Ex Parte Hickson

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 29, 2013

11295974 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2013)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/295,974 12/07/2005 Andrew Ian Hickson GB920040125US1 2121
46320 7590 04/29/2013
CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & O''''KEEFE, LLP
STEVEN M. GREENBERG
7900 Glades Road
SUITE 520
BOCA RATON, FL 33434
EXAMINER
SINGH, AMRESH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2159
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/29/2013 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
_____________

Ex parte ANDREW IAN HICKSON
_____________

Appeal 2011-000702
Application 11/295,974
Technology Center 2100
______________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, BRYAN F. MOORE, and LYNNE E.
PETTIGREW, Administrative Patent Judges.

MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final
Rejection of claims 1, 8, 14, and 21-37 which represent all the pending
claims. Br. 2. Claims 2-7, 9-13, and 15-20 have been cancelled. Id. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM-IN-PART.

INVENTION
The invention is directed to combining a commit command for a
transaction with a subsequent operation instruction in an asynchronous
messaging system.
Claim 1 is exemplary of the invention and is reproduced below:
1. A computer-implemented method of committing the operations
of a synchronized transaction by one or more applications on a
resource manager, comprising:
receiving, within a single combined request, a request for an
operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized
transaction;
committing the outstanding transaction; and
processing the requested operation separately from the
committing the outstanding transaction.

REFERENCES
Dievendorff US 5,465,328 Nov. 7, 1995
Anderson US 5,950,212 Sep. 7, 1999
Gatto US 2005/0054445A1 Mar. 10, 2005
REJECTIONS AT ISSUE
Claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dievendorff. Ans. 3-5.
Claims 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
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§ 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Dievendorff and Anderson.
Ans. 6.
Claims 26, 31, and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of Dievendorff, Anderson, and Gatto.
Ans. 7.

ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff suggests
“receiving, within a single combined request, a request for an
operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized
transaction; committing the outstanding transaction; and
processing the requested operation separately from the committing
the outstanding transaction,” recited in claim 1; and
2. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff suggests “the
request to commit indicates a transaction boundary to the resource
manager and transfers the responsibility of when to commit the
transaction to the resource manager,” recited in claim 24; and
3. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff and Anderson
collectively teach “the resource manager commits the transaction
based on the size of the transaction,” recited in claim 25; and
4. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff, Anderson, and
Gatto collectively teach “the resource manager determines when to
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commit the transaction based on the number of applications with
outstanding transactions in process,” recited in claim 26?
ANALYSIS
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) - Dievendorff
Claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35
Claim 1
Claim 1 recites “receiving, within a single combined request, a request
for an operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized
transaction; committing the outstanding transaction; and processing the
requested operation separately from the committing the outstanding
transaction.” Appellant argues that “the Examiner’s alleged combined
request simply refers to a MQGET with the option of a marking,” rather than
a combined request in which the individual requests are processed
separately. App. Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant argues that “since the
marking is an option of the MQGET request, these operations would not be
performed separately from one another since the performance of the
MQGET request encompasses the performance of the optional marking.” Id.
at 8. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error.
Dievendorff teaches that “[o]ne of the options that the application can
specify with an MQGET request is that the message be marked; the
application issues MQGET_MARK_SKIP_BACKOUT (step 301).”
Dievendorff, 16:21-24. Based on this text from Dievendorff, we agree with
the Examiner that marking is an optional request that can be combined with
the MQGET request. Ans. 9.
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The Examiner further shows that the reading of a request with an
option as a combined request is consistent with Appellant’s Specification.
Id. at 8-9. The Specification recites “[t]he combined request may specify an
option in a get operation request to commit any outstanding unit of work.”
The Appellant responds that “Appellant’s use of the term ‘option’ is
different than Dievendorff’s use of the term ‘option.’ . . . the ‘option’
described by Dievendorff is a sub-feature of the MQGET request. However,
the option described within Appellant’s specification refers to an operation
that is optional.” Reply Br. 2-3 (footnote omitted). Appellant notes (id. at 3)
that the Specification recites that “[t]he described method provides an option
on an operation request [MQGET] requesting that any outstanding
transaction should be committed prior to processing the operation request
[COMMIT]. If the commit succeeds, then the operation request [MQGET] is
carried out, optionally within a new transaction,” (Spec. 8) thereby
suggesting that the Specification uses the term option to point out the request
is “optionally” carried out—not to indicate that the commit is an
“option”(Reply Br. 3).
We find Appellant is misreading the quotation. The quoted language
states that the COMMIT is an option added to MQGET and that in the
combined MQGET operation the MQGET may optionally be carried out in a
new transaction. The Specification makes this clear by stating “[t]he
combined commit request is provided as an option on a get request, for
example, MQGMO_COMMIT.” Spec. 8. Therefore, this argument is not
persuasive of Examiner error.
Appellant also argues that “the Examiner's ‘rational underpinning’ for
the modification to Dievendorff is a benefit that is already found in what
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Dievendorff considers to be the prior art. Additionally, Dievendorff alone
(i.e., without modification) would also achieve the same benefit.” App. Br.
9. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error.
We note that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[t]he obviousness
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words
teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance
of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, the relevant inquiry
is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some
rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550
U.S. at 418).
The Examiner finds that:
It would have been obvious at the time the invention was made
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains to use the template of combining requests
provided by Dievendorff and combine a request such that a
command and a request to commit outstanding transaction are
performed. The combination of the request would allow for
atomicity of transactions incase [sic] a newly formed
transaction is dependent of a previously uncommitted
transaction such as a ATM machine where, a deposit
transaction by a user prior to withdrawal should commit so that
the user does not show negative bank balance.
Ans. 4-5. Upon reviewing the record before us, we find that the Examiner’s
basis for modifying Dievendorff suffices as an articulated reason with some
rational underpinning to justify the legal conclusion of obviousness. In other
words, a user would be motivated to combine the get and commit request in
the same way that Dievendorff combines get and marking, in order to ensure
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that the failure to commit a previous transaction does not cause an
inaccuracy with the current transaction.
As to whether the benefit cited by the Examiner is in the prior art,
Dievendorff does recognize that “[a] known method of ensuring atomicity of
a transaction is to initiate performance of file updates within the transaction
only after verifying that the updates can be completed successfully.”
Dievendorff, 1:60-64. However, Dievendorff notes this solution is “not
always possible,” thus suggesting to one of ordinary skill in the art to seek
other solutions to the problem such as combining a commit and get
operation. Dievendorff, 2:1. Therefore, we are not persuaded by this
argument.
Appellant does not substantively argue the rejection of claims 8, 14,
21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we
affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29,
32-33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
Claim 24
Claim 24 recites “the request to commit indicates a transaction
boundary to the resource manager and transfers the responsibility of when to
commit the transaction to the resource manager.” Appellant argues “the
Examiner’s analysis never identifies exactly what the Examiner believes to
be the transaction boundary.” App. Br. 10. Appellant also argues that the
claim requires “an indication of the transaction boundary is contained within
the request to commit.” Reply Br. 5. This argument is not persuasive of
Examiner error.
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We agree with the Examiner that Figure 4 of Dievendorff shows a
transaction boundary indicated by a commit that is in element 580 when
control is returned to the application just before the commit in element 401.
Dievendorff, Fig. 4; Ans. 9. We also find that the claim does not require “an
indication of the transaction boundary is contained within the request to
commit” as suggested by Appellant, rather only that the commit indicates
the transaction boundary.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) - Dievendorff and Anderson
Claims 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36
Claims 23, 28, and 34
Appellant does not substantively argue the rejection of claims 23, 28,
and 34. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 23, 28, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
Claim 25
Claim 25 recites “the resource manager commits the transaction based
on the size of the transaction.” Appellant argues Anderson decides whether
to commit based on timer intervals instead of using the size of a transaction
to decide when to commit the transaction. App. Br. 11. However, the
Examiner’s cited passage refers to timer intervals, which are what are
actually being set (see Anderson 2:33-34) and define the size of each group
of transactions. However, the size of any individual transaction is not being
used to determine anything regarding committing that individual transaction.
This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error.
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For the reasons stated above, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 25, 30, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) – Dievendorff, Anderson, and Gatto
Claims 26, 31, and 37
Claim 26
Claim 26 recites “the resource manager determines when to commit
the transaction based on the number of applications with outstanding
transactions in process.” Appellant argues “the limitations at issue refer to
when to commit a transaction. The load balancing described by Gatto is a
very common concept, which refers to transactions being divided between
multiple devices (e.g., servers). Load balancing, however, is not relevant to
deciding when to commit a transaction.” App. Br. 12.This argument is
persuasive of Examiner error.
The Examiner states that “the when aspect of the commitment of a
transaction is relevant to load balancing because during load balancing
processing there is a determination made when to commit, i.e. when to
commit is determined by the resource manager based on load balancing, if
load is too high commit, if not don’t commit. etc.” Ans. 10. The Examiner
does not provide persuasive evidence to support this assertion.
We agree with Appellant that load balancing is generally concerned
with balancing which server will do the work rather than with whether or not
the work will be done. For example, one definition of load balancing is “[i]n
distributed processing, the distribution of activity across two or more servers
in order to avoid overloading any one with too many requests from users.
Load balancing can be either static or dynamic. In the former, the load is
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balanced ahead of time by assigning different groups of users to different
servers. In the latter, software refers incoming requests at runtime to
whichever server is most capable of handling them.” Microsoft Computer
Dictionary 315 (5th ed. 2002). The Examiner provides insufficient evidence
showing that load balancing, in light of the Specification, encompasses
determining whether to commit.
Thus, for the reasons stated above, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s
decision to reject claims 26, 31, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 8, 14, and 21-24, 27-29,
and 32-35 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) is affirmed. Examiner’s decision to reject
claims 25, 26, 30, 31, 36, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) is reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED-IN-PART

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