Ex Parte Kilian et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 27, 2017

13792473 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 27, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/792,473 03/11/2013 Jochen KILIAN 8397-US 6696
69054 7590 01/31/2017
RFfTTFS PATFNTS
EXAMINER
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NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/31/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JOCHEN KILIAN and OTMAR RENGERT1
Appeal 2016-001375
Application 13/792,473
Technology Center 2600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, MICHAEL M. BARRY, and
DAVID J. CUTITTAII, Administrative Patent Judges.
CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final
Rejection of claims 1—18, all pending claims of the application. We have
jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is DSP Group Ltd. See
Appeal Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-001375
Application 13/792,473
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According to Appellants, the application relates to a technique to
register new devices into a Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications
(“DECT”) Ultra Low Energy (“ULE”) Home Automation network.
Appellants indicate the technique is effective when new DECT devices to be
registered lack keyboards to type in a pin or personal security code.
Spec. I.2 Claims 1,13, and 16 are independent. Claim 1 is representative
and is reproduced below with disputed limitations italicized:
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
1. A system, comprising:
a trusted Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications
(DECT) device; and
a DECT base station;
wherein the trusted DECT device is arranged to send, to
the DECT base station, registration allowable DECT device
credentials;
wherein the DECT base station is arranged to:
receive from a requesting DECT device that differs from
the trusted DECT device a request for registration of the
requesting DECT device to the DECT base station; wherein the
request comprises requesting DECT device credentials;
register the requesting DECT device to the DECT base
station if the requesting DECT device credentials match the
registration allowable DECT device credentials', and
2 Throughout this Opinion, we refer to: (1) Appellants’ Specification filed
Mar. 11, 2013 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”) mailed
Nov. 6, 2014; (3) the Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.”) filed Apr. 5, 2015; (4) the
Examiner’s Answer (Ans. ”) mailed Sept. 8, 2015; and (5) the Reply Brief
(“Reply Br.”) filed Nov. 5, 2015.
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Application 13/792,473
prevent a registration of the requesting DECT device to
the DECT base station if the requesting DECT device credentials
differ from the registration allowable DECT device credentials.
Appeal Br. 19 (Claims App’x) (emphasis added).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims:
Morvan et al. (“Morvan”) US 6,826,401 B1 Nov. 30, 2004
Luebke et al. (“Luebke”) US 2005/0086366 Al Apr. 21, 2005
REJECTION
Claims 1—18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Luebke and Morvan. Final Act. 8—24.
Our review in this appeal is limited only to the above rejection and
issues raised by Appellants. We have not considered other possible issues
that have not been raised by Appellants and which are, therefore, not before
us. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv) (2014).
ISSUES
Appellants’ arguments present the following issues:
1. Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Luebke
and Morvan teaches or suggests
receive from a requesting DECT device that differs from
the trusted DECT device a request for registration of the
requesting DECT device to the DECT base station; wherein the
request comprises requesting DECT device credentials; [and]
register the requesting DECT device to the DECT base
station if the requesting DECT device credentials match the
registration allowable DECT device credentials,
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as recited in claim 1?
2. Does the Examiner err in concluding it would have been
obvious to combine the teachings and suggestions of Luebke and Morvan in
the manner recited in claim 1, because Morvan teaches away from the
claimed combination?
3. Does the Examiner err in finding the combination of Luebke
and Morvan teaches or suggests “wherein the time window starts after a
predetermined period after a locking of the requesting DECT device to the
DECT base station,” as recited in claim 5?
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of the
Appellants’ arguments that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellants’ conclusions and we adopt as our own: (1) the findings and
reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Final Office Action from which this
appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—24) and (2) the reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief
(Ans. 2—9). We concur with the conclusions reached by the Examiner, and
we highlight the following for emphasis and completeness.
Issue 1
The Examiner finds Luebke’s sensor 10 transmitting a
DATA(profile_information) RF message 424 back to base RF processor 26
of base station 4 teaches or suggests receiving “requesting DECT device
credentials,” as recited in independent claim 1. Final Act. 3 (citing Luebke
Fig. 9A, 1109).
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Appellants argue “Luebke does not teach of a method that includes a
base station that is arranged to register the requesting DECT device to the
DECT base station if the requesting DECT device credentials match the
registration allowable DECT device credentials'1'’ because Luebke does not
teach receiving the “requesting DECT device credentials.” Appeal Br. 11.
More specifically, Appellants argue in Luebke, “[b]oth [the]
attempt_network_discovery message and ‘program sensor’ message do not
include sensor credentials.” Appeal Br. 10 (citing Luebke 1 87).
In response, the Examiner clarifies his interpretation of “credentials”
by noting that “[t]he credentials data described by the claims can be any type
of data, such as type of signal, common frequencies or other info, that is
recognizable by the base station in order for the base station to accept the
sensor.” Ans. 3 (citing Luebke 1 87).
Appellants, thus, argue the Examiner’s interpretation of the term
“credentials,” as recited in claim 1, is unreasonably broad. We find
Appellants’ argument unpersuasive, however, because Appellants fail to
establish the Examiner’s interpretation is not the broadest reasonable
interpretation, consistent with Appellants’ Specification. See In re Am.
Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under a
broadest reasonable interpretation, the words of the claim must be given
their plain meaning unless the plain meaning is inconsistent with the
specification. In reZletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Chef America,
Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The plain
meaning of a term is the ordinary and customary meaning given to the term
by those of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention. In re Suitco
Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1259-60 (Fed. Cir. 2010). The presumption
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that a term is given its ordinary and customary meaning may be rebutted by
Appellants clearly setting forth a different definition of the term in the
specification. In re Morris, 111 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Here, Appellants have not identified an explicit definition in the
Specification, nor established the Examiner’s interpretation of “credentials”
is inconsistent with the Specification. Zletz, 893 F.2d at 321. Furthermore,
Appellants have not proffered sufficient evidence or argument to persuade
us of error in the Examiner’s interpretation. Appeal Br. 12, 14—15.
Accordingly, we find unpersuasive Appellants’ argument that the
Examiner’s interpretation of “credentials” is unreasonably broad.
In view of the Examiner’s interpretation, we agree with the
Examiner’s finding that Luebke’s description of sensor 10 sending a
DATA(profile_information) RF message 424 to the base RF processor 26 of
base station 4 teaches or suggests receiving “requesting DECT device
credentials,” as recited in claim 1. Final Act. Ans. 3 (citing Luebke
1109). In addition, the Examiner finds, and we agree, “to be discovered or
connected, the sensor had to send some type of credential data in order for
the base station to sends [sic] the nwk_connect_confirm (422) message.”
Ans. 3^4 (citing Luebke Tflf 87, 109) (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, we
find Appellants’ arguments unpersuasive.
Appellants’ further argue “[t]he [EJxaminer mixes between
communicating and registering — the mere fact that a DECT device may
communicate with a base station does not mean that the DECT device will
be registered.” Reply Br. 6. As an initial matter, we note Appellants have
not identified an explicit definition in the Specification, nor established the
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Examiner’s interpretation of “register” is inconsistent with the Specification.
Zletz, 893 F.2d at 321.
We disagree, therefore, with Appellants’ contention that the Examiner
confuses communicating and registering. The Examiner does not rely solely
on communication between the base station and sensor. Rather, the
Examiner’s finds Luebke suggests registering the sensor because Luebke’s
base station 4 sends sensor 10 an Acknowledgment SUCCESS) RF message
426 in response to receipt of sensor 10’s DATA(profile_information) RF
message 424, and that this acceptance and acknowledgement of the sensor’s
credentials suggests registration of the sensor to the base station. Final Act.
3; Ans. 3 (citing Luebke Tflf 87, 109, 112, and Fig. 9B) (emphasis omitted).
Accordingly, we also find this argument unpersuasive.
Therefore, Appellants have not persuaded us the combination of
Luebke and Morvan teaches or suggests
receive from a requesting DECT device that differs from the
trusted DECT device a request for registration of the requesting
DECT device to the DECT base station; wherein the request
comprises requesting DECT device credentials; [and]
register the requesting DECT device to the DECT base station if
the requesting DECT device credentials match the registration
allowable DECT device credentials,
as recited in claim 1.
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Issue 2
Appellants argue “while Luebke requires the user of a sensor to attach
the key to the sensor for authentication — Morvan discusses the prior art
disadvantages of user involvement in a authentication process emphasizes
that his method eliminate the need for user interference — and
thus teaches away from Luebke.” Appeal Br. 14.
Appellants have not persuaded us Morvan teaches away from the
claimed system because Appellants have not identified where an ordinarily
skilled artisan “upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from
following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.” In re Gurley, 27
F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Examiner relies on Morvan simply for
Morvan’s teaching that the base station is arranged to prevent a registration
of the requesting DECT device to the DECT base station if the credentials
differ. Final Act. 10. In contrast, Appellants’ argument requires all of the
features of Morvan to be bodily incorporated into the structure of Luebke.
We find this argument unpersuasive because the “test for obviousness
is not whether the features of a secondary reference may be bodily
incorporated into the structure of the primary reference. . . . Rather, the test
is what the combined teachings of the references would have suggested to
those of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA
1981). See also In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“[I]t is
not necessary that the inventions of the references be physically combinable
to render obvious the invention under review”); and In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d
965, 968 (CCPA 1973) (“Combining the teachings of references does not
involve an ability to combine their specific structures”). Rather, “if a
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technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary
skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the
same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is
beyond his or her skill.” KSR Inti Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417
(2007).
Here, Appellants fail to persuade us the Examiner errs in finding
“Morvan features can be used with Luebke art as registration failure
indication and safety protection of the DECT network from other device
intruders” because “[a] DECT device has to have proper credentials in order
to be part of the network.” Final Act. 10 (emphasis omitted). Appellants
provide no persuasive argument or evidence that combining the teachings of
Morvan with the teachings of Luebke was “uniquely challenging or difficult
for one of ordinary skill in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-
Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at
419); see also KSR, 550 at 421 (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person
of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”). Appellants further argue the
Examiner’s rationale amounts to “blunt hindsight.” Reply Br. 7. We find
this argument unpersuasive because the Examiner has articulated a reason
having rational underpinnings for making the proposed combination of prior
art teachings, as discussed above. Appellants fail to demonstrate the
combination is based on impermissible hindsight rather than the Examiner’s
articulated reason.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 1. We also sustain the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejection of
independent claims 13 and 16, which are argued with independent claim 1,
for similar reasons. Appeal Br. 7—8. Dependent claims 2-4, 6—12, 14, and
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15, are not argued separately and fall with their respective independent
claims. Id.
Issue 3
The Examiner relies on Morvan to teach or suggest “wherein the time
window starts after a predetermined period after a locking of the requesting
DECT device to the DECT base station,” as recited in dependent claim 5.
Final Act. 6.
Appellants argue the Examiner errs in the rejection because “in
contrary to the analysis of the Office- TSCAN can not be regarded as a
predefined time period after locking — and the time window of Morvan does
not start after a predetermined period after a locking.” Reply Br. 10.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive because we concur with
the Examiner’s finding that Morvan’s discussion of timers Tscan, Tlock, and
Tattach teach or suggest the disputed features. Final Act. 12—13; Ans. 6—7
(citing, inter alia, Morvan 4: 65 — 5: 6, 5: 31—36, 7:8—15, 7:28-42, Fig. 4).
For this reason, we sustain the rejection of dependent claim 5.
Although Appellants nominally argue claim 17 separately, the argument
presented — “[djuring the period counted by Tlock . . .” (Appeal Br. 17) —
is essentially similar to the argument discussed above for claim 5. We are
not persuaded the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 17 for the same reasons
provided for claim 5. Dependent claim 18 is not argued separately and falls
with claim 5. See Appeal Br. 15—18.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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