Ex Parte Hawkins et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 23, 2015

12756788 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 23, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/756,788 04/08/2010 Gary F. Hawkins 700700-042x2 1330
21836 7590 07/23/2015
HENRICKS SLAVIN AND HOLMES LLP
SUITE 200
840 APOLLO STREET
EL SEGUNDO, CA 90245
EXAMINER
CHENEVERT, PAUL A
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3612
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/23/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte GARY F. HAWKINS and CHING-YAO TANG
____________

Appeal 2013-005364
Application 12/756,7881
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before STEFAN STAICOVICI, WILLIAM A. CAPP, and
JILL D. HILL, Administrative Patent Judges.

STAICOVICI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gary F. Hawkins and Ching-Yao Tang (Appellants) appeal under
35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) claims 30–44 as anticipated by Weller (US 3,809,420, issued May
7, 1974)2. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is The Aerospace
Corporation. Appeal Br. 3.
2 The Examiner’s objections to the Drawings, Specification, and claim
37 (see Final Act. 2–5) have been withdrawn by the Examiner. See Adv.
Act. 2 (mailed July 25, 2012).
Appeal 2013-005364
Application 12/756,788

2

SUMMARY OF DECISION
We REVERSE.

INVENTION
Appellants’ invention relates to a device for “absorbing some or all of
the forces associated with collisions.” Spec. 1, ll. 11–12.
Claims 30, 37, and 38 are independent. Claim 30 is illustrative of the
claimed invention and reads as follows:
30. An automobile bumper assembly, comprising:
an automobile bumper; and
a force diversion apparatus positioned over at least some
of the automobile bumper including
a force conversion portion configured to redirect at
least a portion of a force associated with an object
impacting the force diversion apparatus, and
a force spreading portion operably connected to
force conversion portion.

ANALYSIS
Each of independent claims 30, 37, and 38 requires “an automobile
bumper.” See Appeal Br. 27–28. The Examiner finds that Weller teaches,
inter alia, an automobile bumper 12. See Final Act. 6; see also Weller,
Fig. 1. Appellants argue that the Examiner’s interpretation of Weller’s
vehicle frame member 12 as a “bumper” is not reasonable. See Appeal
Br. 7.
During examination, “claims . . . are to be given their broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification, [ ] and . . . claim
language should be read in light of the specification as it would be
interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831,
Appeal 2013-005364
Application 12/756,788

3

833 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal citation and quotations omitted). This means
that the words of a claim must be given their plain meaning unless the plain
meaning is inconsistent with the specification. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319,
321 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In this case, we agree with Appellants that an ordinary
and customary meaning of the term “bumper” is “a device for absorbing
shock or preventing damage (as in collision); specifically : a bar at either end
of an automobile.” Appeal Br. 8; see also Merriam Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary (10th Ed. 1997). Such an interpretation is consistent with
Appellants’ Specification, which describes an “automobile bumper that is
mounted on the automobile.” Spec. 16, ll. 2–3 (emphasis added). We
further agree with Appellants that the term “automobile bumper” is used in
the prior art as a device attached to a vehicle frame for absorbing and
dissipating the force of an impact. See Appeal Br. 10–113. Hence, we agree
with Appellants that the term “‘[automobile] bumper’ [means] a device at
the end of an automobile that is attached to the body or frame for the
purpose of fending off blows, absorbing shock, and preventing damage.”
See id. at 9.
As such, we do not agree with the Examiner’s interpretation of
Weller’s vehicle frame 12 as the claimed “automobile bumper” as
understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art. Furthermore, although

3 In Helman (US 1,290,187, issued Jan. 7, 1919) bumper assembly 1, 2
is attached to the vehicle frame. See Helman, p. 1, ll. 84–89 and Fig. 2.
Similarly, in Yepsis, impact-receiving member 34, i.e., bumper, is attached
to cross frame member 14. See Yepsis, col. 1, ll. 51–52 and Fig. 1. Finally,
Montgomery discloses that bumper assembly 10 is disposed externally of the
vehicle body 12 and secured to side rail 26 of the vehicle frame. See
Montgomery, col. 2, ll. 27–38 and Fig. 1.
Appeal 2013-005364
Application 12/756,788

4

“Weller does not mention any restriction that the front cross-member (12)
cannot be a bumper” (see Ans. 4), nonetheless, interpreting Weller’s front
cross-member 12 as the claimed automobile bumper is inconsistent with the
purpose of an automobile bumper, namely, to prevent the transmission of
impact forces to the vehicle frame. See e.g., Helman, p. 1, ll. 15–20 (“The
invention relates to bumpers for motor vehicles, and the primary object of
the invention is to provide one . . . that it will absorb and dissipate the force
of an impact to prevent the transmission of the latter to the frame.”). Lastly,
we note that because Weller explicitly teaches structure 18 to be a vehicle
(automobile) bumper, it is unreasonable to interpret Weller’s front cross-
member 12 as also a bumper.
In conclusion, because Weller’s front cross-member 12 does not
constitute an “automobile bumper,” as understood by a person of ordinary
skill in the art, we do not sustain the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) of
claims 30–44 as anticipated by Weller.

SUMMARY
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 30–44 is reversed.

REVERSED
JRG