Ex Parte Heubel et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardApr 27, 201612046934 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 27, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 12/046,934 03/12/2008 34300 7590 04/27/2016 Kilpatrick Townsend and Stockton, LLP 1001 W Fourth Street Winston-Salem, NC 27101 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Robert W. Heubel UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 043508-0405550 2009 EXAMINER OKEBATO, SAHLU ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2625 MAILDATE DELIVERY MODE 04/27/2016 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ROBERT W. HEUBEL, JASON D. FLEMING, ERIN B. RAMSAY, A. TIMOTHY VETTER, ROBERT A. LACROIX, PEDRO GREGORIO, DANNY A. GRANT, and LAURI OLLI MATIAS IMPIVAARA Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 Technology Center 2600 Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, JEFFREYS. SMITH, and AARON W. MOORE, Administrative Patent Judges. DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 Judge MOORE, with whom Judge MacDONALD joins. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of claims 6, 20, 22-25, and 40---43, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We reverse. THE INVENTION The application is directed to a "device [with] a user interface that generates a haptic effect in response to user inputs or gestures." (Abstract.) Claims 6 and 20, reproduced below, are illustrative: 6. A method of operating a user interface comprising: receiving an indication that an object has been flicked by a user gesture and that the object has reached an end point that causes the object to bounce; generating a haptic effect when the object has reached the end point, wherein the haptic effect decreases in magnitude as the bounced object comes to rest; and generating a second haptic effect to confirm that the bounced object has come to rest. 20. A method of operating a device having a touchscreen compnsmg: storing a gesture on the device, wherein the gesture comprises a user interaction associated with a directional motion on the touchscreen; and generating a dynamic haptic effect that simulates the gesture, wherein the dynamic haptic effect is applied to different 1 Appellants identify Immersion Corporation as the real party in interest. (See App. Br. 2.) 2 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 individual portions of the touchscreen in series to simulate the directional motion. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is: Martin et al. Hotelling et al. Ording et al. Chaudhri et al. US 2003/0122779 Al July 3, 2003 US 2006/0026535 Al Feb. 2, 2006 US 2007/0150830 Al June 28, 2007 US 2007/0150842 Al June 28, 2007 THE REJECTIONS2 1. Claim 43 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, i-f 1, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. (See Final Act. 2.) 2. Claims 20, 22-24, 40, 42, and 43 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by Chaudhri. (See Final Act. 4--7.) 3. Claims 6 and 25 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in view of Ording and Martin. (See Final Act. 8-9.) 4. Claim 41 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious in view of Chaudhri and Hotelling. (See Final Act. 11.) ANALYSIS Claim 43 The Examiner concluded that claim 43 fails to comply with the written description requirement because the limitation "comparing the input 2 Claims 1-5, 7-19, 21, and 26-39 were canceled after final. (See July 31, 2013 Amendment After Final.) 3 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 on the touchscreen to the stored gesture ... is nowhere to be found in the specification." (Final Act. 2.) Appellants point to paragraphs 37-38 of the Specification, which describe how "[d]evice 10 can be unlocked when a predetermined gesture is input by the user" as "[ fJor example, the gesture can function as a password or pass code to unlock the menu system of device 10." (Spec. i-f 37.) We agree with Appellants that the cited paragraphs describe the claimed invention in sufficient detail for one skilled in the art to reasonably conclude that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[T]he test for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date."). An artisan would understand that using a "predetermined gesture" as a password or pass code would entail comparing the user input gesture to a stored ("predetermined") gesture. We therefore decline to sustain this rejection. Claims 20, 22-24, 40--42, and 43 Claim 20, which requires "storing a gesture on the device" and "generating a dynamic haptic effect that simulates the gesture" where "the dynamic haptic effect is applied to different individual portions of the touchscreen in series to simulate the directional motion," stands rejected as anticipated by Chaudhri. In the Final Action, the Examiner cited only paragraphs 7 and 34 of Chaudhri regarding the claimed haptic effect. As Appellants point out, however, those paragraphs describe the use of haptic inputs, not haptic outputs, and therefore cannot support an anticipation rejection. (See, e.g., Chaudhri i-f 34 ("The touch screen 126 also accepts 4 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 input from the user based on haptic and/ or tactile contact. The touch screen 126 forms a touch-sensitive surface that accepts user input.").) At page 4 of the Answer, the Examiner additionally cites paragraphs 63, 82, and 83 of Chaudhri. Paragraph 83, which is representative of the pertinent disclosures of the three, reads as follows: In some embodiments, in addition to visual feedback, the device supplies non-visual feedback to indicate progress towards satis- faction of the user input condition. The additional feedback may include audible feedback (e.g., sound(s)) or physical feedback (e.g., vibration(s)). (Chaudhri i-f 83.) While this passage does describe the use of haptic feedback, it simply indicates that such feedback may be used to indicate "progress towards satisfaction of the user input condition." This is insufficient to anticipate because it does not describe generating a dynamic haptic effect that "simulates a gesture" or that the haptic effect is "applied to different individual portions of the touchscreen in series to simulate the directional motion," as claimed. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldfine Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that a reference is anticipatory only if it "disclose[ s] each and every feature of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently"). We accordingly decline to sustain the rejection of claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 102, and, for the same reasons, we decline to sustain the§ 102 rejections of claims 22-24, 40, 42, and 43, or the§ 103 rejection of claim 41. We do not reach Appellants' other arguments for claims 22 and 42. Claims 6 and 25 Claim 6 requires "generating a haptic effect when [a UI object flicked by a gesture] has reached [an] end point that causes the object to bounce," where "the haptic effect decreases in magnitude as the bounced object comes 5 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 to rest" and "generating a second haptic effect to confirm that the bounced object has come to rest." The Examiner provides the following analysis for this claim: Ording disclose[ s that] a displayed portion of the list of items may appear to bounce off of a boundary of the window in the touch-sensitive display when a beginning or an end of the list of items is reached. Since the bouncing motion corresponds to a damped motion, the motion gradually decreases and eventually ends. This bouncing function is obviously observed visually as [its] up and down movement comes to end. The only function missed from the claimed limitation is adding a haptic feedback. To cure this deficiency, Martin discloses generating user controllable haptic events based on the amount of pressure applied. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to use Martin's multi-level ofhaptic events in each step of Ording's damping motion including confirming end of bouncing. (Ans. 3; see Final Act. 8-9.) We agree that Ording teaches the bouncing UI effect and that, in light of iviartin's teachings, it would have been obvious to provide haptic feedback reflecting the bouncing effect. The Examiner, however, does not point us to a teaching or suggestion of using a second effect to confirm that the bounced object has come to rest, or otherwise explain why it would have been obvious to add this additional feature. (See Final Act. 8 (finding that Ording, the reference purported to show the effects, does not disclose ... generating a second haptic feedback to confirm that the bounced object has come to rest").) A rejection on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements but instead requires some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning. See KSR Int 'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417-18 (2007); see also CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int 'l Corp., 349 F .3d 6 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 1333, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[O]bviousness requires a suggestion of all limitations in a claim." (citing In re Royka, 490 F .2d 981, 985 (CCP A 1974)). On this record, we are unable to sustain the obviousness rejections of claim 6 and its dependent claim 25. DECISION The rejections of claims 6, 20, 22-25, and 40-43 are reversed. REVERSED 7 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 SMITH, dissenting in part. In my view, Appellants do not present persuasive arguments to show error in the Examiner's rejection of claim 6. Appellants contend Ording does not teach generating a haptic effect in relation to a bounced object. (App. Br. 15.) However, the Examiner relies on Martin to teach the haptic effect. (Ans. 3.) Appellants also contend Martin teaches haptic events, but does not teach a haptic effect to confirm a bounced object has come to rest. However, the Examiner relies on Ording to teach confirming a bounced object has come to rest by visual observation. (Ans. 3.) "Non-obviousness cannot be established by attacking references individually where the rejection is based upon the teachings of a combination of references." In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981)). Here, Appellants' contentions against the references individually do not show error in the combined teachings of Ording and Martin. Further, Appellants have not provided persuasive evidence or argument to rebut the Examiner's findings. In particular, Appellants have not addressed the Examiner's finding that Ording teaches visually observing when a bouncing object comes to rest. Nor have Appellants addressed the Examiner's finding that adding haptic feedback to the visual observation of coming to rest was within the level of ordinary skill as taught by Martin. I adopt the Examiner's unrebutted findings as my own. "The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results." KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). Here, adding tactile feedback to an event as taught by Martin, such as when a bouncing 1 Appeal2014-006583 Application 12/046,934 object comes to rest as taught by Ording, does no more than yield the predictable result of "generating a second haptic effect to confirm that the bounced object has come to rest" within the meaning of claim 6. I would affirm the rejection of claim 6. 2 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation