Ex Parte Givon et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 30, 2016

13061568 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 30, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/061,568 03/01/2011 Dor Givon XTR-PU-004-US1 7243
60956 7590 12/02/2016
Professional Patent Solutions;
EXAMINER
P.O. BOX 654 KHAN, IBRAHIM A
HERZELIYA PITUACH, 46105
ISRAEL ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2692
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/02/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DOR GIVON, OFER SADKA, ILYA KOTTEL, and
IGOR BUNIMOVICH
Appeal 2016-001132
Application 13/061,568
Technology Center 2600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, KEVIN C. TROCK, and
JESSICA C. KAISER, Administrative Patent Judges.
TROCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Introduction
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—6, 10—12, and 15—21, which constitute all the
claims pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b). Claims 7—9, 13, and 14 have been cancelled.2
We AFFIRM.
1 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is Extreme Reality Ltd.
App. Br. 2.
2 Final Act. 2.
Appeal 2016-001132
Application 13/061,568
Invention
The claims are directed to a system for correlating gestures, which are
defined by manipulating a computerized graphic model of a human, to
computer input signals. Spec. 130.
Exemplary Claim
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter with disputed limitations emphasized:
1. A system for signal converting, said system comprising:
a display;
a data storage adapted to store mapping tables comprising
correlations of indications of human gestures produced by an
image based human-machine interface (IBHMI) to standard
mouse or keyboard output signals;
a rendering module adapted to render a graphic model of
at least a portion of a human body upon said display;
a graphic user interface adapted to (1) allow a user to
manipulate elements of the graphic model of the at least a
portion of the human body by manipulating one or more
functionally associated user input components, and (2) receive a
selection of a first standard mouse or keyboard output signal,
wherein the one or more user input components are not image
based;
a gesture generating module adapted to define a human
gesture based on positions of elements of the graphic model
during a series of one or more user manipulations, using the one
or more user input components, of elements of the graphic model
of the at least a portion of the human body, and
a mapping module adapted to correlate an indication of the
defined human gesture produced by the IBHMI to the first
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Application 13/061,568
standard mouse or keyboard output signal and store the
correlation in said mapping tables.
Applied Prior Art
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Lee et al. (“Lee”) US 6,160,899 Dec. 12, 2000
Hillis et al. (“Hillis”) US 2008/0013826 Al Jan. 17, 2008
Morita et al. (“Morita”) US 2008/0104547 Al May 1, 2008
REJECTIONS
The Examiner made the following rejections:
Claims 1—6, 10, 11, 15—19, and 21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Hillis and Lee. Final Act. 2—20.
Claims 12 and 20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Hillis, Lee, and Morita. Id. at 20-22.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections and the evidence of
record in light of Appellants’ argument that the Examiner has erred. We
disagree with Appellants’ arguments and conclusions. We adopt as our own
the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which
this appeal is taken (Final Act. 2—22) and the findings and the reasons set
forth in the Examiner’s Answer (Ans. 2—9). We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner and further highlight specific findings and
argument for emphasis as follows.
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Application 13/061,568
Independent Claims 1, 10, and 15
“a graphic model of at least a portion of a human body ”
Appellants contend neither Hillis nor Lee teach “a rendering module
adapted to render a graphic model of at least a portion of a human body upon
said display,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 10 and 15.
App. Br. 16—17. Specifically, Appellants argue that Lee teaches a “system
in which a user sees an image of himself/herself on the display as they
perform gestures,” but that displayed user image is “a captured image — not a
rendered graphic model.” Id. at 17. Additionally, Appellants argue Lee’s
user image “is controlled by ... an image based input component” and “is
not used for gesture definition.” Id. Additionally, Appellants argue neither
Hillis’ “cursor” nor “the image captured by the cameras” are graphic models
of a human. Id. at 16—17.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Lee
“render[s] a graphical model of a human body on a display.” Final Act. 4
(citing Lee 1:46—52, Figs. 1—2); Ans. 6. Indeed, Fee uses “a camera 1 for
capturing a user’s image” and the “user’s image is displayed” on a screen.
Fee 2:60-67, Fig. 1.
Although Appellants argue the image that Fee’s “user sees ... of
himself/herself on the display” “is a captured image” and “not a rendered
graphic model” (App. Br.17), neither the claim nor the Specification
preclude a captured image from being within the meaning of a graphic
model. The claim does not recite limitations precluding displayed captured
images from the scope of a “graphic model,” and the Specification does not
provide a definition precluding displayed captured images from being within
the meaning of a “graphic model” (or any definition of a graphic model).
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We agree with the Examiner’s broad, but reasonable, interpretation that “a
graphic model can be a representation of the object” (Ans. 6), and,
accordingly, Lee’s displayed user image is a rendered graphic model
because it is a representation of the user displayed on a screen (Lee Lig. 1,
2:66—67). Additionally, Appellants’ arguments that Lee’s user image is
controlled by an image based input component and is not used for gesture
definition (App. Br. 17) are directed to features not recited in the present
limitation and, moreover, are features defining how a graphic model is used
rather than limiting what the graphic model is.
furthermore, Appellants’ argument that Hillis does not teach a
rendered graphic model (App. Br. 16—17) does not address the Examiner’s
findings regarding Lee’s displayed user image.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Lee
teaches “a rendering module adapted to render a graphic model of at least a
portion of a human body upon said display,” as recited in claim 1 and
similarly recited in claims 10 and 15.
“user input components are not image based”
Appellants contend neither Hillis nor Lee teaches “a graphic user
interface adapted to (1) allow a user to manipulate elements of the graphic
model... by manipulating one or more functionally associated user input
components . . . wherein the one or more user input components are not
image based,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 10 and 15.
App. Br. 18, Reply Br. 5—6. Specifically, Appellants argue the Examiner
“analogiz[es] the user’s hands [in Hillis and Lee] to the input components
recited” (App. Br. 18), but “a human hand is clearly not functionally
associated with a [graphic user interface]” and so cannot be an “input
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component” (Reply Br. 5—6). Appellants further argue that even if the user’s
hands were an input component, “this input component is clearly image
based because the input is conveyed by images,” i.e., Appellants contend
that the hands of the user are an image-based input because the hands are
captured by a camera. Reply Br. 5; App. Br. 17—18.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Hillis
teaches a “user’s hand or finger is an input component because it is used to
make inputs via gestures.” Ans. 8 (citing Hillis H 16—17, 34); Final Act. 4,
22. The Examiner further finds, and we agree, Lee also teaches a “gesture
recognition interface system” where a user’s hand or head is an input
component. Final Act. 4, 22; Ans. 4 (citing Lee 3:9—32, Figs. 1—2, 5), 8—9
(citing Lee 3:40-45). Moreover, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that a
user’s actual, physical hand, is “not image based.” Ans. 7.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ argument that a user’s actual
hand cannot be a non-image based input component functionally associated
with a graphic user interface. Reply Br. 5—6; App. Br. 17—18. As the
Examiner points out, Appellants’ Specification does not preclude a user’s
hand from being a non-image input component (see Ans. 4—5 (citing Spec.
130, Fig. 4), 7), and we agree with the Examiner’s broad, but reasonable,
interpretation that the actual, physical user body parts in Hillis and Lee are
input components which are not image based (Ans. 7—8; Final Act. 22).
Indeed, as the Examiner points out (Final Act. 3—4), Hillis teaches that a
“user’s hand” is a “sensorless input object” for a graphic interface (Hillis
1119, 22 (emphasis added); see Hillis 129, Fig. 3). Furthermore, in Lee,
“[w]hen the user moves his hand . . . the user’s hand image on the screen
also moves” according to the user’s physical hand, i.e., the manipulation of
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the user’s physical hand is the input which manipulates the graphic model’s
hand. See Lee 3:9—22. Although cameras capture the physical hand, the
Examiner does not assert the camera is the recited “input component.”
Instead, the Examiner finds the “input component” is the actual physical
hand itself, which is not image based. Ans. 4, 7—8. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred in finding Hillis and Lee teach “a graphic user
interface adapted to allow a user to manipulate elements of the graphic
model... by manipulating one or more functionally associated user input
components . . . wherein the one or more user input components are not
image based,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly recited in claims 10 and 15.
“define a human gesture ”
Appellants contend Hillis does not teach “a gesture generating module
adapted to define a human gesture based on positions of elements of the
graphic model during a series of one or more user manipulations, using the
one or more user input components, of elements of the graphic model of the
at least a portion of the human body,” as recited in claim 1 and similarly
recited in claims 10 and 15. App. Br. 19. Specifically, Appellants argue
“[t]here is no explanation how” Hillis’ teaching of “defining features by
performing them in front of a camera” teaches “defining gestures by
manipulating a graphic model.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Appellants further
argue Hillis’ gestures are not defined “using non-image based input
elements.” Id.
We are not persuaded. The Examiner finds, and we agree, Hillis
defines a new gesture using a “‘begin gesture sample’ operation” where the
user “perform[s] the new gesture [and] capture[s] the appropriate images of
the new gesture.” Ans. 9 (citing Hillis 135). The Examiner further finds,
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and we agree, Lee teaches a graphic model performing gestures, e.g., a head
nod. Ans. 9 (citing Lee 3:40-45 Fig. 1). The Examiner’s combination
incorporates Lee’s gesturing graphic model with Hillis’ new gesture defining
operation. Ans. 9; Final Act. 4.
Appellants’ argument that the Examiner fails to explain how Hillis
defines a gesture (App. Br. 19) is not persuasive. The Examiner explains
that Hillis “defme[s] a human gesture” (Ans. 9) because Hillis’ gesture
memory is “dynamically programmable, such that new gestures can be
added” by “captur[ing] the appropriate images of the new gesture” (Hillis
135). Further, Appellants’ argument directed to using a graphic model to
define gestures (App. Br. 19) inappropriately attacks Hillis individually
when the Examiner’s rejection combines the teachings and suggestions of
Hillis and Lee to “modify the gesture recognition interface of Hillis to
include [Lee’s] graphical model” (Final Act. 4; Ans. 9). In re Keller, 642
F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (citation omitted). Further, Appellants’
argument that the gesture definition is not defined “using non-image based
input” (App. Br. 20) is not persuasive because we agree with the Examiner’s
finding that the user’s physical body part, e.g., a hand or head, is a non­
image based input (which manipulates the user image), as discussed supra.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding the
combination of Hillis and Lee teaches
a gesture generating module adapted to define a human gesture
based on positions of elements of the graphic model during a
series of one or more user manipulations, using the one or more
user input components, of elements of the graphic model of the
at least a portion of the human body,
within the meaning of claims 1,10, and 15.
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Dependent Claims 2 6, 11, 12, and 16—21
Appellants do not argue separate patentability for dependent claims 2—
6, 11, 12, and 16—21 which depend from claims 1,10, and 15. See App. Br.
20-21. For the reasons set forth above, therefore, we are not persuaded the
Examiner erred in rejecting these claims. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349,
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We conclude that the Board has reasonably
interpreted Rule 41.37 to require applicants to articulate more substantive
arguments if they wish for individual claims to be treated separately.”).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of claims 2—6, 11, 12, and
16-21. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
DECISION
We AFFIRM the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections of claims 1—
6, 10-12, and 15-21.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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