Ex Parte HardisonDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardOct 16, 201210674758 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 16, 2012) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 10/674,758 09/30/2003 Pamela Hardison 06-0320-PHA.RA 4217 29043 7590 10/17/2012 WILLIAMSON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, LLC 1870 THE EXCHANGE, SUITE 100 ATLANTA, GA 30339 EXAMINER FLICK, JASON E ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3763 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 10/17/2012 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE __________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD __________ Ex parte PAMELA HARDISON __________ Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 Technology Center 3700 __________ Before ERIC GRIMES, MELANIE L. McCOLLUM, and JEFFREY N. FREDMAN, Administrative Patent Judges. FREDMAN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 involving claims to a suspension apparatus. The Examiner rejected the claims as failing to comply with the written description requirement and as obvious. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 2 Statement of the Case Background “[T]he present invention is a support and retention device for use in holding medical appliances, preferably wound drainage systems” (Spec. 9, ll. 13-15). The Claims Claims 1-20 and 22 are on appeal. Claims 1 and 7 are representative and read as follows: 1. A suspension apparatus for supporting medical appliances, said suspension apparatus comprising a length of material joined together so as to form an upper section and a lower section, wherein said length of material forming said upper section and said lower section is uniform in diameter throughout said upper section and said lower section, and wherein said upper section is dimensioned to fit over a user's head, and wherein the medical appliance is attached to said lower section. 7. The suspension apparatus of claim [1, further comprising a first end and a second end joined together into a joint thereby forming a continuous loop, wherein said joint comprises a splice], wherein said splice has a diameter and said length of material has a diameter, and wherein said splice diameter is approximately equal to said length of material diameter. The Issues A. The Examiner rejected claims 1, 14, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement (Ans. 5). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 3 B. The Examiner rejected claims 1-19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Giacona, III 1 and Chu 2 (Ans. 6-7). C. The Examiner rejected claims 20 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Giacona, III, Chu, and Millen 3 (Ans. 8-9). A. 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, written description The Examiner finds that “[c]laims 1, 14, and 22 have been amended to indicate an upper and lower section which is uniform in diameter” (Ans. 5). The Examiner finds that “figures may not be used to show support for limitations relating to scale/relative size of elements (MPEP 2125). Furthermore, paragraph [0019] of applicant‟s disclosure specifically states that the drawings of the disclosure are not necessarily drawn to scale” (id.). The Examiner finds that the “written portion of the disclosure (page 10, lines 15-16) cited by applicant‟s representative does not provide support for the amended claims” (id.). Appellant contends that at “page 10, lines 14-16, the Specification recites that „preferably, splice 30 is smooth and has substantially the same diameter 32 as the diameter 26 of length of material 20‟” (App. Br. 6). Appellant contends that “[b]ecause Applicant addressed, and proposed a solution to, the problem of having a non-uniform diameter, anyone skilled in the art would clearly recognize that Applicant had possession of the invention with an upper and lower section having uniform diameters” (id. at 7). Appellant contends that “claim 7 implicitly recites the length of material 1 Giacona, III, C., US 2005/0092789 A1, published May 5, 2005. 2 Chu et al., US 2004/0225181 A1, published Nov. 11, 2004. 3 Millen, T., US 6,129,709, issued Oct. 10, 2000. Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 4 having a single, uniform diameter, which is thus applicable to the upper section and the lower section” (App. Br. 7). The issue with respect to this rejection is: Does the evidence of record support the Examiner‟s conclusion that the limitation “wherein said length of material forming said upper section and said lower section is uniform in diameter throughout said upper section and said lower section” represents new matter? Findings of Fact 1. Figure 1 of the Specification is reproduced below: “FIG. 1 is a perspective view of a device” (Spec. 8, l. 11). 2. The Specification teaches that “apparatus 10 is preferably a length of material 20 . . . . Length of material 20 has ends 22 and 24 fixed together to form splice 30. Preferably, splice 30 is smooth and has substantially the same diameter 32 as the diameter 26 of length of material 20” (Spec. 10, ll. 6-16). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 5 3. The Specification includes original claim 7 as reproduced below: 7. The suspension apparatus of claim 3, wherein said splice has a diameter and said length of material has a diameter, and wherein said splice diameter is approximately equal to said length of material diameter. (Spec. 18, ll. 5-8.) 4. The Specification teaches that the “invention is preferably a soft flexible length of material . . . formed into a circle, spliced so as to complete the circle in a fashion that does not increase the diameter of the spliced area, and preferably utilized by the wearer by placing about the neck” (Spec. 9, ll. 15-21). Principles of Law “[I]t is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession. And while the description requirement does not demand any particular form of disclosure, ... or that the specification recite the claimed invention in haec verba, a description that merely renders the invention obvious does not satisfy the requirement” Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Analysis While the Examiner is correct that the specific language of the claims was not disclosed ipsis verbis in the Specification, ipsis verbis support is not required. Fujikawa v. Wattanasin, 93 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The Specification teaches that “splice 30 is smooth and has substantially the same diameter 32 as the diameter 26 of length of material 20” (Spec. 10, ll. 14-16; FF 2). The requirement that the splice, or joining, Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 6 of the two ends of material 26 have the same diameter as the length of material 20 reasonably teaches that the entire length has a single, and therefore uniform, diameter, as required by the claim amendment of uniform in diameter (FF 2). Original claim 7 further supports this position, since original claim 7 requires that the length of material has a diameter, the splice has a diameter, and these diameters are approximately equal (FF 3). This is additionally supported by Figure 1, which depicts uniform diameter (FF 1). We therefore agree with Appellant that the person of ordinary skill, in reading the Specification, would have found that the Specification demonstrated possession of a length of material which is “uniform in diameter” as now required by the independent claims. Conclusion of Law The evidence of record does not support the Examiner‟s conclusion that the limitation “wherein said length of material forming said upper section and said lower section is uniform in diameter throughout said upper section and said lower section” represents new matter. B. U.S.C. § 103(a) over Giacona, III and Chu The Examiner finds that Giacona, III teaches a device and method for retaining objects about a person (figure 1, item 10) (attaching an object to said lower section) (figures 1 and 2) comprising a length of material (a chain of linked elements) (figure 1, items 11 and 26) joined together so as to form an upper section (figure 1, item 11) and a lower section (figure 1, item 26), wherein said upper section is dimensioned to fit over a user‟s head (figure 2), and wherein a medical appliance is capable of being attached to said lower section (figures 3 and 4) Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 7 (Ans. 6). The Examiner finds that “Giacona, III does not specifically state that the material forming the upper and lower sections is uniform in diameter” (Ans. 7). The Examiner finds that “Chu teaches a support apparatus . . . wherein the material is uniform in diameter” (id.). The Examiner finds it obvious “to modify the structure taught by Giacona, III, with the use of a uniform length of material, as taught by Chu, in order to increase ease of use, as well as to allow for easier adjustment of attachments across all length of the material” (id.). Appellant contends that “Chu et al. „181 merely teaches a sling that may have a uniform thickness. In essence, the Examiner is arguing that the word „thickness‟ is subsumed by the word „diameter‟. Not only is this argument counter-intuitive, it is contrary to established rules regarding claim construction” (App. Br. 12). Appellant contends that Chu “teaches that the „cable 27 [attached to strap 11] is preferably a much smaller diameter than the maximum thickness of large loop member 11’” (id. at 15). The issue with respect to this rejection is: Does the evidence of record support the Examiner‟s conclusion that Giacona III and Chu render the claims obvious? Findings of Fact 5. Giacona III teaches “an improved bottled drink carrier apparatus that can easily be carried by the user at the neck or shoulder area or strapped to a belt” (Giacona III 1 ¶ 0012). 6. Giacona III teaches that “cable is preferably much smaller in diameter than the maximum width of the strap so that the cable can be made very small and lightweight” (Giacona III 1 ¶ 0017 (emphasis added)). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 8 7. Giacona III teaches that the “cable has a cable thickness and the strap member has a maximum width, the maximum width being much greater than the cable thickness; the maximum width of the strap member is preferably at least two times greater than the cable thickness” (Giacona III 2 ¶ 0029). 8. Figure 7 of Giacona III is reproduced below: “FIG. 7 is a front elevation view of a second and preferred embodiment of the apparatus” (Giacona III 4 ¶ 0099). 9. Figure 1 of Chu is reproduced below: Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 9 “FIG. 1 shows a sling delivery system 10 according to an illustrative embodiment of the invention” (Chu 3 ¶ 0034). 10. Chu teaches that “the length and width of the sling 16 can be adapted to the body part of the patient that requires support” (Chu 3 ¶ 0035). 11. Chu teaches that the “sling 16 may have a uniform thickness over the entire length and/or width of sling 16. Alternatively, the thickness can be suitably varied at one or more locations” (Chu 3 ¶ 0035). 12. The word “diameter” is defined as “1. Math a. A straight line segment passing through the center of a figure, esp. of a circle or sphere, and terminating at the periphery. B. The length of such a segment. 2. Width or thickness.” 4 4 Webster‟s II New Riverside University Dictionary 373 (1984). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 10 Principles of Law “The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007). “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id. at 417. As noted by the Court in KSR, “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” 550 U.S. at 421. Claim terms are interpreted using the broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the Specification. See, e.g., In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[D]uring examination proceedings, claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification.”). Analysis 5 Claim 1 Claim interpretation is at the heart of patent examination because before a claim is properly interpreted, its scope cannot be compared to the 5 Appellant first contends that Chu does not qualify as a reference because Appellant “has submitted an [sic, a] Declaration herewith attesting to the fact that Applicant conceived of the invention in the instant patent application on December 17, 2002” (App. Br. 11). However, as pointed out by the Examiner, “these declarations are not formally entered, and thus, have not been considered by the examiner. The Appellant has not shown or demonstrated any valid reason why these declarations were not filed earlier in prosecution, prior to the filing of an Appeal Brief” (Ans. 11). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.33(d)(2). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 11 prior art. In this case, there is no dispute that Giacona III and Chu each suggest a suspension apparatus which comprises a length of material (FF 6- 9), and that Giacona III teaches the length of material joined together to form an upper and lower section which is dimensioned to fit over a user‟s head (FF 5-8). Appellant contends that “Chu et al. „181 does not supply the missing requirement of a „uniform diameter‟ as required by Applicant‟s independent claims” (App. Br. 12). During prosecution, claim terms are given their broadest reasonable interpretation as they would be understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art in the light of the Specification. Therefore, we first turn to the Specification to determine whether the meanings of the phrase “uniform in diameter” at issue can be discerned. The Specification does not define the word “diameter” nor is there any reason based on the Specification to interpret the word “diameter” differently than its ordinary meaning (FF 1-4). The word “diameter” is defined as “1. Math a. A straight line segment passing through the center of a figure, esp. of a circle or sphere, and terminating at the periphery. B. The length of such a segment. 2. Width or thickness” (FF 12). In the context of the support device claimed and those of Giacona III and Chu, these are three dimensional objects with a length, width, and depth. The “uniform in diameter” limitation cannot reasonably be intended to refer to the length of the suspension apparatus, and must refer to either or both of the width and depth. Claim 1 does not require that the suspension apparatus material is cylindrical, so this interpretation is consistent with the ordinary Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 12 definition of the term diameter, which recognizes that diameter refers to “[w]idth or thickness” (FF 12). Having found that diameter is reasonably interpreted as referring to “[w]idth or thickness,” we agree with the Examiner that Chu teaches that the “sling 16 may have a uniform thickness over the entire length and/or width of sling 16” (Chu 3 ¶ 0035; FF 11). We further agree with the Examiner that in view of Chu‟s teaching, the ordinary artisan of ordinary creativity would have found it obvious that the width, depth, and/or thickness of the support device may be uniform, resulting in a uniform diameter (FF 11). Appellant contends that “Chu et al. „181 merely teaches a sling that may have a uniform thickness. In essence, the Examiner is arguing that the word „thickness‟ is subsumed by the word „diameter‟. Not only is this argument counter-intuitive, it is contrary to established rules regarding claim construction” (App. Br. 12). Appellant contends that Giacona III “teaches that the „cable 27 [attached to strap 11] is preferably a much smaller diameter than the maximum thickness of large loop member 11’” (id. at 15). We are not persuaded. In light of the definition of the term “diameter,” the Examiner has reasonably interpreted diameter as the width and thickness of the device, an interpretation which is consistent with the dictionary definition of the term “diameter” (FF 12). We recognize that Giacona III teaches an embodiment where the cable may have a smaller diameter, but Chu expressly teaches a uniform thickness (FF 11). See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“The prior art‟s mere disclosure of more than one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 13 discredit, or otherwise discourage the solution claimed”). Appellant does not identify, and we do not find, any teaching in the cited references which criticize, discredit, or otherwise discourage the use of a uniform diameter support. Claim 7 Appellant contends that “if Giacona, III . . . teaches anything, it teaches a splice diameter that is necessarily different than the diameter of the materials” (App. Br. 15). The Examiner finds, regarding claim 7, that “the prior art to Giacona, III clearly meets the recited claim limitations” (Ans. 12). We find that the Examiner has the better position. While we agree with Appellant that absolute reliance cannot be placed on the scale in the figures of Giacona III, Chu expressly teaches the use of a uniform thickness (FF 11) and this teaching reasonably suggests to the ordinary artisan that the splicing can also be uniform in thickness. Conclusion of Law The evidence of record supports the Examiner‟s conclusion that Giacona III and Chu render the claims obvious. C. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Giacona, III, Chu, and Millen The Examiner finds that “Millen teaches a suspension apparatus for supporting medical devices wherein medical appliances are attached via at least one safety pin” (Ans. 8). The Examiner finds it obvious “to modify the structure taught by Giacona, III and Chu, with the use of safety pins, as taught by Millen, in order to provide an alternative means of attaching items to the supporting structure” (id.). Appeal 2011-012155 Application 10/674,758 14 The Examiner provides sound fact-based reasoning for combining Millen with Giacona III and Chu. We adopt the fact finding and analysis of the Examiner as our own. Appellant argues the merits of the obviousness rejection of claim 1, but Appellant does not identify any material defect in the Examiner‟s reasoning for combining Millen with Giacona III and Chu. Since Appellant only argues the rejection which we affirmed above, we affirm this rejection for the reasons stated by the Examiner. SUMMARY In summary, we reverse the rejection of claims 1, 14, and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement. We affirm the rejection of claims 1 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Giacona, III and Chu. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1), we also affirm the rejection of claims 2-6 and 8-19 as these claims were not argued separately. We affirm the rejection of claims 20 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Giacona, III, Chu, and Millen. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED cdc Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation