Ex Parte Green

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 28, 2018

12645662 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 28, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/645,662 12/23/2009 Mitch Green 058083/0382822 (B1144) 8670
72058 7590 03/30/2018
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
Adobe Systems, Inc. 58083
Mailstop: IP Docketing - 22
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530
EXAMINER
DAGNEW, SABA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3682
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/30/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipefiling@kilpatricktownsend.com
KT S Docketing2 @ kilpatrick. foundationip .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MITCH GREEN
Appeal 2016-003 8341
Application 12/645,6622
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, ANTON W. FETTING, and
TARA L. HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—16 and 21—23. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Aug. 6, 2015) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Feb. 29, 2016), and the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Dec. 30, 2015), and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Dec. 29, 2014).
2 Appellant identifies Adobe Systems Incorporated as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 1.
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CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates generally to computer software
that runs, displays, provides, or otherwise uses electronic content.”
Spec. 11.
Claims 1,13, and 23 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A computer-implemented method comprising:
receiving, by a processor of a first device, a request to
transfer a first application from the first device to a second
device, the first application including machine-readable code
that, when read by a web browser, causes the first application to
be displayed;
in response to the request, determining an advertisement
for use on the second device while transferring the first
application to the second device, wherein the advertisement is
determined by comparing category or keyword information
associated with the first application with category or keyword
information associated with the advertisement; and
transferring, by the processor of the first device, the first
application from the first device to the second device, wherein,
while transferring the first application from the first device to the
second device, the advertisement is presented at the second
device.
REJECTIONS3
Claims 1—16 and 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claims 1—16 and 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed
to non-statutory subject matter.
3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph. Ans. 2.
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Claims 1—16 and 21—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Barsade et al. (US 2002/0169670 Al, pub. Nov. 14, 2002)
and Hoyle (US 6,771,290 Bl, iss. Aug. 3, 2004).
ANALYSIS
Written Description
Whether a specification complies with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is a question of fact and is
assessed on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v.
Faulding, Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Vas-Cath, Inc.
v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The disclosure, as
originally filed, need not literally describe the claimed subject matter (i.e.,
using the same terms or in haec verba) in order to satisfy the written
description requirement. But the Specification must convey with reasonable
clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date, Appellant was in
possession of the claimed invention. See id.
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 1—16 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as
failing to comply with the written description requirement (App. Br. 7—9).
The Examiner maintains that the Specification lacks written description
support for the phrase “the first application including machine-readable code
that, when read by a web browser, causes the first application to be
displayed,” as recited in independent claims 1,13, and 23. Ans. 2—3. In
particular, the Examiner finds that the Specification “do[es] not explain how
the machine-readable code is read by the browser.” Final Act. 3. The
Examiner finds that if Appellant intended to limit a machine readable code
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to HTML code or a keyword, the Appellant should recite an HTML code or
keyword instead. Ans. 4. In the Answer, the Examiner interprets “a
machine-readable code” as a barcode or QR code, and then finds that the
Specification provides inadequate support for a barcode or QR code. Id.
However, we agree with Appellant that a person of ordinary skill in
the art would understand from the Specification, particularly including
paragraphs 2, 5, 11, 25, and 27, that Appellant was in possession of the
claimed invention at the time the application was filed. App. Br. 8—9.
Paragraph 25, for example, describes embedding HTML embed code for a
host application into a first user’s web page such that then the first user’s
page is loaded by a web browser, the host application is part of the content
displayed on the first user’s page. The host application can then be
executed. Spec. 125. In our view, one of ordinary skill in the art would
understand that Appellant had possession of a first application including
machine-readable code, such as HTML embed code for a first code, that
when read by a web browser cases the first application to be displayed.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1—16 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, as failing
to comply with the written description requirement.
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS
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Banklnt’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (internal citation and quotations
omitted).
The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim
laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim
patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the
claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea,
the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where
the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered
combination”’ to determine whether there are additional elements that
“‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Alice
Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78).
“The ‘abstract idea’ step of the inquiry calls upon us to look at the
‘focus of the claimed advance over the prior art’ to determine if the claim’s
‘character as a whole’ is directed to excluded subject matter.” Affinity Labs
of Tex., LLCv. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1257-58 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(internal citations omitted). In cases involving software innovations, this
inquiry often turns on whether the claims focus on “the specific asserted
improvement in computer capabilities ... or, instead, on a process that
qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335—36 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
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Here, exemplary claim 1 recites a method that results in an
advertisement being presented. The method performs the steps of receiving
a request to transfer a first application from a first device to a second device,
determining an advertisement for use on a second device while transferring
the first application, and transferring the first application while presenting
the advertisement at the second device. According to the Specification,
“applications,” such as widgets and other small applications, are “offered in
a bundle with a utility or entertainment application such that a user
downloading the utility or entertainment application receives [an]
advertisement application as well.” Spec. 12. Different distribution models
may bundle applications and advertising, causing applications from
competitors to be inadvertently bundled together to the disappointment of
both businesses. Id. ^ 3. Business entities have an interest in their
applications not being paired with a competitor’s application or other
objectionable or undesirable content. Id.
To prevent undesirable bundling, the claimed invention associates an
application with a restriction that prevents it from being offered, bundled, or
used with other applications associated with a certain category or keyword.
Id. 14. Competitors can use such techniques to prevent undesirable cross
promotion, bundling, and sharing of applications. Id. When a request to
share an application is received, an advertisement is determined by
comparing information associated with an application with information
associated with an advertisement. Id. 1 5. Specifically, the method
compares a keyword or category associated with an application with
inclusion or exclusion lists associated with advertisements. Id. In other
words, the claims focus on solving a problem perceived by a business related
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to an objectionable bundling of the business’s application with undesired or
objectionable content, such as a competitor’s advertisement. The claimed
advance relies on category or keyword information associated with the
application and advertisement to solve this problem.
The claim language, in light of the Specification, thus supports the
Examiner’s determination that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of
“targeted advertising,” which is a fundamental economic practice. Ans. 9;
Final Act. 4 (determining that the claims are directed to “presenting [an]
advertisement while transferring the first application”); see also App. Br. 28
(the claims recite “a specific way of determining and presenting an
advertisement in a specific context”). In addition, we agree with the
Examiner that the claimed method is not meaningfully distinct from claims
involving the collection, organization, manipulation, and display of data that
have been deemed patent-ineligible by the Federal Circuit. See Ans. 9
(citing numerous cases).
For example, in Electric Power Group, the Federal Circuit held that
claims focused “on collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying
certain results of the collection and analysis” are directed to an abstract idea.
Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Stating that “[information as such is an intangible,” the Federal
Circuit in Electric Power Group noted that the Federal Circuit has “treated
collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which
does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract
ideas.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The Federal Circuit pointed out that
“[i]n a similar vein, ... [it has] treated analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
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more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Id.
at 1354.
Similarly, in Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Erie Indemnity, 850 F.3d
1315, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2017), the Federal Circuit held that creating and using
an index to search for and retrieve data is an abstract idea. In that case, the
court determined that
organizing and accessing records through the creation of an
index-searchable database, includes longstanding conduct that
existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet. For
example, a hardcopy-based classification system (such as
library-indexing system) employs a similar concept.... There,
classifiers organize and cross-reference information and
resources (such as books, magazines, or the like) by certain
identifiable tags, e.g., title, author, subject. Here, tags are
similarly used to identify, organize, and locate the desired
resource.
Id. at 1327. The court further determined that the claims were not “focused
on how usage of the [] tags alters the database in a way that leads to an
improvement in the technology of computer databases, as in Enfish,” but
instead focuses “at a high level on searching a database using an index.” Id.
at 1328.
Much like the situation in Electric Power and Intellectual Ventures,
the advance Appellant’s claims “purport to make is a process of gathering
and analyzing information of a specified content, then . . . [transmitting] the
results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology,” i.e., an
abstract idea. Elec. Power Grp., 830 F.3d at 1354. Like the use of tags at
issue in Intellectual Ventures, Appellant’s claims focus at a high-level on the
use of keywords or categories to identify an advertisement to bundle with the
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advertisement, and do not focus on any particular technical implementation
that improves technology.
At step two, we “must determine whether the claims do significantly
more than simply describe [the] abstract method” and, thus, transform the
abstract idea into patent eligible subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu,
LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are
“additional features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,”
rendering the claim eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an
abstract idea. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. Those “additional features” must be
more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566
U.S. at 77, 79.
Appellant repeats the steps for receiving, determining, and comparing,
as recited in the steps of claim 1, and summarily asserts that these features
are directed to significantly more than applying the abstract idea of
presenting an advertisement while transferring an application. See App. Br.
27—28. Yet, each of these steps is a well-understood, routine operation for
processing information that itself is an abstract idea. See Elec. Power Grp.,
LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (claims held to be
directed to an abstract idea where “[t]he advance they purport to make is a
process of gathering and analyzing information of a specified content, then
displaying the results, and not any particular assertedly inventive technology
for performing those functions”).
The claims additionally recite that the first application includes
machine-readable code that, when read by a web browser, causes the first
application to be displayed. Yet, the claim language does not provide any
specific showing of what is inventive about this limitation or the technology
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used to achieve it. See Secured Mail Sols. LLC v. Universal Wilde, Inc., 873
F.3d 905, 912 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding “claim language [that] does not
provide any specific showing of what is inventive about the [limitations in
question] or about the technology used to generate and process it” does not
satisfy Alice’s second step.) Similarly, the Specification (see, e.g., Spec.
25—27) does not explain what is innovative about this feature, or provide
any implementation details for how it is achieved, suggesting that the feature
utilizes only existing technologies. See Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance
Ltd., 2017-1463,2018 WL 656377, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 1, 2018) (“the
failure to provide any implementation details for the zoom features suggests
that the zoom feature utilizes only existing technologies”). Stated another
way, we are not persuaded that including machine readable code in the
application that causes the first application to be displayed when read by a
web browser is other than routine, additional activity, which is insufficient
under step two. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715—16
(Fed. Cir. 2014) ( “routine additional steps such as updating an activity log,
requiring a request from the consumer to view the ad, restrictions on public
access, and use of the Internet” are insufficient to render patent eligibility).
The claims also additionally recite generic computer components,
such as a “processor” and “device,” but employing generic computer
components fails to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible
application. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357; see also Spec. ^fl[ 21—23 (describing
well-known processors, devices, and storage medium employed by the
claimed invention to implement the abstract idea). Here, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that the additional
elements, considered individually and as a combination, relate to more than
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an implementation of the abstract idea in a particular technological
environment. See Ans. 8—9.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument regarding preemption.
App. Br. 28. Although the Supreme Court has described “the concern that
drives this exclusionary principle [i.e., the exclusion of abstract ideas from
patent eligible subject matter] as one of pre-emption,” see Alice Corp., 134
S. Ct. at 2354, characterizing pre-emption as a driving concern for patent
eligibility is not the same as characterizing pre-emption as the sole test for
patent eligibility. “The Supreme Court has made clear that the principle of
preemption is the basis for the judicial exceptions to patentability” and “[f]or
this reason, questions on preemption are inherent in and resolved by the
§ 101 analysis.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed.Cir.2015) (citing Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354). Although
“preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of
complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Id.
Appellant argues that the claims are like those in DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014), because they recite “a
specific way of determining and presenting an advertisement in a specific
context, during a download of an application.” App. Br. 28. Appellant
further argues that the claims are similar because the claims do not “rely[] on
normal, expected manners of presenting an advertisement that are shown in
the references cited in the claim rejections.” Id. at 29.
However, we do not find any parallel between the pending claims and
those in DDR Holdings. The claims at issue in DDR Holdings changed the
routine, conventional functioning of Internet hyperlink protocol to direct a
user of a host website to a “store within a store” on the host website, rather
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than to an advertiser’s third-party website, when the user clicks an
advertisement. DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257—58. The court determined
that the invention was “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order
to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer
networks,” and that the claimed invention did not simply use computers to
serve a conventional business purpose. Id.
In contrast, Appellant’s claimed invention solves a problem of
ensuring that advertisements bundled with a business’s application are not
objectionable to the business, such as excluding competitor advertisements
from the bundling.. This problem is a business problem, not a technical
problem. The claims recite a specific way and specific context for
determining and presenting the advertisement — namely, the advertisement
is determined by comparing keyword information and is presented during
transfer of the application. Yet, while these steps limit the scope of the
abstract idea, the limitations are not sufficient to transform Appellant’s
otherwise patent-ineligible abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter.
See Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“we rejected the argument [in Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594—95 (1978)] that ‘implementing] a principle in
some specific fashion’ will ‘automatically fal[l] within the patentable subject
matter of § 101”); id. (“limiting the use of an abstract idea “‘to a particular
technological environment’” is not enough for patent eligibility) (citing
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609—611 (2010)); see also Ultramercial, 772
F.3d at 714 (rejecting the argument that claims “directed to a specific
method of advertising and content distribution that was previously unknown
and never employed on the Internet before” were patent-eligible).
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that because the
“references cited in the rejection of claim 1 do not actually disclose the
recitations of claim 1,” the claim elements or combination of elements
“cannot be well-understood, routine, or conventional in any computer
implementation.” App. Br. 29. A finding of novelty or non-obviousness
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that claimed subject matter is
patent-eligible. Although the second step in the MayolAlice framework is
termed a search for an “inventive concept,” the analysis is not an evaluation
of novelty or non-obviousness, but rather, a search for “an element or
combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in
practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible
concept] itself.’” Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (citation omitted). A novel
and non-obvious claim directed to a purely abstract idea is, nonetheless,
patent-ineligible. See Mayo, 566 U.S. at 90.
We are not persuaded, for the reasons set forth above, that the
Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1—16 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection.
Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1, 13, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) at least
because none of the cited references, individually or in combination,
discloses or suggests “in response to the request, determining an
advertisement for use on the second device while transferring the first
application to the second device, wherein the advertisement is determined by
comparing category or keyword information associated with the first
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application with category or keyword information associated with the
advertisement,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 13 and
23. App. Br. 11—16. The Examiner acknowledges that Barsade does not
teach this limitation, and relies on Hoyle to cure the deficiency. Final Act.
6—7 (citing Hoyle, col. 6,11. 1—21); see also Ans. 4 (citing Hoyle, col. 5,
11. 13—40, 43; col. 6,11. 1—21; col. 10,11. 35—55). However, we find nothing
in the cited portions of Hoyle that discloses or suggests the argued
limitation.
Hoyle relates to user interfaces that provide advertising over the
Internet. Hoyle, col. 1,11. 14—18. Hoyle describes providing a user of a
computer with an “automatically-upgradeable software application.” Id. at
col. 5,11. 62—65. In particular, a program is separated into a plurality of
program modules, and some or all of the program modules have at least one
version identifier associated with them. Id. at col. 5,1. 65—col. 6,1. 3. A
version identifier of the program modules is operable upon execution to
access the stored version identifiers and at least one updated version
identifier from a server via a network, including a global public network
such as the Internet. Id. at col. 6,11. 3—7. The updated version identifers
“represent updated program modules accessible from a server via the
network.” Id. at col. 6,11. 7—9. The program module is further operable to
download one or more updated program modules when the stored version
identifier and the updated version identifier are different, with the updated
program modules replacing one or more of the program modules. Id. at col.
6,11. 9—13. In this way, software upgrades can be carried out automatically
without any user action required. Id. at col. 6,11. 13—15.
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Hoyle describes that a GUI module generates an application window
that is separated into a first region having a number of user-selectable items
or links, and a second region or banner region for advertisements. Id. at col.
10.11. 35—40; col. 5,11. 13—26. At least some of the user selectable items are
associated with a different data set, and each data sets is representative of
another category of information (e.g., finance, sports, and news). Id. at col.
5.11. 13—21. A first program module provides a user with information
associated with links selected by links, and also notifies a second module,
i.e., an ADM module, regarding the user’s selection. Id. at col. 5,11. 28—32.
The ADM module stores statistical data regarding the user’s selections of
information, software applications, and other network accessible files, and
permits targeted banner advertisements based upon the selections. Id. at 5,
col. 35 42. In particular, upon determining new advertising is needed, the
ADM module downloads new banners from the ADM server, and sends the
ADM server computer usage information used in profiling the end user. Id.
at col. 10,11. 45-52.
The Examiner finds that Hoyle’s version identifier teaches the
claimed “category” and “keyword.” See Final Act. 7 (“version identifier
(category or keyword)”); see also Ans. 5 ('''version identifier (category or
keyword)”). We disagree. Appellant’s Specification defines the term
“category” to mean “a topic, subject, or description that an application
(hosting, advertisement, or other) is associated with that can be selected as
defining or describing the content of an application.” Spec. 116.
Exemplary categories include health and fitness, music and radio, science
and nature, sports and recreation, travel, movies and radio, home and garden,
gaming, education, hobbies and interests, etc. Id. Additionally, the
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Specification defines the term “keyword” to mean “a word or phrase that is
generally received as input from a user describing the content of an
application.” Id. 117. Exemplary keywords for a baseball game application
include “baseball” and “game.” Id. Hoyle’s version identifier, on the other
hand, “represents] [whether] updated program modules are accessible from
a server” (Hoyle, col. 6,11. 7—9). In our view, one of ordinary skill would
understand, in light of the Specification, that the terms “category” and
“keyword,” as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 13 and 23,
are not met by a version identifier, as taught by Hoyle. See App. Br. 13.
Additionally, even if Hoyle’s version identifier taught the claimed
category or keyword, Hoyle does not teach or suggest: (1) determining an
advertisement by comparing the version identifier of the application to a
version identifier of the advertisement, (2) making the determination in
response to a request to transfer a first application, or (3) while transferring
the first application, as required by claims 1,13, and 23. Instead of being
based on a version identifier associated with the application, Hoyle’s
advertisement is selected based on accumulated data regarding a user’s
interaction with user-selectable data. Moreover, the advertisements are
determined when the ADM module determines an update is needed, not in
response to a request to transfer an application and while transferring the
application.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of independent claims 1, 13, and 23, and their dependents under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a).
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DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—16 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, first paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description
requirement is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—16 and 21—23under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejections of claims 1—16 and 21—23 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) are reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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