Ex Parte Isayeva et al

Patent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 16, 2017

13601130 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 16, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/601,130 08/31/2012 Rimma Isayeva 83257436 3040 28395 7590 03/20/2017 RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER 1000 TOWN CENTER CASS, JEAN PAUL 22ND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3669 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/20/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing @brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte RIMMA ISAYEVA, WILLIAM REYNOLDS, and JONATHAN ANDREW BUTCHER Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 Technology Center 3600 Before WILLIAM A. CAPP, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the final rejection of claims 1—14. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We REVERSE. Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 THE INVENTION Appellants’ invention relates to control systems for an electric machine in an electric vehicle. Spec. 11. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A vehicle comprising: an electric machine; and at least one controller configured to, in response to a disabling of the electric machine during a drive cycle, (i) reset duty cycle commands for the electric machine and (ii) re-enable the electric machine during the drive cycle within a predefined time period from the disabling of the electric machine. THE REJECTIONS The Examiner relies upon the following as evidence in support of the rejections: Lansberry US 5,627,758 May 6, 1997 Kizer US 2004/0075462 A1 Apr. 22, 2004 Wilton US 6,897,629 B2 May 24, 2005 Nada US 6,898,494 B2 May 24, 2005 Severinsky US 7,520,353 B2 Apr. 21,2009 Ishikawa JP 2010-200540 A Sept. 9, 2010 Sum KR 2012061434 A June 13, 2012 The following rejections are before us for review: 1. Claims 1 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Nada. 2. Claims 6 and 8 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Lansberry 3. Claims 1, 2, 5, 7, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kizer and Lansberry. 4. Claim 3 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kizer, Lansberry, and Wilton. 2 Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 5. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kizer, Lansberry, and Severinsky. 6. Claims 9 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lansberry and Sum. 7. Claims 9 and 13 are also rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lansberry and Nada. 8. Claims 10 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lansberry and Ishikawa. 3. Claims 1, 6, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Nada and Kizer. OPINION Construction of “Electric Machine ” All of the various rejections are predicated on findings by the Examiner that Nada and Lansberry each disclose an “electric machine” that is disabled and then re-enabled during a drive cycle. Final Action 11, 12, 14, 18, 19, 27,30, and 35. Appellants construe “electric machine” as a motor/generator capable of delivering power or generating electric power in a hybrid-electric or battery-electric vehicle. Appeal Br. 7. Appellants contend that “electric machine” is a term of art in the field of battery powered and hybrid vehicles. Id. The Examiner states that, under the broadest reasonable construction, an “electric machine” is “any machine that is electric in nature.” Ans. 8. The Examiner finds that Appellants have failed to specifically define the term “electric machine” in their Specification in a manner that would support a narrower construction. Id. 3 Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 In reply, Appellants direct our attention to four passages in the Specification that refer to “electric machine” in a context that Appellants contend requires limiting the meaning to their proposed construction. Reply Br. 2—3 (citing Spec. 2, 16, 38, & 42). Appellants also provide a description of “electric machine” from an on-line encyclopedia that Appellants contend supports their construction. Id. at 3 (quoting Wikipedia).1 During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007). We have been repeatedly admonished by the Federal Circuit that a claim construction during examination cannot be so broad as to be unreasonable. “[t]he protocol of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpretation . . . does not include giving claims a legally incorrect interpretation.” In re Skvorecz, 580 F.3d 1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also In re Suitco Surface, Inc., 603 F.3d 1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The broadest-construction rubric coupled with the term ‘comprising’ does not give the PTO an unfettered license to interpret claims to embrace anything remotely related to the claimed invention.”). Rather, “claims should always be read in light of the specification and teachings in the underlying patent.” Suitco, 603 F.3d at 1260. . . . Even under the broadest reasonable interpretation, the Board’s construction “cannot be divorced from the specification and the record evidence,” In reNTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1279, 1288 (Fed.Cir.2011), and “must be consistent with the one that those 1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric machine. 4 Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 skilled in the art would reach,” In re Cortright, 165 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A construction that is “unreasonably broad” and which does not “reasonably reflect the plain language and disclosure” will not pass muster. Suitco, 603 F.3d at 1260. Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015); See also In re Man Machine Interface Tech. LLC, 822 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Broad construction unreasonable in view of the specification’s clear teaching). In the instant case, Appellants’ invention is related to the field of battery electric vehicles and hybrid electric vehicles. Battery electric vehicles (BEV s) include a traction battery that is rechargeable from an external electric power source and powers the electric machine. Hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) include an internal combustion engine, one or more electric machines, and a traction battery that at least partially powers the electric machine. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) are similar to HEV s, but the traction battery in a PHEV is capable of recharging from an external electric power source. These vehicles are examples of vehicles that are capable of being at least partially driven by an electric machine. Spec. 12 (emphasis added). The context in which the term “electric machine” is used throughout the Specification is consistent with Appellants’ construction. See Reply Br. 2—3 (and Spec, passages quoted therein). We are not persuaded by the Examiner’s reasoning that Appellants’ Specification fails to provide an explicit meaning in definitional format. Ans. 8. It is well settled that “[e]ven when guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format, the ‘specification may define claim terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.’” Irdeto Access, Inc. v. EchoStar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 5 Appeal 2015-004910 Application 13/601,130 “Above all, the broadest reasonable interpretation, must be reasonable in light of the claims and specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns Rb\ LLC, 815 F.3d 747, 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In view of the foregoing, we reject the Examiner’s construction that “electric machine” is broad enough to encompass “any machine that is electric in nature.” Ans. 8. The Examiner’s construction is not reasonable in light of the context provided by the Specification which essentially provides a narrower definition by implication. Irdeto, 383 F.3d at 1300. Prior Art Rejections of Claims 1—14 All of the Examiner’s anticipation and obviousness rejections rely on an overly broad construction of “electric machine.” Ans. 8 (“sub processor of the battery is considered an electric machine”). Appellants are correct in pointing out that both Nada and Lansberry are directed to sending reset signals to a computer unit. Appeal Br. 7. The Examiner does not find, and neither do we, that Nada and/or Lansberry resets duty cycle commands for an “electric machine,” or re-enables an “electric machine” during a drive cycle in accordance with a correct construction of “electric machine.” Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejections of claims 1—14. DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—14 is REVERSED. REVERSED 6