Ex Parte Large

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 26, 2017

13408257 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/408,257 02/29/2012 Timothy Andrew Large 335290-US-NP 2793
69316 7590 01/30/2017
MICROSOFT CORPORATION
ONE MICROSOFT WAY
REDMOND, WA 98052
EXAMINER
HONG, RICHARD J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2626
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
u sdocket @ micro soft .com
chriochs @microsoft.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte TIMOTHY ANDREW LARGE
Appeal 2016-003771
Application 13/408,2571
Technology Center 2600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, CARL L. SILVERMAN, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Microsoft Corporation.
App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-003771
Application 13/408,257
INVENTION
Appellant’s application relates to implementing a prism illumination-
optic for a vision-based interactive-display device. Abstract. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as follows, with the
disputed limitation shown in italics:
1. A vision-based interactive-display device comprising:
a partially-transparent display configured to form images
for viewing on a display surface of the vision-based interactive-
display device;
an illumination-optic overlaying the partially-transparent
display, the illumination-optic having an upper face positioned
towards the display surface and a lower face positioned towards
the partially-transparent display, the illumination-optic
configured with prisms on the lower face that reflect light out of
the upper face of the illumination-optic to illuminate the display
surface; and
an image detector configured to capture reflections of light
from an object on or near the display surface when the display
surface is illuminated, the illumination-optic overlaying the
partially-transparent display, and the image-detector positioned
below the partially-transparent display, the illumination-optic
configured to illuminate the display surface to enable the image
detector to capture reflections of light from the object on or near
the display surface.
REJECTION
Claims 1—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable
over the combination of Bell et al. (US 2008/0150913 Al; published June
26, 2008) and Miyashita (US 2007/0002587 Al; published Jan. 4, 2007).
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Application 13/408,257
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with Appellant’s
contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1) the findings
and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is
taken and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur with the
conclusions reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following additional
points.
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because the cited portions of
Bell do not teach “an illumination-optic overlaying the partially transparent
display,” where the illumination-optic is “configured to illuminate the
display surface to enable the image detector to capture reflections of light
from the object on or near the display surface.’ ’ App. Br. 13. Appellant
argues that the textured material and the edge lighting of Bell corresponds to
a backlight for an LCD, not an illuminator to illuminate an object. Id. at 14.
Appellant further argues that Bell's use of separate illuminators shows that
the edge lighting 1110 of Bell is not an illuminator for the camera. Id. at 15.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of Examiner error. In the
Answer, the Examiner explained that Bell teaches in Figures 11 and 18B an
illumination-optic 112 (“transparent plane 1860”) overlaying the partially
transparent display 106 (“display screen 1885”). Ans. 17. The Examiner
found that display screen 1885 of Bell is partially-transparent. Id. (citing
Bell 1114). The Examiner also found that Bell teaches transparent plane
1860 is configured to illuminate the surface of display screen 1885 to enable
the camera 1885 to capture reflections of light 1880 from object 1875 on or
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Application 13/408,257
near the display surface of display screen 1885. Id. at 17—18. In so finding,
the Examiner interpreted the recited limitation “display surface” as broad
enough to encompass the surface of display 106. Id. at 18.
Appellant has not shown the Examiner’s interpretation of the recited
term “display surface” is overly broad, unreasonable, or inconsistent with
the Specification.2 Thus, we agree with the Examiner's reasonable
interpretation of the claim term “display surface.” (Claim 1).
Appellant contends “transparent pane 1860” of Bell does not teach the
“illumination-optic” recited in claim 1 because Bell describes that light is
only able to escape transparent pane 1860 if an object or user is touching the
screen. App. Br. 18—19. Appellant argues that, because of a steep angle of
incidence, the light 1870 reflects completely within the confines of
transparent pane 1860. Id. at 18 (citing Bell 1144).
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner found
it was well-known in the art at the time of the invention that “no light can be
perfectly reflected toward one direction only, i.e., 100% entirely toward
‘upper face’ or ‘bottom face’ of ‘transparent pane I860’ in Bell.” Ans. 20.
Thus, the Examiner found that an artisan of ordinary skill would have
understood paragraph 114 of Bell as teaching that:
at least a portion of the light 1870 is able to scatter toward the
upper face of transparent panel860, while majority of the
light 1870 is able to scatter toward the bottom face of
transparent pane 1860, allowing it to escape the confines of
transparent pane 1860, the portion of the light 1870 being
reflected by the object 1875, then finally allowing it to escape
2 Because “applicants may amend claims to narrow their scope, a broad
construction during prosecution creates no unfairness to the applicant or
patentee.” In re ICON Health and Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
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Application 13/408,257
the confines of transparent pane 1860. This light 1880 scattered
toward the upper face of transparent panel860 and reflected
by the object 1875 toward the bottom face of transparent pane
1860 is then able to be detected by the camera 1885.
Id. Appellant presents no persuasive explanation or evidence to rebut the
Examiner’s findings.
Moreover, the Examiner cited Miyashita as teaching the limitation
“the illumination-optic overlaying the partially-transparent display, and the
image-detector positioned below the partially-transparent display, the
illumination-optic configured to illuminate the display surface to enable the
image detector to capture reflections of light from the object on or near the
display surface,” recited in claim 1. Ans. 5—6 (citing Miyashita Abstract,
Fig. 2). The Examiner relied on transparent plane 1860 of Bell as the recited
“illumination-optic,” and relied the “light guide” element of Miyashita in
combination with transparent pane 1860 of Bell as teaching the recited
limitation. Ans. 21—22.
Appellant contends that Miyashita does not teach or suggest the
disputed illumination-optic limitation because Miyashita is directed to a
“backlight unit.” App. Br. 19. Appellant further argues that combining the
cited teachings of Bell and Miyashita “would replace ‘transparent pane
I860’ of Bell” and “would render Bell inoperable for its intended purpose
because light would be unable to travel back from an object to the camera
because such light would be blocked by the ‘reflecting sheet 4’ described by
Miyashita.” Id. at 20.
Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they do not address
the Examiner’s rejection. Appellant’s first argument attacks the references
individually, even though the Examiner relied on the combination of Bell
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Application 13/408,257
and Miyashita in rejecting claim 1. In reMouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)) (“The test
for obviousness is what the combined teachings of the references would
have suggested to those having ordinary skill in the art.”) Furthermore, the
issue is not whether Miyashita’s light guide could have been bodily
incorporated into Bell’s system, but rather whether it would have been
obvious to a skilled artisan to use Miyashita’s light guide plate 12 in Bell’s
system to guide light toward camera 1885.
Moreover, Appellant’s combinability argument overlooks that the
Examiner excluded Miyashita’s reflecting sheet 4 from the proposed
combination. Ans. 5. Additionally, the Examiner found that “it is not
‘reflecting sheet 4,’ but ‘prisms 17’ of Tight guide plate 12,’ that
substantially ‘allows the light to exit to the outside through the top surface
12c,’ while ‘reflecting sheet 4 merely reflects light leaking out from the light
guide 12 back to the light guide plate 12.’” Ans. 22 (citing Miyashita Figs.
1—4,128). Appellant has not persuasively rebutted these findings by the
Examiner.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
finding that the combination of Bell and Miyashita teaches or suggests the
limitations of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 17 and 20, which recite similar limitations and for which
Appellant makes similar arguments. App. Br. 21—29. We also sustain the
Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 2—16, 18, and 19, for which
Appellant makes no additional arguments. See, e.g., id. at 24.
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DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1—20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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