Ex Parte KurzweilDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMay 31, 201710735294 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/735,294 12/12/2003 Raymond C. Kurzweil 14202-002001 9946 26161 7590 06/02/2017 FISH & RICHARDSON P.C. (BO) P.O. BOX 1022 MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440-1022 EXAMINER GRANT, MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3715 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/02/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): PATDOCTC@fr.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RAYMOND C. KURZWEIL Appeal 2015-0010911 Application 10/735,2942 Technology Center 3700 Before MICHELLE R. OSINSKI, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL 1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed July 21, 2014) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” mailed Oct. 27, 2014), the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Sept. 19, 2014) and Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Feb. 13, 2014), a transcript of the oral hearing held on March 23, 2017 (“Tr.,” mailed May 1, 2017), and the Board’s Decision on Appeal (“Prior Decision,” mailed June 4, 2013). 2 Appellant identifies Kurzweil Technologies, Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—23. An oral hearing was held on March 23, 2017. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. CLAIMED INVENTION Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to virtual reality devices, and in particular, using these devices for communication and contact.” Spec. 1, 11. 4—6. Claims 1, 9, and 15 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A virtual encounter system comprising, a mannequin having life-like features, the mannequin comprises: a body; a camera coupled to the body, the camera for sending first video signals over a communications network; and a microphone coupled to the body, the microphone for sending first audio signals over the communications network; and a set of goggles including a display to render electrical signals representative of second video signals received from the communications network and a transducer to transduce electrical signals representative of second audio signals received from the communications network, the respective second video signals and second audio signals at least partially reflect views and sound of a location different from a location of the mannequin in real time. 2 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 REJECTIONS Claims 1—4, 7—10, 13—17, and 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as upatentable over Abbasi (US 6,786,863 B2, iss. Sept. 7, 2004) and Choy (US 6,695,770 Bl, iss. Feb. 24, 2004). Claims 5, 6, 11, 12, and 18—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Abbasi, Choy, and Gutierrez (US 5,111,290, iss. May 5, 1992). ANALYSIS Independent Claims 1, 9, and 15 Appellant argues claims 1, 9, and 15 as a group. App. Br. 9. We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1). In rejecting independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner cites Abbasi for disclosing a virtual encounter system and method comprising a partial mannequin having life-like features, and a display to render the video signals received from the camera and a transducer to transduce the audio signals received from the microphone. Final Act. 2 (citing Abbasi, col. 2,11. 54—67). The Examiner acknowledges that Abbasi does not disclose that the mannequin is a complete mannequin representing the human figure and does not provide a video display in the form of goggles. Id. at 3. And the Examiner relies on Choy to cure the deficiencies Id. (citing Choy, col. 3,11. 1—6, 23—25, 41—45; col. 7,11. 11—19; Figs. 1—2); see also Ans. 11 (“Choy teaches the use of goggles to provide that audio and video, as well as the use of [a] full human mannequin for such a remote physical contact system”). 3 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 Abbasi relates to enabling remote physical contact. Abbasi, col. 1,11. 66—67. A user kisses a first mechanical surrogate attached to a first computer. The kiss is perceived at sensors located in the first mechanical surrogate, and characteristics of the kiss are communicated by the first computer to the second computer. Id. at col. 4,1. 62—col. 5,1. 1. The kiss is recreated on a second mechanical surrogate attached to the second computer. Id. at col. 5,11. 1—3. Video information is received from a video camera attached to the first computing device and conveyed to a second computing device for display. Id. at col. 2,11. 54—60. In addition, audio information from a microphone attached to the first computing device is conveyed to a speaker of the second computing device. Id. at col. 2,11. 63—67. Users control privacy by selecting command buttons on the display to enable or disable video or audio transmission. Id. at col. 7,11. 31—35. Choy relates to a system using virtual reality to simulate an environment and provide a sexual experience. Choy, col. 1.11. 6—9. The invention may be implemented with a mannequin or doll fitted with appropriate sensors. Id. at col. 2,11. 14—18. The system “allow[s] a user to enter a virtual world and have a sexual experience with a virtual human, or indeed another real human who is also linked up to the same world.” Id. at col. 2,11. 4—7. The invention is used with a head mounted display system and a movement and position sensing device applied to a critical part or parts of the user’s body. Id. at col. 1,11. 63—65. The headset is lightweight, and provides audio and images. Id. at col. 3,11. 43—45. A mannequin or doll is fitted with appropriate sensors to sense and transmit information (e.g., where touched), and to receive a control message in response (e.g., moving 4 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 an appropriate part of the doll). Id. at col. 8,11. 4—15; see also id. at col. 7,1. 11. 1-63. In a two-person embodiment, a user enters a virtual world to have a sexual experience with another human portrayed in the software as an avatar. Id. at col. 11,11. 13—16. The two-person embodiment, thus, replaces the one-person embodiment’s virtual human having artificial intelligence with another user. Id. at col. 10,11. 58—60. Each user’s movements are tracked and transmitted to the other user in real time. Id. at col. 3,11. 23—25, col. 10,11.5-9, col. 11,11. 1-5. The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to replace the partial mannequin of Abbasi with the full-size mannequin of Choy to allow for more involved simulation and to modify Abbasi’s display by providing a head mounted display/goggles to enhance the reality of the virtual environment. Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 18. In the Answer, the Examiner reasons that “it would have been obvious to . . . substitute the partial mannequin of Abbasi with the full size mannequin of Choy so as to allow for substantially more involved simulation and virtual experience to occur between a plurality of parties[,]” and that “providing a head mounted display/goggles in order to enhance the reality of a virtual environment be allowing a user to fantasize about a person displayed in the headset display.” Ans. 18. Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the Examiner’s rejection “do[es] not give due consideration to the Board’s prior decision.” App. Br. 8. In this regard, Appellant suggests that the Board in the Prior Decision found that Choy does not disclose a mannequin. Id. (“the Board had found that Choy did not 5 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 cure the deficiencies in the rejection.”) But this suggestion is incorrect. In its Prior Decision the Board found that the Examiner’s application of Choy did not cure the deficiencies of Abbasi because the Examiner applied Choy for disclosing goggles, not a mannequin. Prior Decision 4—5. Appellant contends that the Examiner does not establish a prima facie rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 9-11. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the Examiner mischaracterizes the claim language of a set of goggles that include a display that renders second video signals and transduces second audio signals, as “routing” data from one location to another location. App. Br. 10. Appellant charges that the Examiner has not made the correct factual inquiry to ascertain differences between Abbasi and the claims at issue, and improperly construed the scope and content of Abbasi. Id. at 10-11. But in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the Examiner finds that Abbasi at column 2, lines 54—67 teaches a display — not a set of goggles — performs the claimed rendering of second video signals and transducing of second audio signals. See Final Act. 2-4; see also Ans. 8—11 (finding Abbasi teaches all of the elements of the claim limitation except that the display (and transducer) is a set of goggles and the mannequin being a complete human form). We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that Abbasi’s display renders second video signals and transduces second audio signals under a broad, but reasonable, interpretation of the claim language. Appellant argues that the Examiner “mischaracterizes Abbasi as partially reflecting views . . . different from a location of the mannequin.” App. Br. 10. In the Reply Brief, Appellant elaborates that in Abbasi “the 6 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 view received by one user is the view that the camera at the other user captures, thus the camera cannot partially reflect views . . . different from a location of the mannequin [the view that the camera of the other user captures].” Reply Br. 3 (alterations in original). Appellant contends that “the point of [the claimed] feature is that. . . you can actually modify part of the surrounding.” Tr., 14,11. 8—10. However, even though Appellant may have intended claim 1 to require modifying views of video received from a location of a second mannequin or to require that the claimed second video/audio signals be video/audio with modified views and sounds meant to replace the first video/audio signals sent by the camera/microphone of a first mannequin, the claim language does not so require. Instead, claim 1 recites: (1) a mannequin having a camera coupled to the body “for sending first video signals over a communications network,” and (2) a set of goggles receiving second video signals received from the communications network that “at least partially reflect views ... of a location different than the mannequin [i.e., the same mannequin that sent the first video signals, not a second mannequin].” We agree with the Examiner that receiving a video signal at a first location where there is a first surrogate from a second location, as described by Abbasi, meets the recited claim language. Ans. 10-11. Appellant argues that “Choy teaches a headset display[,] not a set of goggles.” App. Br. 11; see also id. at 13. In the Reply Brief, Appellant compares virtual glasses shown in Figure 3 of the Specification with pictures from of a head mounted display from an owner’s manual for Pro View™ XL. Reply Br. 5—7. However, a set of goggles, as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claim 9, requires “a display . . . and a transducer.” And 7 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 nothing in Appellant’s Specification defines or otherwise limits the form of the recited set of goggles to the glasses shown in Figure 3. Choy describes a lightweight headset that displays video and provides audio. See Choy, col. 3,11. 3—6, col. 3,1. 41—col. 4,1. 55. We agree with the Examiner that Choy’s headset constitutes a set of goggles under a broad, but reasonable, interpretation of the claim language. See Ans. 13—15; see also Final Act. 3. Appellant contends that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because one of ordinary skill in the art would not have been motivated to combine Abbasi and Choy. See App. Br. 11—15; see also Reply Br. 9 (“No logical reason exists for combining Abbasi and Choy”). Appellant also argues that “Abbasi, specifically[,] and Abbasi and Choy together teach away from using ‘a set of goggles including a display to render electrical signals representative of second video signals’ which ‘at least partially reflect surrounding views ... of a location different from a location of the mannequin.’” App. Br. 11. We have carefully considered Appellant’s contentions, but none are persuasive of Examiner error. For example, Appellant asserts that “the user would not be able to see . . . and kiss the surrogate” using a set of goggles. App. Br. 12; see also id. at 14 (“the user 10 would need to remove the goggles to locate the surrogate 50”); Reply Br. 6 (“when the HMD is mounted on the head, it clearly would not enable a user to view and thus easily interact with surrogates in Abbasi without removing the HMD”). Appellant similarly contends that Abbasi’s user would be unable to “see both his surrogate and the user interface'1'’ if the user of Abbasi wore a set of goggles. App. Br. 12; see also id. at 14 (“the user 10 would have had to take off the goggles to look at his keyboard 8 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 and his user interface each time the user 10 types, sends, or receives textual messages from the user 20, or each time the user 10 initiates, accepts or terminates the remote physical contact.”), 15 (“Abbasi requires the users to view the surrogate, the keyboard, and the windows on the user interface so that the users . . . can perform one or more of (a) [remote physical contact through surrogates], (b) [viewing video presentation on GUI], and (c) [communicating with each other using keyboard and GUI] simultaneously or sequentially”). Appellant’s assertions are not persuasive, at least because the rejection applies a combination of Abbasi and Choy as disclosing the argued limitation, not either reference alone. The Examiner finds that the combination of Abbasi and Choy describes a user interacting with a mannequin — not Abbasi’s mechanical surrogate alone. See Final Act. 3. And the Examiner finds that a user of the combined system can employ the virtual reality headset while interacting with the mannequin. Ans. 16. The Examiner’s finding is consistent with, and supported by, Choy. See Choy, col. 1,1. 63—col. 2,1. 45 (generally describing a user physically interacting with a mannequin while wearing a head mounted display system). Likewise, the Examiner’s finding that the user can interact with a mannequin while wearing a virtual reality headset is consistent with remarks about Appellant’s invention made by Appellant’s counsel during the oral hearing. See Tr., 7,11. 15—17 (“it’s not necessary for the user [of Appellant’s invention] to actually really see the mannequin as the user can certainly contact and feel the mannequin”). The Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill to modify Abbasi to provide a mannequin for a remote 9 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 physical contact system, as described by Choy, to provide a “substantially more involved simulation and virtual experience.” Final Act. 3. And the Examiner reasons that it would have been obvious to modify Abbasi by providing Choy’s head mounted display to further “enhance the reality of a virtual environment.” Id. Consistent with this rationale, the Examiner determines that the user of the combined Abbasi and Choy system would communicate using a microphone instead of by typing on a keyboard because it provides a more realistic virtual contact experience. See Ans. 12— 13. We determine the Examiner adequately explained how and why the proposed combination would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Moreover, we are not persuaded that wearing the headset only during a virtual contact experience and not when engaged in other activities described by Abbasi (e.g., starting or ending the physical contact session, text messaging (see Abbasi, col. 7,11. 43^47)) would “destroy[] the intent[,] purpose^] and function of Abbasi,” as charged by Appellant. Reply Br. 9. For example, Abbasi does not describe or suggest that the user must see the keyboard and interface to communicate using keystrokes while kissing the surrogate. Appellant charges that “nothing in Choy describes that a user is allowed to view a video of another individual while interacting with a surrogate or mannequin.” App. Br. 12. And Choy’s user “does not communicate with a remote user in the [same] manner [that] the users of Abbasi communicate, e.g., through multiple windows on a computer display and/or keyboard.” Id. at 13. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive, at least because the Examiner does not rely on Choy for communicating with a remote user in the same manner as the users of Abbasi. Instead, the 10 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 Examiner applies Choy’s use of goggles to provide the audio and video outputs of Abbasi. See Ans. 11. In view of the foregoing, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 9 and 15, which fall with claim 1. Dependent Claims 2—4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, and 17 Appellant argues that dependent claims 2—4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, and 17 are allowable for the same reasons set forth with respect to independent claims 1, 9, and 15. See App. Br. 16—18. We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 9, and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2-4, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons set forth above with respect to the independent claims. Dependent Claims 21—23 Claim 21 depends from claim 1 and recites “modifying one or more characteristics of the second audio signals . . ., second audio signals . . . represent at least partially modified sound of the surrounding of the location different from the location of the mannequin.” Claims 22 and 23, which each depends from one of claims 9 and 15, recite similar language. In rejecting claims 21—23, the Examiner took Official Notice that modifying audio signals that are captured via microphone is “notoriously old and well known,” citing as an example the “digitizing and/or compressing” of an analog signal (voice) captured by microphone. Final Act. 5; see also Ans. 19. However, we agree with Appellant that the Official Notice taken by the Examiner does not account for partially modifying sound of the 11 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 surrounding location to be different from the location of the mannequin, as required by claims 21—23. See Appeal Br. 17. Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent Claims 5, 11, and 18 Appellant argues that Gutierrez does not cure the deficiency in the Examiner’s rejection of the independent claims. See App. Br. 19. However, we are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting the independent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 5, 11, and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Dependent Claims 6, 12, and 19 Claim 6 depends from claim 1 and further recites that the body includes an ear canal, and the microphone is positioned within the ear canal. Claims 12 and 19, which depend from claims 9 and 15 respectively, recite similar language. Appellant argues that it would not have been obvious to modify Abbasi and Choy in view of Gutierrez because Gutierrez fails to teach placing a microphone within an ear canal of a mannequin. See App. Br. 19. Gutierrez discloses with reference to Figure 8, a circuit diagram, locating a microphone 112 within a mannequin, but does not disclose a location of microphone 112 within the mannequin. Compare Gutierrez, col. 4,11. 34— 36, Fig. 8, with Fig. 7. Responding to Appellant’s argument, the Examiner finds that Gutierrez teaches “locating a sensor device within its appropriate anatomical region within a mannequin” by describing locating a video camera within the eye of the mannequin. Ans. 20. And the Examiner determines that it 12 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill to modify Abbasi and Choy in view of Gutierrez “to locate said microphone and camera in their appropriate anatomical areas within the mannequin, namely the camera in the mannequin’s eye and the microphone in the mannequin’s ear, in order to most accurately reproduce via audio and video the first user’s interaction with the mannequin to the second user.” Id. In the Reply Brief, Appellant responds that “Gutierrez does not describe to locate a microphone within the ear canal merely by the [Ejxaminer’s characterization that Gutierrez teaches locating a sensor device within its appropriate anatomical region.” Reply Br. 12. But the Examiner does not find that Gutierrez describes locating a microphone in the ear canal. Rather, the Examiner determines that the modification would have been obvious in view of the combined teachings of the references, including Gutierrez’s disclosure of placing a device (a camera) in its corresponding anatomical region (an eye). We are not persuaded on the present record that the Examiner erred in rejecting dependent claims 6, 12, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection. Dependent Claim 20 Appellant argues that claim 20 is patentable for the same reasons set forth with respect to claim 6. See App. Br. 20. We are not persuaded for the reasons set forth above that the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons set forth above with respect to claim 6. 13 Appeal 2015-001091 Application 10/735,294 DECISION The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—20 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) are affirmed. The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21—23 is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 14 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation