Ex Parte Hanna et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 15, 2017

13014200 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/014,200 01/26/2011 Michael D. Hanna P011043-RD-SDJ 1143
104102 7590
BrooksGroup
48685 Hayes
Shelby Township, MI 48315
06/16/2017 EXAMINER
WILLIAMS, THOMAS J
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3657
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/16/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MICHAEL D. HANNA, JAMES A. WEBSTER, and
RICHARD M. KLEBER
Appeal 2015-007818
Application 13/014,200
Technology Center 3600
Before EDWARD A. BROWN, GEORGE R. HOSKINS, and
SEAN P. O’HANLON, Administrative Patent Judges.
BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Michael D. Hanna et al. (Appellants)1 appeal under 35 U.S.C.
§ 134(a) from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—6, 8—11, 20—27,
39-42, 44-47, 58—62, and 64—71.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 General Motors LLC is identified as the real party in interest. Appeal
Br. 4.
2 Claims 7, 12—19, 28—34, 38, and 43 have been cancelled; claims 35—37,
49-57, and 63 have been allowed; and claim 48 has been objected to as
depending from a rejected base claim, but indicated to contain allowable
subject matter. Appeal Br. 4; Final Act. 1 (Office Act. Summ.).
Appeal 2015-007818
Application 13/014,200
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants’ disclosure “relates generally to molded components and,
more particularly, to molded components having at least one visible design
feature, reduced weight, or increased strength via selective inclusion of a
porous preform forming a mixed-material composite.” Spec. 11.
Claims 1, 20, 22, 39, 48, and 58 are independent. Claim 1,
reproduced below, illustrates the claimed subject matter.
1. A brake rotor comprising:
a rotor body having a primary portion and a visible design
portion, wherein:
the primary portion comprising a metal;
the visible design portion comprising a mixed-material
composite including a porous structure and the metal;
the primary portion of the rotor body comprising a
frictional surface to be contacted by a rotor pad in operation of
the rotor; and
the design portion comprising a design surface adjacent
the frictional surface of the rotor body.
Appeal Br. 24 (Claims App.).
REJECTIONS3
1. Claims 66 and 69 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
2. Claims 67 and 70 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite.
3 A rejection of claims 67 and 70 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 has been
withdrawn. Ans. 2; Final Act. 3.
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3. Claims 39-42, 44, 45, 58—60, and 64 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Kimura (JP 2002-126865 A, published
May 8, 2002).
4. Claims 58 and 59 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Rau (WO 2007/033378 Al, published Mar. 22, 2007).
5. Claims 1—6, 8—11, 20, 21, and 65—71 are rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Murata (JP 5-126178 A, published
May 21, 1993) and Rau.
6. Claims 22—27 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Novak (US 6,811,003 B2, issued Nov. 2, 2004) and Rau.
7. Claims 46, 47, 61, and 62 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Kimura and Rau.
ANALYSIS
Rejection 1 — Claims 66 and 69 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph,
written description requirement
Claim 65 recites that “the porous structure comprising a preform
including a body and a plurality of holes formed in the body.” Appeal Br.
33 (Claims App.). Claim 66 depends from claim 65 and recites the
limitation “the plurality of holes are equally spaced from each other.” Id.
Claim 69 recites the same limitation as claim 66. Id.4 The Examiner
determines that the original Specification does not disclose the specific
spacing of the holes in the preform. Final Act. 2. Rather, the Examiner
determines, the presence of holes in the preform is only supported by the
4 Claim 69 depends from claim 20; however, claim 20 does not provide
antecedent basis for the limitation of claim 69. Appeal Br. 33 (Claims
App.). It appears claim 69 should instead depend from claim 68. Id.
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drawing figures, particularly Figure 1, and “unless [FJigure 1 is indicated as
being to scale one cannot rely on the figure for supporting the recitation
‘holes are equally spaced apart from each other.’” Id.
Appellants assert that “[possession may be shown ... by showing
that the invention was ‘ready for patenting’ such as by the disclosure of
drawings.” Appeal Br. 13 (citing MPEP § 2163(1)). Appellants contend
that:
Figure 1 need not indicate that the figure is to scale in order to
establish a preform with equally spaced holes. 35 U.S.C. §112
merely requires the Applicant[s] to submit figures that would
“enable ” one of ordinary skill in the art. There is no requirement
that Applicants] submit drawings that function as technical
illustrations depicting actual, mathematically equally spaced
holes in order to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 112.
Reply Br. 4 (emphasis added).
Appellants’ contentions are not persuasive. As for the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, “the test for
sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (emphasis added). To show “possession,” “the specification must
describe an invention understandable to that skilled artisan and show that the
inventor actually invented the invention claimed.” Id.
The limitation that “the plurality of holes are equally spaced from
each other” is not recited in any of the original claims. We also are unable
to find this limitation described in the Specification. We construe this
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limitation to mean that the plurality of holes are the same distance from each
other.
We next determine whether the drawings provide support for claims
66 and 69. We disagree with Appellants’ assertion that “35 U.S.C. §112
merely requires the Applicants] to submit figures that would ‘enable’ one of
ordinary skill in the art.” Reply Br. 4. As explained in Ariad, “this court has
consistently held that § 112, first paragraph, contains a written description
requirement separate from enablement. . . .” Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351
(emphasis added). Although Figure 1 shows clearly that porous structure
100 has a plurality of holes, Appellants do not direct us to any description in
the Specification that those holes are “equally spaced,” that is, a particular
distance from each other. Nor does the Specification indicate that Figure 1
is drawn to scale. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int 7, 222
F.3d 951, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well established that patent drawings
do not define the precise proportions of the elements and may not be relied
on to show particular sizes if the specification is completely silent on the
issue.”). Accordingly, we are not persuaded that the original disclosure
demonstrates Appellants had possession of the subject matter recited in
claims 66 and 69. Thus, we sustain the rejection of claims 66 and 69 under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, written description requirement.
Rejection 2 — Claims 67 and 70 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph
Claims 67 and 70 both recite that “the visible design portion has the
shaped [sic] of a logo.” Appeal Br. 33 (Claims App.). The Examiner
determines that “logo” is a “relative term,” rendering claims 67 and 70
indefinite. Final Act. 3. The Examiner states that a “logo” is not defined by
the Specification, and “[a] corporate logo can assume many shapes, designs
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and forms and as such is unlimited.” Ans. 2. The Examiner states that “[a]
logo to one person may not be a logo to another,” and, as such, the metes
and bounds of claims 67 and 70 are not clearly defined. Final Act. 3.
Appellants state that “[a] Togo’ is commonly understood to include
any representation or symbol that is typically uniquely designed for ease of
recognition” (Appeal Br. 11) and that “[t]he term Togo’ is defined as: a
‘graphic representation or symbol of a company name, trademark,
abbreviation, etc., often uniquely designed for ready recognition” {id. at 13;
see also id. at 20 (citing dictionary.reference.com)). Appellants contend that
the term “logo” is not a relative term. Id. at 13.
Appellants’ contentions are persuasive. The Specification describes
that “[i]n some embodiments, the porous structure is shaped to form an
emblem such as a trademarked logo of a company. ” Spec. | 64 (emphasis
added). This description indicates that a “logo” is an example of an
“emblem.” The Specification does not describe that a “logo” has any
particular structure. By not specifying particular structure, claims 67 and 70
are broad, but merely because a claim is broad does not mean that it is
necessarily indefinite. See In re Miller, 441 F.2d 689, 692—693 (CCPA
1971). Rather, when these claims are read in light of the disclosure, their
meanings are sufficiently definite. Thus, we do not sustain the rejection of
claims 67 and 70 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
Rejection 3 — Claims 39—42, 44, 45, 58—60, and 64 as anticipated by Kimura
Claims 39, 40, 42, 44, and 45
As to claim 39, the Examiner finds that Kimura discloses a brake rotor
comprising hat portion lb, frictional disc portion 10 including mixed-
material composite 3 comprising a porous structure saturated with a metal
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(i.e., aluminum), in which mixed material composite 3 does not extend to a
frictional surface of frictional disc portion 10. Final Act. 4 (citing Kimura,
Fig. 6,114).5 The Examiner finds that thin film 11 covers porous structure
3 for at least a period of use. Id. (citing Kimura 116).
Appellants contend that Kimura is non-enabling. Appeal Br. 14. “A
claimed invention cannot be anticipated by a prior art reference if the
allegedly anticipatory disclosures cited as prior art are not enabled.” Amgen,
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Prior art patents and printed publications cited by the Patent and Trademark
Office (“PTO”) in rejections are presumed to be enabling. In reAntor
Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
[Djuring patent prosecution, an examiner is entitled to reject
claims as anticipated by a prior art publication or patent without
conducting an inquiry into whether or not that prior art reference
is enabling. As long as an examiner makes a proper prima facie
case of anticipation by giving adequate notice under [35 U.S.C.]
§ 132, the burden shifts to the applicant to submit rebuttal
evidence of nonenablement.
Id. at 1289.6 “Enablement of prior art requires that the reference teach a
skilled artisan—at the time of filing—to make or carry out what it discloses
in relation to the claimed invention without undue experimentation.” In re
Morsa, 803 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
5 The Examiner refers to the English translation of Kimura as “Kimura.”
For consistency, we will also.
6 The PTO satisfies 35 U.S.C. § 132 by “notifying] the applicant. . . [by]
stating the reasons for [its] rejection . . . together with such information and
references as may be useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the
prosecution of [the] application.” In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (alterations in original).
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Appellants contend that the Kimura translation does not have any
description for Figure 6 or element 11 in the disclosure. Appeal Br. 14
(citing “SF2”).7 We disagree. Kimura describes Figure 6 at paragraphs 14
and 16, and thin film 11 at paragraphs 16 and 21. The Examiner’s Answer
further explains how the cited portions of Kimura disclose all of the claim
limitations. See Ans. 3. Appellants reply by contending that “[t]he sections
of Kimura which the Examiner references have not been translated clearly
enough to be enabling to one of ordinary skill in the art to carry out the
claimed invention.” Reply Br. 5. This contention does not explain with any
specificity why the sections of Kimura “have not been translated clearly
enough to be enabling,” or otherwise apprise us of Examiner error.
Appellants do not provide persuasive argument or evidence to show that one
skilled in the art would be unable to make the anticipating subject matter
without undue experimentation. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claim 39, and claims 40, 42, 44, and 45 depending therefrom and not
separately argued, as anticipated by Kimura.
Claim 41
Claim 41 depends from claim 39 and recites that “the porous structure
comprises a substance comprising at least one of: a metal, or a ceramic.”
Appeal Br. 29 (Claims App.). The Examiner finds that Kimura discloses
7 The Appeal Brief includes a Statement of the Facts section presenting
statements of fact (“SF”) SF1—SF11. Appeal Br. 20—22. SF2 states,
“Kimura merely discloses an aluminum brake rotor having a load sliding
portion in which the pad of the outer peripheral part of the brake rotor
carries out sliding contact wherein the load sliding part comprises an
aluminum impregnated ceramic mesh.” Id. at 20 (citing Kimura 114).
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porous structure 3 comprising a ceramic mesh. Final Act. 4 (citing Kimura
114).
Appellants contend that Kimura does not identically disclose or
suggest the limitation of claim 41. Appeal Br. 15 (citing “SF4”). SF4 states,
in relevant part, that “Kimura merely discloses a metallic casting
component. See Field of the Invention.” Id. at 20.
This contention is not persuasive. Kimura discloses ceramic mesh 3
impregnated with aluminum. See Kimura ]Hf 13—14. As such, the
impregnated material comprises porous ceramic and metal, and thus, meets
the limitation of claim 41. As Appellants do not apprise us of Examiner
error, we sustain the rejection of claim 41 as anticipated by Kimura.
Claims 58—60 and 64
The Examiner finds that Kimura discloses all limitations of claim 58.
Final Act. 5 (citing Kimura 114, Figs. 6, 14).
Appellants contend that the Examiner has not shown where Kimura
discloses the limitation “the frictional disc portion includes within it a
mixed-material composite comprising a porous structure substantially
saturated with a body material, wherein the porous structure comprising a
preform including a body and a plurality of holes formed in the body.”
Appeal Br. 15.
The Examiner responds that, in Kimura, “the preform is intended to
be saturated by the surrounding metal during the molding process, see
paragraph 14 line 4, in which it is stated ... sliding part 2 comprises the
aluminum impregnating ceramic mesh 3. The mesh being impregnated is
thus properly interpreted as being saturated by the surrounding metal.”
Ans. 3.
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Appellants’ contention does not apprise us of any error in the
Examiner’s findings, or explain persuasively why Kimura does not disclose
the disputed limitation of claim 58. Rather, Appellants’ contention amounts
essentially to stating what claim 58 recites and asserting generally that
Kimura does not disclose the claim limitations. This is insufficient. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim
recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the
claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Thus,
we sustain the rejection of claim 58, and claims 59, 60, and 64 depending
therefrom and not separately argued, as anticipated by Kimura.
Rejection 4 — Claims 58 and 59 as anticipated by Rau
The Examiner finds that Rau discloses all limitations of claim 58.
Final Act. 5. Particularly, the Examiner finds that Rau discloses a brake
rotor comprising a frictional disc portion including a mixed-material
composite 2 comprising a porous structure saturated with a body material
(i.e., a porous ceramic preform having holes), and vanes formed between
adjacent vent passages 16 to form two sub-disc assemblies, with the mixed
material composite located in each disc sub-assembly. Id. (citing Rau, Fig.
14 A).
Appellants contend that Rau discloses a “porous ceramic preform”
and fails to disclose “a mixed-material composite comprising a porous
structure substantially saturated with a body material. . . wherein the porous
structure comprising a preform including a body and a plurality of holes
formed in the body,” as claimed. Appeal Br. 16 (citing SF7, SF8).
The Examiner responds that Rau discloses a preform having pores
infiltrated by a metal. Ans. 3 (citing Rau 9:3—15, 13:1—28, and 28:8—17).
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The Examiner notes that Appellants’ Specification describes that the mixed
material composite can be a porous ceramic material, and finds that Rau
discloses that the ceramic preform can comprise a variety of materials. Id. at
3^4 (citing Spec. Tflf 35, 41; Rau 13:1—5). The Examiner notes that Rau
describes “MMC materials,” and the Examiner correctly interprets “MMC”
as meaning “mixed-material composite.” Id. at 4; see, e.g., Rau 19:20.
Appellants do not explain persuasively why Rau does not disclose a
mixed-material composite, as claimed. Appellants state generally what
claim 58 recites, but do not address the specific findings made by the
Examiner. This is insufficient. See Jung, 637 F.3d at 1365 (“it has long
been the Board’s practice to require an applicant to identify the alleged error
in the examiner’s rejections”). As Appellants do not apprise us of any error
in the Examiner’s findings, we sustain the rejection of claim 58 and
dependent claim 59 as anticipated by Rau.
Rejection 5 —Claims 1—6, 8—11, 20, 21, and 65—71
as unpatentable over Murata and Rau
Claims 1—6, 8—11, 65—67, and 71
Claim 1 recites a brake rotor comprising, inter alia, a rotor body
having a “visible design portion,” and “the design portion comprising a
design surface adjacent the frictional surface of the rotor body.” Appeal Br.
24 (Claims App.) (emphasis added). The Examiner finds that Murata
discloses a brake rotor comprising rotor body 10 having primary portion 14
and visible design portion 18 (“the design portion is a ring when viewed
from above, see [Fjigure 2”). Final Act. 6. The Examiner also finds that
Murata teaches that the design portion comprises a ceramic material, but
does not teach that the design portion comprises a mixed material composite
that includes a porous structure and a metal. Id. The Examiner finds that
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Rau teaches a porous ceramic structure infiltrated with a metal that forms a
mixed material composite. Id. at 7. The Examiner concludes that it would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill to replace the ceramic structure of
Murata with the porous ceramic structure forming a mixed material
composite, as taught by Rau, to provide a light weight, wear resistant design
structure that is integrally attached to the surrounding metal. Id.
Appellants contend that Murata’s “ring portion” is not a “design
portion,” but “is merely a product of the circular shape of any brake rotor.”
Appeal Br. 17 (citing SF9). Appellants also contend that Rau does not
disclose, and the combination of Murata and Rau does not suggest, a “design
portion comprising a design surface adjacent the frictional surface of the
rotor body.” Id. (citing SF6—SF8). Consequently, Appellants contend, the
Examiner has not presented a prima facie case of obviousness. Id.
The Examiner responds that:
When looking upon the brake rotor of Murata as in [Fjigure 2,
one sees a ring about the outer rotor edge. This ring is separate
from a primary friction portion 14 and appears as a design. This
is not so different from the annular ring that represents a visible
design portion of the instant invention as seen in [F]igure[s] 15
or 16.
Ans. 4.
Appellants’ contentions are not persuasive. Appellants do not direct
us to a definition of a “design portion” in the Specification. We note that a
“design feature” is described in the Specification, and that design feature
302 is shown in Figure 3. See, e.g. Spec. 1 53, Fig. 3. The design feature
302 is formed by inclusion of a porous structure, such as porous structure
100 or 200. Id. 1 53. Figures 1 and 2 show porous structures 100, 200. The
Specification describes that:
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The porous structure may include any of a variety of
configurations, including size, shape, and materials. Regarding
shape, for example, the porous structure is in some
embodiments shaped to form a design feature having at least
one letter and in some cases one or more words. In some
embodiments, the porous structure is shaped to form an emblem
such as a trademarked logo of a company.
Spec. 1 64. This description does not limit the shape of the “design feature.”
Appellants do not direct us to any other disclosure that precludes the
Examiner from finding that the claimed “design portion” reads on Murata’s
ring structure.
Moreover, the “visible design portion” and “design surface” describe
the ornamental appearance of the rotor body. Aspects of these claim
features that relate to “ornamentation only and have no mechanical function
whatsoever” cannot be relied upon for patentability of a claim in a utility
patent application. In re Seid, 161 F.2d 229, 231 (CCPA 1947).
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and claims 2—6, 8—
11, 65—67, and 71, which depend from claim 1 and are not separately
argued, as unpatentable over Murata and Rau.
Claims 20, 21, and 68—70
As to claim 20, the Examiner’s findings and reasoning (Final Act. 6)
and Appellants’ contentions (Appeal Br. 17) are substantially the same as for
claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 20, and claims 21
and 68—70, which depend from claim 20 and are not separately argued, as
unpatentable over Murata and Rau.
Rejection 6— Claims 22—27 as unpatentable over Novak and Rau
Claim 22 recites a brake rotor comprising, inter alia, a hat portion
comprising a hub frictional surface section, which “comprises a mixed-
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material composite comprising a porous structure substantially saturated
with the body material,” “wherein the porous structure comprising a
preform including a body and a plurality of holes formed in the body.”
Appeal Br. 26 (Claims App. (emphasis added)).
The Examiner finds that Novak discloses brake rotor 8 comprising,
inter alia, hat portion 100 including hub body section 104 and hub frictional
surface section 106, but does not disclose that hub frictional surface section
106 comprises a mixed-material composite comprising a porous structure
saturated with a body material. Final Act. 8; see Novak, Figs. 1, 2. The
Examiner finds that Rau teaches a drum brake interior surface having a hub
frictional surface section comprising a mixed-material composite comprising
porous preform structure 2 saturated with a body material. Final Act. 8. The
Examiner further finds that Rau’s porous structure is provided with pores or
“window holes.” Id. (citing Rau 13:12—24). The Examiner determines that
this porous structure would provide a wear resistant friction surface on the
interior of the hat of Novak. Id. The Examiner concludes that it would have
been obvious to provide the interior surface of Novak’s hat with a wear
resistant mixed material composite porous structure, as taught by Rau, to
increase life expectancy of the interior braking surface. Id. at 8—9.
Appellants contend that Novak merely discloses a means of mounting
a wheel on a vehicle, and neither Novak nor Rau discloses or suggests the
limitation “wherein the porous structure comprising a preform including a
body and a plurality of holes formed in the body.” Appeal Br. 18 (citing
SF6-SF8, SF11).
Appellants’ contentions are not persuasive because they not address
the Examiner’s specific findings and reasoning for claim 22. As Appellants
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do not apprise us of any error in the Examiner’s findings, or rationale for
combining the teachings of Novak and Rau, we sustain the rejection of claim
22, and claims 23—27 depending from claim 22 and not separately argued, as
unpatentable over Novak and Rau.
Rejection 7— Claims 46, 47, 61, and 62 as unpatentable
over Kimura and Rau
Appellants contend that Rau does not cure the deficiencies of Kimura
with regard to claims 39 and 58. Appeal Br. 18—19. As Appellants do not
apprise us of any deficiency in the rejection of claims 39 and 58, we sustain
the rejection of dependent claims 46, 47, 61, and 62 as unpatentable over
Kimura and Rau.
DECISION
The rejection of claims 66 and 69 under 35U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement, is
affirmed.
The rejection of claims 67 and 70 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite, is reversed.
The rejection of claims 39-42, 44, 45, 58—60, and 64 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) as anticipated by Kimura is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 58 and 59 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as
anticipated by Rau is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 1—6, 8—11, 20, 21, and 65—71 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Murata and Rau is affirmed.
The rejection of claims 22—27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Novak and Rau is affirmed.
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The rejection of claims 46, 47, 61, and 62 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Kimura and Rau is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal maybe extended according to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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