Ex Parte Lawrow et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2017

12239322 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/239,322 09/26/2008 Ivan LAWROW 81414502US01 3215
65913 7590 03/29/2017
Intellectual Property and Licensing
NXPB.V.
411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41
SAN JOSE, CA 95134
EXAMINER
RIVERO, ALEJANDRO
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2647
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/29/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip. department .u s @ nxp. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte IVAN LAWROW and STEPHEN BATE
Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
Technology Center 2600
Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, DAVID M. KOHUT, and
MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judges.
ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of
claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, and 20-30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellants, the claims are directed to calculating mean
propagation delay based on time measurements from two devices. Abstract.
Claim 1, reproduced below with key disputed limitations emphasized and
designated as limitations LI and L2, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
1. A method of determining a propagation delay of wireless
communications between fixed and mobile wireless network
devices, the method comprising:
exchanging first and second messages between fixed and
mobile wireless network devices, wherein the first message is
sent from the fixed wireless network device to the mobile
wireless network device and the second message is sent from the
mobile wireless network device to the fixed wireless network
device;
[LI] recording, in the fixed wireless network device, a first
elapsed time measured between the fixed wireless network device
sending the first message to the mobile wireless network device
and receiving the second message from the mobile wireless
network device;
[L2] recording, in the mobile wireless network device, a
second elapsed time measured between the mobile wireless
network device receiving the first message from the fixed
wireless network device and sending the second message to the
fixed wireless network device;
sending the recorded second elapsed time from the mobile
wireless network device to the fixed wireless network device;
and
determining, in the fixed wireless network device, a
propagation delay based upon the recorded first elapsed time, the
recorded second elapsed time, and a frequency error parameter.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
REFERENCES
appeal is:
Leeper
Mizugaki
Tanaka
US 7,203,500 B2 Apr. 10, 2007
US 7,321,575 B2 Jan. 22, 2008
US 7,529,551 B2 May 5, 2009
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Application 12/239,322
REJECTIONS
Claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20-28, and 30 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Leeper and Tanaka. Final Act.
5-20.
Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Leeper, Tanaka, and Mizugaki. Final Act. 21.
ISSUES
First Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “recording .... a first elapsed time”
and “recording .... a second elapsed time,” as recited in independent claim
1 and as similarly recited in independent claims 8 and 13?
Second Issue'. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “recording .... a third elapsed time”
and “recording .... a fourth elapsed time,” as recited in dependent claim 5
and as similarly recited in dependent claim 17?
Third Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests that “the delta value is a fraction of a
clock period,” as recited in dependent claim 23?
Fourth Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “the correlator provides an output
that indicates the delta value as a fraction of the clock cycle,” as recited in
dependent claim 26?
Fifth Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests that “the delay factor x is a fraction
of a clock signal period,” as recited in dependent claim 28?
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Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
ANALYSIS
First Issue
In the Final Office Action, the Examiner cites Leeper as teaching
“exchanging first and second messages,” “recording ... a first elapsed
time,” “recording .... a second elapsed time,” “sending the recorded second
elapsed time,” and “determining .... a propagation delay,” as claimed in
claims 1, 8, and 13. Final Act. 5-7 (citing Leeper, 8:40-10:6). The
Examiner finds “Leeper does not specify wherein the first device is a fixed
device” and cites Tanaka for this teaching. Id. at 7 (citing Tanaka, Fig. 1,
1:8-14, 5:34^18, 10:55-60).
Appellants argue that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka does not
teach or suggest “a first elapsed time” and “a second elapsed time” as
claimed, because “disclosure of two instantaneous times is not equivalent to
measuring a single elapsed time.” App. Br. 9; see id. at 10. Appellants also
argue that “[wjhile Leeper may calculate a propagation time, Leeper’s
technique is different from the claims” because “Leeper fails to disclose any
measurement that combines both values cited by the Examiner.” Id.
Appellants further argue “Leeper measures neither a first elapsed time nor a
second elapsed time” and “[t]hus, Leeper cannot record these values.” Id. at
10.
The cited portions of Leeper in columns 8 and 9 describe Figure 7,
which is reproduced below.
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Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
ms
UmtimA k k Mm&M
S'U>:f ?,s
Ml .y"
Ussi-s#; 15^,
#•#: 11Ss>
Si*-S ' f 1
55 •? f§m SS s*«#t 5 3.s:$
«**■
r*&* #■'
• 5- ^ < >
iimmt'. ¥4m
I*#; T#,. ?%s
f f
Figure 7 depicts transmitting and receiving messages and recorded
transmission and reception times in Devices A and B.
Figure 7 depicts transmitting message Ml and recording the time of its
transmission at device A as Tlz4. Leeper, 8:64-67. Remote device B
receives message Ml, records the time of reception as Tli^, and issues
message M2. Id. at 9:1-5. Remote device B also records the time of
transmitting message M2 as T2zs. Id. at 9:5-6. Device A receives message
M2 and records the time reception as T2avi. Id. at 9:7-8.
Although Leeper does not explicitly disclose calculating the
difference between T2avi and T1 ta and recording that difference, we agree
with the Examiner that the cited portions of Leeper teach disputed limitation
LI. Similarly, although Leeper does not explicitly disclose calculating the
difference between T2zb and T1 rb and recording that difference, we agree
that the cited portions of Leeper teach disputed limitation L2.
We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive because the test for
obviousness is not whether the claimed subject matter is expressly disclosed
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Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
in the cited prior art teachings, but whether it would have been obvious to
the ordinarily skilled artisan in light of these teachings. KSR Int 7. Co. v.
Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Moreover, “a person of ordinary skill is also
a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421
(emphasis added). We find that it would have been within the level of
ordinary skill in the art to perform the arithmetic necessary to obtain the
difference between T2/m and T1 ta and the difference between T2 tb and T1 rb.
Indeed, the Examiner notes that Appellants’ own Specification discloses that
[0025] . . . The fixed node 102 then begins to time a
duration ttA between sending the Request communication 202
and receiving an Acknowledgement communication 204 from
the mobile node 104. In embodiments of the invention, this is
accomplished by the fixed node 102 recording a value of a local
timer or resetting and starting the local timer upon completion of
transmitting the Request communication 202 . . .
[0028] As noted above, the fixed node 102 measures a time
ttA between the times ti and U (completion of transmission of
Request 202 and receipt of Acknowledgement 204) for example
by starting and stopping an internal timer.
Ans. 23 (quoting Spec. 25, 28).
Furthermore, we find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive because we
agree with the Examiner’s finding that “Leeper effectively records an
elapsed time as currently claimed because the instants of time recorded in
Leeper represent a starting time and an ending time of an elapsed time
period, such that the ending time represents a value of elapsed time with
respect to the starting value.” Id. at 20.
In view of the above, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
finding the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests disputed
limitations LI and L2 as recited in independent claims 1, 8, and 13.
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Application 12/239,322
Second Issue
With regard to claims 5 and 17, Appellants argue that the combination
of Leeper and Tanaka does not teach or suggest “recording .... a third
elapsed time” and “recording .... a fourth elapsed time” as claimed,
because “separate disclosure of two instantaneous times is not equivalent to
measuring a single elapsed time.” App. Br. 11; see id. at 12. Second,
Appellants also argue that “Leeper fails to disclose any measurement that
combines both values cited by the Examiner.” Id. Appellants further argue
“Leeper measures neither a third elapsed time nor a fourth elapsed time” and
“[t]hus, Leeper cannot record these values.” Id. at 10.
As shown in Ligure 7 of Leeper reproduced above, Leeper depicts
sending message M3 and recording T3ta in Device A. Leeper, 9:9-13.
Device B receives message M3 at time T3a« and records this reception time.
Id. at 9:14-15. Device B also transmits message M4 at time T4tb and
records this transmission time. Id. at 9:16-21. Device A receives message
M4 and records the reception time as T4avi. Id. at 9:22-23.
As such, and for reasons substantially similar to the reasons discussed
above with respect to the first issue, we concur in the Examiner’s findings
that Leeper teaches the disputed limitations recited in claims 5 and 17. See
Ans. 22.
Third and Fourth Issues
Appellants argue Tanaka does not teach or suggest that “the delta
value is a fraction of a clock period,” as recited in dependent claim 23 based
on the Examiner’s finding that “Tanaka discloses a time delay error being of
magnitude of resolving power at the most.” App. Br. 13 (quoting final Act.
21); see final Act. 19 (citing Tanaka, fig. 4, 11:23-12:10). Appellants also
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Application 12/239,322
argue that the Examiner presents “no articulated reasoning .... to show that
calculations of fractions of a clock period would be inherent in Tanaka, the
Office Action fails to present a prima facie case of obviousness based upon
Tanaka.” Reply Br. 6-7.
Claim 23 depends from claim 21, which recites, inter alia,
“determining a delta value representing a time period between completion of
receiving a communication and detection of the receipt of the
communication.” The Examiner finds Tanaka teaches the claimed “delta
value” and the limitation recited in claim 23:
In the cited portions of Tanaka, while Tanaka does not explicitly
refer to the delta value (Tanaka uses the term “delay time” rather
than delta value) as a “fraction” of a clock period, Tanaka
discloses wherein a processing time (tpi, tP2) is affected
predominantly by clock error (ei, 82) rather than added “delay
time” {tDi, toi), hence “delay time” does not add significant error
to the processing time. Tanaka further discloses an example of a
processing time in which a nominal value has an error of 10ns
(which is equivalent to one clock cycle in case of a 100 MHz
clock), such that the processing time error of 10ns (one clock
cycle) results in an error of 3m when calculating distance, thus
having a significant impact in distance calculations (col. 11 line
23-col. 12 line 10 of Tanaka). Hence, an error of the size of a
clock cycle has a significant impact, whereas an error introduced
by “delay time” does not have a significant impact. Therefore,
the “delay time” is smaller than (a fraction of) a clock cycle.
Ans. 25.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because the
Examiner does not rely on the inherency or an express disclosure of the term
“fraction” in the cited teachings of Tanaka. Tanaka discloses an example in
which a processing time “has an error of 10 ns (which corresponds to one
clock cycle in the case of a 100-MHz clock).” Tanaka, 12:3-5. Tanaka
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Appeal 2014-006274
Application 12/239,322
further discloses that “the delay time of the RF transmitting and receiving
circuits and the accuracy of the clock” and “[ejrrors due to the delay time are
of the magnitude of resolving power at the most, and the nominal value of
tpi- is sufficiently small,” and thus, “the nominal value W is affected
predominantly by the clock accuracy.” Id. at 11:54-59.
In Tanaka’s example, processing time W has an error that
corresponds to one clock cycle. Tanaka discloses that processing time is
affected predominantly by clock accuracy, and less so, by delay time. Thus,
the portion of the one clock cycle of processing time that is attributed to
delay time is some fraction, and the error to due to clock error is the
remaining fraction of clock period. Accordingly, we concur in the
Examiner’s findings.
Appellants present the same arguments with respect to claim 26. For
substantially similar reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred
in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests
that the “the correlator provides an output that indicates the delta value as a
fraction of the clock cycle,” as recited in dependent claim 26.
Fifth Issue
Appellants argue that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka does not
teach or suggest that “the delay factor x is a fraction of a clock signal
period,” as recited in dependent claim 28 because the Examiner’s allegation
that “Tanaka discloses shifting phase by 90 degrees” is insufficient. App.
Br. 15 (quoting Final Act. 22). The Examiner finds that
[WJhile Tanaka does not explicitly refer to the delay factor x
(Tanaka uses the term ‘phase shift’ rather than delay factor t) as
a “fraction” of a clock period, Tanaka discloses wherein a phase
shifter shifts generating timing for sliding correlation in order to
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Application 12/239,322
achieve synchronization, wherein phase shift may be 90 degrees,
hence a phase delay of a quarter of a clock period . . . hence a
fraction.
Ans. 27-28 (citing Tanaka, 6:12-16, 7:1-3). Appellants’ argument does not
persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings.
For the foregoing reasons discussed above with respect to the first
through fifth issues, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20-
28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Leeper and
Tanaka.
Claim 29 is rejected over the combination of Leeper, Tanaka, and
Mizugaki. Appellants do not argue this claim with specificity. See App. Br.
16. As such, we sustain the rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
for obviousness over Leeper, Tanaka, and Mizugaki.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1,5,8, 12, 13, 17, and 20-30 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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