Ex Parte Kueh

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 9, 2014

11730481 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 9, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/730,481 04/02/2007 Victor Y.H. Kueh 5243-120-US01 7515 79184 7590 06/09/2014 SMITH, GAMBRELL & RUSSELL 1055 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW Suite 400 WASHINGTON, DC 20007 EXAMINER PATEL, AJIT ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2644 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/09/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________________ Ex parte VICTOR Y.H. KUEH ____________________ Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 Technology Center 2600 ____________________ Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, DEBRA K. STEPHENS, and JASON V. MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPHENS, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a final rejection of claims 1-19, 21, 23-26, and 28-44. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 20, 22, and 27 have been allowed. We AFFIRM. Introduction According to Appellant, the claims are directed to roaming in wireless networks such that a session having an established routing passing through a home network and a visited network is relocated (Abstract). Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 2 Exemplary Claims Claims 1 and 28, reproduced below, are representative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of roaming for a first UE [user equipment] from a first wireless home network in a visited wireless network comprising: relocating a session having an established user plane routing which passes through both the first home network and the visited network by supplying service information for the first UE from the first home network to the visited network and transferring the user plane routing away from the first home network. 28. A policy node in a wireless network which has the capability to communicate with a policy node of another wireless network to convey information needed for the relocation of a roaming user plane to transfer context to the other wireless network. REFERENCE Kant US 2008/0130637 A1 Jun. 5, 2008 filed Nov. 18, 2005 REJECTION The Examiner made the following rejection: Claims 1-19, 21, 23-26, and 28-44 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Kant (Ans. 4-8). We have only considered those arguments Appellant actually raised in the Brief. Arguments Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii)(2010). Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 3 ISSUE 1 35 U.S.C. § 102(e): Claims 1-19, 21, 23-26, 30-33, and 36-44 Appellant argues the invention as recited in claim 1 is not anticipated by Kant (App. Br. 13-17). The issues presented by the proffered arguments are: Issue 1: Has the Examiner erred in finding Kant discloses “a session having an established user plane routing which passes through both the first home network and the visited network” and “supplying service information for the first UE from the first home network to the visited network” as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS Appellant argues Kant is directed to a single operator providing two types of wireless access that use two different technologies, WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network) and GPRS (General Packet Radio Service), in the same geographical area (App. Br. 13). Kant, according to Appellant, describes the UE originally accesses the GPRS network and when entering a WLAN hotspot, hands-over to the WLAN (App. Br. 14). Therefore, Appellant contends, Kant describes transfer with one network of one technology to another (App. Br. 15-16). Appellant asserts even if the two networks are defined as the GPRS network and the WLAN network, Kant does not disclose an “established user plane routing which passes through both the first home network and the visited network” as recited in the claim (App. Br. 15). Appellant further argues even using an alternative definition of “network,” the system described in Kant does not disclose a home and a Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 4 visited network but instead describes a single linked set of network components (id.). Initially, as a matter of claim construction, we determine the phrase “which passes through both the first home network and the visited network” as recited in claim 1, can be interpreted as modifying the previous claim words “session” or “routing.” The Examiner appears to be interpreting this phrase as modifying “session” while Appellant appears to be arguing the claim limitation modifies “routing.” We find the Examiner’s interpretation to be reasonable. Thus, we concur with the Examiner that Kant discloses “a session having an established user plane routing which passes through both the first home network and the visited network” as recited in independent claim 1. Specifically, we agree Kant discloses two networks, a GPRS (home) network and a WLAN (visited) network, and a session which passes through both the GPRS network and the WLAN network (Ans. 4 and 9). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that WLAN and GPRS are not separate networks, but are instead network components (App. Br. 15). Appellant did not explicitly define “network” in their Specification and we are not persuaded by the proffered arguments. (See also Kant, ¶[0004].) We are further not persuaded Kant does not disclose “supplying service information for the first UE from the first home network to the visited network” as recited in claim 1. We instead, agree with the Examiner that Kant describes the client supplying service information (Ans. 4, 9; see also Kant, ¶[0022]). Appellant argues the information being supplied is not “service information”; however, Appellant did not explicitly define “service Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 5 information” in the Specification. Thus, we are not persuaded service information is not supplied. Accordingly, based on this record, we are persuaded Kant discloses the invention as recited in independent claim 1 and commensurately recited in independent claims 23-26 and 36-40, and dependent claims 2-19, 21, 30, and 42-44, not separately argued. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 1-19, 21, 23-26, 30-33, and 36-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Kant. ISSUE 2 35 U.S.C. § 102(e): Claims 28, 29, 34, and 35 Appellant argues their invention is not anticipated by Kant (App. Br. 13-17). However, none of these arguments are directed to the invention as recited in independent claims 28 and 29. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Kant discloses the invention as recited in independent claims 28 and 29. Dependent claims 34 and 35, not separately argued, thus, fall with their respective independent claims. Therefore, we sustain the rejection of claims 28, 29, 34, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Kant. DECISION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-19, 21, 23-26, 28-35, and 36-44 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Kant is affirmed.1 1 Should there be further prosecution, the Examiner’s attention is directed to claims 30-35 and 41-44, which fail to specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed in the claim from which it depends as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶4. Specifically, claims 30-35 and 41-44 are directed to “a Appeal 2012-000136 Application 11/730,481 6 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED rwk non-transitory computer readable medium” and depend from method claims 1, 23, 26, 25, 36, 37, 40, and 39, respectively. Thus, each of claims 30-35 contains a reference to a previously set forth independent claim; however, each of the claims fails to specify a further limitation of the subject matter of the independent claim to which each respectively refers because claims 30- 35 and 41-44 are completely outside the scope of claims 1, 23, 26, 25, 36, 37, 40, and 39. Pfizer, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 457 F.3d 1284, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006).