Ex Parte Hassani et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 5, 2018

14931132 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 5, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
14/931,132 11/03/2015
28395 7590 11/07/2018
BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./FG1L
1000 TOWN CENTER
22NDFLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Ali Hassani
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
83580973 1208
EXAMINER
HAN,QI
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2659
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/07/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALI HASSAN!, SCOTT ANDREW AMMAN,
FRANCOIS CHARETTE, JOHN EDWARD HUBER,
BRIGITTE FRANCES MORA RICHARDSON,
GINTARAS VINCENT PUSKORIUS, AN JI, and
RANJANI RANGARAJAN 1
Appeal2018-002845
Application 14/931, 13 2
Technology Center 2600
Before ROBERT E. NAPPI, JOHN P. PINKERTON and
JOHN D. HAMANN, Administrative Patent Judges.
NAPPI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner's final
rejection of claims 1 through 20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellants, Ford Global Technologies LLC. is the real party
in interest. App. Br. 3.
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Application 14/931, 132
INVENTION
The invention is directed to a generating a speech utterance set for
speech recognition training. Abstract. Claim 17 is representative of the
invention and is reproduced below.
17. A system comprising:
a controller programmed to create a speech utterance set
for speech recognition training by, in response to receiving data
representing a neutral utterance and parameter values defining
signal noise, generating data representing a Lombard effect
version of the neutral utterance using a transfer function
associated with the parameter values and defining distortion
between neutral and Lombard effect versions of a same
utterance due to the signal noise.
EXAMINER'S REJECTION2
The Examiner has rejected claims 1 through 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
for being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 4--6.
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Patent-eligible subject matter is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 of the
Patent Act, which recites:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
2 Throughout this Decision we refer to the Appeal Brief ("App. Br.") filed
August 23, 201 7, the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.") filed January 22, 2018, Final
Office Action ("Final Act.") mailed March 20, 2017, and the Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.") mailed November 22, 2017.
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There are, however, three judicially created exceptions to the broad
categories of patent-eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101: "[l]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas." Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Int'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012). The Supreme Court sets
forth a two-part "framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-
eligible applications of those concepts." Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id.
First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to
one of those patent-ineligible concepts .... [Mayo, 566 U.S. at
7 6-77]. If so, we then ask, "[ w ]hat else is there in the claims
before us?" Id., at [77-78]. To answer that question, we
consider the elements of each claim both individually and "as
an ordered combination" to determine whether the additional
elements "transform the nature of the claim" into a patent-
eligible application. Id., at [78-79]. We have described step
two of this analysis as a search for an "'inventive concept"'-
i. e., an element or combination of elements that is "sufficient to
ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more
than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself." Id., at [71-
73].
Although an abstract idea itself is patent ineligible, an application of
the abstract idea may be patent eligible. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. Thus, we
must consider "the elements of each claim both individually and 'as an
ordered combination' to determine whether the additional elements
'transform the nature of the claim' into a patent-eligible application." Id.
(quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). The claim must contain elements or a
combination of elements that are "sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ abstract idea]
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itself." Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73). The Federal Circuit has
explained that, in determining whether claims are patent-eligible under
Section 101, "the decisional mechanism courts now apply is to examine
earlier cases in which a similar or parallel descriptive nature can be seen-
what prior cases were about, and which way they were decided." Amdocs
(Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
The Federal Circuit also noted in that decision that "examiners are to
continue to determine if the claim recites (i.e., sets forth or describes) a
concept that is similar to concepts previously found abstract by the courts."
Id. at 1294 n.2.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed Appellants' arguments in the Briefs, the
Examiner's rejection, and the Examiner's response to Appellants'
arguments. Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us of error in the
Examiner's conclusion that the claims are directed to patent-ineligible
subject matter.
Appellants argue that the Examiner's rejection of claims 1 through 20
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is in error as the Examiner has not demonstrated that
the concept of creating a speech utterance set associated with a specific
noise signal for speech recognition training is directed to an abstract idea by
demonstrating that it is similar to what the courts have identified as abstract
ideas. App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 1-2. Appellants argue that Digitech Image
Techs., LLC v. Elecs.for Imaging, Inc. 758 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2014) and
Gottschalk v Benson 93 S. Ct. 253 (1972), cited by the Examiner, dealt with
dissimilar concepts and are irrelevant to the claims at issue. App. Br. 8.
The Examiner provides a detailed response to Appellants' arguments
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on pages 3 through 6 of the Answer. The Examiner considers the
"claimed invention is basically identified and related to a concept of
manipulating/applying a transfer function (mathematical relationship) on/to
neutral utterances with noise signal ( as input data) to generate Lombard
effected utterance (output data), which is substantially directed to or
interpreted as an abstract idea of 'mathematical relationship/formula"'
Answer 3--4. Further, the Examiner states:
Further, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize
that (i) a transfer function itself is a mathematical
relationship/formula between input and output data, so as being
a "mathematical relationship" as an abstract idea; and (ii)
simply applying a generic transfer function to one type of data
to generate another type of data without sufficient/necessary
definitions/ descriptions for the transfer function itself, is also
directed to an abstract idea ( such as a generic idea/ concept of
applying/using a generic mathematical relationship/formula, or
merely mentally processing immature idea/function).
Furthermore, it is noted that the limitation of "the transfer
function defines distortion between neural and Lombard effect
versions of a same utterance due to the specified noise signal",
only describes the data/information (such as the input utterance
and noise and output utterance) outside of the transfer function,
but for the transfer function itself it merely recites a generic
feature of "distortion", without any specific
definition/ description of the function itself ( such as specific
equation, parameters, and/or or rules/algorithms belonging to
or included within the transfer function).
Answer4-5.
We concur with the Examiner's rationale in finding that the
claims recite an abstract idea. Claim 17 recites a controller that
a) receives data representing a neutral utterance and values defining
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signal noise, and b) generates data using a transfer function. 3 As
identified by the Examiner a transfer function is a mathematical
algorithm. Answer 4. The definition of transfer function is "the
mathematical relationship between the output of a control system and
it's input," McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical
Terms, Fifth Ed. 1994. Thus, claim 17 is reciting a controller that
receives data (information) and performs a mathematical altorigthm to
generate data. As our reviewing court has said "we have treated
collecting information, including when limited to particular content
(which does not change its character as information) as within the
realm of abstract ideas ... In a similar vein, we have treated analyzing
information ... by mathematical algorithms, without more ... as within
the abstract-idea category." Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom
S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The limitations
directed to the data representing neutral utterances, parameter values
of noise or Lombard effect version of the neutral utterance, merely
define the content of the data and do not change the character of the
data to something else, i.e., the limitations just identify the data as
being of a particular type and do not make it something other than
data. Thus, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the
Examiner's application of Digitech and Gottschalk, as demonstrating
that claims directed to mathematical algorithms are not patent eligible,
is inapplicable to the current claims. The distinction Appellants rely
upon, data representing utterances and noise, merely relates to the
3 Appellants' arguments group claims 1 through 20. In accordance with
37 C.F.R. § 4I.37(c)(l)(iv) we select claim 17 as representative of the group.
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content of the data, which does not make the data less of an abstract
concept. Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in
finding that representative claim 17 is directed to an abstract idea.
Appellants further argue that even if the claims recite an
abstract idea the rejection is in error as the claims recite significantly
more that the abstract idea. App. Br. 9--11. Appellants argue the
claimed controller is used to create a speech utterance set for speech
recognition training, which is significantly more than what is routine
and conventional in the field as no anticipation or obviousness
rejections are applied. App. Br. 10. Appellants argue that the claims
do not preempt every application of the idea. Answer 10 (citing DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Reply Br. 2. Appellants state: "[i]n the instant application, the claims
also resolve a particular problem relating to an 'involuntary tendency
of a person speaking in a noisy environment to introduce distortions
into their speech so as to ensure understanding in the presence of
audible interference' via a specific technical solution." App. Br. 10.
The Examiner addresses these arguments by stating that the
claims merely recite generic components to implement the abstract
idea and Appellants have not shown that the claims recite an
improvement in computer related technology. Answer 6-7. Thus, the
Examiner does not consider the claims to recite significantly more that
he abstract idea.
Appellants' arguments have not persuaded us the Examiner
erred in not considering the claims to recite significantly more than
the abstract idea. Appellants' argument that the claims are directed to
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Application 14/931, 132
significantly more than an abstract idea because they are more than
what is routine as shown by the lack of an anticipation or obviousness
rejection is not persuasive. App. Br. 10. Although the second step in
the Alice/Mayo analysis includes a search for an inventive concept,
the analysis is not an evaluation of novelty or nonobviousness, but
rather, a search for "an element or combination of elements that is
'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly
more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself."' Alice, 134 S.
Ct. at 2355. A novel and nonobvious claim directed to a purely
abstract idea is, nonetheless, patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct.
at 1304; see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188-89 (1981)
("The novelty of any element or steps in a process, or even of the
process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly
patentable subject matter."); see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v.
Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining
that a jury's determination that certain prior art did not anticipate or
render obvious the asserted claims did "not resolve the question of
whether the claims embody an inventive concept at the second step of
Mayo/Alice"). Further we are not persuaded by Appellants'
preemption argument. Our reviewing court has said "[ w ]here a
patent's claims are deemed only to disclose patent ineligible subject
matter under the Mayo framework, [] preemption concerns are fully
addressed and made moot." Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom,
Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Finally, Appellants'
arguments, that the claims are directed to solving a technical problem
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relating to understanding a person speaking in the presence of audible
interference, are not persuasive as they are not commensurate with the
scope of the claims. As discussed above, claim 17 is directed to
generating a training set (of data) based upon using a transfer function
on received data. Representative claim 17 does not recite that the
received data (neural utterance) is spoken data that the controller is
trying to understand, or that the training data ( the created data) is
actually being used in a step to improve the understanding of a person
speaking in the presence of noise, i.e., the claim recites receiving and
creating the data, but not using it in the manner to implement the
asserted technical solution. According, we are not persuaded that
claim 17 recites significantly more that the abstract concept of
applying a mathematical algorithm to data and, as such, are not
persuaded of error in the Examiner's rejection of representative claim
17. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's rejection of claims 1
through 20 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner's rejections of claims 1 through 20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Additionally, should there be further prosecution of this application
the Examiner is encouraged to evaluate whether independent claims 1 and
17 are single means claims. See MPEP 2181 (I) and (V).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv) (2016).
AFFIRMED
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