Ex Parte He et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 23, 2017

11539522 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/539,522 10/06/2006 Zhongli He WM10160TS-US 3812
53236 7590 03/27/2017
NXP-Huffman Law Group, P.C.
6501 William Cannon Drive West
Austin, TX 78735
EXAMINER
LEE, Y YOUNG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2485
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/27/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ip. department .u s @ nxp. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ZHONGLI HE and YONG YAN
Appeal 2016-003738
Application 11/539,522
Technology Center 2400
Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, NABEEL U. KHAN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection
of claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and 34—36, which constitute all the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 6, 11—24, 32, and 33 are cancelled. Br. 1.
We reverse.
1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Freescale
Semiconductor Inc. Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-003738
Application 11/539,522
RELATED PROCEEDINGS
The instant application was the subject of previous Appeal 2011-
011824, dismissed December 6, 2012. Ex parte Zhongli He et al., Appeal
2011-011824, Order Dismissing Appeal (PTAB Dec. 6, 2012).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ disclosed “invention relates in general to scalable video
processing, and more specifically to . . . scaling complexity of video
processing using prioritized layered coding and based on a power savings
factor.” Spec. 11. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. A method of scaling complexity of a video processing system,
comprising:
determining a frame size, a frame rate and a frame type suitable
for a given power level;
determining a power saving factor based on at least one
operating parameter of the video processing system, the
at least one operating parameter including available
power, wherein the power saving factor is at a first level
corresponding to said given power level and is adjusted
in response to decreases of available power; and
adjusting processing of video information by the video
processing system when the power saving factor
indicates less available power than the given power level
to reduce computation complexity while maintaining the
frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that
determined for the given power level, wherein said
adjusting processing of video information comprises:
performing prediction error adjustment to adjust an
amount of sub-pixel interpolation when the power
saving factor is at least a second level which
indicates less available power than when at the
first level; and
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Application 11/539,522
performing fast mode decision to reduce processing
performed for selecting between an intracoding
mode and an intercoding mode for each video
block of a frame when the power saving factor is at
least a third level which indicates less available
power than when at the second level.
Claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and 34—36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ju (US 2006/0215755 Al; Sept. 28,
2006) in view of Nagarajan (US 2006/0109910 Al; May 25, 2006). See
Final Act. 2—5.
Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief
(“Br.” filed Aug. 13, 2015) and the Specification (“Spec.” filed Oct. 6, 2006,
amended June 5, 2009, drawings amended Oct. 2, 2009 and Nov. 30, 2012)2
for the positions of Appellants and the Final Office Action (“Final Act.”
mailed March 26, 2015) and Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” mailed Nov. 3.
2015) for the reasoning, findings, and conclusions of the Examiner.
ISSUE
The dispositive issue3 presented by Appellants’ arguments is as
follows: Does the Examiner err in finding Ju, when combined with
Natarajan, teaches or suggests
determining a frame size, a frame rate and a frame type suitable
for a given power level[, and] . . . adjusting processing of video
information by the video processing system when [a] power
2 The record includes citations to the “Spec.” that actually refer to He et al
(US 2008/0084491 Al; Apr. 10, 2008) (hereinafter “He”), which is the
published patent application corresponding to the instant case, rather than
the amended as-filed Specification. See, e.g., Ans. 6.
3 Appellants’ arguments present additional issues. Because the identified
issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the additional issues.
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Application 11/539,522
saving factor indicates less available power than the given power
level to reduce computation complexity while maintaining the
frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that
determined for the given power level
(the “argued limitation”), as recited in claim 1?
ANALYSIS
The Examiner relies on Ju to teach the argued limitation of claim 1.
Final Act. 2—3 (citing Ju 2, Figs. 3—7); see also Ans. 5—8 (additionally
citing Ju 121; Spec. Fig. 2; He4 15—16, 18). Appellants contend Ju does
not teach or suggest the argued limitation because “Ju does not adjust
processing of video information to reduce computation complexity other
than by changing one of picture type (frame type), picture size (frame size)
or picture rate (frame rate).” Br. 9. We agree with Appellants for the
reasons stated by Appellants.
As an initial matter, we note that in a paragraph discussing the
features of claim 1 (Br. 9—10) Appellants conclude the paragraph with the
following sentence: “Thus, according to Ju, the frame size, rate and type are
all maintained at the same level while processing of the video information is
adjusted to reduce computation complexity” (Br. 10 (emphasis added)). The
Examiner indicates that this sentence is an admission that Ju teaches the
argued limitation. See Ans. 5. We disagree with the Examiner. The
transition word “[tjhus,” the sentence’s position at the end of the paragraph,
and the overall context of the discussion of claim 1 in the paragraph, all
indicate that the sentence in question is intended to sum up the paragraph,
4 Referred to in the Examiner’s Answer as “Spec.”
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Application 11/539,522
which described claim 1, not Ju. Accordingly, we conclude the mention of
“Ju” in the sentence was a typographical error and the intended meaning of
the sentence was as follows: “Thus, according to [claim 1], the frame size,
rate and type are all maintained at the same level while processing of the
video information is adjusted to reduce computation complexity.”5
Claim construction is an issue of law that we review de novo. Cordis
Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The
argued limitation of claim 1 recites that “computation complexity” is
adjusted, i.e., “reduc[ed]” in response to a decline in “available power” from
a “given power level” “while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and
the frame type equal to that determined for the given power level” (emphasis
added). Although not limited to any particular digital video standard (see
Spec. Ill), Appellants’ written description describes the claimed invention
in terms of an advance over the MPEG64 and its extensions. See Spec. 2—
5; see also Br. 3^4. Appellants and the Examiner appear to agree that
“frame” in claim 1 is equivalent to “picture” as used in Ju. See Br. 7; Ans. 8.
Appellants and the Examiner also appear to agree that “frame type” refers to
the I, P, and B picture types defined by the MPEG standards. See Br. 8;
Ans. 7; see also Ju 114. There similarly seems to be agreement regarding
the meaning of “frame size” and “frame rate.” The Examiner construes
“maintaining” as follows:
Examiner broadly but reasonably construes maintaining as a
consistent selection of processing adjustment for a frame of
5 We note that correction of this typographical error in a timely-filed Reply
Brief would have reduced the risk of our having misunderstood Appellants’
intended meaning.
6 Motion Picture Experts Group. Spec. 2.
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video information. Ju discloses that I and P frames are processed
consistently within a given power level ([0021 ]). Examiner finds
that I or P frame within the same power level each has the same
selected size, rate, and type that are within a threshold of a power
level describe the selections are maintained. Therefore, Ju’s
disclosure of selecting a particular size, rate, and type from a
plurality of selections within a threshold of the power level for
the video information describes maintaining the particular size,
rate, and type for the power level. Similarly, Ju's disclosure of
not selecting other sizes, rates, and types from the plurality of
selections outside of the threshold of the power level describes
maintaining the selected size, rate, and type for the power level.
Furthermore, a recitation that “adjusting processing
computation in additional to” size, rate, and type is not found in
Appellant's claim 1, as illustrated in Figure 2 of Appellant's
Drawings. Without such specific limitation included in the
claims, Examiner maintains that the invention of Ju is consistent
with Appellant’s disclosure in its broadest sense where a video
frame may be either unchanged or consistently adjusted and
processed.
Ans. 6—7 (brackets in original). We disagree.
The Examiner is correct that “maintain” as used in claim 1 requires a
consistent selection of processing adjustments, in particular of “the frame
size, the frame rate and the frame type.” The ordinary meaning of
“maintain,” which is consistent with both its use in the Specification and
claim 1, is “vt... 1 : to keep in an existing state.” Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 702 (10th ed. 1999). However, the Examiner’s
claim construction unreasonably takes the term out of the context of the
other words of the claim. It is well settled that “[a]ll words in a claim must
be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.”
In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970). The argued limitation of
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claim 1 recites that frame size, rate, and type are determined for a “given
power level,” and that as available power decreases below the “given power
level” video information processing is adjusted “to reduce computational
complexity while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and the frame
type equal to that determined for the given power level.” In other words,
claim 1 requires that all three of frame size, rate, and type remain constant
and unchanged from the existing state determined for the given power level,
while aspects of video information processing other than frame size, rate,
and type are changed in response to the available power reaching a second
level lower than the first level7 and again when the available power reaches a
third level lower than the second level.
The passages of Ju relied on by the Examiner show adjusting picture
(i.e., frame) type (Ju Fig. 5), size (Ju Fig. 6), and rate (Ju Fig. 7) in response
to available power level, but do not show any adjustment to video
information processing while all three of picture type, size, and rate are held
in their existing state, i.e. maintained.
Appellants have persuaded us the rejection of claim 1 is based on an
unreasonably broad claim construction. Accordingly, we do not sustain the
rejection of (1) claim 1; (2) independent claim 31, which recites a limitation
substantially similar to the argued limitation and was rejected on
substantially the same bases (see Final Act. 2—5); and claims 2—5, 7—10, 25—
30, and 34—36, which variously depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1
and 31, and therefore incorporate the argued limitation.
7 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner and Appellants may wish
to consider whether “the first level” recited in claim 1, and similarly recited
in claim 31, finds adequate antecedent basis in the claims.
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DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and
34—36 is reversed.
REVERSED
8