Ex Parte Kamikawa et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jan 26, 2017

13874984 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/874,984 05/01/2013 Yoji KAMIKAWA RYM-723-3738 2783
27562 7590 01/30/2017
NIXON & VANDERHYE, P.C.
901 NORTH GLEBE ROAD, 11TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
NAGHDALI, KHALIL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2438
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/30/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOMAIL@nixonvan.com
pair_nixon @ firsttofile. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YOJI KAMIKAWA, TAIYO HARA, MAKOTO TAKANO,
KOJIRO TAGUCHI, HIROKAZU SHIMAOKA, and YUYA ONO
Appeal 2016-002181
Application 13/874,9841
Technology Center 2400
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and
TERRENCE W. MCMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judges.
MCMILLIN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final
rejection of claims 1—18. Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Nintendo Co., Ltd.
App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-002181
Application 13/874,984
REJECTIONS ON APPEAL
Claims 1—18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Abelow (US 2012/0069131 Al; published Mar. 22, 2012)
and Klitsner et al. (US 2007/0155204 Al; published July 5, 2007).
THE CLAIMED INVENTION
The present invention generally relates to an information processing
system, an information processing apparatus, and an information processing
method, and more particularly to information processing for accessing a
server or content provider. Spec. 1. Independent claim 1 is directed to a
system; independent claim 9 is directed to an apparatus; independent claim
10 is directed to a non-transitory computer readable storage medium; and
independent claim 11 is directed to a method. App. Br. 24—27 (Claims
App’x).
Claim 1 recites:
1. An information processing system comprising a
server which provides a specific service and an information
processing apparatus including a predetermined application for
receiving a provision of the specific service, wherein the
information processing apparatus comprises at least one
processor at least configured to:
execute the predetermined application;
acquire a white list from a server controlled by a provider
which provides the specific service; and
when content for the specific service is requested in the
predetermined application, determine, in accordance with the
acquired white list, whether or not it is possible to access a
server which provides the requested content in the
predetermined application.
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ANALYSIS
Claims 1—3, 7—11, and 17
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and “Klitsner does not
disclose that the white list applied to the dongle is used to perform a
determination of ‘whether or not it is possible to access a server which
provides the requested content in the predetermined application,’” as recited
in claim 1. App. Br. 15 (emphasis added). In response, the Examiner finds
Klitsner teaches “the dongle is a predetermined application,” and “the
dongle is recognized by the server . . . then a white list is presented,” and
determining “a particular predetermined application provide [d] a specific
white list” wherein the server allows user navigation “through the set of
sites.” Ans. 2—3. We agree with the Examiner.
As cited by the Examiner, Klitsner discloses:
. . . when a dongle is recognized by the server, the server
applies a white list to the electronic device coupled with the
dongle. The white list includes a set of web sites that the
electronic device is permitted to navigate, for the time that the
dongle is coupled. For instance, a dongle is configured to
provide access to the Nickelodeon® web site hosted by the
Disney corporation. When the dongle for Nickelodeon access is
coupled to a networked personal computer and identifies itself
to the server, through the network, the server provides a white
list to the personal computer based on the identification. In this
case, the white list comprises a set of Nickelodeon sites selected
for the dongle such that the personal computer is permitted
navigation to only sites on the white list.
Klitsner 1176 (emphases added). In other words, Klitsner describes
acquiring an authorized white list for a dongle coupled to a device, the white
list providing a set of server accessible sites, and providing access to that
white list and navigation of the white list when the dongle is recognized. As
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such, Klitsner teaches or suggests determining, in accordance with the white
list for a coupled dongle, whether it is possible to access sites from the
server based on what sites are listed on the white list provided by the server.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence that “determine, in
accordance with the acquired white list, whether or not it is possible to
access a server which provides the requested content in the predetermined
application,” as recited in claim 1, is not taught or otherwise suggested by
Klitsner’s allowed navigation through a white list based on the server
provided white list for a coupled dongle.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of independent claim 1,
as well as the rejection of commensurate independent claims 9-11, and the
rejection of dependent claims 2, 3, 7, 8, and 17, not separately argued. See
App. Br. 16.
Claims 4 and 5
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not
teach or suggest “at least one processor is further configured to execute a
further application different from the predetermined application when it is
determined that it is impossible to access the server which provides the
content, thereby to access the server which provides the content by the
further application,” as recited in claim 4. App. Br. 16—17 (emphasis
added). In response, the Examiner finds Klitsner teaches using another
application that is not the predetermined application. Ans. 3. We agree with
the Examiner.
As cited by the Examiner, Klitsner discloses:
The authentication procedure preferably employs the hidden
information on the dongle such that its activities are
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transparent, and typically require no interaction or information
from the user.
After authentication proceeds at the step 1815, the process 1800
concludes. If, however, at the step 1810, an entry for the
authentication program is not located in the registry of the
electronic device, then the process 1800 transitions to the step
1820, where a browser automatically launches with a remote
location for authentication.
Klitsner || 155—156 (emphases added). In other words, Klitsner describes
authentication for the dongle, resulting in server access and provision of a
white list, by attempting authentication from one location and then
authenticating instead from a different remote location when access is not
possible from the first location. As such, Klitsner teaches or suggests
authenticating from one location, or executing one application, determining
it is impossible to authenticate and thereby to access the server from the one
location, and then authenticating from a second remote location, or
executing a further application different from the first application.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence that “execute a
further application different from the predetermined application when it is
determined that it is impossible to access the server which provides the
content,” as recited by claim 4, is not taught or otherwise suggested by
Klitsner’s authentication of a dongle for access to the server from a remote
location when authentication is impossible from a first location.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 4, as well as
the rejection of claim 5, not separately argued.
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Claim 6
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not
teach or suggest “at least one processor is configured to suspend the
performance of the predetermined application prior to the execution of the
further application,” as recited in claim 6. App. Br. 18. The Examiner
responds Abelow teaches suspending the use of a particular device and
Klitsner teaches disabling functionality. Ans. 4. Appellants argue “Abelow
teaches suspending a particular device not the performance of a
predetermined application,” and “suspending the particular device by
Abelow would not allow for execution of the further application.” App. Br.
18.
We agree with Appellants. Abelow discloses “a device ... is in use . .
. and an identity or a user provides a manual command to suspend . . . said
device . . . whereby ‘suspend’ includes saving said device’s state.” Abelow
1819. In other words, Abelow teaches suspending a device.
Contrary to the Examiner’s findings, Abelow merely teaches
suspending a device and saving the state of a device. Suspending a device
inherently suspends the application running on the device, but fails to
provide for the subsequent execution of another application. As such, the
combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not teach or suggest “at least one
processor is configured to suspend the performance of the predetermined
application prior to the execution of the further application,” as recited in
claim 6 (emphasis added).
Therefore, we do not sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 6.
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Claim 12
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not
teach or suggest “when the predetermined application is executed, send a
request for the white list, the request including an electronic certificate
authorizing the information processing apparatus to access the requested
white list,” as recited in claim 12. App. Br. 18. Specifically, Appellants
argue Klitsner does not use an electronic certificate when authenticating a
dongle for access to content and does not teach a request for a white list
includes an electronic certificate. App. Br. 19.
Appellants’ argument against Klitsner separately from Abelow does
not persuasively rebut the combination made by the Examiner. One cannot
show non-obviousness by attacking references individually, where the
rejections are based on combinations of references. In re Merck & Co., Inc.,
800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986); In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981).
Specifically, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that claim 12 only
introduces an electronic certificate, “and the electronic certificate is
disclosed by Abelow.” Ans. 5. For example, Abelow discloses:
The identity provider determines if the device and/or identity is
authorized and provides the appropriate authentication, which
may also include providing a certificate, pass key, cookie etc.
for subsequent sign-ons by said device and identity.
Abelow 1 1656. In other words, Abelow describes determining if a device is
authorized by utilizing an electronic certificate. Klitsner teaches acquiring a
white list for an authorized dongle coupled to a device, the white list
providing a set of server accessible sites, and providing access to that white
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list and navigation of the white list when the dongle is recognized. See
Klitsner ]f 176.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence that “when the
predetermined application is executed, send a request for the white list, the
request including an electronic certificate authorizing the information
processing apparatus to access the requested white list,” as recited in claim
12 (emphasis added), is not taught or otherwise suggested by the Klitsner’s
coupling of a dongle, and then authorizing the dongle in order to access a
white list, combined with Abelow’s authorizing of a device using an
electronic certificate.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 12.
Claim 13
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not
teach or suggest “when it is determined that it is not possible to access the
server which provides the requested content in the predetermined
application, suspend operation of the predetermined application and activate
another application, different from the predetermined application,” as recited
in claim 13. App. Br. 19—20. In response, the Examiner finds Klitsner
teaches using another application that is not the predetermined application.
Ans. 3; see Ans. 5. The Examiner further finds Abelow teaches suspending
the use of a particular device. Ans. 4. We agree with the Examiner.
As cited by the Examiner, Klitsner teaches authenticating the dongle
from one location, determining it is impossible to authenticate and thereby to
access the server from the one location, and then authenticating from a
second remote location. See Klitsner 1156. Abelow teaches suspending a
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device, which includes suspending the applications on the device as it
suspends the device state. See Abelow 1819.
Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence that: “when it is
determined that it is not possible to access the server which provides the
requested content in the predetermined application,” as recited in claim 13,
is not taught or otherwise suggested by Klitsner’s determining it is
impossible to authenticate from one location; “suspend operation of the
predetermined application,” as recited in claim 13, is not taught or otherwise
suggested by Abelow’s suspending device state; and “activate another
application, different from the predetermined application,” as recited in
claim 13, is not taught or otherwise suggested by Klitsner’s authenticating
from a second remote location when it is impossible to authenticate from a
first location.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 13.
Claims 14—16 and 18
Appellants contend the combination of Abelow and Klitsner does not
teach or suggest “when the other application is activated, the other
application sends a request for the requested content to the server which
provides the requested content, and the other application receives the
requested content,” as recited in claim 14. App. Br. 20—21. The Examiner
responds that Klitsner “discloses where the other application after
authentication through a remote location will have access to content.” Ans.
5. Appellants argue that Klitsner’s automatically launched application “is
launched for authentication of the electronic device” but does not send “a
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request for the requested content to a server which provides the requested
content.” App. Br. 21.
We agree with Appellants. Klitsner teaches acquiring a white list for
a dongle coupled to a device, the white list providing a set of server
accessible sites, and providing access to that white list and navigation of the
white list when the dongle is recognized. See Klitsner 1176. Separately,
Klitsner teaches authenticating the dongle from one location, determining it
is impossible to authenticate and thereby to access the server from the one
location, and then authenticating from a second remote location. See
Klitsner 1156.
Contrary to the Examiner’s findings, while Klitsner teaches providing
access to a server and sites in accordance with a server provided white list
for a dongle, Klitsner’s use of a remote location when it is impossible to
authenticate the dongle from a first location merely teaches a method for
authenticating the dongle. However, Klitsner’s remote location only
provides authentication and does not include requesting the requested
content from the server. As such, the combination of Abelow and Klitsner
does not teach or suggest “when the other application is activated, the other
application sends a request for the requested content to the server which
provides the requested content, and the other application receives the
requested content,” as recited in claim 14 (emphasis added).
Therefore, we do not sustain the § 103(a) rejection of claim 14. Claim
18 contains limitations commensurate to those of claim 14, and claims 15
and 16 are dependent on claim 14. We do not sustain the rejection of claims
15, 16, and 18 for the reasons stated above with regard to claim 14.
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CONCLUSION
The rejection of claims 1—5, 7—13, and 17 is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 6, 14—16, and 18 is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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