the electronic
transaction request corresponds with the transaction template.
App. Br. 23-24 (Claims App.).
Rejections on Appeal
Claim 1 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 1---6, 8-18, and 20-22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claim 1 under§ 112,first paragraph
Claim 1 recites, "wherein only electronic transaction requests that
correspond to the transaction template are available for authorization." App.
Br. 23. The Examiner finds the aforementioned limitation is not found
within Appellant's Specification. See Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 2-3.
Appellant argues paragraphs 38, 41, and 51 of Appellant's Specification
describe a transaction template, and, more specifically, describe an
electronic transaction request being analyzed to verify that the contents of a
digital instrument comply with a transaction template. See App. Br. 8-9; see
also Reply Br. 3-5. Thus, according to Appellant, Appellant's Specification
provides sufficient written description support for the aforementioned
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limitation. See App. Br. 9.
The Federal Circuit has consistently held that 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, contains a written description requirement separate from
enablement. See Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
598 F.3d. 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en bane). To satisfy the written
description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to
those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in
possession of the invention, and that the invention, in that context is
whatever is now claimed. See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1563---64 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
For the reasons argued in Appellant's Briefs, we agree with Appellant
that paragraphs 3 8, 41, and 51 of Appellant's Specification provide
sufficient written description support for the claimed "wherein only
electronic transaction requests that correspond to the transaction template are
available for authorization," as recited in claim 1. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Rejection of Claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22 under§ 101
Applicable Law
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
"new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter."
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted§ 101
to include an implicit exception: "[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas" are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int 'l,
134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
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Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75-77 (2012), "for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in the analysis is to "determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts." Id. For
example, abstract ideas include, but are not limited to, fundamental
economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, an idea of
itself, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Id. at 2355-2357. The
"directed to" inquiry asks not whether "the claims involve a patent-ineligible
concept," but instead whether, "considered in light of the specification, ...
'their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter."' Enfish,
LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal
citations omitted). In that regard, we determine whether the claims "focus
on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology" or are
"directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely invoke
generic processes and machinery." McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games
Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If, at the first stage of the Alice analysis, we conclude that the claim is
not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, it is considered patent eligible
under § 101 and the inquiry ends. Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect,
Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the second
step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims "individually
and 'as an ordered combination"' to determine whether there are additional
elements that "'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible
application." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
In other words, the second step is to "search for an "'inventive concept"'-
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i.e., an element or combination of elements that is 'sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself."' Id. (brackets in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 72-73). The prohibition against patenting an abstract idea
"'cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a
particular technological environment' or adding 'insignificant post solution
activity."' Bilski v. Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 610-611 (2010) (internal citation
omitted).
The Office recently published revised guidance on the application of
35 U.S.C. § 101. USPTO's January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, Federal Register Vol. 84, No. 4,
50-57 ("Memorandum"). Under the revised guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites: any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human interactions such as fundamental economic practices, or
mental processes); and additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Memorandum at 54--55. Only if a
claim recites a judicial exception and does not integrate that exception into a
practical application, do we then look to whether the claim adds a specific
limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not "well-understood,
routine, conventional" in the field. See Memorandum at 56.
Appellant's Arguments.±
Appellant contends the claims are eligible under the first step of Alice
because they are not directed to an abstract idea. See App. Br. 11. More
4 Appellant argues claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22 as a group, focusing on
independent claims 1, 11, and 22. See App. Br. 9-20. Although Appellant
argues the Office has not provided an explanation as to why each of the
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specifically, Appellant contends the Examiner provides no support for the
assertion that the claims are directed to a "fundamental economic practice,"
and more specifically that facilitating a secure electronic transaction is a
"fundamental economic practice," which Appellant alleges amounts to
taking Official Notice. See App. Br. 10. Appellant further contends none of
the claims are directed to a concept that any court has identified as an
abstract idea, and the Examiner wrongly analogized the claims to the claims
in SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Laboratories, SA,
555 Fed. Appx. 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014), Cyberfone Systems, LLC v. CNN
Interactive Group, Inc., 558 Fed. Appx. 988 (Fed. Cir. 2014), and Digitech
Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344
(Fed. Cir. 2014), as none of the facts considered in these cases have any
relevance to the facts of the instant application on appeal. See App. Br. 14--
15; see also Reply Br. 11. Appellant also contends the claims are directed to
improvements in computer-related technology (i.e., electronic financial
transactions and cybersecurity), and the claims provide improvements in a
technological field of cyber-secure electronic transactions. See App. Br. 12;
see also Reply Br. 9-11. As argued by Appellant, the claimed solution to
securing electronic financial transactions is rooted in technology, cannot be
performed in a human mind or accomplished using pen and paper, and is not
dependent claims is patent-ineligible (see App. Br. 20-21 ), Appellant fails to
proffer any separate arguments for the patent-eligibility of the dependent
claims, and thus, the argument for the separate eligibility of claims 2---6, 8-
10, 12-18, and 20-21 is not persuasive. We consider claims 1, 11, and 22 to
be representative of the claimed subject matter on appeal and, therefore, we
decide the rejection of claims 2-6, 8-10, 12-18, and 20-21 on the basis of
representative claims 1, 11, and 22. See 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv).
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merely an improvement to the underlying financial transaction. See App.
Br. 12-13; see also Reply Br. 6.
In addition, Appellant contends the claims are eligible under the
second step of Alice because the claims as a whole amount to significantly
more than the purported abstract idea. See App. Br. 16. More specifically,
Appellant contends the claims recite additional limitations (e.g., a payor
device and a transaction authorization system) that are significantly more
than an abstract idea, similar to Example 21 provided in Appendix 1 of the
Office's guidance issued in the July 2015 Update on Subject Matter
Eligibility ("July 2015 Update"). See App. Br. 16-17. As further contended
by Appellant, the claims are similar to the claims in DDR Holdings, LLC v.
Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) because the claims address
an Internet-centric problem of securing electronic financial transactions over
a network, and, thus, are necessarily rooted in computer technology. See
App. Br. 17. Appellant also contends the claims are similar to the claims in
BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) because, even if the claims recite known and
conventional elements, the claims are directed to a non-conventional and
non-generic arrangement of those elements. See App. Br. 17. As further
contended by Appellant, the claims, taken as a whole, improve the cyber
security of a transaction processing system and are significantly more than
the purported abstract idea of facilitating secure financial transactions. See
App. Br. 18; see also Reply Br. 6-7. Appellant also contends the steps
recited in the claims are not well-understood, routine, or conventional
functions as evidenced by the absence of any prior-art rejections under 35
U.S.C. §§ 102 and/or 103. See App. Br. 19-20; see also Reply Br. 7-9.
Appellant further contends the claims are similar to the claims in McRO
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because the claims do not preempt the relevant technological space. See
App. Br. 20; see also Reply Br. 6-7. Further, in the Reply Brief, Appellant
argues the claims are similar to the claims in Amdocs Ltd. v. Opnet Telecom,
Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016) because the claims provide an
unconventional technological solution (i.e., using digital security features in
combination which provide a party's identity) to a technological problem
(i.e., fraud that is common in digital transaction processing). See Reply
Br. 12-13.
Appellant additionally filed a Supplemental Reply Brief on September
24, 2018, to further respond to the Examiner's Answer. However, Appellant
"may file only a single reply brief to an examiner's answer."
37 C.F.R. § 41.41(a). Thus, we have not considered the arguments in
Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief. 5
Further, Appellant's Appeal Brief and Reply Brief, as well as the
Final Office Action and Examiner's Answer, were all filed before the
issuance of new Office guidance in the Memorandum. However, we analyze
the claims and the Examiner's rejection under§ 101 under the Office
guidance detailed in the Memorandum.
Step One of Alice
Prong 1 : Whether Claims Are Directed to an Abstract Idea
The Examiner finds the claims are directed toward facilitating a
secure electronic transaction, where facilitating a secure electronic
5 Even assuming that the filing of Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief was
permitted, the arguments in Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief are not
persuasive, as the Examiner has provided sufficient evidence to establish
that the claims recite well-understood, routine, and conventional activity for
the reasons described infra.
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transaction is a fundamental economic practice, and thus, the claims are
directed toward an abstract idea. See Final Act. 4, 7; see also Ans. 3--4. The
Examiner additionally found the claims are also directed to mathematical
concepts and mental processes. See Final Act. 5-7. However, we do not
reach these additional findings because, considering the focus of claims 1,
11, and 22 as a whole, in view of Appellant's Specification, we agree with
the Examiner that claims 1, 11, and 22 are directed to a fundamental
economic practice (i.e., facilitating a secure electronic transaction), which
the Office Guidance identifies as a certain method of organizing human
activity that is an abstract idea. See Memorandum at 52.
Consistent with the Examiner's findings, we find claim 1 is directed to
a method for facilitating a secure electronic financial transaction comprising:
(1) "defining a transaction template that comprises a set of established
transaction specifications that define contents of acceptable digital
instruments, the digital instrument further comprising payment instructions
that define how payments to payees are authorized"; (2) "generating a
unique payee identifier that represents a payee"; (3) "combining ... the
unique payee identifier with a digital instrument that has been digitally
[ signed] to create a secure instrument that cannot be surreptitiously
presented to an electronic transaction processing system by any other party";
(4) "receiving an electronic transaction request ... the electronic transaction
request comprising the unique identifier and the secure instrument that has
been digitally signed by at least one payor, the digital signature being
encrypted using [a selected] encryption type"; (5) "verifying an identity of at
least one of the payor and the payee using a digital security protocol"; ( 6)
"verifying the digital signature using the selected encryption type"; (7)
"comparing the electronic transaction request to the transaction template";
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and (8) "authorizing a payment to the payee according to payment
instructions included in the secure instrument if the electronic transaction
request corresponds with the transaction template". App. Br. 23-24. We
further find claim 11 is directed to a similar method and claim 22 is directed
to a similar system. See App. Br. 26-27, 29-30.
We agree with the Examiner that the aforementioned recited steps are
steps of a fundamental economic practice, which is a certain method of
organizing human activities that is an abstract idea. See Final Act. 3--4; see
also Memorandum at 52. Consistent with the Examiner's findings, and
contrary to Appellant's argument that claims 1, 11, and 22 are not similar to
any idea previously found to be abstract, we see no meaningful difference
between the claims and similar claims our reviewing court has found are
directed to an abstract idea. See, e.g., Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (holding the
concept of intermediated settlement is an abstract idea directed to a
"fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our system of commerce"
(citation omitted)); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350,
13 5 3-13 54 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ( citing cases where contractual relations at issue
constituted fundamental economic practices, and noting that forming or
manipulating economic relations may involve an abstract idea); OIP Techs.,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("'automatic
pricing method and apparatus for use in electronic commerce'"); Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat 'l Ass 'n,
776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that claims directed to "the
mere formation and manipulation of economic relations" and "the
performance of certain financial transactions" have been held to involve
abstract ideas); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that claims reciting a method of using advertising
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as an exchange or currency are directed to an abstract idea). Further, the fact
that the financial transaction is electronic does not impart patent-eligibility
to the claims, as the recitation of "electronic" merely amounts to a statement
to use a computing system to process the financial transaction. "[I]f a
patent's recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to
'implemen[t]' an abstract idea 'on ... a computer,' that addition cannot
impart patent eligibility." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S.
at 84).
We disagree with Appellant's argument that the Examiner is
effectively taking Official Notice that the claims are directed to a
fundamental economic practice, as the Examiner has made sufficient
findings that the claims are similar to claims that courts have previously
identified as a fundamental economic practice. See Final Act. 4, 7. Further,
we are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims are not
directed to a concept that has been identified by a court as an abstract idea,
as Appellant fails to persuasively rebut the Examiner's findings that claims
1, 11, and 22 are directed to a fundamental economic practice, similar to the
fundamental economic practice identified by the courts in Alice, Bilski,
buySAFE, and Ultramercial. See Final Act. 7. Thus, Appellant fails to
persuasively rebut the Examiner's findings that claims 1, 11, and 22 are
directed to a fundamental economic practice.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the claims
do not seek to tie up or otherwise preempt an abstract idea.
While preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter,
the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility .... Where a patent's claims are deemed only
to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo
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framework, as they are in this case, preemption concerns are
fully addressed and made moot.
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs. Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
788 F.3d 1359, 1362-1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("that the claims do not preempt
all price optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-
commerce setting do not make them any less abstract").
Prong 2: Whether Claims Integrate Abstract
Idea Into a Practical Application 6
The Examiner finds the claims do not include an improvement to
another technology or technical field, an improvement to the functioning of
the computer itself, or meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment. See Final
Act. 4; see also Ans. 4. The Examiner further finds the claims merely recite
limitations that are instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer
and require no more than a generic computer to perform generic functions.
See Final Act. 4--5. More specifically, the Examiner finds independent
claims 1, 11, and 22 recite steps which either can be performed by any
general-purpose computer or are insignificant extra-solution operations. See
Final Act. 5---6. The Examiner further finds the focus of the claims are not
on an improvement in computers as tools, but on certain abstract ideas that
use computers as tools. See Ans. 7.
6 We acknowledge that some of these considerations may be properly
evaluated under the second step of Alice (Step 2B of Office guidance as
identified in the Memorandum). Solely for purposes of maintaining
consistent treatment within the Office, we evaluate them under the first step
of Alice (Step 2A of Office guidance as identified in the Memorandum). See
Memorandum at 54--55.
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We agree with the Examiner's findings that the claims do not recite
elements ( or a combination of elements) that are either an improvement to
the functioning of an underlying computer or an improvement to another
technology or technical field. See Final Act. 4. We conclude Appellant's
argued improvement (i.e., preventing fraudulent financial transactions) is not
a technological improvement, but, instead is an improvement to the
underlying fundamental economic practice of facilitating a secure electronic
financial transaction.
We further agree with the Examiner's findings that the claims merely
recite elements that generally link the use of the fundamental economic
practice to a computing system that includes an electronic transaction
processing system and a payor device, where Appellant's Specification
discloses the computing system can be any type of computing system known
in the art, such as a computing system including one or more processors and
memory (i.e., a particular technological environment). See Final Act. 4--5;
see also Spec. ,r,r 58, 65. Further, in view of Appellant's Specification, and
consistent with the Examiner's findings, the claims do not recite an
additional element that: applies or uses an abstract idea to effect a particular
treatment or prophylaxis; implements an abstract idea with, or uses the
abstract idea in conjunction with a particular machine; effects a
transformation of a particular article; uses the abstract idea in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the abstract idea to a
particular technological environment; or otherwise integrates the abstract
idea into a practical application. See Memorandum at 55.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims are
directed to an improvement to computer-related technology or an
improvement in a technological field. As previously discussed, Appellant's
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argued improvement does not actually improve the technology of securing
electronic transactions, but instead improves the underlying fundamental
economic practice of facilitating a secure electronic financial transaction by
linking the economic practice to a particular technological environment that
performs operations that either merely apply the economic practice on a
computing system, or are merely extra-solution operations. See Final
Act. 5---6 (identifying the steps of independent claims 1, 11, and 22, and
further characterizing the steps either as operations that may be performed
by any general-purpose computer, or as extra-solution operations).
Appellant's argument that the claims are similar to the claims in
Example 21 of the July 2015 Update is also not persuasive. Consistent with
the Examiner's findings, unlike claim 2 in Example 21 of the July 2015
Update, which recites a solution necessarily rooted in computer technology
(i.e., triggering an activation of a stock viewer application to enable a
connection of a remote computer) to solve an Internet-centric problem (i.e.,
alerting a subscriber with time-sensitive information when a subscriber's
computer is offline ), the claims merely recite an improvement to the
underlying fundamental economic practice of facilitating a secure electronic
financial transaction. See Ans. 5---6.
We are further not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims
are similar to the claims in DDR Holdings. In DDR Holdings, the disputed
claims solved an Internet-specific problem (i.e., third-party merchants luring
a host website's visitor traffic away from the host website in response to
clicking on a merchant's advertisement link displayed on the host site) with
an Internet-based solution (i.e., generating a composite web page displaying
product information from the third-party merchant, but retaining the host
website's "look and feel") that was "necessarily rooted in computer
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technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm
of computer networks." DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257-1258. That is not
the case here. Instead, consistent with the Examiner's findings, the claims
merely recite an improvement to the underlying fundamental economic
practice of facilitating a secure electronic financial transaction. See Ans. 5-
6.
We are also not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims are
similar to the claims in BASCOM. The court in BASCOM noted an inventive
concept can be found in a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of
known, conventional pieces. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1350. However,
the claims are distinguishable from those in BASCOM. In BASCOM, the
system claims were directed to a "content filtering system for filtering
content retrieved from an Internet computer network," which the court held
were directed to an abstract idea. Id. at 1348-1349. The court further held
the claims included an inventive concept in the ordered combination of
system components, including a local client computer and a remote ISP
server connected to the client computer and Internet computer network
providing for "the installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote
from the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end
user." Id. at 1350. Appellant has failed to establish that the claims here
include a similar or analogous arrangement or "ordered combination" of
components, and, instead, rely on the absence of prior-art rejections under
35 U.S. C. §§ 102, 103 as evidence that the arrangement is non-conventional
and non-generic. See App. Br. 17. However, this argument conflates the
standards of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and non-obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) with the requirements of patent-eligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101. A lack of prior art does not direct a claim towards
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statutory subject matter. As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he 'novelty' of
any element or steps in a process, or even of the process itself, is of no
relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within
the§ 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter." Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-189 (1981).
We are further not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the claims
are similar to the claims in Amdocs. Unlike the claims in Amdocs, which
provided an "unconventional technological solution ... to a technological
problem" that "improve[d] the performance of the system itself' (Amdocs,
841 F.3d 1288 at 1302), Appellant's claims merely recite an improvement to
the underlying fundamental economic practice of facilitating a secure
electronic financial transaction, as previously described.
We are also not persuaded by Appellant's argument that the Examiner
has not considered the claims as a whole. Instead we agree with the
Examiner that the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 includes a thorough
analysis of the claims as a whole, including individual elements and an
ordered combination of the elements. See Ans. 7.
Thus, we conclude the claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application. Accordingly, we conclude the claims are directed to an
abstract idea.
Step Two of Alice
Regarding step two of the Alice analysis, the Examiner finds the
elements of the claims, when considered individually or in combination, do
not recite substantially more than the abstract idea. See Final Act. 4. With
respect to whether the claims recite elements that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional, the Examiner further finds the combination of
elements in the claims other than the abstract idea amount to no more than a
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recitation of generic computer structure performing generic computer
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional activities
previously known to the pertinent industry. See id. In support of this
finding, the Examiner cited Appellant's Specification. See Final Act. 7
( citing Spec. ,r 65); see also Ans. 4 ( citing Spec. ,r 65).
For the reasons stated by the Examiner, we agree with the Examiner's
findings and conclusions that the combination of elements in the claims
other than the abstract idea are no more than well-understood, routine, and
conventional activities previously known in the industry and specified at a
high level of generality. See Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 4. Consistent with
the Examiner's findings, evidence that the claimed functionality is well-
understood, routine, and conventional is found in Appellant's Specification,
which describes that the components of a computing system that may be
used to implement the disclosed embodiments are computer components
typically found in computing systems and represent computer components
that are well-known in the art. See Spec. ,r,r 58, 65. As Appellant's
Specification discloses that any general purpose computer is capable of
implementing the claimed functionality, the Specification serves as evidence
that the claimed functionality is well-understood, routine, and conventional.
We are not persuaded by Appellant's arguments that the absence of
any prior-art rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and/or 103 is evidence that
the steps recited in the claims are not well-understood, routine, or
conventional. As previously described, this argument conflates the
standards of novelty under 35 U.S.C. § 102 and non-obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) with the requirements of patent-eligible subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101. Thus, although our reviewing court recently held that
"[ t ]he patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact" (see
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Appeal 2017-011338
Application 13/401,748
Berkheimerv. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)), we determine
that Appellant's argument is insufficient to raise an issue of fact requiring
the Examiner to present additional evidence showing that any aspect of the
claims is well-understood, routine, and conventional in the art.
The other relevant considerations regarding whether the claims are
directed to something significantly more than an abstract idea have
previously been discussed with respect to the first step of Alice. Thus, we
conclude the claims are not directed to something significantly more than the
abstract idea.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we sustain the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1, 11, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. For the
same reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 2---6, 8-10, 12-18, and 20-
21, which are not separately argued, under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
We reverse the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph.
We affirm the Examiner's rejection of claims 1-6, 8-18, and 20-22
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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