Ex Parte He et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardMar 23, 201711539522 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2017) Copy Citation United States Patent and Trademark Office UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O.Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/539,522 10/06/2006 Zhongli He WM10160TS-US 3812 53236 7590 03/27/2017 NXP-Huffman Law Group, P.C. 6501 William Cannon Drive West Austin, TX 78735 EXAMINER LEE, Y YOUNG ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2485 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/27/2017 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): ip. department .u s @ nxp. com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ZHONGLI HE and YONG YAN Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 Technology Center 2400 Before BRUCE R. WINSOR, NABEEL U. KHAN, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges. WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the final rejection of claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and 34—36, which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). Claims 6, 11—24, 32, and 33 are cancelled. Br. 1. We reverse. 1 The real party in interest identified by Appellants is Freescale Semiconductor Inc. Br. 1. Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 RELATED PROCEEDINGS The instant application was the subject of previous Appeal 2011- 011824, dismissed December 6, 2012. Ex parte Zhongli He et al., Appeal 2011-011824, Order Dismissing Appeal (PTAB Dec. 6, 2012). STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellants’ disclosed “invention relates in general to scalable video processing, and more specifically to . . . scaling complexity of video processing using prioritized layered coding and based on a power savings factor.” Spec. 11. Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows: 1. A method of scaling complexity of a video processing system, comprising: determining a frame size, a frame rate and a frame type suitable for a given power level; determining a power saving factor based on at least one operating parameter of the video processing system, the at least one operating parameter including available power, wherein the power saving factor is at a first level corresponding to said given power level and is adjusted in response to decreases of available power; and adjusting processing of video information by the video processing system when the power saving factor indicates less available power than the given power level to reduce computation complexity while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that determined for the given power level, wherein said adjusting processing of video information comprises: performing prediction error adjustment to adjust an amount of sub-pixel interpolation when the power saving factor is at least a second level which indicates less available power than when at the first level; and 2 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 performing fast mode decision to reduce processing performed for selecting between an intracoding mode and an intercoding mode for each video block of a frame when the power saving factor is at least a third level which indicates less available power than when at the second level. Claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and 34—36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Ju (US 2006/0215755 Al; Sept. 28, 2006) in view of Nagarajan (US 2006/0109910 Al; May 25, 2006). See Final Act. 2—5. Rather than repeat the arguments here, we refer to the Appeal Brief (“Br.” filed Aug. 13, 2015) and the Specification (“Spec.” filed Oct. 6, 2006, amended June 5, 2009, drawings amended Oct. 2, 2009 and Nov. 30, 2012)2 for the positions of Appellants and the Final Office Action (“Final Act.” mailed March 26, 2015) and Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” mailed Nov. 3. 2015) for the reasoning, findings, and conclusions of the Examiner. ISSUE The dispositive issue3 presented by Appellants’ arguments is as follows: Does the Examiner err in finding Ju, when combined with Natarajan, teaches or suggests determining a frame size, a frame rate and a frame type suitable for a given power level[, and] . . . adjusting processing of video information by the video processing system when [a] power 2 The record includes citations to the “Spec.” that actually refer to He et al (US 2008/0084491 Al; Apr. 10, 2008) (hereinafter “He”), which is the published patent application corresponding to the instant case, rather than the amended as-filed Specification. See, e.g., Ans. 6. 3 Appellants’ arguments present additional issues. Because the identified issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the additional issues. 3 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 saving factor indicates less available power than the given power level to reduce computation complexity while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that determined for the given power level (the “argued limitation”), as recited in claim 1? ANALYSIS The Examiner relies on Ju to teach the argued limitation of claim 1. Final Act. 2—3 (citing Ju 2, Figs. 3—7); see also Ans. 5—8 (additionally citing Ju 121; Spec. Fig. 2; He4 15—16, 18). Appellants contend Ju does not teach or suggest the argued limitation because “Ju does not adjust processing of video information to reduce computation complexity other than by changing one of picture type (frame type), picture size (frame size) or picture rate (frame rate).” Br. 9. We agree with Appellants for the reasons stated by Appellants. As an initial matter, we note that in a paragraph discussing the features of claim 1 (Br. 9—10) Appellants conclude the paragraph with the following sentence: “Thus, according to Ju, the frame size, rate and type are all maintained at the same level while processing of the video information is adjusted to reduce computation complexity” (Br. 10 (emphasis added)). The Examiner indicates that this sentence is an admission that Ju teaches the argued limitation. See Ans. 5. We disagree with the Examiner. The transition word “[tjhus,” the sentence’s position at the end of the paragraph, and the overall context of the discussion of claim 1 in the paragraph, all indicate that the sentence in question is intended to sum up the paragraph, 4 Referred to in the Examiner’s Answer as “Spec.” 4 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 which described claim 1, not Ju. Accordingly, we conclude the mention of “Ju” in the sentence was a typographical error and the intended meaning of the sentence was as follows: “Thus, according to [claim 1], the frame size, rate and type are all maintained at the same level while processing of the video information is adjusted to reduce computation complexity.”5 Claim construction is an issue of law that we review de novo. Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The argued limitation of claim 1 recites that “computation complexity” is adjusted, i.e., “reduc[ed]” in response to a decline in “available power” from a “given power level” “while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that determined for the given power level” (emphasis added). Although not limited to any particular digital video standard (see Spec. Ill), Appellants’ written description describes the claimed invention in terms of an advance over the MPEG64 and its extensions. See Spec. 2— 5; see also Br. 3^4. Appellants and the Examiner appear to agree that “frame” in claim 1 is equivalent to “picture” as used in Ju. See Br. 7; Ans. 8. Appellants and the Examiner also appear to agree that “frame type” refers to the I, P, and B picture types defined by the MPEG standards. See Br. 8; Ans. 7; see also Ju 114. There similarly seems to be agreement regarding the meaning of “frame size” and “frame rate.” The Examiner construes “maintaining” as follows: Examiner broadly but reasonably construes maintaining as a consistent selection of processing adjustment for a frame of 5 We note that correction of this typographical error in a timely-filed Reply Brief would have reduced the risk of our having misunderstood Appellants’ intended meaning. 6 Motion Picture Experts Group. Spec. 2. 5 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 video information. Ju discloses that I and P frames are processed consistently within a given power level ([0021 ]). Examiner finds that I or P frame within the same power level each has the same selected size, rate, and type that are within a threshold of a power level describe the selections are maintained. Therefore, Ju’s disclosure of selecting a particular size, rate, and type from a plurality of selections within a threshold of the power level for the video information describes maintaining the particular size, rate, and type for the power level. Similarly, Ju's disclosure of not selecting other sizes, rates, and types from the plurality of selections outside of the threshold of the power level describes maintaining the selected size, rate, and type for the power level. Furthermore, a recitation that “adjusting processing computation in additional to” size, rate, and type is not found in Appellant's claim 1, as illustrated in Figure 2 of Appellant's Drawings. Without such specific limitation included in the claims, Examiner maintains that the invention of Ju is consistent with Appellant’s disclosure in its broadest sense where a video frame may be either unchanged or consistently adjusted and processed. Ans. 6—7 (brackets in original). We disagree. The Examiner is correct that “maintain” as used in claim 1 requires a consistent selection of processing adjustments, in particular of “the frame size, the frame rate and the frame type.” The ordinary meaning of “maintain,” which is consistent with both its use in the Specification and claim 1, is “vt... 1 : to keep in an existing state.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 702 (10th ed. 1999). However, the Examiner’s claim construction unreasonably takes the term out of the context of the other words of the claim. It is well settled that “[a]ll words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of that claim against the prior art.” In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385 (CCPA 1970). The argued limitation of 6 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 claim 1 recites that frame size, rate, and type are determined for a “given power level,” and that as available power decreases below the “given power level” video information processing is adjusted “to reduce computational complexity while maintaining the frame size, the frame rate and the frame type equal to that determined for the given power level.” In other words, claim 1 requires that all three of frame size, rate, and type remain constant and unchanged from the existing state determined for the given power level, while aspects of video information processing other than frame size, rate, and type are changed in response to the available power reaching a second level lower than the first level7 and again when the available power reaches a third level lower than the second level. The passages of Ju relied on by the Examiner show adjusting picture (i.e., frame) type (Ju Fig. 5), size (Ju Fig. 6), and rate (Ju Fig. 7) in response to available power level, but do not show any adjustment to video information processing while all three of picture type, size, and rate are held in their existing state, i.e. maintained. Appellants have persuaded us the rejection of claim 1 is based on an unreasonably broad claim construction. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of (1) claim 1; (2) independent claim 31, which recites a limitation substantially similar to the argued limitation and was rejected on substantially the same bases (see Final Act. 2—5); and claims 2—5, 7—10, 25— 30, and 34—36, which variously depend, directly or indirectly, from claims 1 and 31, and therefore incorporate the argued limitation. 7 In the event of further prosecution, the Examiner and Appellants may wish to consider whether “the first level” recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claim 31, finds adequate antecedent basis in the claims. 7 Appeal 2016-003738 Application 11/539,522 DECISION The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1—5, 7—10, 25—31, and 34—36 is reversed. REVERSED 8 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation