Ex Parte HicksonDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 29, 201311295974 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 29, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/295,974 12/07/2005 Andrew Ian Hickson GB920040125US1 2121 46320 7590 04/29/2013 CAREY, RODRIGUEZ, GREENBERG & O''''KEEFE, LLP STEVEN M. GREENBERG 7900 Glades Road SUITE 520 BOCA RATON, FL 33434 EXAMINER SINGH, AMRESH ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2159 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 04/29/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE _____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD _____________ Ex parte ANDREW IAN HICKSON _____________ Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 Technology Center 2100 ______________ Before JASON V. MORGAN, BRYAN F. MOORE, and LYNNE E. PETTIGREW, Administrative Patent Judges. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 2 This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Final Rejection of claims 1, 8, 14, and 21-37 which represent all the pending claims. Br. 2. Claims 2-7, 9-13, and 15-20 have been cancelled. Id. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM-IN-PART. INVENTION The invention is directed to combining a commit command for a transaction with a subsequent operation instruction in an asynchronous messaging system. Claim 1 is exemplary of the invention and is reproduced below: 1. A computer-implemented method of committing the operations of a synchronized transaction by one or more applications on a resource manager, comprising: receiving, within a single combined request, a request for an operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized transaction; committing the outstanding transaction; and processing the requested operation separately from the committing the outstanding transaction. REFERENCES Dievendorff US 5,465,328 Nov. 7, 1995 Anderson US 5,950,212 Sep. 7, 1999 Gatto US 2005/0054445A1 Mar. 10, 2005 REJECTIONS AT ISSUE Claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Dievendorff. Ans. 3-5. Claims 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 3 § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Dievendorff and Anderson. Ans. 6. Claims 26, 31, and 37 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over the combination of Dievendorff, Anderson, and Gatto. Ans. 7. ISSUES 1. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff suggests “receiving, within a single combined request, a request for an operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized transaction; committing the outstanding transaction; and processing the requested operation separately from the committing the outstanding transaction,” recited in claim 1; and 2. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff suggests “the request to commit indicates a transaction boundary to the resource manager and transfers the responsibility of when to commit the transaction to the resource manager,” recited in claim 24; and 3. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff and Anderson collectively teach “the resource manager commits the transaction based on the size of the transaction,” recited in claim 25; and 4. Did the Examiner err in finding that Dievendorff, Anderson, and Gatto collectively teach “the resource manager determines when to Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 4 commit the transaction based on the number of applications with outstanding transactions in process,” recited in claim 26? ANALYSIS 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) - Dievendorff Claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35 Claim 1 Claim 1 recites “receiving, within a single combined request, a request for an operation and a request to commit any outstanding synchronized transaction; committing the outstanding transaction; and processing the requested operation separately from the committing the outstanding transaction.” Appellant argues that “the Examiner’s alleged combined request simply refers to a MQGET with the option of a marking,” rather than a combined request in which the individual requests are processed separately. App. Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant argues that “since the marking is an option of the MQGET request, these operations would not be performed separately from one another since the performance of the MQGET request encompasses the performance of the optional marking.” Id. at 8. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Dievendorff teaches that “[o]ne of the options that the application can specify with an MQGET request is that the message be marked; the application issues MQGET_MARK_SKIP_BACKOUT (step 301).” Dievendorff, 16:21-24. Based on this text from Dievendorff, we agree with the Examiner that marking is an optional request that can be combined with the MQGET request. Ans. 9. Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 5 The Examiner further shows that the reading of a request with an option as a combined request is consistent with Appellant’s Specification. Id. at 8-9. The Specification recites “[t]he combined request may specify an option in a get operation request to commit any outstanding unit of work.” The Appellant responds that “Appellant’s use of the term ‘option’ is different than Dievendorff’s use of the term ‘option.’ . . . the ‘option’ described by Dievendorff is a sub-feature of the MQGET request. However, the option described within Appellant’s specification refers to an operation that is optional.” Reply Br. 2-3 (footnote omitted). Appellant notes (id. at 3) that the Specification recites that “[t]he described method provides an option on an operation request [MQGET] requesting that any outstanding transaction should be committed prior to processing the operation request [COMMIT]. If the commit succeeds, then the operation request [MQGET] is carried out, optionally within a new transaction,” (Spec. 8) thereby suggesting that the Specification uses the term option to point out the request is “optionally” carried out—not to indicate that the commit is an “option”(Reply Br. 3). We find Appellant is misreading the quotation. The quoted language states that the COMMIT is an option added to MQGET and that in the combined MQGET operation the MQGET may optionally be carried out in a new transaction. The Specification makes this clear by stating “[t]he combined commit request is provided as an option on a get request, for example, MQGMO_COMMIT.” Spec. 8. Therefore, this argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appellant also argues that “the Examiner's ‘rational underpinning’ for the modification to Dievendorff is a benefit that is already found in what Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 6 Dievendorff considers to be the prior art. Additionally, Dievendorff alone (i.e., without modification) would also achieve the same benefit.” App. Br. 9. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. We note that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that “[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418). The Examiner finds that: It would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains to use the template of combining requests provided by Dievendorff and combine a request such that a command and a request to commit outstanding transaction are performed. The combination of the request would allow for atomicity of transactions incase [sic] a newly formed transaction is dependent of a previously uncommitted transaction such as a ATM machine where, a deposit transaction by a user prior to withdrawal should commit so that the user does not show negative bank balance. Ans. 4-5. Upon reviewing the record before us, we find that the Examiner’s basis for modifying Dievendorff suffices as an articulated reason with some rational underpinning to justify the legal conclusion of obviousness. In other words, a user would be motivated to combine the get and commit request in the same way that Dievendorff combines get and marking, in order to ensure Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 7 that the failure to commit a previous transaction does not cause an inaccuracy with the current transaction. As to whether the benefit cited by the Examiner is in the prior art, Dievendorff does recognize that “[a] known method of ensuring atomicity of a transaction is to initiate performance of file updates within the transaction only after verifying that the updates can be completed successfully.” Dievendorff, 1:60-64. However, Dievendorff notes this solution is “not always possible,” thus suggesting to one of ordinary skill in the art to seek other solutions to the problem such as combining a commit and get operation. Dievendorff, 2:1. Therefore, we are not persuaded by this argument. Appellant does not substantively argue the rejection of claims 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 8, 14, 21-22, 24, 27, 29, 32-33, and 35 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Claim 24 Claim 24 recites “the request to commit indicates a transaction boundary to the resource manager and transfers the responsibility of when to commit the transaction to the resource manager.” Appellant argues “the Examiner’s analysis never identifies exactly what the Examiner believes to be the transaction boundary.” App. Br. 10. Appellant also argues that the claim requires “an indication of the transaction boundary is contained within the request to commit.” Reply Br. 5. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 8 We agree with the Examiner that Figure 4 of Dievendorff shows a transaction boundary indicated by a commit that is in element 580 when control is returned to the application just before the commit in element 401. Dievendorff, Fig. 4; Ans. 9. We also find that the claim does not require “an indication of the transaction boundary is contained within the request to commit” as suggested by Appellant, rather only that the commit indicates the transaction boundary. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) - Dievendorff and Anderson Claims 23, 25, 28, 30, 34, and 36 Claims 23, 28, and 34 Appellant does not substantively argue the rejection of claims 23, 28, and 34. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 23, 28, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Claim 25 Claim 25 recites “the resource manager commits the transaction based on the size of the transaction.” Appellant argues Anderson decides whether to commit based on timer intervals instead of using the size of a transaction to decide when to commit the transaction. App. Br. 11. However, the Examiner’s cited passage refers to timer intervals, which are what are actually being set (see Anderson 2:33-34) and define the size of each group of transactions. However, the size of any individual transaction is not being used to determine anything regarding committing that individual transaction. This argument is not persuasive of Examiner error. Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 9 For the reasons stated above, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25, 30, and 36 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) – Dievendorff, Anderson, and Gatto Claims 26, 31, and 37 Claim 26 Claim 26 recites “the resource manager determines when to commit the transaction based on the number of applications with outstanding transactions in process.” Appellant argues “the limitations at issue refer to when to commit a transaction. The load balancing described by Gatto is a very common concept, which refers to transactions being divided between multiple devices (e.g., servers). Load balancing, however, is not relevant to deciding when to commit a transaction.” App. Br. 12.This argument is persuasive of Examiner error. The Examiner states that “the when aspect of the commitment of a transaction is relevant to load balancing because during load balancing processing there is a determination made when to commit, i.e. when to commit is determined by the resource manager based on load balancing, if load is too high commit, if not don’t commit. etc.” Ans. 10. The Examiner does not provide persuasive evidence to support this assertion. We agree with Appellant that load balancing is generally concerned with balancing which server will do the work rather than with whether or not the work will be done. For example, one definition of load balancing is “[i]n distributed processing, the distribution of activity across two or more servers in order to avoid overloading any one with too many requests from users. Load balancing can be either static or dynamic. In the former, the load is Appeal 2011-000702 Application 11/295,974 10 balanced ahead of time by assigning different groups of users to different servers. In the latter, software refers incoming requests at runtime to whichever server is most capable of handling them.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary 315 (5th ed. 2002). The Examiner provides insufficient evidence showing that load balancing, in light of the Specification, encompasses determining whether to commit. Thus, for the reasons stated above, we cannot sustain the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 26, 31, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). DECISION The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 8, 14, and 21-24, 27-29, and 32-35 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) is affirmed. Examiner’s decision to reject claims 25, 26, 30, 31, 36, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) is reversed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED-IN-PART tj Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation