Ex Parte Hayner et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 15, 2012

10600637 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 15, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DAVID A. HAYNER and
MAUREEN A. STENGLER
________________

Appeal 2009-012818
Application 10/600,637
Technology Center 2600
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Before BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, BRUCE R. WINSOR, and
JENNIFER S. BISK, Administrative Patent Judges.

BAUMEISTER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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SUMMARY
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 21-37. These claims stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Watanabe (US 6,298,019 B1; Oct. 2, 2001).
We reverse.
Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter a new
ground of rejection. We reject claim 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being
directed to non-statutory subject matter. We reject claim 36 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, ¶ 2, as being indefinite.

THE REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
CLAIMS 21 AND 22
Independent claim 21 is illustrative of the cited claims:
21. A device comprising:
a first actuator control law portion comprising an input to
receive a representation of a first actuator position, and an
output;
a second actuator control law portion comprising an input
to receive a representation of a second actuator position, and an
output;
a first actuator decoupler portion comprising a first input
coupled to the output of the first actuator control law portion
and a second input coupled to the output of the second actuator
control law portion, and an output to provide a signal with
decoupling compensation for a first actuator based on the
representation of the second actuator position.

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Contentions
The Examiner rejects claim 21 as being anticipated by Watanabe. The
Examiner maps Watanabe’s tracking actuator 130 to the claimed “first
actuator” and the reference’s focus actuator to the “second actuator” (Ans. 5-
6). Furthermore, the Examiner finds Watanabe teaches the claimed “output
to provide a signal with decoupling compensation for a first actuator,”
stating that the tracking control “is compensated by a gain change means
122” (Ans. 6 (citing col. 39, ll. 27-34)). Accordingly, to address the
requirement that the claimed “compensation” is “based on the representation
of the second actuator position,” the Examiner finds “tracking gain change
122 is affected by the focus gain change 121” (Ans. 11).
Appellants argue, inter alia, Watanabe fails to disclose the “signal
with decoupling compensation” (App. Br. 9). Appellants characterize the
cited teachings of Watanabe as “a technique for learning the tracking gain of
the tracking servo by creating a disturbance and then calculating a correction
value with which the tracking gain can be corrected” (App. Br. 8 (citing col.
38, l. 24 to col. 39, l. 34)). Appellants contend “Watanabe teaches that this
learning technique can be initiated by a focus jumping, but Watanabe fails to
disclose that this learned tracking gain of the tracking control has any effect
on the focus control or vice versa” (id. (emphasis omitted)). Accordingly,
Appellants contend Watanabe fails to disclose “that any control signal
includes decoupling compensation in any manner” (id. (emphasis omitted)).
Principles of Law
“[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the
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patent application.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (en banc). It is the use of the words in the context of the written
description and customarily by those skilled in the relevant art that
accurately reflects both the “ordinary” and the “customary” meaning of the
terms in the claims. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover
Res., Inc. v. Mega Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
[The claims] are part of a fully integrated written instrument,
consisting principally of a specification that concludes with the
claims. For that reason, claims must be read in view of the
specification . . . . [T]he specification is always highly relevant
to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it
is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
WATANABE
Watanabe discloses an apparatus for reading and writing optical
media, where tracking control gain learning is used for disks with multiple-
layers (col. 38, ll. 24-27). Watanabe’s tracking error (TE) signal controls the
light beam on the disk to correctly scan the tracks, and the gain change
circuit 122 adjusts this TE signal to “a prescribed amplitude (gain)” (col. 17,
ll. 61-62). In Watanabe’s apparatus, the tracking servo system is turned on
when the focus of the light beam emitted from the laser is lead into one of
the multiple layers, “information faces,” of the disk (col. 38, ll. 35-40). In
the embodiment cited by the Examiner, “the tracking gain is learned and the
tracking gain is changed to an optimum value for the information face”
when focus jumping from one face to another (col. 39, ll. 18-20).
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Analysis
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 21 and 22. We find that the Examiner has failed to establish
Watanabe discloses “a signal with decoupling compensation” as claimed.
In light of the Specification and the ordinary and customary meaning,
the claim term “compensation” requires that the “decoupler” output a signal
that provides a correction for the effect of cross-coupling. For example, the
Specification discusses decoupling “compensation” in the context of
removing and subtracting the cross-coupling effect (Spec. ¶¶ 0019-23).
The Examiner states that Watanabe’s tracking control is
“compensated by a gain change means 122,” but Watanabe fails to show a
correction for a cross-coupling effect (Ans. 6). Likewise, the Examiner’s
finding that “tracking gain change 122 is affected by the focus gain change
121” during a focus jump (Ans. 11) does not establish whether a
compensation for a cross-coupling effect is present. At most, the teachings
noted by the Examiner show a signal based on the focus actuator position.
Regarding the “decoupling,” the Examiner finds “both [tracking
control] and [focus control] are connected to DSP 129” (Ans. 6) and later
explains the focus jump “will switch off (de-couple) the tracking operation”
(Ans. 13). However, a signal that switches off tracking prevents the cross
coupling effect as opposed to correcting for the cross coupling effect, as
required by the term “compensation.” As such, the Examiner has not shown
the result of the focus jump is a “decoupling compensation.”
Because Appellants have persuaded us that the Examiner erred in
interpreting Watanabe’s teachings, we will not sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of independent claim 21 or of dependent claim 22.
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CLAIMS 23-25
Independent claim 23 is illustrative of the cited claims:
23. An optical disk drive comprising:
a focus control loop;
a tracking control loop, wherein the focus control loop
and the tracking control loop are cross-coupled, wherein a focus
control command excites the tracking control loop and a
tracking control command excites the focus control loop; and
a decoupler configured to produce a modified focus
control command from the focus control command and the
tracking control command, and configured to produce a
modified tracking control command based on the tracking
control command and the focus control command, wherein the
modified focus control command has a different excitation of
the tracking control loop than the focus control command and
wherein the modified tracking control command has a different
excitation of the focus control loop than the tracking control
command.
Contentions
The Examiner rejects claim 23 as being anticipated by Watanabe. In
particular, the Examiner finds Watanabe’s tracking control command
“excites” the focus control and vice versa because the prior art teaches a
servo loop where “any change of gain value inside the loop will excite a
sequence of servo operations on both the tracking gain and the focusing
gain” (Ans. 12). The Examiner interprets the term “excites” as
encompassing the step of switching off the tracking operation in response to
a focus jump as well as the situation when “the tracking operation will excite
the preventative operation of an objective lens being moved in a focusing
direction” (id.).
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In response, Appellants argue, inter alia,
Watanabe fails to disclose that a tracking control command on
the tracking component of Watanabe excites the focus
component of Watanabe, or vice versa, in any manner.
Although the Office attempts to demonstrate cross-coupling and
mutual excitation by way of the DSP 129 of Watanabe,
Watanabe merely discloses that events in one of the tracking
component or focus component can serve to initiate an
operation in the other, but one of ordinary skill in the art will
readily appreciate that a triggering event does not serve to
excite a control loop as provided by claim 23.
(App. Br. 10).
Analysis
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claim 23. We find that the Examiner has failed to establish Watanabe
discloses the limitation “a focus control command excites the tracking
control loop.” We disagree with the Examiner that the claimed requirement
that “focus control command excites the tracking control loop” encompasses
Watanabe’s operation of turning off the tracking control when focus
jumping or other triggering events in Watanabe.
Appellants’ Specification provides sufficient guidance and context for
interpreting the term “excites.” For example, the Specification discusses
excitation of the control loops in the context of achieving “tracking only
action (force or torque)” (Spec. ¶ 0025 (emphasis added)). To this end, the
Specification states the actuator decoupler 406 operates to produce a
tracking control signal that provides “substantially only excitation of the
tracking loop” (Spec. ¶ 0026). Consistent with the plain and ordinary
meaning in the art, the Specification’s discussion of “action,” “force,” and
“torque” suggests that the term “excite” requires a focus command
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contribute to inducing some activity in the tracking control. In contrast, the
Examiner’s rejection is predicated on the interpretation that the term
“excites” encompasses inducing inactivity: “switching off the tracking
operation” (Ans. 12). Therefore, the Examiner has failed to show that
Watanabe discloses the “focus control command excites the tracking control
loop.”
Appellants have persuaded us that the Examiner’s reliance on
Watanabe in the rejection of claim 23 is an error. Accordingly, we will not
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 23 or of claims 24 and
25, which depend from claim 23.
CLAIMS 26-30, 36, AND 37
Independent claim 26 is illustrative of the cited claims:
26. A method comprising:
determining cross-coupling characteristics of a focus
actuator and a tracking actuator of an optical pickup unit; and
determining a decoupling matrix to decouple the focus
actuator and the tracking actuator.
Contentions
The Examiner rejects claim 26 as being anticipated by Watanabe.
Regarding the “determining a decoupling matrix” step, the Examiner finds
Watanabe’s “DSP 129 and gain change means forms a servo loop having
servo parameters which can be considered as a de-coupling matrix of
tracking and focusing” (Ans. 8-9). Furthermore, the Examiner states,
the prior art of Watanabe’s gain change means 121, 122 and
127 forms a servo loop control means which has cross-coupling
control paths linked to each gain change means like a matrix in
order to carry out control signals so that the servo loop control
means function under assigned characteristics.
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(Ans. 13).
Appellants argue, inter alia,
Further, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that the alleged “servo
loop” of the DSP 129 and the gain change circuits 121, 122,
and 127 constitutes a “decoupling matrix,” the Office fails to
establish how Watanabe determines the “decoupling
matrix”/“servo loop”, much less how Watanabe determines the
“decoupling matrix”/“servo loop” based on the “servo loop”
(which the Office also interprets as the “cross-coupling
characteristics” from which the “decoupling matrix” is
determined as provided by claims 26 and 36).
(App. Br. 13).
Analysis
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 26 and 36. The Examiner has failed to establish Watanabe discloses
the claimed “determining a decoupling matrix.” Appellants’ claim 26 recites
the active, positive step of “determining a decoupling matrix.” Likewise,
claim 36 requires a “means for” doing so.
The Examiner’s rejection appears to map the claimed “matrix” to a
structure in Watanabe’s system, but fails to address the step and function of
“determining” as noted by Appellants (App. Br. 13). Under the mapping
proposed in the rejection, the Examiner has not shown that Watanabe’s
system performs any act of “determining” that produces a “matrix” required
by the claim. Instead, the Examiner has equated the “matrix” to Watanabe’s
circuits, implying that the optical disk drive itself, in the rejection of claim
36, contains a “means for determining” these circuits, which is clearly not
consistent with the teachings of the prior art.
Because Appellants have persuaded us that the Examiner’s reliance on
Watanabe in the rejection of claims 26 and 36 is an error, we will not sustain
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the Examiner’s rejection of independent claims 26 or 36, or of claims 27-30
and 37, which depend from claims 26 and 36, respectively.
CLAIMS 31-35
Independent claim 31 is illustrative of the cited claims:
31. An optical disk drive comprising:
a lens assembly;
a focus actuator that is configured to move the lens
assembly in a focus direction;
a tracking actuator that is configured to move the lens
assembly in a tracking direction; and
a decoupler configured to decouple the focus actuator
from the tracking actuator by reducing signal cross coupling.
Contentions
The Examiner’s rejection states “[c]laims 31-35 have limitations
similar to those treated in the above rejection [of claim 26], and are met by
the reference as discussed above” (Ans. 9).
In response, Appellants contend Watanabe fails to disclose the
claimed “decoupler” because “Watanabe fails to address signal cross
coupling, or the reduction thereof, in any manner” (App. Br. 14-15).
Analysis
Appellants have persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 31-35. Unlike claim 26, claim 31 expressly requires the claimed
“decoupler” perform its function “by reducing signal cross coupling.” The
Examiner’s rejection of claim 26 fails to discuss “signal cross coupling.”
Moreover, the portions of Watanabe cited in the rejection of claim 26 also
fail to expressly mention “signal cross-coupling” (Ans. 8-9 (citing
Watanabe, Fig. 1)), and it is not reasonably clear how these portions are
mapped to the claim limitations of claim 31. Thus, the Examiner’s reliance
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on the reasoning presented in the rejection of claim 26 fails to address the
limitations newly introduced in claim 31. For these reasons, we find
Examiner has not reasonably articulated an ascertainable basis for the
finding that Watanabe anticipates the claimed “reducing signal cross
coupling.”
Accordingly, we will not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 31.
We will, likewise, not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 32-25,
which depend from claim 31.

NEW REJECTION OF CLAIM 26 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Principles of Law
Statutory provision 35 U.S.C. § 101 reads as follows: “Whoever
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” However, the scope of subject matter encompassed by § 101 does
have limits. Exceptions falling outside of the scope of § 101’s coverage
include the laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). A method that can be
performed “by human thought alone is merely an abstract idea and is not
patent-eligible under § 101.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2011). As stated in CyberSource:
Methods which can be performed entirely in the human mind
are unpatentable not because there is anything wrong with
claiming mental method steps as part of a process containing
non-mental steps, but rather because computational methods
which can be performed entirely in the human mind are the
types of methods that embody the “basic tools of scientific and
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technological work” that are free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.
Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (emphasis
omitted)).
Analysis
The method of claim 26 is an unpatentable abstract idea because the
method can be performed by human thought alone. The presence of device
components, such as the optical pickup unit, in the claim does not change the
character of the claimed steps because such components are the objects on
which the steps operate. The language of claim 26 fails to expressly or
implicitly limit either “determining” step to necessarily be accomplished by
a machine. Moreover, even if some physical steps are required to obtain the
information operated on, such steps cannot alone confer patentability. Id. at
1372 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Turning to the claim language, the “determining cross-coupling
characteristics” step encompasses mental determinations based on data
collected. The Specification discloses taking measurements to determine the
effects of cross-coupling using a test article (Spec. ¶ 0028), but as broadly
recited in the claim, the step of “determining” encompasses mental
determinations based on these measurements. That is, the step is not limited
to the measuring device itself making the determination, but instead, the
step, as claimed, encompasses computations performed by the human mind
to determine characteristics based on these measurements using the physical
principles governing the operation of the device.
Likewise, the “determining decoupling matrix” step can be performed
in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper. The determination
of a matrix is merely the manipulation of data that encompasses steps
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performed in the mind of a person designing an optical disk drive. To the
extent recordation may be necessary, doing so using a pen and paper would
suffice in view of Appellants’ disclosed matrix operations (Spec. ¶ 0030-40).
Specifically, the complexity of the claimed step does not require the use of a
computer to perform the calculations or to maintain the matrix. Taken as a
whole, the claimed method is broad enough to encompass a computational
method that an engineer could mentally perform when designing the optical
drive.
Accordingly, we reject claim 26 as not directed to patent-eligible
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed method
constitutes an unpatentable mental process.
Although we decline to reject every claim under our discretionary
authority under 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b), we emphasize that our decision does not
mean the remaining claims are patentable. Rather, we merely leave the
patentability determination of these claims to the Examiner. See MPEP
§ 1213.02.

NEW REJECTION OF CLAIM 36 UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2
Independent claim 36 reads as follows:
36. An optical disk drive comprising:
means for determining cross-coupling characteristics of a
focus actuator and a tracking actuator; and
means for determining a decoupling matrix to decouple
the focus actuator and the tracking actuator.
Principles of Law
Once a court concludes that a claim limitation is a means-plus-
function limitation, two steps of claim construction remain: 1) the court must
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first identify the function of the limitation; and 2) the court must then look to
the Specification and identify the corresponding structure for that function.
Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205,
1210 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
As set forth in Default Credit:
“[I]f one employs means-plus-function language in a
claim, one must set forth in the specification an adequate
disclosure showing what is meant by that language. If an
applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant
has in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim
the invention as required by the second paragraph of section
112.” In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed.Cir.1994)
(en banc). “The specification must be read as a whole to
determine the structure capable of performing the claimed
function.” Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369,
1379 (Fed.Cir.2001). A structure disclosed in the specification
qualifies as “corresponding” structure only if the specification
or prosecution history clearly links or associates that structure
to the function recited in the claim. B. Braun Med. v. Abbott
Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed.Cir.1997). This duty to link or
associate structure to function is the quid pro quo for the
convenience of employing § 112, ¶ 6. See O.I. Corp. v. Tekmar
Co., 115 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1997). “Fulfillment of the
§ 112, ¶ 6 trade-off cannot be satisfied when there is a total
omission of structure.” Atmel, 198 F.3d at 1382. While
corresponding structure need not include all things necessary to
enable the claimed invention to work, it must include all
structure that actually performs the recited function. See
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106,
1119 (Fed.Cir.2002).
Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d
1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (brackets in original).
The “clear linkage or association” in the Specification of the structure
to the function recited in the claim is determined based on the understanding
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of an artisan of ordinary skill. See AllVoice Computing PLC v. Nuance
Commc’ns, Inc., 504 F.3d 1236, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
“If there is no structure in the specification corresponding to the
means-plus-function limitation in the claims, the claim will be found invalid
as indefinite.” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp., 490 F.3d 946, 950
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
Analysis
We reject claim 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, as being indefinite
because the Specification does not disclose the necessary structure
corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation “means for determining
cross-coupling characteristics of a focus actuator and a tracking actuator.”
In particular, the Specification discloses embodiments where determination
of the characteristics is performed during manufacture of the drive, but fails
to provide sufficient disclosure of the corresponding structure that functions
as a component in the optical disk drive as required by the claim.
Because the claim limitation invokes § 112, ¶ 6, we must, therefore,
determine if the Specification discloses the corresponding structure in
accordance with the statute. The Specification contains the following
disclosure regarding determining cross-coupling characteristics:
Cross-coupling characteristics, i.e., cross-coupling matrices, of
the system are determined, step 504. For example, a
measurement quantifying the effects of tracking commands on
the focus position can be made by providing a tracking
command to a tracking actuator and a known circuit (for
example, a known simple regulator) to the focus actuator and
measuring results on the focus position. These and other cross-
coupling effects can be measured and stored. These
measurement and storage operations can be performed with test
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articles, during manufacture of the drive or during operation of
the drive.
(Spec. ¶ 0028).
The Specification fails to disclose a corresponding structure “for
determining cross-coupling characteristics” that is part of the optical disk
drive, as required by claim 36. The embodiments where the characteristics
are determined during the manufacture of the drive are not relevant to our
inquiry because the claim requires that the means be an element within the
“optical disk drive.”
Moreover, the Specification’s additional statement that the
“measurement and storage operations can be performed with test articles, . . .
during operation of the drive” is not a sufficient disclosure of structure. The
fact that one of ordinary skill in the art could imagine various types of
devices capable of determining the cross-coupling effects within an optical
disk drive, during its operation, is not sufficient under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6,
to put one on notice of what structures the Specification, itself, discloses.
See Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 953 (“The inquiry is whether one of skill in the
art would understand the specification itself to disclose a structure, not
simply whether that person would be capable of implementing a structure.”
(citing Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1212)).
In the cited portion of the Specification, the phrase “test articles” does
not clearly define a specific structure in the optical drive itself. In particular,
the Specification does not describe what these “test articles” are or whether
such articles are included within the drive itself. Moreover, the discussion
of “cross-coupling matrices” in paragraph 0028 of the Specification suggests
that subsequent calculations are performed on the measurements to
determine the “characteristics.” It is not reasonably clear whether the “test
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articles” or some other device performs these subsequent calculations.
Therefore, the corresponding structure is not disclosed in the Specification
itself in a way that one skilled in the art would understand what structure
performs the function recited in claim 36.
Accordingly, we reject claim 36 as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
¶ 2.
Although we decline to reject every claim under our discretionary
authority under 37 C.F.R. 41.50(b), we emphasize that our decision does not
mean the remaining claims are patentable. Rather, we merely leave the
patentability determination of these claims to the Examiner. See MPEP
§ 1213.02.

DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 21-37 is reversed.
Pursuant to our authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we enter the
following new grounds of rejection:
We reject claim 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to non-
statutory subject matter.
We reject claim 36 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2, as being indefinite.
Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) states that “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Furthermore, 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that Appellants, WITHIN
TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE DECISION, must exercise
one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of
rejection to avoid termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
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(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating
to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the matter
reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the proceeding
will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the proceeding be
reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon the same record. . . .
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

REVERSED
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

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