Ex Parte Jagota et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

May 31, 2013

11460027 (P.T.A.B. May. 31, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ANURAG JAGOTA and ROY J. DAVIS
____________________

Appeal 2011-001232
Application 11/460,0271
Technology Center 2800
____________________

Before THU A. DANG, JAMES R. HUGHES, and
GREGORY J. GONSALVES, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Application filed July 26, 2006. The real party in interest is Lineage Power
Corporation. (App. Br. 3.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Examiner’s
final decision rejecting claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, 21, 26,
and 28-31 which are all the claims remaining in the application. Claims 3, 6,
10, 13, 17, 20, 22-25, and 27 have been canceled. (App. Br. 3.) We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
Appellants’ Invention
Appellants’ invention is directed to “power conversion and, more
specifically, to a site-adaptive current manager, a method of managing a site-
adaptive current and a DC power plant employing the manager or the
method.” (Spec. 1, ¶ [0001].)2
Representative Claim
Independent claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations
italicized, further illustrates the invention:
1. A site-adaptive current manager for use with a
rectifier system having a plurality of rectifiers, said manager
comprising:
a current limit programmer configured to set an AC input
current limit for said plurality of rectifiers corresponding to a
site-restricted current capability of an AC supply for said
rectifier system;
an input current sensor coupled to said current limit
programmer and configured to determine an AC input current

2 We refer to Appellants’ Specification (“Spec.”); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”)
filed August 18, 2010, and Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed March 23, 2010.
We also refer to the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed July 21, 2010.
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provided by said AC supply and shared by said multiple
rectifiers; and
a rectifier current coordinator coupled to said input
current sensor and configured to restrict said AC input current
based on said AC input current limit.
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 5, 7-9, 12, 14, 26, 28, 29, and
31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Mapham (U.S.
Patent No. 3,590,323, issued June 29, 1971) and Harrington (U.S. Pat. Appl.
Pub. No. 2005/0078024 A1, published Apr. 14, 2005).
2. The Examiner rejects claims 4 and 11 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Mapham, Harrington, and Plow (U.S. Patent No.
5,815,389, issued Sep. 29, 1998).
3. The Examiner rejects claims 15, 16, 19, 21, and 30 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Mapham, Harrington, and
Rogowsky (U.S. Patent No. 4,459,492, issued July 10, 1984).
4. The Examiner rejects claim 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Mapham, Harrington, Rogowsky, and Plow.

ISSUES
Based on our review of the administrative record, Appellants’
contentions, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the following
issues are before us:
1. Under § 103, did the Examiner err in finding that the cited
combination of references collectively, would have taught or suggested “an
input current sensor coupled to said current limit programmer and
configured to determine an AC input current provided by said AC supply
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and shared by said multiple rectifiers,” within the meaning of claim 1 and
commensurate limitation of claims 8 and 15?
2. Under § 103, did the Examiner err in finding that the cited
combination of references collectively would have taught or suggested “a
current limit programmer configured to set an AC input current limit for said
plurality of rectifiers corresponding to a site-restricted current capability of
an AC supply for said rectifier system,” within the meaning of claim 1 and
commensurate limitation of claims 8 and 15?
3. Under § 103, did the Examiner err in combining the cited references?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Answer and the Final Office
Action as our own.

ANALYSIS
Based on Appellants’ arguments, we select independent claim 1 as
representative of Appellants’ arguments and groupings with respect to
claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Input Current Sensor
Appellants contend, inter alia, that “[t]he Examiner fails to even
assert, however, that the current sensing transformer 16 of Mapham
determines ‘an AC input current provided by said AC supply and shared by
said multiple rectifiers’ as recited in independent Claim 1. . . . Thus, the
Examiner fails to even assert that the applied combination teaches each and
every element of Claim 1.” (App. Br. 8: see Reply Br. 2.)
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The Examiner relied on Mapham to teach or suggest the limitation at
issue. (Ans. 4.) We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings.
The language argued by Appellants (configured to determine . . .) is
functional and, as such, is a statement of intended use, which does not
further distinguish the claimed apparatus from the prior art.3 Therefore, the
functional language will not be given patentable weight.
Assuming arguendo that the functional language is ascribed
patentable weight, we agree with the Examiner, that Mapham discloses the
“input current sensor,” that determines an AC input current provided by an
AC supply (current transformers 47a-c) as claimed. (Ans. 10-11.)
Appellants have not argued, much less shown, that the cited references are
not capable of performing the recited function and Appellants’ arguments
(supra) are ineffective in rebutting the Examiner’s prima facie case.
Therefore, Appellants’ arguments have not established that the functional
language distinguishes the present limitation from the prior art. Independent
claims 8 and 15 recite commensurate limitations.
With particular regard to claim 15, Appellants contend:
The current transformers 47a-c of Mapham, however, are not
“coupled to said current limit programmer” as recited in Claim
15. On the contrary, as asserted by the Examiner, Mapham
does not even teach a current limit programmer. (See page 7 of

3 While features of an apparatus may be recited either structurally or
functionally, claims directed to an apparatus must be distinguished from the
prior art in terms of structure rather than function. In re Schreiber, 128 F.3d
1473, 1477-78, (Fed. Cir. 1997) (The absence of a disclosure in a prior art
reference relating to function did not defeat the Board’s finding of
anticipation of claimed apparatus because the limitations at issue were found
to be inherent in the prior art reference).

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the Final Rejection.) Thus, Mapham fails to disclose each
element of Claim 15 upon which it is relied.
(App. Br. 14.)
The Examiner found that Harrington describes the digital controller
14 that is coupled to a current sense circuit 18. (Ans. 5; Harrington, Fig. 1.)
Mapham describes input current sensors (current transformers) connected to
a peak limiter/rectifier. (Mapham, Fig. 3.) As noted by the Examiner, it
would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to substitute the peak
limiter/rectifier current coordinator described in Mapham, with a digital
controller described in Harrington. (Ans. 5.) Therefore, we find that the
cited references collectively, would have taught or suggested the present
limitation as recited in claim 15.
Based on this record, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in
finding that the cited references, collectively would have taught or suggested
“input current sensor” within the meaning of independent claims 1, 8, and
15.
Current Limit Programmer
Appellants contend, inter alia:
Harrington as applied, however, provides no teaching or
suggestion of setting an AC input current limit that corresponds
to a site-restricted current capability. On the contrary, the
digital controller 14 of Harrington appears to control an
individual circuit based on a current limit for that individual
circuit. (See paragraph 9 and 33 (e.g., turn off switch 16)).
Since a site-restricted current capability does not appear to
have even been considered in Harrington, the Examiner
appears to be improperly relying on hindsight analysis. Such
hindsight is, of course, impermissible. . . . (See MPEP
§ 2141.01 § III.) [.]

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(App. Br. 9) (emphasis added.)
The Examiner found that Harrington describes a digital controller 14,
(current limit programmer) that sets an input current for a plurality of
rectifiers. (Ans. 4, 11-12.) We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s
findings. It is our view that the Examiner relied on Harrington to teach that
a current limit programmer was well known at the time of Appellants’
invention. We further agree with the Examiner that “there is no reason to
ascertain based on the current claim language that a current limit for an
individual circuit is different than a site-restricted current capability because
there is no limitation in the claim that requires a ‘site’ to contain multiple of
the aforementioned ‘individual circuits’”. (Ans. 11.)
Appellants contend that the Examiner’s claim construction was
unreasonably broad and was not consistent with the specification. (Reply
Br. 2-3.) However, we will not endeavor to read limitations from the
Specification into the claims. “Though understanding the claim language
may be aided by explanations contained in the written description, it is
important not to import into a claim limitations that are not part of the claim.
For example, a particular embodiment appearing in the written description
may not be read into a claim when the claim language is broader than the
embodiment.” SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises, Inc., 358 F.3d
870, 875, (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This
reasoning is applicable in the present case.
Regarding Appellants’ hindsight argument, it is our view that an
artisan possessing common sense and creativity at the time of the invention
would have been familiar with a variety of methods for current limiting
systems, such as those methods taught or suggested by the collective
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teachings of Mapham and Harrington. While we are fully aware that
hindsight bias often plagues determinations of obviousness, Graham v. John
Deere Co.of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966), we are also mindful that the
Supreme Court has clearly stated that the “combination of familiar elements
according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more
than yield predictable results.” KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398, 401 (2007) (citation omitted).
This reasoning is applicable here. Thus, we find unavailing
Appellants’ contention that the Examiner has relied on impermissible
hindsight reconstruction. (App. Br. 9.).
Based on this record, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in
finding that the cited references would have taught or suggested the “current
limit programmer” as recited in claims 1, 8, and 15.
Combinability
Appellants contend, inter alia:
The Examiner, however, has failed to show that the problem
addressed in the present specification was known in the field of
endeavor at the time of the invention as represented by Mapham
and Harrington. (See, for example, paragraphs 4 and 16 of the
present specification.) Neither Mapham nor Harrington as
applied appear to address the problem of the prevailing AC
input current conditions for a particular site regardless of the
rated output current capability of individual rectifiers.
(App. Br. 9: See App. Br. 15.)
We note that prior art need not be in the same field of endeavor to be
applicable as prior art under § 103. KSR, 550 U.S. at 411 (“When a work is
available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces
can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one.”).
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Furthermore, for a prima facie case of obviousness to be established,
the reference need not recognize the problem solved by the Appellants. See
In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1996); In re Beattie, 974 F.2d
1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Ex parte Obiaya, 227 USPQ 58, 60 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1985) (“The fact that appellant has recognized another
advantage which would flow naturally from following the suggestion of the
prior art cannot be the basis for patentability when the differences would
otherwise be obvious” (citations omitted).). This reasoning is applicable in
the present case.
Based on this record, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in
rejecting independent claims 1, 8, and 15. Accordingly, we affirm the
Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 8, and 15, and associated dependent
claims 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 21, 26, and 28-31 which are not
argued with particularity. (App. Br. 16-17.)

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1, 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12, 14-16, 18, 19, 21, 26, and 28-31 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-9, 11, 12,
14-16, 18, 19, 21, 26, and 28-31 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

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AFFIRMED
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