Ex Parte Lawrow et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 27, 201712239322 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 12/239,322 09/26/2008 Ivan LAWROW 81414502US01 3215 65913 7590 03/29/2017 Intellectual Property and Licensing NXPB.V. 411 East Plumeria Drive, MS41 SAN JOSE, CA 95134 EXAMINER RIVERO, ALEJANDRO ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2647 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/29/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip. department .u s @ nxp. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte IVAN LAWROW and STEPHEN BATE Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 Technology Center 2600 Before MAHSHID D. SAADAT, DAVID M. KOHUT, and MONICA S. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judges. ULLAGADDI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from a Final Rejection of claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, and 20-30. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. STATEMENT OF THE CASE According to Appellants, the claims are directed to calculating mean propagation delay based on time measurements from two devices. Abstract. Claim 1, reproduced below with key disputed limitations emphasized and designated as limitations LI and L2, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 1. A method of determining a propagation delay of wireless communications between fixed and mobile wireless network devices, the method comprising: exchanging first and second messages between fixed and mobile wireless network devices, wherein the first message is sent from the fixed wireless network device to the mobile wireless network device and the second message is sent from the mobile wireless network device to the fixed wireless network device; [LI] recording, in the fixed wireless network device, a first elapsed time measured between the fixed wireless network device sending the first message to the mobile wireless network device and receiving the second message from the mobile wireless network device; [L2] recording, in the mobile wireless network device, a second elapsed time measured between the mobile wireless network device receiving the first message from the fixed wireless network device and sending the second message to the fixed wireless network device; sending the recorded second elapsed time from the mobile wireless network device to the fixed wireless network device; and determining, in the fixed wireless network device, a propagation delay based upon the recorded first elapsed time, the recorded second elapsed time, and a frequency error parameter. The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on REFERENCES appeal is: Leeper Mizugaki Tanaka US 7,203,500 B2 Apr. 10, 2007 US 7,321,575 B2 Jan. 22, 2008 US 7,529,551 B2 May 5, 2009 2 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 REJECTIONS Claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20-28, and 30 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Leeper and Tanaka. Final Act. 5-20. Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Leeper, Tanaka, and Mizugaki. Final Act. 21. ISSUES First Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “recording .... a first elapsed time” and “recording .... a second elapsed time,” as recited in independent claim 1 and as similarly recited in independent claims 8 and 13? Second Issue'. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “recording .... a third elapsed time” and “recording .... a fourth elapsed time,” as recited in dependent claim 5 and as similarly recited in dependent claim 17? Third Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests that “the delta value is a fraction of a clock period,” as recited in dependent claim 23? Fourth Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests “the correlator provides an output that indicates the delta value as a fraction of the clock cycle,” as recited in dependent claim 26? Fifth Issue. Did the Examiner err in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests that “the delay factor x is a fraction of a clock signal period,” as recited in dependent claim 28? 3 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 ANALYSIS First Issue In the Final Office Action, the Examiner cites Leeper as teaching “exchanging first and second messages,” “recording ... a first elapsed time,” “recording .... a second elapsed time,” “sending the recorded second elapsed time,” and “determining .... a propagation delay,” as claimed in claims 1, 8, and 13. Final Act. 5-7 (citing Leeper, 8:40-10:6). The Examiner finds “Leeper does not specify wherein the first device is a fixed device” and cites Tanaka for this teaching. Id. at 7 (citing Tanaka, Fig. 1, 1:8-14, 5:34^18, 10:55-60). Appellants argue that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka does not teach or suggest “a first elapsed time” and “a second elapsed time” as claimed, because “disclosure of two instantaneous times is not equivalent to measuring a single elapsed time.” App. Br. 9; see id. at 10. Appellants also argue that “[wjhile Leeper may calculate a propagation time, Leeper’s technique is different from the claims” because “Leeper fails to disclose any measurement that combines both values cited by the Examiner.” Id. Appellants further argue “Leeper measures neither a first elapsed time nor a second elapsed time” and “[t]hus, Leeper cannot record these values.” Id. at 10. The cited portions of Leeper in columns 8 and 9 describe Figure 7, which is reproduced below. 4 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 ms UmtimA k k Mm&M S'U>:f ?,s Ml .y" Ussi-s#; 15^, #•#: 11Ss> Si*-S ' f 1 55 •? f§m SS s*«#t 5 3.s:$ «**■ r*&* #■' • 5- ^ < > iimmt'. ¥4m I*#; T#,. ?%s f f Figure 7 depicts transmitting and receiving messages and recorded transmission and reception times in Devices A and B. Figure 7 depicts transmitting message Ml and recording the time of its transmission at device A as Tlz4. Leeper, 8:64-67. Remote device B receives message Ml, records the time of reception as Tli^, and issues message M2. Id. at 9:1-5. Remote device B also records the time of transmitting message M2 as T2zs. Id. at 9:5-6. Device A receives message M2 and records the time reception as T2avi. Id. at 9:7-8. Although Leeper does not explicitly disclose calculating the difference between T2avi and T1 ta and recording that difference, we agree with the Examiner that the cited portions of Leeper teach disputed limitation LI. Similarly, although Leeper does not explicitly disclose calculating the difference between T2zb and T1 rb and recording that difference, we agree that the cited portions of Leeper teach disputed limitation L2. We find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive because the test for obviousness is not whether the claimed subject matter is expressly disclosed 5 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 in the cited prior art teachings, but whether it would have been obvious to the ordinarily skilled artisan in light of these teachings. KSR Int 7. Co. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Moreover, “a person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (emphasis added). We find that it would have been within the level of ordinary skill in the art to perform the arithmetic necessary to obtain the difference between T2/m and T1 ta and the difference between T2 tb and T1 rb. Indeed, the Examiner notes that Appellants’ own Specification discloses that [0025] . . . The fixed node 102 then begins to time a duration ttA between sending the Request communication 202 and receiving an Acknowledgement communication 204 from the mobile node 104. In embodiments of the invention, this is accomplished by the fixed node 102 recording a value of a local timer or resetting and starting the local timer upon completion of transmitting the Request communication 202 . . . [0028] As noted above, the fixed node 102 measures a time ttA between the times ti and U (completion of transmission of Request 202 and receipt of Acknowledgement 204) for example by starting and stopping an internal timer. Ans. 23 (quoting Spec. 25, 28). Furthermore, we find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive because we agree with the Examiner’s finding that “Leeper effectively records an elapsed time as currently claimed because the instants of time recorded in Leeper represent a starting time and an ending time of an elapsed time period, such that the ending time represents a value of elapsed time with respect to the starting value.” Id. at 20. In view of the above, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests disputed limitations LI and L2 as recited in independent claims 1, 8, and 13. 6 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 Second Issue With regard to claims 5 and 17, Appellants argue that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka does not teach or suggest “recording .... a third elapsed time” and “recording .... a fourth elapsed time” as claimed, because “separate disclosure of two instantaneous times is not equivalent to measuring a single elapsed time.” App. Br. 11; see id. at 12. Second, Appellants also argue that “Leeper fails to disclose any measurement that combines both values cited by the Examiner.” Id. Appellants further argue “Leeper measures neither a third elapsed time nor a fourth elapsed time” and “[t]hus, Leeper cannot record these values.” Id. at 10. As shown in Ligure 7 of Leeper reproduced above, Leeper depicts sending message M3 and recording T3ta in Device A. Leeper, 9:9-13. Device B receives message M3 at time T3a« and records this reception time. Id. at 9:14-15. Device B also transmits message M4 at time T4tb and records this transmission time. Id. at 9:16-21. Device A receives message M4 and records the reception time as T4avi. Id. at 9:22-23. As such, and for reasons substantially similar to the reasons discussed above with respect to the first issue, we concur in the Examiner’s findings that Leeper teaches the disputed limitations recited in claims 5 and 17. See Ans. 22. Third and Fourth Issues Appellants argue Tanaka does not teach or suggest that “the delta value is a fraction of a clock period,” as recited in dependent claim 23 based on the Examiner’s finding that “Tanaka discloses a time delay error being of magnitude of resolving power at the most.” App. Br. 13 (quoting final Act. 21); see final Act. 19 (citing Tanaka, fig. 4, 11:23-12:10). Appellants also 7 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 argue that the Examiner presents “no articulated reasoning .... to show that calculations of fractions of a clock period would be inherent in Tanaka, the Office Action fails to present a prima facie case of obviousness based upon Tanaka.” Reply Br. 6-7. Claim 23 depends from claim 21, which recites, inter alia, “determining a delta value representing a time period between completion of receiving a communication and detection of the receipt of the communication.” The Examiner finds Tanaka teaches the claimed “delta value” and the limitation recited in claim 23: In the cited portions of Tanaka, while Tanaka does not explicitly refer to the delta value (Tanaka uses the term “delay time” rather than delta value) as a “fraction” of a clock period, Tanaka discloses wherein a processing time (tpi, tP2) is affected predominantly by clock error (ei, 82) rather than added “delay time” {tDi, toi), hence “delay time” does not add significant error to the processing time. Tanaka further discloses an example of a processing time in which a nominal value has an error of 10ns (which is equivalent to one clock cycle in case of a 100 MHz clock), such that the processing time error of 10ns (one clock cycle) results in an error of 3m when calculating distance, thus having a significant impact in distance calculations (col. 11 line 23-col. 12 line 10 of Tanaka). Hence, an error of the size of a clock cycle has a significant impact, whereas an error introduced by “delay time” does not have a significant impact. Therefore, the “delay time” is smaller than (a fraction of) a clock cycle. Ans. 25. We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments because the Examiner does not rely on the inherency or an express disclosure of the term “fraction” in the cited teachings of Tanaka. Tanaka discloses an example in which a processing time “has an error of 10 ns (which corresponds to one clock cycle in the case of a 100-MHz clock).” Tanaka, 12:3-5. Tanaka 8 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 further discloses that “the delay time of the RF transmitting and receiving circuits and the accuracy of the clock” and “[ejrrors due to the delay time are of the magnitude of resolving power at the most, and the nominal value of tpi- is sufficiently small,” and thus, “the nominal value W is affected predominantly by the clock accuracy.” Id. at 11:54-59. In Tanaka’s example, processing time W has an error that corresponds to one clock cycle. Tanaka discloses that processing time is affected predominantly by clock accuracy, and less so, by delay time. Thus, the portion of the one clock cycle of processing time that is attributed to delay time is some fraction, and the error to due to clock error is the remaining fraction of clock period. Accordingly, we concur in the Examiner’s findings. Appellants present the same arguments with respect to claim 26. For substantially similar reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka teaches or suggests that the “the correlator provides an output that indicates the delta value as a fraction of the clock cycle,” as recited in dependent claim 26. Fifth Issue Appellants argue that the combination of Leeper and Tanaka does not teach or suggest that “the delay factor x is a fraction of a clock signal period,” as recited in dependent claim 28 because the Examiner’s allegation that “Tanaka discloses shifting phase by 90 degrees” is insufficient. App. Br. 15 (quoting Final Act. 22). The Examiner finds that [WJhile Tanaka does not explicitly refer to the delay factor x (Tanaka uses the term ‘phase shift’ rather than delay factor t) as a “fraction” of a clock period, Tanaka discloses wherein a phase shifter shifts generating timing for sliding correlation in order to 9 Appeal 2014-006274 Application 12/239,322 achieve synchronization, wherein phase shift may be 90 degrees, hence a phase delay of a quarter of a clock period . . . hence a fraction. Ans. 27-28 (citing Tanaka, 6:12-16, 7:1-3). Appellants’ argument does not persuasively rebut the Examiner’s findings. For the foregoing reasons discussed above with respect to the first through fifth issues, we sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5, 8, 12, 13, 17, 20- 28, and 30 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Leeper and Tanaka. Claim 29 is rejected over the combination of Leeper, Tanaka, and Mizugaki. Appellants do not argue this claim with specificity. See App. Br. 16. As such, we sustain the rejection of claim 29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for obviousness over Leeper, Tanaka, and Mizugaki. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1,5,8, 12, 13, 17, and 20-30 is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 10 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation