Ex Parte Kumar

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 21, 2016

12587664 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 21, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
12/587,664 10/10/2009
27939 7590 04/21/2016
Philip ff Bum1s, IV
Burrus Intellectual Property Law Group LLC
222 12th Street NE
Suite 1803
Atlanta, GA 30309
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Kshitij Kumar
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
BPCUR0020KK 8908
EXAMINER
MONTOYA,OSCHTAI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2421
MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE
04/21/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte KSHITIJ KUMAR
Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587 ,664 1
Technology Center 2400
Before THU A. DANG, CARLL. SILVERMAN, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's Final
Rejection of claims 1-3, 5-10, 12-17, 19, and 20. Claims 4, 11, and 18 are
cancelled. Br. 6. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to generating a playlist and retrieving a plurality
of multimedia content. Abstract. Claim 1 is exemplary of the matter on
appeal:
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Concurrent Computer
Corporation. Br. 2.
Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587,664
1. A computing device for generating a play list of multimedia
data, the system comprising:
a processor; and
a memory device coupled to the processor and having stored
therein a plurality of instructions, which when executed by the
processor cause the processor to:
retrieve a plurality of multimedia content from a multimedia
database in response to a selection from a user;
generate a multimedia play list that identifies an order of the
plurality of multimedia content;
determine text or multimedia information based on the plurality
of multimedia content;
update the multimedia playlist with the multimedia information
including the temporal order and spatial location of the multimedia
information; and
generate a video based on the multimedia playlist, the video
including the plurality of multimedia content and the multimedia
information associated therewith;
wherein the multimedia information is displayed with the video
and can be changed each time the video is displayed to include
information that is relevant at a point in time when the video is
displayed;
wherein the multimedia information displayed comprises do
you know data.
Br. 16 (Claims App.).
THE REJECTIONS
Claims 1-3, 8-10, and 15-17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Zott et al. (US 2009/0228919 Al; published Sept.
10, 2009) ("Zott") in view of Logan et al. (US 2008/0092168 Al; published
Apr. 17, 2008) ("Logan"), and Portuesi (US 5,774,666; issued June 30,
1998). Final Act. 2---6.
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Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587,664
Claims 5-7, 12-14, 19, and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Zott, Logan, Portuesi, and Yu et al. (US
8,250, 179 B2; issued Aug. 21, 2012) ("Yu"). Final Act. 6-8.
ANALYSIS
Appellant argue Portuesi does not teach the claim 1 limitation
"wherein the multimedia information displayed comprises do you know
data." Br. 12-14. According to Appellant, "there is absolutely no teaching
of the presentation of do you know data occurring in the reference" because
Portuesi discusses only the presentation ofURLs in a video. Id. (citing
Portuesi col. 3, 1. 66-col. 4, 1. 37). Appellant argues Portuesi defines URLs
as being "an identifier of a network document or other reference, formatted
in accordance with a uniform network protocol, such that the computer
clients of the network, for example, can request the document or resource
from computer servers of the network by reference to the identifier." Id.
(citing Portuesi col. 4, 11. 2-8).
Appellant argues an identifier of a remotely stored resource is not do
you know data and refers to the Specification wherein the location of do you
know data can be identified with an URL. Br. 13 (citing Spec. i-f 192).
Appellant further argues:
By definition, an identifier of the location of something cannot
be the something itself. Illustrating by example, a treasure map,
which identifies the location of treasure, cannot be the treasure
itself. The same is true of a URL. To wit, the identifier of the
location of data cannot be the data itself. To suggest otherwise
is nonsensical. A URL points to data, and if the URL were
itself data, no pointer would be required.
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Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587,664
Tri <>f 11
_LU. UL _I_ J •
Appellant also argues "when Portuesi is combined with Zott and
Logan, at best, the combination presents URLs, i.e., identifiers of the
location of data, in a video." Id. According to Appellant:
Advantageously, Appellant's invention does not require the
tedious and burdensome clicking of location identifiers and
sorting through the resulting locations to find desired data that
occurs in the combination of Zott, Logan, and Portuesi. To the
contrary, Appellant's invention presents not only data, but more
precisely do you know data while the video is being displayed,
saving the user countless hours of searching and clicking.
Id. at 13-14.
However, the Examiner finds "a type of definition" about do you
know data is in the Specification which describes do you know data can be
"any information." Ans. 3. (citing Spec. i-f 32). The Examiner then finds
Portuesi describes URLs as being information and data, such as encoded
information or encoded data. Id. (citing Portuesi Abstract; col. 4, 11. 20-22;
col. 5, 11. 13-58; col. 6, 11. 46---64; col. 9, 11. 5-12; Tables 1-8).
We note Appellant does not present a definition for do you know data
and the term as used in the Specification provides little guidance to one of
ordinary skill in the art. See Spec. i-fi-132, 192. The phrase" ... and possible
other information (sometimes called DUKS-Do-you-knows) and other
messages" may, but not clearly, suggest "the other information" is other than
advertisements. Id.
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Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587,664
Based on the record before us, ii~ppellant presents no persuasive basis
to limit the meaning of do you know data to exclude the teaching of
Portuesi' s URLs as relied on by the Examiner and as understood by one of
ordinary skill in the art. Claim terms in a patent application are given the
broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification, as
understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Crish, 393 F.3d 1253,
1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, great care should be taken to avoid reading
limitations of the Specification into the claims. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com
Corp., 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Regarding the URLs of Portuesi, assuming arguendo an URL is
merely a link to the data, the limitation "wherein ... " does not exclude
accessing the data through a URL as long as the information displayed
"comprises" the "do you know" data.
We are also not persuaded by Appellant's arguments regarding the
asserted advantages of the invention, e.g., "no tedious and burdensome
clicking of identifiers," as these arguments are not commensurate with the
scope of the claims. Cf In re Self, 671F.2d1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982)
("Many of appellant's arguments fail from the outset because, ... they are
not based on limitations appearing in the claims .... ").
In view of the above, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and
independent claims 8 and 15 as these claims recite the disputed limitation
and are argued together with claim 1. Br. 12-14. Dependent claims 2, 3, 5-
7, 9, 10, 12-14, 16, 17, 19, and 20 are not argued separately and, therefore,
we sustain the rejection of these claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
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Appeal2014-005899
Application 12/587,664
19, and 20.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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