Ex Parte Gilman et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 28, 2016

13177172 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 28, 2016)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/177,172 07/06/2011 Dale Gilman 83178468 5937
28395 7590 11/30/2016
RROOKS KTTSHMAN P C /FfTET EXAMINER
1000 TOWN CENTER TERRELL, EMILY C
22ND FLOOR
SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075-1238 ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/30/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing @brookskushman.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DALE GILMAN, PAUL ALDIGHIERI, LEANN KRIDNER,
RYAN SKAFF, VILAY PATEL, and STEPHEN JAY ORRIS1
Appeal 2015-006170
Application 13/177,172
Technology Center 2600
Before MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, DANIEL N. FISHMAN, and
JAMES W. DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judges.
DEJMEK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1—5, 9, 14, and 18. Claims 6—8, 10-13, 15—17, 19, and 20. App. Br.
App’x. 1—3. We have jurisdiction over the remaining pending claims under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 Appellants identify Ford Global Technologies, LLC as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-006170
Application 13/177,172
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellants’ claimed invention is directed to determining a range limit
for an electric/battery-powered vehicle based on the vehicle’s energy source
status. Abstract. In a disclosed embodiment, a travel distance from the
current location of the vehicle to a predetermined primary charging location
may be determined. Spec. H 5—6. In other disclosed embodiments, the
calculation of a range limit may account for the current direction the vehicle
is heading or may find an alternate charging station when the primary
charging station is located beyond the current range limit of the vehicle.
Spec. 1110, 55.
Claim 1 is representative of the subject matter on appeal and is
reproduced below with the disputed limitations emphasized in italics'.
1. A system comprising:
a processor configured to:
receive a vehicle distance-to-empty;
calculate a distance from a current vehicle location a
predefined primary recharging location',
calculate a range limit, representing a remaining range,
for a vehicle traveling on a current heading, beyond which return
to the primary recharging location is estimated by the processor
to be no longer possible', and
when the range limit has been exceeded, automatically
find a new, secondary recharging point within the distance-to-
empty.
The Examiner’s Rejections
1. Claims 1 and 3—5 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Todoriki et al. (US 6,864,807 B2; Mar. 8, 2005)
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Application 13/177,172
(“Todoriki”) and Saga et al. (US 5,815,824; Sept. 29, 1998) (“Saga”). Final
Act. 3—5.
2. Claims 1, 2, 9, 14, and 18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Takahira et al. (US 5,539,399; July 23,
1996) (“Takahira”) and Saga. Final Act. 5—9.
Issues on Appeal
1. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Todoriki
and Saga teaches or suggests a processor configured to “calculate a range
limit, representing a remaining range, for a vehicle traveling on a current
heading, beyond which return to the primary recharging location is estimated
by the processor to be no longer possible,” as recited in claim 1?
2. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Todoriki
and Saga teaches or suggests a “predefined primary recharging location,” as
recited in claim 1?
3. Did the Examiner err in finding the combination of Takahira
and Saga teaches or suggests a processor configured to “calculate a range
limit, representing a remaining range, for a vehicle traveling on a current
heading, beyond which return to the primary recharging location is estimated
by the processor to be no longer possible,” as recited in claim 1?
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Appeal 2015-006170
Application 13/177,172
ANALYSIS2
Rejection over Todoriki and Saga
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Todoriki teaches
calculating a range limit as claimed. App. Br. 6—8; Reply Br. 1—2. In
particular, Appellants assert Todoriki merely teaches a binary calculation of
whether a destination can be reached. App. Br. 6 (citing Todoriki, col. 5,
11. 12—16). However, Appellants argue, the claimed range limit is not simply
the maximum range of the vehicle, but rather “the range of the vehicle
beyond which return to the primary charging station cannot be achieved.”
App. Br. 6.
Similarly, Appellants assert the Examiner erred in finding Saga also
teaches calculating the claimed range limit. App. Br. 7—8; Reply Br. 3.
Appellants assert Saga’s reachability determination means merely provides a
binary calculation of whether the vehicle can reach a destination. App. Br. 7
(citing Saga, col. 12,11. 10—29).
To distinguish the claimed range limit from a maximum range,
Appellants provide hypothetical examples to illustrate how Appellants
interpret the range limit is calculated. App. Br. 6—7; Reply Br. 2—5.
Appellants argue “[n]one of the prior art teaches calculating a range limit
beyond which return to a charging point is no longer possible.” Reply Br. 5
(emphases omitted). Appellants argue a distinction between the claimed
range limit and the calculations described in Todoriki and Saga is that the
2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered the Appeal Brief, filed
January 27, 2015 (“App. Br.”); the Reply Brief, filed June 4, 2015 (“Reply
Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed on April 7, 2015 (“Ans.”); and the
Final Office Action (“Final Act.”), mailed on July 29, 2014, from which this
Appeal is taken.
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Application 13/177,172
claimed range limit “will clearly vary based on vehicle heading” as opposed
to a determination of whether the charging point is within a travelable
distance. App. Br. 7.
As an initial matter, the Examiner notes, the claim language does not
preclude the range limit from being a “binary calculation,” which Appellants
assert is taught by the identified prior art. Ans. 6—7. Although the claims
are interpreted in light of the Specification, limitations from the
Specification are not read into the claims. In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181,
1184 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
We agree with the Examiner that neither the claim language nor the
Specification restrict the range limit from being a binary calculation.
Nonetheless, the Examiner finds Todoriki and Saga each teach
calculating the narrower interpretation of the range limit urged by
Appellants. Ans. 6—8; see also Final Act. 3^4.
Todoriki teaches a calculated travelable distance (i.e., a maximum, or
remaining, range) and a route distance between “the present position and the
destination.” Todoriki, col. 5,11. 12—14; see also Todoriki, col. 4,11. 64—67
(“The route and the travel distance of the route are derived from the
destination information . . . and the positional information obtained from
[the] positional information obtaining section.”). By comparing these
distances, Todoriki determines “whether or not the vehicle of the present
energy condition can reach the destination.” Todoriki, col. 5,11. 14—16. In
other words, if the distance between the present position of the vehicle and
the destination (e.g., the primary recharging location) is greater than the
calculated travelable distance (i.e., the remaining range), returning to (or
reaching) the destination is no longer possible.
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As the Examiner explains, this calculation may be repeated by
Todoriki. Ans. 6. For example, if the vehicle is traveling away from the
destination, the remaining range will continue to lower and the distance to
return to the destination will become greater. When the distance to the
destination is greater than the remaining range, return to the destination is no
longer possible. Thus, contrary to Appellants’ assertion, Todoriki does take
into account the vehicle heading information in determining the travelable
distance. Accordingly, we agree with the Examiner that Todoriki teaches
the disputed limitation.
Regarding Saga, the Examiner finds, and we agree, the reachability
determination means of Saga teaches calculating the narrower interpretation
of range limit urged by Appellants. Final Act. 4 (citing Saga, col. 12,11. 10-
29); Ans. 7. “[T]he reachability determination means 34 also determines
during the driving whether the vehicle can reach the destination or the
planned charging point in response to variations in the remaining driving
distance.'’'’ Saga, col. 12,11. 10-14 (emphases added). Thus, Saga teaches a
continuous calculation (i.e., during the driving) to determine whether “the
situation changes from a reachable situation to an unreachable situation in
the course of driving” (i.e., calculating a range limit, representing a
remaining range, beyond which return to the primary recharging location is
estimated to be no longer possible). See Saga, col. 12,11. 19—21.
Additionally, Appellants contend neither Todoriki nor Saga teaches a
“predefined primary recharging location,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 7;
Reply Br. 4. Appellants distinguish the currently chosen charging point
destinations of Todoriki and Saga from a charging location defined by the
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vehicle user and stored in the vehicle profile. Reply Br. 4 (citing Spec. 1
43).
We are unpersuaded by Appellants’ arguments because, as the
Examiner explains, the Specification does not provide a limiting definition
of a predefined primary recharging location. Ans. 7, 11—12. Rather, the
Specification provides examples of primary charging points that “may be”
defined by the user and stored in the vehicle. See Spec. 143. The
Specification further states that location information (i.e., of the primary
charging point) may be input by the vehicle using a navigation system.
Spec. 143.
“Without evidence in the patent specification of an express intent to
impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary
meaning.” Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324, 1334
(Fed. Cir. 2000). To give a term other than the ordinary meaning, the
Specification must clearly redefine the term so as to put person skilled in the
art on notice that the patent intends to redefine the term. See Process
Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
We find no evidence of an express intent to impart a novel meaning to
a “predefined primary recharging location” that would distinguish from the
recharging stations of Todoriki and Saga. Given the lack of evidence of an
express intent to impart a novel meaning to a “predefined primary
recharging location” from Appellants’ Specification, the Examiner broadly
but reasonably construes a “predefined primary recharging location,”
consistent with the Specification, to encompass Todoriki and Saga’s
recharging stations “whose locations are fixed in space and time.” Ans. 7.
Additionally, we note Saga teaches, in addition to the “planned charging
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point” (i.e., the primary predefined recharging location), displaying alternate
(i.e., not primary) charging points located along the way to the planned
charging point. Saga, col. 12,11. 10-29. Therefore, we are not persuaded
the Examiner erred by finding a predefined primary recharging location is
taught or suggested by Todoriki and Saga’s recharging stations.
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Additionally, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—5, which
depend therefrom and were not argued separately. See App. Br. 6—8.
Rejection over Takahira and Saga
Appellants advance similar arguments that Takahira, like Todoriki,
teaches a maximum range (i.e., running range) and not the claimed range
limit beyond which return to a specified point is no longer possible. App.
Br. 8—9; Reply Br. 4—5. Appellants also rely on the same arguments
regarding the alleged deficiencies of Saga. App. Br. 9.
We are unpersuaded of Examiner error. The Examiner relies on Saga,
not Takahira, to teach “the aspects of the system wherein the processor is
made to calculate a range limit value, representing a remaining range, for a
vehicle traveling on a current heading, beyond which return to the primary
recharging location is no longer possible.” Final Act. 5—6 (citing Saga,
col. 12,11. 10-29). As discussed supra, we do not agree with Appellants’
arguments that Saga does not teach or suggest the disputed limitations from
claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claim 1 and, for similar reasons, the rejection of independent claims 14 and
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18, which recite similar limitations and were not argued separately. See
App. Br. 8—9. Additionally, we sustain the Examiner’s rejections of
dependent claims 2 and 9, which were not argued separately. See App.
Br. 9.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1—5, 9, 14, and 18.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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