Ex Parte Hartmann

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 31, 2017

14051559 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 31, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/051,559 10/11/2013 Stefan Hartmann LSTC-087 2512
103523 7590 11/02/2017
Livermore Software Technology Corp.
Attn: Roger Chu
P.O. Box 712
Livermore, CA 94551
EXAMINER
PIERRE LOUIS, ANDRE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2123
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/02/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
rogerchu @ lstc .com
roger. chu .patent @ gmail. com
rogerchu 168 @ gmail. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte STEFAN HARTMANN
Appeal 2017-006297
Application 14/051,559:
Technology Center 2100
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOVAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BUI, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1—18, which are all the claims pending
in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.1 2
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Livermore Software
Technology Corporation. App. Br. 1.
2 Our Decision refers to Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed
November 28, 2016; Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed February 28, 2017;
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed February 2, 2017; Final Office Action
(“Final Act.”) mailed June 30, 2016; and original Specification (“Spec.”),
filed October 11,2013.
Appeal 2017-006297
Application 14/051,559
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant’s invention relates to “methods and systems for joining
imperfectly-matching Non-Uniform Rational Basis Splines (NURBS)
patches to form a computerized model suitable for Finite Element Analysis
(FEA).” Spec. 11; Title (capitalization altered); Abstract. NURBS-based
curves and surfaces are used in computer-aided design (CAD) for
representing an object’s geometry by surface modeling, while FEA is a
computerized method used to model an object using a mesh model of the
object’s geometric description and the object’s material properties at each
point within the model. Spec. 2^4. Appellant’s invention enables
imperfectly or partially-matching NURBS patches describing an object
under analysis, to be joined together along a physical boundary to form a
computerized model suitable for finite element analysis of the object. Spec.
H5-6, 8, 10, 26,38.
Claims 1, 7, and 13 are independent. Claim 1 illustrates Appellant’s
invention, as reproduced below:
1. A method of joining imperfectly-matching Non-
Uniform Rational Basis Splines (NURBS) patches to form a
computerized model suitable for finite element analysis (FEA),
said method comprising:
receiving, in a computer system having an application
module installed thereon, definitions of a first NURBS patch and
a second NURBS patch, the first and second NURBS patches to
be joined together along a physical boundary defined in a first
curve with a first set of control points, associated weights and a
corresponding first plurality of knot-vector values in the first
NURBS patch and defined in a second curve with a second set
of control points, associated weights and a corresponding second
plurality of knot-vector values in the second NURBS patch,
wherein the first set of control points and said first plurality of
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knot-vector values are different from the second set of control
points and said second plurality of knot-vector values;
normalizing said first plurality of knot-vector values such
that the first curve’s parametric length equals the first curve’s
physical length in the first NURBS patch;
normalizing said second plurality of knot-vector values
such that the second curve’s parametric length equals the second
curve’s physical length in the second NURBS patch;
determining a common curve as an overlapped section of
the first and the second curves to represent the physical
boundary;
adjusting the first and the second curves such that first and
second projection points correspond to starting and end locations
of the common curve, respectively;
designating one of the first and second curves having less
number of control points along the common curve as a master
curve, the other as a slave curve; and
determining a set of linear constraint equations for
numerically connecting the first and second NURBS patches
along the physical boundary by computing dependencies of the
slave curve’s control points to the master curve’s control points,
whereby the first and second NURBS patches together with the
set of linear constraint equations for the control points along the
physical boundary enable a computerized model created
therefrom suitable for finite element analysis.
App. Br. 12—17 (Claims App.).
Examiner’s Rejection
Claims 1—18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the
claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. Final Act. 3.
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ANALYSIS
In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014), the Supreme Court reiterates an analytical two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that
claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that
claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at
2355. The first step in the analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” such as an
abstract idea. Id. If the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept,
the second step in the analysis is to consider the elements of the claims
“individually and ‘as an ordered combination’” to determine whether there
are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a
patent-eligible application.” Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78—79). In other
words, the second step is to “search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72—73).
In rejecting independent claims 1, 7, and 13 and dependent claims 2—
6, 8—12, and 14—18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner finds these claims
are directed to an abstract idea of “a mathematical concept’ in which “a
number of mathematical steps are performed which enable the creation of a
computerized mathematical model.” Ans. 2, 4. The Examiner also finds the
claims do not
provide anything that amounts to significantly more than the
judicial exception, as the claims merely provide a number of
mathematical steps that merely enable the creation of a
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computerized mathematical model using a computational
processor, a well-known routine, conventional suitable for FEA;
and ... all the steps set forth including the steps of receiving, in
a computer having application stored thereon, definition of a
first and second NURBS patches representing the curves,
normalizing a first and second knot-vectors values, []
determining a common [curve] as an overlapped section; the
claims further include additional steps of adjusting the first and
second curves, and designating one of the first and second curve
to determine a set of linear constraint equations where set of
linear constraints equations enable the creation of computerized
mathematical model suitable for FEA, are concepts that have
been identified by the courts as abstract such as a formula for
computing in Flook....
Ans. 2—3.
As to the first step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant contends
independent claims 1,7, and 13 are not directed to an abstract idea; instead,
Appellant argues these claims “convert one computerized model (i.e.,
NURBS patches for CAD) to another computerized model (i.e., FEA mesh
model for CAE [computer aided engineering]).” App. Br. 7; see also Reply
Br. 3. Appellant argues the claims’ “conversion is not simply [a]
mathematical concept [or] purely mental activity . . . because the conversion
of a CAD model to a CAE model is a mechanical engineering design
analysis activity performed using a specialized computer under directions of
engineers/scientists who design the product (e.g., car, airplane).” App. Br. 7.
In the Reply, Appellant further argues “the present claims are directed to an
improvement in the functioning of a computer (i.e., joining mis-matched
NURBS patches (CAD models) to a computerized model suitable for finite
element analysis (F[E]A)).” Reply Br. 4.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. As correctly
recognized by the Examiner, Appellant’s claims 1, 7, and 13, when
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considered in light of Appellant’s Specification, recite “mathematical
concepts in which a number of mathematical steps are performed which
enable the creation of a computerized mathematical model” by manipulating
data including NURBS patches, knot-vector values, and first and second
curves correlated by linear constraint equations. Ans. 2; see also Final Act.
2.
We agree with the Examiner that claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to
the abstract idea of manipulating data through mathematical relationships,
which is similar to the computing formula discussed in Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978), and the Arrhenius formula in Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175 (1981). Particularly, Appellant’s claim 1, and similarly claims 7 and 13,
manipulate data including: mathematical curves (“Non-Uniform Rational
Basis Splines (NURBS),” see Spec. Tflf 1, 39) and surfaces (“NURBS
patches” of a “NURBS surface description,” see Spec. Tflf 5, 38); control and
projection points representing curves (see Spec. 26, 29, 38—39, 42);
weight values at control points (see Spec. Tflf 26, 39); knot-vector values
associated with curve points (see Spec. 26, 33, 39); and curves’ lengths
(“knot-vector values of the first curve are normalized” by, e.g., “evaluating]
the physical length of the curve (e.g., by numerical integration) first, then the
knot-vector representing the curve is scaled in such a way that the difference
between the first and the last knot-vector value matches the physical length,”
see Spec. 27). Additionally, the claimed “determining a set of linear
constraint equations” merely determines dependencies between curves’
control points by, e.g., matrix operations between arrays of control points.
See Spec. H 31, 4AA5, Fig. 7F.
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Furthermore, information as such is intangible, and data analysis and
algorithms are abstract ideas. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437, 451 n.12 (2007); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355; Flook, 437 U.S. at
589, 594—95 (“Reasoning that an algorithm, or mathematical formula, is like
a law of nature, Benson applied the established rule that a law of nature
cannot be the subject of a patent.”); and Gottschalkv. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,
71—72 (1972). Information collection and analysis, including when limited
to particular content, is within the realm of abstract ideas. See, e.g., Internet
Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2014); and CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). That is, “[wjithout additional limitations, a
process that employs mathematical algorithms to manipulate existing
information to generate additional information is not patent eligible.”
Digitech, 758 F.3d at 1349—51 (“Data in its ethereal, non-physical form is
simply information that does not fall under any of the categories of eligible
subject matter under section 101”).
Appellant also argues “a computer is required for performing the
claimed method,” as the “[independent claims are inextricably tied to
creating a computerized (FEA) model,” thereby removing the claims from
the realm of “abstract ideas.” App. Br. 7. We remain unpersuaded by
Appellant’s argument. All the steps of Appellant’s claim 1 (and similarly
claims 7 and 13), including, for example: i) receiving definitions of NURBS
patches; ii) normalizing knot-vector values; iii) determining a common curve
and adjusting the first and second curves; and iv) determining a set of linear
constraint equations by computing dependencies between curves’ control
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points, are abstract mathematical concepts and algorithms that could be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper, without
need of any computer or other machine. See CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1373
(“[A] method that can be performed by human thought alone is merely an
abstract idea and is not patent-eligible under § 101see also In re
Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[MJental processes—or
processes of human thinking—standing alone are not patentable even if they
have practical application.”); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (“Phenomena of nature
. . . , mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable,
as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work” (emphasis
added)). Additionally, mental processes remain unpatentable even when
automated to reduce the burden on the user of what once could have been
done with pen and paper. CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1375 (“That purely
mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer,
was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the method
claimed in independent claims is a method to convert one computerized
model (i.e., NURBS patches for CAD) to another computerized model (i.e.,
FEA mesh model for CAE)[, which] is NOT an abstract idea.” App. Br. 7.
As the Examiner finds, “the claims do not explicitly recite the conversion of
one model to another.” Ans. 5; see also Ans. 2. Thus, Appellant’s argument
is not supported by corresponding language in claims 1, 7, and 13. Ans. 2,
5.
Claims 1, 7, and 13 also do not recite a CAD model, a computer aided
engineering (CAE) model, or “a mechanical engineering design analysis” for
a “product (e.g., car, airplane),” as advocated by Appellant. App. Br. 5, 7.
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The claims’ only real-world element is the “physical boundary” along which
the first and second NURBS patches are to be joined. The claimed “physical
boundary,” however, is not tied to an engineering application or to an actual
product to be modeled; rather, claim 1, and similarly claims 7 and 13,
merely recite that “first and second NURBS patches to be joined together
along a physical boundary defined in a first curve . . . and defined in a
second curve,” the curves having an overlapped section “representing] the
physical boundaryApp. Br. 12 (emphasis added). The claims further
recite “the first and second NURBS patches together with the set of linear
constraint equations for the control points along the physical boundary
enable a computerized model created therefrom suitable for finite element
analysis.” App. Br. 12—13 (emphasis added). This limitation, again, does
not tie the “computerized model” to an engineering application, and does not
specify what the model is used for.
Thus, we find claims 1, 7, and 13 are directed to an abstract idea of
manipulating data through mathematical relationships, which is similar to
the computing formula discussed in Flook, and the Arrhenius formula in
Diehr.
Appellant further argues claims 1, 7, and 13 are similar to the claims
in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016), in that
these claims “are directed to an improvement in the functioning of a
computer (i.e., joining mis-matched NURBS patches (CAD models) to a
computerized model suitable for finite element analysis (F[E]A)).” Reply
Br. 3^4 (citing Spec. 5, 8). Appellant, however, does not present
evidence to establish claims 1, 7, and 13 recite a specific improvement to the
computers. See Enfish, 822 F.3dat 1336. Appellant also has not
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demonstrated the claims “improve the way a computer stores and retrieves
data in memory,” as the claims in Enfish did via a “self-referential table for a
computer database.” See Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1336, 1339. For example,
claims 1, 7, and 13 merely require determining linear constraint equations
for numerically connecting NURBS patches, and enabling a computerized
model to be created therefrom suitable for finite element analysis, which
does not demonstrate an actual improvement to the way computers (or
computers’ memory) operate. Rather, Appellant’s claims 1, 7, and 13 recite
a mathematical determination of equations for joining imperfectly-matching
spline-modeled surfaces. Such mathematical determination involves
conventional matrix operations (see Spec. H 31, 44-45, Fig. 7F), which
could be performed, equally, by a human using pen and paper, and by a
conventional computer.
Under step two of the Alice framework, we agree with and adopt the
Examiner’s findings on pages 2—3 and 5 of the Answer. We find that the
additional limitations, taken individually and as a whole in the ordered
combination, do not add significantly more to the abstract idea of
manipulating data through mathematical relationships or transform the
abstract idea into a patent-eligible application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
Particularly, claims 1, 7, and 13 recite well-understood, routine, and
conventional elements (i.e., computer system having an application module,
memory, processor, and computer readable storage medium) that enable the
creation of a computerized model using a “generic computer structure that
serves to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional.” Final Act. 3; see also Ans. 5. “[T]he use of
generic computer elements like a microprocessor or user interface do not
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alone transform an otherwise abstract idea into patent-eligible subject
matter.” Fair Warning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing DDR Holdings, LLC, v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d
1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014)); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772
F.3d 709, 715—16 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims merely reciting the abstract idea
of using advertising as currency as applied to particular technological
environment of the Internet are not patent eligible); Accenture Global Servs.,
GmbHv. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir.
2013) (claims reciting “generalized software components arranged to
implement an abstract concept [of generating insurance-policy-related tasks
based on rules to be completed upon the occurrence of an event] on a
computer” are not patent eligible); and Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d
1315, 1333—34 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“[s]imply adding a ‘computer aided’
limitation to a claim covering an abstract concept, without more, is
insufficient to render [a] claim patent eligible”).
Further, under the second step of the Alice inquiry, Appellant argues
“[c]laim 1 defines significantly more than an abstract idea because [it]
cover[s] an improvement to the technology in mechanical engineering
design and analysis with an improved method of converting a CAD model
(i.e., NURBS patches) to a CAE model (i.e., FEA mesh model).” App. Br. 7
(emphasis removed). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. As
discussed supra, we agree with the Examiner that independent claims 1, 7,
and 13 do not recite converting a CAD model to another model. The claims
also do not recite “special purpose computers (e.g., a computer with CAD
software, FEA software[)]” as advocated by Appellant. See App. Br. 8—9.
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Appellant also argues “like the claims in DDR Holdings that recite ‘a
specific way’ of creating a composite web page, Appellant’s Claim 1 defines
a specific way of converting a CAD model (i.e., first and second NURBS
patches) to a CAE model (i.e., a computerized model suitable for FEA).”
App. Br. 8 (citing DDR Holdings). We remain unpersuaded, as Appellant
has not demonstrated their claimed generic computer components are able in
combination to perform functions that are not merely generic, as the claims
in DDR. See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258 (holding the claims at issue
patent eligible because “they do not broadly and generically claim ‘use of
the Internet’ to perform an abstract business practice (with insignificant
added activity),” and “specify how interactions with the Internet are
manipulated to yield a desired result—a result that overrides the routine and
conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the click of a
hyperlink”). As discussed supra, Appellant’s claims 1, 7, and 13 merely
recite data processing steps that can be performed by conventional matrix
operations. See Spec. Tflf 44^45, Fig. 7F.
Because Appellant’s claims 1—18 are directed to a patent-ineligible
abstract concept and do not recite something “significantly more” under the
second prong of the Alice analysis, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
these claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
CONCLUSION
On the record before us, we conclude Appellant has not demonstrated
the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—18 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
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DECISION
As such, we affirm the Examiner’s final rejection of claims 1—18.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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