Ex Parte Itani

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Feb 5, 2018

13844454 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 5, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/844,454 03/15/2013 Majed Itani 1301-032U 5718
29973 7590 02/07/2018
CRGO LAW
ATTN: STEVEN M. GREENBERG, ESQ.
7900 Glades Road
SUITE 520
BOCA RATON, EL 33434
EXAMINER
PADOT, TIMOTHY
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3683
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
02/07/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@crgolaw.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MAJED ITANI
Appeal 2016-004923
Application 13/844,4541
Technology Center 3600
Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
ROBERT J. SILVERMAN, Administrative Patent Judges.
WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1-15. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is SugarCRM, Inc.
(Appeal Br. 2.)
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Application 13/844,454
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s “invention relates to customer relationship management
(CRM) data processing and more particularly to environmentally influenced
operation of CRM data processing.” (Spec. ^ 2.)
Claims 1, 6, and 11 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative. It recites:
1. A method for time and location aware customer
relationship management (CRM), the method comprising:
obtaining a location for a mobile computing device;
forwarding the location to a CRM application; and,
responsive to identifying a contact in the CRM application
that is proximate to the obtained location, retrieving a related
data record for the contact from the CRM application and
displaying the related record in the mobile computing device in
a user interface for the CRM application.
REJECTIONS
Claims 1-15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
Claims 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as anticipated by Busch (US 2008/0248815 Al, pub. Oct. 9, 2008).
Claims 4, 9, and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of
Busch and Blants (US 6,732,080 Bl, iss. May 4, 2004).
ANALYSIS
The §101 rejection
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CIS Bank
Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). Alice applies a two-step framework, earlier set
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out in Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66
(2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible
applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Under the two-step framework, it must first be determined if “the
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Id. If the claims
are determined to be directed to a patent-ineligible concept, then the second
step of the framework is applied to determine if “the elements of the
claim . . . contain[] an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2357 (citing
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 79).
Under step one of the Alice framework, we “look at the ‘focus of the
claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s ‘character as a
whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC
v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Elec.
Power Grp., LLCv. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
Thus, although we consider the claim as a whole, the “directed to” inquiry
focuses on the claim’s “character as a whole.”
With regard to step one, the Examiner determines that “the claims are
directed to the abstract idea of providing location-based services to users,
which is a fundamental economic practice (widely utilized in targeted
marketing, mobile advertising, location-based advertising, and the like).”
(Final Action 5.)
Appellant does not argue that the Examiner erred in this
determination. (See Appeal Br. 4-12.) Therefore, we are not persuaded that
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the Examiner erred in determining that the claims are directed to an abstract
idea.
Step two of the Alice framework has been described “as a search for
an ‘ “inventive concept” ’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that
is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73).
Appellant argues that
Appellants’ [sic] invention presents the innovative concept of
time and location aware location based services for CRM. This
innovative concept is achieved through the identification of a
CRM application contact that is proximate to an obtained
location for a mobile computing device, the retrieval of a related
data record for the contact from the CRM application and the
display of the related data record in the mobile computing device.
(Appeal Br. 11.) Appellant further argues that
the innovative concept of time and location aware CRM of
Applicants’ [sic] claims are achieved by the acquisition of time
and location data in a mobile device and the corresponding
identification of a contact in a CRM application so that a record
related to the contact is retrieved in the CRM application and
thereafter displayed in the mobile device. Accordingly, in
contrast to the claims of Internet Patents [Internet Patents Corp.
v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2015)],
Appellants’ [sic] claim language indicates how the innovative
concept is achieved, and therefore, are [sic] statutory under the
law.
{Id. 12.) We do not find Appellant’s arguments persuasive of error.
“An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of
abstraction.” Apple Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Appellant’s argument that the “claim language indicates how the
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innovative concept is achieved” (Appeal Br. 12) is, at its core, an argument
regarding the level of abstraction at which the abstract idea is expressed.
For example, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, the Federal Circuit
referred to the district court’s determination “that the abstract idea at the
heart of the [patent-in-suit] was ‘that one can use [an] advertisement as an
exchange or currency.’” Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714
(Fed. Cir. 2014). Additionally, the Federal Circuit found
that claim 1 includes eleven steps for displaying an
advertisement in exchange for access to copyrighted media. . . .
[T]he steps include: (1) receiving copyrighted media from a
content provider; (2) selecting an ad after consulting an activity
log to determine whether the ad has been played less than a
certain number of times; (3) offering the media for sale on the
Internet; (4) restricting public access to the media; (5) offering
the media to the consumer in exchange for watching the selected
ad; (6) receiving a request to view the ad from the consumer;
(7) facilitating display of the ad; (8) allowing the consumer
access to the media; (9) allowing the consumer access to the
media if the ad is interactive; (10) updating the activity log; and
(11) receiving payment from the sponsor of the ad.
Id. at 714-15. Even though one may argue that the claim describes “how”
the abstract idea is achieved, “[t]his ordered combination of steps recites an
abstraction —an idea, having no particular concrete or tangible form.” Id.
at 715. “Although certain additional limitations, such as consulting an
activity log, add a degree of particularity, the concept embodied by the
majority of the limitations describes only the abstract idea of showing an
advertisement before delivering free content.” Id. In short, the combination
of claim elements (1-11) did not amount to significantly more than the
ineligible concept itself. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
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Internet Patents is not to the contrary. In Internet Patents, the Federal
Circuit “agree[d] with the district court that the character of the claimed
invention is an abstract idea: the idea of retaining information in the
navigation of online forms.” Internet Patents, 790 F.3d at 1348. Claim 1 of
Internet Patents recites “providing an intelligent user interface to an online
application comprising the steps of: furnishing a plurality of icons on a web
page,” “displaying said dynamically generated online application form . . .
wherein said dynamically generated online application form set comprises a
state determined by at least one user input; and maintaining said state upon
the activation of another of said icons.” Id. at 1344^15. Again, even though
one may argue that the claim describes “how” the abstract idea is achieved,
the ordered combination did not amount to significantly more than the
ineligible concept itself and the Federal Circuit affirmed that the claim “is
not directed to patent-eligible subject matter.” Id. at 1348.
In view of the above, even if one considered claim 1 to “indicate[]
how the innovative concept is achieved” (Appeal Br. 12), we are not
persuaded that this would result in a determination that the claim recites
patent-eligible subject matter.
Additionally, the Specification discloses that the invention can be
implemented using generic computer components, e.g., the CRM application
may implemented on “a processor of a general purpose computer.” (See,
e.g., Spec. ^ 30.) Thus, the introduction into the claims of a generic mobile
computing device and a “CRM application,” i.e., instructions to a generic
computer to implement the abstract idea, does not alter the analysis at step
two.
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[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.
Stating an abstract idea “while adding the words ‘apply it’ ” is
not enough for patent eligibility. Nor is limiting the use of an
abstract idea “ ‘to a particular technological environment.’ ”
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words “apply it with a
computer” simply combines those two steps, with the same
deficient result. Thus, if a patent’s recitation of a computer
amounts to a mere instruction to “implemen[t]” an abstract idea
“on ... a computer,” that addition cannot impart patent
eligibility. This conclusion accords with the preemption concern
that undergirds our §101 jurisprudence. Given the ubiquity of
computers, wholly generic computer implementation is not
generally the sort of “additional featur[e]” that provides any
“practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (citations omitted). “[T]he relevant question is
whether the claims here do more than simply instruct the practitioner to
implement the abstract idea ... on a generic computer.” Id. at 2359. They
do not.
Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computing devices at each step is purely conventional. Obtaining,
transmitting/forwarding, analyzing/retrieving related records, and displaying
data are basic computer functions. In short, each step does no more than
require generic computing devices to perform generic computer functions.
Considered as an ordered combination, the computing devices of
Appellant’s method add nothing that is not already present when the steps
are considered separately. The claims do not, for example, purport to
improve the functioning of the computing devices themselves. Nor do they
effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. Instead,
the claims at issue amount to nothing significantly more than an instruction
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to apply the abstract idea using generic computing devices. That is not
enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id. at
2360.
Additionally, Appellant does not persuasively argue why the “CRM
application” recited in the claims is more than “simply instruct[ing] the
practitioner to implement the abstract idea with routine, conventional
[programming] activity.” See Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d at 715.
Nor are we persuaded that the claims are analogous to those in DDR
Holdings, LLCv. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). {See
Appeal Br. 11.) Unlike the present claims, the claims in DDR Holdings
“specify how interactions with the Internet are manipulated to yield a desired
result — a result that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of
events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.'''’ DDR Holdings,
773F.3datl258 (emphasis added).
Therefore, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting
claim 1 under § 101. Claims 2-15 are not separately argued and fall with
claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The ft 102(b) rejection
With regard to the § 102(b) rejection, Appellant argues claims 1-3, 5-
8, 10-13, and 15 together. {See Appeal Br. 12-17.) We select claim 1 as
representative. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
“[A]n invention is anticipated if the same device, including all the
claim limitations, is shown in a single prior art reference.” Richardson v.
Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Busch discloses “[mjethods and systems that record the location of a
user and transmit targeted content to a user based upon their current and past
location information.” (Busch, Abstract.) Busch further discloses:
The mobile device collects location information over time and
either sends the raw data at a later time; or, the data is processed
into a list of traveled routes and visited locations. Thus, the
mobile device does not necessarily send current location
information. A user profile (or information to identify a user
profile stored on a remote server) may also be transmitted to
associate the location information with a particular user. Then,
a data set is returned containing location based content tailored
to the interests or current needs of the user.
(Busch T| 341.)
Appellant argues that “Busch lacks the teaching of locating a
customer proximate to the location determined for a mobile device.”
(Appeal Br. 13.) Claim 1, however, does not recite “locating a customer
proximate to the location determined for a mobile device.” (See claim 1.)
Claim 1 recites “obtaining a location for a mobile computing device.”
Claim 1 also recites “responsive to identifying a contact in the CRM
application that is proximate to the obtained location, retrieving a related
data record . . . .” Because Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with
the scope of the claim, we do not find the argument persuasive of error.
Nonetheless, we note that Busch discloses “a remote server
periodically receives and stores location information associated with a
mobile device, such as a mobile phone. The information is sent from the
mobile device . . . .” (Busch 335; see also Final Action 7.) Busch further
discloses that “the location information of the mobile device is sent to the
system and compared with information describing the perimeters of business
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locations.” (Busch ^ 338; see also Final Action 7.) Busch also discloses
that “targeted content (or advertisements) are sent to the user of the mobile
device and displayed on the screen of the mobile device. The targeted
content is based on various factors, including . . . any business within a
radius or perimeter of the user.” (Busch ^ 368; see also Answer 7.)
In other words, Busch discloses a remote server obtaining a location
for a mobile device, sending/forwarding that information to a system,
comparing that location information with information describing perimeters
of business locations/contacts, and, for businesses/contacts identified as
within a radius or perimeter of the user, sending targeted content/data
records based on the businesses/contacts to the mobile device for display.
Thus, Busch teaches sending targeted content based on identifying a
business/contact proximate the location obtained for the user/mobile device.
Appellant also argues that the “Examiner’s remarks had been directed
to the equivalence of the ‘user profile’ of paragraph [0341] to the ‘contact’
of claim 1.” (Appeal Br. 14.) And, Appellant further argues, “the user
profile of paragraph [0341] is not a contact in a CRM application.” (Id.,
emphasis omitted; see also id. at 16-17.) We do not find this argument
persuasive of error.
[E]ven assuming arguendo that Busch’s user profile is not
interpreted as a contact, the claim limitation is nevertheless met
because Busch also teaches a contact via identification of a [sic]
another type of contact (i.e., other than within a user profile) by
the disclosed features directed to retrieving/identifying the name
of a business associated with the location of the user’s mobile
device . . . and retrieving a data record for the contact.
(Answer 7, emphasis omitted.)
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In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1 under § 102(b). Claims 2, 3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 are not
separately argued and fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
The § 103(a) rejection
Appellant argues that the rejection of dependent claims 4, 9, and 14
should not be sustained “for the reasons set forth in connection with
claims 1, 6, and 11.” (Appeal Br. 19.)
For the reasons discussed above, we are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 6, and 11 and, thus, we are also not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 4, 9, and 14 which
depend from claims 1, 6, and 11, respectively.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-15 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is
affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 4, 9, and 14 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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