Ex Parte Jung et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 3, 2014

11904016 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/904,016 09/24/2007 Edward K.Y. Jung SE1-0077C2-US 2154
80118 7590 12/04/2014
Constellation Law Group, PLLC
P.O. Box 580
Tracyton, WA 98393
EXAMINER
PATEL, NEHA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/04/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte EDWARD K.Y. JUNG, ROYCE A. LEVIEN,
ROBERT W. LORD, MARK A. MALAMUD,
JOHN D. RINALDO, JR., and LOWELL L. WOOD, JR.
________________

Appeal 2012-004559
Application 11/904,0161
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before FRED E. MCKELVEY, JEFFREY T. SMITH, and
DONNA M. PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judges.

PRAISS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Searete, LLC. Br. 5.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the final rejection of
claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 18, 21–26, 28–32, 34–37, 43–45, 48, 50–52,
55, 59, 61–67, 69–72, 75, 77, 79, 81, and 83–92. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6.
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to labeling for medications and
other health-related products. Spec. 1. Independent claims 1, 69, and 90 are
illustrative (bracketed matter and italics added):
1. A method of marking multiple health-related product
components comprising:
[a] providing a substance dosage of a medication or other
health-related product that is designated for a particular patient;
[b] establishing a visual identifier that includes a primary
recognizable symbolic aspect intended to facilitate
identification of the particular patient based on a cross-
reference correlation between the visual identifier and the
particular patient; and
[c] providing a display scheme for incorporating one or
more elements of the visual identifier in association with one or
more additional components for use in connection with
administration of the substance dosage to the particular patient.
69. A marking system for health-related products,
comprising:
[a] a substance dosage of a medication or other the
health-related product that is designated for a particular patient;
[b] a visual identifier that includes a primary
recognizable symbolic aspect intended to facilitate
identification of the particular patient based on a cross-
reference to correlate the particular patient with their respective
visual identifier; and
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[c] one or more additional components for use in
connection with administration of the substance dosage of the
medication or other health-related product, wherein each such
additional component displays one or more elements of the
primary recognizable symbolic aspect of the visual identifier.
90. A kit for facilitating identification of a particular
patient from whom one or more substance dosages are
designated, the kit comprising:
[a] at least one container composed of one or more cover
portions and one or more receptacle portions for receiving at
least some of the one or more substance dosages;
[b] at least one visual identifier integrated as at least one
shape of at least a portion of the one or more cover portions
and/or the one or more receptacle portions; and
[c] at least one cross-reference implementation for
documenting association between the at least one shape and the
at least one particular patient.
The Examiner relied on the following references in rejecting the
appealed subject matter:
Song US 6,227,371 B1 May 8, 2001
Keene US 2005/0038558 A1 Feb. 17, 2005
Khan US 6,888,095 B2 May 3, 2005
Rines US 2005/0147667 A1 July 7, 2005
Ruben US 7,016,752 B1 Mar. 21, 2006
Kimura US 2006/0177637 A1 Aug. 10, 2006
Chalmers US 2006/0254580 A1 Nov. 16, 2006

The Examiner maintains, and Appellants appeal, the following
rejections:
1. Claim 29 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
as indefinite for reciting “substantially” without providing a
standard in the Specification for ascertaining the requisite degree.
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2. Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 18, 21–26, 28–32, 34–37, 43–45,
48, 50–52, 55, 59, 61–67, 69–72, 75, 77, 79, 81, and 83–89 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being unpatentable subject
matter.
3. Claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11, 14–16, 18, 21–23, 28–32, 35–37, 45, 50–
52, 55, 59, 61–67, 69–72, 77, 79, 81, 83, and 86 stand rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Keene.2
4. Claims 43, 84, and 85 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Keene.
5. Claims 24–26 and 75 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Keene in view of Khan.
6. Claim 44 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Keene in view of Ruben.
7. Claims 48, 87, and 88 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Keene in view of Rines.
8. Claim 89 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Keene in view of Song.
9. Claims 90 and 91 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Song in view of Kimura.
10. Claim 92 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Song in view of Kimura and Chalmers.
ISSUES
Did the Examiner err in determining that claim 29 is indefinite? We
decide this issue in the negative.

2 The final rejection does not include a prior art rejection of claim 34.
Br. 48; Ans. 37.
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Did the Examiner err in determining that claims 1, 2, 5–7, 10, 11,
14-16, 18, 21–26, 28–32, 34–37, 43–45, 48, 50–52, 55, 59, 61–67, 69–72,
75, 77, 79, 81, and 83–89 are unpatentable subject matter? We decide this
issue in the negative.
Did the Examiner err in determining that the claims 1–2, 5–7, 10, 11,
14–16, 18, 21–23, 28–32, 35–37, 45, 50–52, 55, 59, 61–67, 69–72, 77, 79,
81, 83, and 86 are anticipated by Keene? We decide this issue in the
negative.
Did the Examiner err in determining that the claims 24–26, 43, 44, 48,
75, 84, 85, and 87–92 are unpatentable over Keene, Khan, Ruben, Rines,
Song, Kimura, and Chalmers? We decide this issue in the negative.
FINDINGS OF FACT
We find that the following enumerated findings are supported by at
least a preponderance of the evidence. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d
1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for
proceedings before the Office).
1. Keene is directed to a system for labeling medication and/or patient
specific prescriptions with both graphic and textual information to
identify a patient specific prescription, including a bar code
system, and information about medications, dosage, amount,
directions for a particular patient are in a data unit. Ans. 8, 19;
Keene ¶¶ 20, 54, 58–59, Fig. 6A.
2. Keene teaches graphical representation of the medication is provided
on the top label and pictograms may be provided on the top and/or
side label representing directions that the medication should be
taken with food. Ans. 8–9; Keene Figs. 6B, 6C.
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3. Keene teaches a schedule describing times and procedures for taking
prescribed medications such as time, which medication, and how
much of the medication, which may be displayed on a monitor or
provided to the patient or caregiver in a printed or electronic
version. The schedule utilizes the same graphical representations
and pictograms found on the label and together with the label may
be used to verify the right medication is taken. Ans. 8–9; Keene
¶¶ 18, 62, Fig. 6C.
4. Keene teaches symbolized pictures or pictograms to depict a method
or location of administration of the medication, such as oral or
nasal, and other directions, such as taken with food. Ans. 16;
Keene ¶ 80.
5. Keene teaches cross-reference information accessible to the patient
and caregiver electronically via a network. Ans. 22; Keene ¶ 52.
6. Keene also teaches primary and secondary symbolic aspects that
visually identify a substance dosage and patient. Ans. 20–21;
Keene ¶¶ 58, 59, Fig. 6A.
7. Khan teaches suitable additives provided in a coating on a solid
substrate, including foodstuffs and pharmaceutical dosage units
such as a tablet or pill, that form a dye or chromophore in situ and
are edible. Ans. 26; Khan col. 2, ll. 5–20.
8. Kimura is directed to a color ID patterned matching label for affixing
to a patient’s drug package to identify the patient. Ans. 31–32;
Kimura ¶ 109, Fig. 11.
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9. Rines teaches the use of three dimensional shapes as identification
that is an integral part of the medication and a supplemental
identifier. Ans. 28–29; Rines ¶ 11.
10. Ruben is directed to visually identifying a particular patient having a
shared affiliation or grouping. Ans. 28; Ruben col. 3, ll. 4–22,
Fig. 4.
11. Chalmers is directed to a display scheme for incorporating a visual
identifier as an edible addition to the health-related substance
including a color. Ans. 33; Chalmers ¶ 46.
12. Song is directed to a display scheme incorporating a visual identifier
as a shape of a container for a substance dosage that is associated
with the medication, dosage prescribed, and frequency of
application. Ans. 30, 31; Song col. 1, ll. 35–50, col. 3, ll. 45–50,
Figs. 1, 2.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The definiteness of a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph,
depends on whether one skilled in the art would understand with reasonable
certainty the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).
35 U.S.C. § 101 defines patent-eligible subject matter as “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof . . . .” The Supreme Court has held that
Section 101, although broad, is subject to important limitations. For
example “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not
patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, “every element of the claimed invention must
be identically shown in a single reference . . . .” In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
832 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the factual inquiry into obviousness requires a
determination of: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the
differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art; (3) the level
of ordinary skill in the art; and (4) secondary considerations, if any. Graham
v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
[A]nalysis [of whether the subject matter of a claim would have
been obvious] need not seek out precise teachings directed to
the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court
can take account of the inferences and creative steps that a
person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007).
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
The Examiner finds that claim 29 is indefinite because the
Specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite
degree required by the claim term “substantially” making it unclear as to
what is meant by “displaying at least a portion of the symbolic display
element that is substantially the same as a corresponding portion of the
related symbolic display element” as recited in claim 29. Ans. 4.
Appellants contend that the rejection is conclusory, without any
analysis or citations. Br. 20. Appellants also include from the Specification
Figure 3 as support for the proposition that “one of ordinary skill in the art
would understand” claim 29. Id. at 21–22. No further explanation is
provided by Appellants as to how Figure 3 depicts or clarifies the term
“substantially” as used in the context of claim 29.
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We are not persuaded by Appellants that one skilled in the art would
clearly understand what is meant by claim 29 in view of the Specification.
The portion of the Specification that Appellants direct us to does not address
the indefiniteness problem. Instead, Figure 3 includes multiple components
of a kit with one or more identifiers on each component. Figure 3,
reproduced below, does not indicate the degree to which the identifiers are
substantially the same as between the tablet and the serum, the serum and
the tester, or the tester and the tablet, each of which include one or more of a
star, a triangle, a rectangle, and an alphanumeric expression.

Figure 3 depicts a schematic illustration of an exemplary implementation
applicable for medical kit components. Spec. 3.

Therefore, Figure 3 provides no guidance as to how to measure the degree to
which the symbolic display elements are substantially the same. See Ans.
34; cf Br. 21 (quoting MPEP 2173.05 “‘to substantially increase the
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efficiency of the compound as a copper extractant’ was definite in view of
the general guidelines contained in the specification.” (citation omitted)).
The rejection of claim 29 based on § 112, second paragraph, is
affirmed.
Patentable Subject Matter
The Examiner finds that the broadest reasonable interpretation of the
steps in independent claim 1 is “mentally deciding what symbol to use” to
mark a health-related product component. Ans. 5. The Examiner further
finds that the steps “can be just dictating or setting up policy related to
identifying [a] person and medication” and a “hand gesture.” Id. at 34–35.
The Examiner also finds the marking system of independent claim 69 does
not add any physical structure or component and the broadest reasonable
interpretation “can be just [an] idea of color co-ordination . . . .” Id. at 35;
see id. at 7.
Appellants do not dispute the Examiner’s finding of the broadest
reasonable interpretation of independent claims 1 and 69. Appellants argue
that the Examiner has not made out a prima facie case of unpatentability
under Section 101 because the Examiner applied the “overruled machine-or-
transformation test” of In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Br.
26). Appellants further argue that “the recitations of the claims are not
abstract.” Id. at 29.
The Supreme Court has not held that the machine-or-transformation
test is not appropriate. Rather, the Court explained that it is “not the sole test
for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’” Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010). “[T]he machine-or-transformation
test is a useful and important clue, an investigative tool, for determining
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whether some claimed inventions are processes under § 101.” Id.
Appellants do not dispute that the rejected claims fail to meet the machine-
or-transformation test.
Appellants acknowledge that to be patentable subject matter under
Section 101, the claimed subject matter must not be an abstract idea. Br. 28.
See also, Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S.Ct. at 1293 (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). Appellants’ conclusory statement that
“the recitations of the claims are not abstract” (Br. 29) followed by recitation
of claims 1 and 69 each concluding with “are not abstract” (id. at 29, 30)
does not identify for the Board any alleged error in the Examiner’s rejection.
See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t has long been the
Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the
examiner’s rejections.” (citing Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI
2010) (precedential))). See also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (first sentence).
In Alice Corp. Pty, Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355
(2014), the Supreme Court recently addressed the process for analyzing
claims to determine whether claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter. In Alice, the Supreme Court applied the framework set forth
previously in Mayo, “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of these concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The first step in
the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one
of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If they are directed to a patent
ineligible concept, the second step in the analysis is to consider the elements
of the claims “individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine
whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the
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claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at
1291, 1297). In other words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive
concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent
upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). The machine-or-transformation test “can provide
a ‘useful clue’ in the second step of the Alice framework . . . .”
Ultramercial, Inc. v. HULU, LLC, No. 2014-1544, slip op. at 12 (Fed. Cir.
Nov. 14, 2014) (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). The “prohibition against
patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the
use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding
‘insignificant post solution activity.’” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3230 (quoting
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191–92 (1981)).
On this record, the claims have been demonstrated to be abstract ideas
or naturally occurring products. Appellants have not directed us to any
inventive concept, let alone one that amounts to more than the patent
ineligible concept identified by the Examiner. Therefore we do not find
error in the Examiner’s rejection of the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The rejection based on § 101 is affirmed.
If prosecution is continued, the Examiner may wish to consider
whether the preamble of claim 90 reciting “[a] kit for facilitating
identification of a particular patient” amounts to an inventive concept under
the Alice framework.
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Anticipation
Appellants do not separately argue each claim rejected under Section
102 is patentable. Br. 39, 75. In accordance with 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(vii), claims that are not separately argued will stand or fall
together.
The Examiner finds that each and every element set forth in claim 1
and its dependent claims 6, 21, 77, 79, and 81 is disclosed in Keene. FF1–3;
Ans. 8–10, 12.
The Examiner finds that Keene teaches marking a container with top
and side labels that provide the patient or caregiver with graphic and textual
information, including non-alphanumeric symbolic aspects, and the graphic
information represents the medication. Ans. 8, 10, 21; Keene ¶¶ 58, 59, Fig.
6A.
The Examiner also finds that Keene teaches a data unit uses
information for a particular patient such as all medications, dosage, amount,
directions, and time and provides a schedule to display administration
information. Ans. 8–9; Keene ¶¶ 54, 62, Figs. 6B, 6C.
The Examiner also finds that Keene’s graphic information includes
recognizable symbolic aspects that are primary, secondary, and tertiary.
Ans. 20–22; Keene ¶¶ 58, 59, Figs. 6A, 6B.
Therefore, the Examiner has provided sufficient findings based on the
cited reference to identify how claims 1, 6, 21, 77, 79, and 81 are anticipated
by Keene.
The Examiner also finds that each and every element set forth in claim
69 is disclosed in Keene. FF1–4; Ans. 15–16.
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The Examiner finds that Keene teaches a system of marking a
container with top and side labels with both graphic and textual information
where the graphical representation of the medication on the side labels can
be identical to the top label and pictograms indicating the method of
administration and frequency can be added. Ans. 15–16; Keene ¶¶ 58, 59,
80, Fig. 6A.
Therefore, the Examiner has provided sufficient findings based on the
cited reference to identify how claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79, and 81 are
anticipated by Keene.
Appellants provide repeated quotations of claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79,
and 81 (Br. 34, 36, 37, 41, 43, 45, 47, 50, 55, 58, 59, 69–70, 72), repeated
quotations of the Examiner’s entire rejections of claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79,
and 81 (id. at 33–34, 41, 45, 50, 54, 58, 68–69), and reprint figures and
paragraphs of Keene identified in the Examiner’s rejections (id. at 35–37,
38, 41–42, 45–46, 51–52, 55, 59, 70–74). However, Appellants have failed
to explain how the reference, including the cited portions, does not meet the
claimed invention. Appellants assert that they have “shown by direct
quotations that [Claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79, 81] and the cited portions of
Keene are very different on their faces.” Id. at 39, 43, 47, 52, 56, 60, 74. On
this basis, Appellants assert that claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79, and 81 are
“prima facie patentable over the pinpoint-cited portions of Keene.” Id. at 39,
43, 47, 53, 56, 60, 75.
Rather than addressing the disclosures in Keene relied upon by the
Examiner, Appellants assert that they have “shown by direct quotations that
[Claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79, and 81] and the cited portions of Keene are very
different on their faces.” Id. at 39, 43, 47, 52, 56, 60, 74. Appellants’
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arguments are not persuasive because they fail to establish error in the
findings on which the Examiner based anticipation over the Keene reference.
Whether claims 1, 6, 21, 69, 77, 79, and 81 read on Keene is precisely the
substantive basis upon which the Examiner rejected Appellants’ claims.
Appellants have failed to articulate what gaps, in fact, exist between, for
example, (1) the emphasized “symbolic aspect” and “identification of the
particular patient based on a cross-reference correlation” of claim 1 (id. at 34
(emphasis omitted)) and (2) the Keene reference. Appellants quote the
Examiner’s full rejection (Br. 33–34) without further explanation of how the
anticipation rejection over Keene may be deficient. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d
at 1363 (“whether there are gaps between the prior art and the rejected
claims is a substantive issue, and [appellant’s] assertion that the examiner
must ‘bridg[e] the facial differences’ between the claims and the prior art
begs the substantive question of whether there are facial differences to be
bridged.”). A prior art reference does not have to satisfy an ipsissimis verbis
test to disclose a claimed element, therefore Appellants’ demand for such an
exacting match is not persuasive of error. See In re Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331,
1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
In the absence of a more detailed explanation, we are not convinced of
error on the part of the Examiner in concluding the claimed invention would
have been anticipated by Keene. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365.
The rejection based on anticipation over Keene is affirmed.
Obviousness
Appellants do not separately argue claims 24–26, 43, 44, 48, 75, 87–
89, 91, and 92 rejected under Section 103 are patentable. Br. 39, 75, 81. In
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accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii), these claims will stand or fall
together with claims 84, 85, and 90 separately argued by Appellants.
We have reviewed the Final Office Action and Answer and find the
Examiner provided detailed facts and reasons in support of the obviousness
determination for each of the rejected claims. See Final 21–32; Ans. 23–33.
We have considered each of Appellants’ arguments in support of
patentability, but are not convinced of any error on the part of the Examiner
for the reasons stated in the Answer (Ans. 23–33). In our view, the
Examiner has not relied on unsupported, conclusory statements, but has
more than adequately explained the reason to modify Keene (claims 84, 85,
see, e.g., Ans. 24–26) and combine Song and Kimura (claim 90, see, e.g.,
Ans. 32). Appellants have not explained, with any degree of specificity,
why the Examiner’s proposed motivation to modify Keene and combine
Song and Kimura is not supported by the evidence of record. Nor have
Appellants provided a cogent technical explanation why teachings of the
Song and Kimura references cannot be combined. Appellants’ assertion that
claim limitations are not expressly “recited” in a reference (see, e.g., Br. 78)
and argument that absent an express recitation in the prior art additional
evidence the claims are prima facie patentable over the secondary reference
(see, e.g., Br. 79–80) does not indicate lack of prima facie obviousness, but,
rather, “begs the substantive question of whether there are facial differences
to be bridged.” See In re Jung, 637 F.3d at 1363.
In the absence of a technical explanation distinguishing the claimed
invention over corresponding prior art as identified by the Examiner and
addressing the Examiner’s reason for combining the references, Appellants
have not shown any error on the part of the Examiner in concluding the
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claimed invention would have been obvious within the meaning of
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See id. at 1365 (“[I]t has long been the Board’s practice
to require an applicant to identify the alleged error in the examiner’s
rejections[.]” (citing Ex Parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential) (“The panel then reviews the obviousness rejection for error
based upon the issues identified by appellant, and in light of the arguments
and evidence produced thereon.”)).
In sum, upon thorough consideration of the appeal, and for the reasons
expressed in the Answer and above, we find a preponderance of the evidence
favors the Examiner’s conclusion of unpatentability based on obviousness.
Therefore, we affirm the Examiner’s final rejection of the claims under §
103.
The obviousness rejections are affirmed.
DECISION
The decisions of the Examiner to finally reject the pending claims
under §§ 112, 101, 102, and 103 are affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(v).
ORDER
AFFIRMED

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