Ex Parte Kodas et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardAug 21, 201814056134 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 21, 2018) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 14/056,134 10/17/2013 60601 7590 08/22/2018 Muncy, Geissler, Olds & Lowe, P.C. 4000 Legato Road Suite 310 Fairfax, VA 22033 UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Toivo T. Kodas UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 4303/0144PUS1 7038 EXAMINER GREENE, NAN A ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 1619 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/22/2018 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte TOIVO T. KODAS, MARK J. HAMPDEN-SMITH, KLAUS KUNZE, DAVIDE. DERICOTTE, KAREL VANHEUSDEN, and AARON STUMP 1 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056, 134 Technology Center 1600 Before JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, RY ANH. FLAX, and DAVID COTTA, Administrative Patent Judges. FLAX, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is a decision under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) involving claims directed to a method for making nanoparticulates. Claims 12, 14--16, 19--22, and 50- 54 are on appeal as rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and § 103. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm-in-part. 1 Appellants identify the Real Party in Interest as "SICPA HOLDING SA." Appeal Br. 2. Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The Specification states, "[a]s a result of the large number of applications for nanoparticulate materials, a variety of methods have been developed for making and processing nanoparticulates. One common problem faced by these methods is the tendency of the nanoparticulates to agglomerate because of their high surface area." Spec. 1. Independent claims 12 and 50 are representative and are reproduced below: 12. A gas dispersion method for making nanoparticulates, the method comprising: generating a flowing gas dispersion, as generated the gas dispersion comprising droplets of a precursor medium dispersed in a gas phase, with the precursor medium comprising liquid vehicle and at least two precursors, a first said precursor being a precursor to a first material and a second said precursor being a precursor to a second material, the second material being a surface-modifying material comprising a dispersing agent capable of inhibiting agglomeration and promoting dispersion of nanoparticulates in a dispersion medium; in the gas dispersion, forming particles dispersed in the gas phase, the particles dispersed in the gas phase each comprising the second material and nanoparticulates that include the first material; the forming particles comprising removing at least a portion of the liquid vehicle from the droplets; wherein, the particles are decomposable in a liquid dispersion medium to release the nanoparticulates from the particles for dispersion of the nanoparticulates in the liquid dispersion medium; and wherein, when the particles are decomposed in and the nanoparticulates are dispersed in the liquid dispersion medium, 2 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 at least a portion of the second material modifies a surface of the dispersed nanoparticulates. 50. A gas dispersion method for making nanoparticulates, the method comprising: generating a flowing gas dispersion, as generated the gas dispersion comprising droplets of a precursor medium dispersed in a gas phase, with the precursor medium comprising liquid vehicle and at least two precursors, a first said precursor being a precursor to a first material and a second said precursor being a precursor to a second material; in the gas dispersion, forming multi-phase particles dispersed in the gas phase, the multi-phase particles each comprising a dispersion of nanoparticulates and matrix, the nanoparticulates maintained in a dispersed state by the matrix, the nanoparticulates comprising the first material and the matrix comprising the second material; the forming multi-phase particles comprising removing at least a portion of the liquid vehicle from the droplets to the gas phase and reacting the first precursor to form the first material; wherein, prior to the forming multi-phase particles, the gas dispersion comprises a reducing agent; and wherein the forming multi-phase particles comprises reaction of the reducing agent to promote chemical reduction to form the first material. Appeal Br. 40, 41--42 (Claims App'x) (paragraph returns added for clarity). The following rejections are appealed: Claims 12, 14--16, and 19--22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, as indefinite. Answer 3; see also Final Action 3. 3 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 Claims 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, and 50-54 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Xia2 and Sharma. 3 Answer 7; see also Final Action 6-7. Claims 16 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Xia, Sharma, and Choi. 4 Answer 7; see also Final Action 12. DISCUSSION "[T]he examiner bears the initial burden, on review of the prior art or on any other ground, of presenting aprimafacie case ofunpatentability. If that burden is met, the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shifts to the applicant." In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Indefiniteness For claims under examination, "'a claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose meaning is unclear,"' i.e., "ambiguous, vague, incoherent, opaque, or otherwise unclear in describing and defining the claimed invention." In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1310-13 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also MPEP § 2173.02(I) (Rev. 07.2015, Nov. 2015) (advising examiners that a rejection for indefiniteness is appropriate "after applying the broadest reasonable interpretation to the claim, if the metes and bounds of the claimed invention are not clear"). "A claim is not 'indefinite' simply 2 Bin Xia et al., Novel Route to Nanoparticle Synthesis by Salt-Assisted Aerosol Decomposition, 13(20) Aov. MATER. 1579-82 (2001) ("Xia"). 3 Pramod K. Sharma et al., Tailoring the particle size from µm ~ nm scale by using a surface modifier and their size effect on the fluorescence properties of europium doped yttria, 82 J. LUMINESCENCE 187-93 (1999) ("Sharma"). 4 Han-Ho Choi et al., Enhanced cathodoluminescent properties of ZnO encapsulated ZnS:Ag phosphors using an electrochemical deposition coating, 82(15) APPL. PHYS. LETT. 2494--96 (2003) ("Choi"). 4 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 because it is hard to understand when viewed without benefit of the specification." S3 Incorporated v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). "[B]readth is not to be equated with indefiniteness." In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 693 (CCPA 1971). The Examiner determined that the language "surface-modifying material" is indefinite because a person of ordinary skill would not understand its metes and bounds; the Examiner determined that such language might apply to the surface atoms of the nanoparticles/particulates or alternatively to the matrix material or alternatively to something altogether different that modifies the nanoparticles' surfaces. Final Action 4. The Examiner explained that "the application as filed does not define applicant's terminology 'surface modifying material,' and while example[s] in the specification provide a starting point" for understanding the language, it is not enough. Id. at 5. Also, the Examiner determined that the claim language "the particles are decomposable" is indefinite because it is unclear what the metes and bounds of decomposable should be. Id. at 4. The Examiner explains that the term decomposable is a term of art in the chemical arts and relates to a chemical reaction to transform a material into other components ( e.g., charcoal bums to produce CO2 and H20), but that the claim language reads on such things as a salt matrix dissolving in water, which is inconsistent with such an understanding in the field. Id. at 5. Appellants argue that the language of claim 12 is clear that the claimed second material is a swface-modifying material as described by the examples in the Specification, and the materials recited by dependent claims 14--16 clarify the meaning of such a material. Appeal Br. 11-12 ( citing 5 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 Spec. 40). Regarding the "decomposable" claim language, Appellants argue the Specification describes what is meant by the decomposition of particles and also argues that the dictionary definitions of decompose and decomposition touching on the breaking down, splitting up, and disintegrating of substances, reflect the meaning of the claim language. Appeal Br. 13 (citing Spec. 37; Appeal Br. Exhibit A (HACKH'S CHEMICAL DICTIONARY 200 (4th ed. 1969))). Appellants argue claims 14, 15, and 19-- 21 separately and contend these claims are more specific about the surface- modifying and decomposable elements. Appeal Br. 14--16. We agree with Appellants and conclude the claim language at issue is not indefinite. As claimed, the second material is a surface-modifying material, which modifies the surface of dispersed nanoparticles (nanoparticulates ), and it includes a dispersing agent for the nanoparticles. Appeal Br. 40 (claim 12). Further, the second material may chemically react with the nanoparticles to functionalize (i.e., modify) their surfaces. Id. at 41 ( claims 16, 20). Further, the second material may contribute to a matrix that maintains the nanoparticles in a dispersed state. Id. (claim 22). The Specification describes "[ o ]ne type of surface modification that may be performed on the nanoparticulates is coating or covering a surface of the nanoparticulates with a material that masks, or otherwise modifies, the surface properties of the nanoparticulates." Spec. 40. The Specification further describes that "[t]he surface-modifying material may function as a surfactant to modify the surface properties" of nanoparticles, or it "may function as a dispersing agent to promote uniform separation and dispersion 6 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 of the nanoparticulates in a liquid medium," or it "may function as a stabilizer to inhibit chemical degradation of the nanoparticulates." Id. at 41. The Specification also describes that surface-modification can include adding or removing functional groups from nanoparticulates. Id. at 21, 4 7, 49. The Specification also provides lists of exemplary materials that can be surface-modifying materials. Id. at 41--49 (Tables 12 and 13). Further, the Specification distinguishes surface-modification from compositional modification and structural modification, the former involving changes to the composition of the interior of nanoparticles and the later involving non- compositional physical changes, e.g., to crystallinity or particle morphology, of nanoparticles. Id. at 49-50. Based on the disclosure of the Specification and in the context of the claims, the claim language surface-modifying material is not unclear. It means a material that can alter the surface of nanoparticles in essentially any way, but particularly in the ways disclosed in the Specification, for example, coating or wetting the nanoparticles, as opposed to altering the crystallinity or morphology of the nanoparticles. Just because the term swface- modifying material is broad does not mean it is indefinite. Regarding the claim term "decomposable," we agree with Appellants that the term is used according to its ordinary meaning, as evidenced by Appellants' dictionary evidence. The term refers to a substance that breaks down or splits up into simpler constituents, such as by, for example, chemical reaction, weathering, or dissolving. We reverse the indefiniteness rejection. 7 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 Obviousness "The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). "In determining whether the subject matter of a patent claim is obvious, ... [ w ]hat matters is the objective reach of the claim. If the claim extends to what is obvious, it is invalid under§ 103." Id. at 419. The Examiner determined that appealed claims 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, and 50-54 would have been obvious over the Xia-Sharma prior art combination and that appealed claims 16 and 20 would have been obvious over this same prior art combination and also adding Choi. Final Action 6- 16 and Answer 7-10. Except as otherwise indicated below, we discern no error in the Examiner's determinations and we agree with and adopt the Examiner's findings of fact and rationale in support of the obviousness rejection as set forth in the Final Office Action and Answer. Final Action 6- 16; Answer 7-10. We address Appellants' arguments below. Appellants argue Xia is directed to a salt-assisted aerosol decomposition process of forming nanoparticles and Sharma is directed to a wet chemical method of forming nanoparticles, utilizing a surface-modifier, and that these two processes are so different that the person of ordinary skill in the art would not have combined the references and would not have expected the Xia process to have benefited from using the surface modifier of Sharma. Appeal Br. 1 7. This argument is repeated throughout Appellants briefing in relation to several claims. It is not persuasive. 8 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 As an initial matter, the evidence does not support that the distinction between what Xia calls salt-assisted and what Sharma calls wet chemical is as great as portrayed by Appellants. There is no evidence, other than attorney argument, that the two processes for forming similar nanoparticles are so different that the skilled artisan would not consult each of Xia and Sharma in view of the other to combine features taught therein to be advantageous in forming nanoparticles. Xia uses the term salt-assisted for what appears to be an introduction of the use of salts as additives to prevent agglomeration of nanoparticulate materials, but otherwise discloses using wet components, e.g., solutions, mists, droplets, aqueous precursor solutions, suspended in an aerosol and then heated to leave Y203-Zr02 nanoparticles, and only such nanoparticles, after washing away the salt, which wets the nanocrystallite surfaces of (i.e., modified the surfaces of), prevents agglomeration of, and promotes dispersion of the nanoparticles. See generally Xia. Sharma discloses synthesizing Eu203-Y203 nanoparticles using a solution of ethanol and Tween-80 / Emulsogen-OG as a nanoparticle-wetting surface-modifier to prevent agglomeration of the nanoparticles, followed by drying and washing the product to leave nanoparticles. See generally Sharma. Both processes are wet, both utilize surface-modifiers, and both generally form nanoparticles in the same way and produce very similar products. Appellants also argue that one may not consider the teachings of Xia alone to render claim 12 obvious because the Examiner has relied upon the combination of Xia and Sharma for the obviousness rejection. Appeal Br. 18. 9 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 This argument is not persuasive. Xia discloses that its salt additive is a surface-modifying material, e.g., it wets the surface of nanoparticles, promoting their dispersion and preventing agglomeration. Appellants appear to recognize this in making an argument that Xia should not be considered alone because the Examiner combined it with Sharma for some purposes. We note the Board may rely on less than all of the references applied by the Examiner in an obviousness rationale without designating it as a new ground of rejection. In re Bush, 296 F.2d 491,496 (CCPA 1961); In re Boyer, 363 F.2d 455, 458 n.2 (CCP A 1966). In any event, each of Xia alone or Xia and Sharma combined teaches, suggests, and renders obvious the claimed methods as each teaches and suggests a surface-modifying material that wets the surface ofnanoparticles. Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (That the prior art "discloses a multitude of effective combinations does not render any particular formulation less obvious. This is especially true because the claimed composition is used for the identical purpose taught by the prior art."). Appellants argue "the rejection improperly relies upon an assertion [that a surfactant and/or ethanol would be used in the Xia process] without any supporting evidence." Appeal Br. 18-19 (citing MPEP § 2144.03 and In re Ahlert and Kruger, 424 F.2d 1088 (CCPA 1970). This argument is not persuasive. None of the claims require ethanol, specifically, but the Specification describes ethanol as a preferred reducing agent (which is claimed at claims 50-54). Spec. 26 (Table 7). Ethanol is used as a solvent in Shanna's disclosed method. Ethanol is a well-known liquid that is readily soluble in water (the primary ingredient in all alcoholic 10 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 beverages) and is volatile (readily evaporates). Xia discloses a spray pyrolysis method, which utilizes volatile liquids. It would have been obvious to use components taught to be useful by Sharma in producing nanoparticles, e.g., ethanol as a solvent, in the aqueous precursor solution of the methods of producing similar nanoparticles as taught by Xia. Xia encourages incorporating "additives" in its process and indicates that "solvent is capable of accelerating the material formation kinetics and improving the product crystallinity" in its process. Xia 1581. Also, Sharma discloses that using Tween-80 in its process advantageously prevents agglomeration, which is also an objective disclosed by Xia. Thus, using such a surfactant in Xia's process would have been obvious. Regarding claims 14, 15, 21, and 50, Appellants restate the claim requirements and argue Xia does not teach it. Appeal Br. 20-21, 22, 23-24, 25-26. Further, Appellants again argue, as they did for claim 12, that because Sharma is directed to a different process than Xia (wet chemical as opposed to salt-assisted, respectively) and, therefore, cannot be combined with Xia, the rejection fails to establish obviousness. Id. These arguments are not persuasive. Statements in a brief that "merely mention [a] claim ... and lack any type of separate, substantive argument concerning the claim" are not sufficient to constitute separate argument regarding that claim under 37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv). In re Kao, 639 F.3d 1057, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2011 ). Furthermore, we have addressed above that the methods and elements disclosed by Xia and Sharma would have been obvious to combine. 11 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 Regarding claims 51 and 52, Appellants argue they require the reducing agent be contained in the precursor medium and Xia, alone or in view of Sharma, does not teach this. Appeal Br. 30, 31. As discussed above, it would have been obvious to include the ethanol disclosed as useful in Sharma' s process in the precursor materials of Xia' s method in producing nanoparticles. The Specification discloses ethanol is a preferred reducing agent. Spec. 24--26. Thus, it would have been obvious to include a reducing agent in the precursor medium, as claimed. Regarding claims 53 and 54, which are dependent from claim 50, Appellants argue they require that the reducing agent reduces a temperature at which the first material forms in the gas dispersion (by at least 50°C in claim 54) and Xia, alone or in view of Sharma, does not teach this. Appeal Br. 31-32, 34. Appellants argue that the Examiner's determination that the ethanol of Sharma, when used in Xia's process as a co-solvent, would function to reduce the material formation temperature in this way because the Specification confirms that ethanol functions in such a way in a process as claimed and as disclosed in the prior art, is in error because Xia and Sharma cannot be combined. Id. at 32, 34. Appellants argue that obviousness rejections cannot rely on inherency. Appellants' arguments are not persuasive. We have addressed how and why the cited references can and would have been combined. Further, Where . . . the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical ... the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product. Whether the rejection is based on "inherency" under 35 U.S.C. § 102, on "prima facie obviousness" under 35 U.S.C. § 103, jointly or 12 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 alternatively, the burden of proof is the same, and its fairness is evidenced by the PTO' s inability to manufacture products or to obtain and compare prior art products. In re Best, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255 (CCPA 1977) (citations and footnote omitted). Here, the Examiner has established that it would have been obvious to include ethanol in the precursor materials, as disclosed by Sharma, in the nanoparticle fabrication process disclosed by Xia. The presumption of obviousness based on a reference disclosing structurally similar compounds ( or methods) may be overcome where there is evidence showing there is no reasonable expectation of similar properties in structurally similar compounds. In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1094 (CCPA 1978). Here, because the combined prior art method and the claimed methods are substantially identical, it is incumbent upon Appellants to establish that providing ethanol to the Xia process, as suggested by Sharma, would not result in the functional claim element of reducing formation temperature. Appellants provide no such evidence. Regarding claims 16 and 20, Appellants argue "[t]he examiner's final rejection does not indicate how disclosure of Choi of enhanced cathodoluminscent properties of ZnO encapsulated in ZnS:AG phosphor relates to reacting the second material with the nanoparticulates to functionalize a surface of the nanoparticulates." Appeal Br. 37. Appellants also argue "the rejection does not state why or how the disclosures would have been combined." Id. The entirety of the Examiner's rejection rationale is "[t]he difference between the rejected claims and the teachings of Xia et al. is that Xia et al. does not expressly teach surface functionalizing the nanoparticulates. Choi 13 Appeal2017-008945 Application 14/056,134 et al. teaches enhanced cathodolmninescent properties of ZnO encapsulated in ZnS:Ag phosphor using an electrochemical deposition coating (see whole document)." Final Action 12-13. We agree with Appellants that the Examiner has not established how or why Choi teaches or suggests the claimed surface functionalizing. Upon reviewing the reference, it appears to be directed to forming nano-sized particles on micro-sized particulates. It is unclear how this relates to the claimed functionalizing of nanoparticles. We conclude a prima facie case has not been established here and we reverse the rejection of claims 16 and 20. SUMMARY The rejection of the claims as indefinite is reversed. The obviousness rejection of claims 12, 14, 15, 19, 21, 22, and 50-54 is affirmed. The obviousness rejection of claims 16 and 20 is reversed. TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART 14 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation