Ex Parte Gichana et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Aug 22, 2016

13271631 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE
13/271,631 10/12/2011
11764 7590
Ditthavong & Steiner, P,C,
44 Canal Center Plaza
Suite 322
Alexandria, VA 22314
08/24/2016
FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
Brian Omwenga Gichana
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P5704USOO 1084
EXAMINER
LEVITIAN, KARINA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2165
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/24/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
docket@dcpatent.com
Nokia.IPR@nokia.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRIAN OMWENGA GI CHANA, PAULINE GITHINJI,
JUSSI MARKUS IMPIO, MARKO MIKAEL MYLL YLUOMA,
and MOSES SITATI
Appeal2015-003209
Application 13/271,631
Technology Center 2100
Before LARRY J. HUME, JOHN P. PINKERTON, and
SCOTT B. HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judges.
HOW ARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants 1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
claims 1-20, which constitute all of the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.
1 Appellants identify Nokia Corp. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1.
Appeal2015-003209
Application 13/271,631
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed invention is directed to a method and
apparatus for providing identification based on a multimedia signature.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. A method comprising facilitating a processing of and/or
processing (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one
signal, the (1) data and/or (2) information and/or (3) at least one
signal based, at least in part, on the following:
a processing of one or more incoming device events at a
user device to determine one or more participants, one or more
participant devices, or a combination thereof;
a recording, a sampling, a parsing, or a combination
thereof of at least an incoming portion of one or more
communication sessions associated with the one or more
incoming device events; and
a generation of one or more multimedia signatures based,
at least in part, on the recording, the sampling, the parsing, or a
combination thereof;
an association of the one or more multimedia signatures
with the one or more participants, the one or more participant
devices, or a combination thereof; and
a determination to identify the one or more participants,
the one or more participant devices, or a combination thereof
based, at least in part, on the association.
THE REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
Phillips US 2011/0054894 Al Mar. 3, 2011
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Application 13/271,631
REJECTION
Claims 1-20 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as
being anticipated by Phillips. Final Act. 5-8; Adv. Act. 2.2
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner's rejection in light of Appellants'
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellants.
We are persuaded by Appellants' arguments regarding claims 1-20.
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in finding Phillips discloses "a
recording, a sampling, a parsing, or a combination thereof of at least an
incoming portion of one or more communication sessions associated with
the one or more incoming device events," as recited in claim 1. App.
Br. 11-12. More particularly, Appellants argue Phillips is directed to a
speech processing system that is "capable of performing speed recognition
and entering text into an application." App. Br. 11. That is, Phillips
discloses recording the user's voice and converting voice data to text data.
App. Br. 11-12. However, Appellants assert, because Phillips is not used
with any incoming device events or communication sessions associated with
an incoming device event, Phillips does not disclose "a recording, a
sampling, a parsing, or a combination thereof of at least an incoming portion
of one or more communication sessions." App. Br. 11.
2 We note that in the Final Action the Examiner objects to each of the
claims. Final Act. 2. These are petitionable, rather than appealable, matters,
and we express no opinion as to their propriety as they are not before us on
Appeal. See 3 7 CPR § 1.181.
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Appeal2015-003209
Application 13/271,631
The Examiner concludes that a "communication session," as recited in
claim 1, is broad enough "to mean the communication by the user using a
mobile device wherein the user's incoming communication is the speech and
the system records then converts to speech to text." Adv. Act. 2; Ans. 3.
The Examiner's conclusion is based, inter alia, on paragraph 34 of the
Specification, which states "the communication session 'involve telephone
communications, video conference communications, email communications,
and the like."' Id.
During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable
interpretation while reading claim language in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). We consult the
patent's specification to help clarify the meaning of claim terms, because the
claims "must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part."
Trading Technologies Intern, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F .3d 967,
979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en bane), ajf'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996)). Absent an
express intent to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the words take on
the ordinary and customary meanings attributed to them by those of ordinary
skill in the art. Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d
1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
"To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every
limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently." In re
Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The absence of a single
limitation---even if that limitation would be obvious from the cited
reference-negates anticipation. Id.
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Application 13/271,631
We are persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner erred in
construing the claim. Reading the claim as a whole, we conclude the claim
term "incoming device events" is not broad enough to encompass only the
user's speech. Instead, the term "incoming" requires that some type of event
happens elsewhere and comes to or is received by the user's device.
Similarly, the phrase "communication session associated with the one or
more incoming device events" infers multiple participants and not a user
speaking to a device for purposes of converting voice data to text.
Nor does the cited section of the Specification support the Examiner's
claim construction. Instead, paragraph 34 discloses communications with a
second device/user:
In one embodiment, one or more of the device events may be one
or more communication sessions. Such communication sessions
may involve images, videos, text, audio, or a combination
thereof. By way of example, such communication sessions may
involve telephone communications, video conference
communications, email communications, and the like. In
response to the communication session, the identification
platform 103 may cause a recording, a sampling, a parsing, or a
combination thereof of at least a portion of the communication
sessions associated with the device events to generate the
multimedia signatures associated with the device events, the
participants associated with the device events, and/ or the
participant devices associated with the device events. By way of
example, for a telephone communication session, the multimedia
signature may constitute an audio recording of at least a portion
of the communication session. The multimedia signature may
correspond to only the portion of the communication session that
1s associated with the participant talking during the
communication. Thus, by associating the recording of the
participant with the participant in, for example, a contacts list,
the user of the device may identify the participant in the contacts
list based on the multimedia signature (e.g., the audio recording
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Appeal2015-003209
Application 13/271,631
of the participant playing), rather than the user having visually
determine the participant in the list.
Spec. i-f 34 (emphasis added). While the claims are not limited to the
embodiments described in the Specification, there is nothing in the cited
paragraph that would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art to believe the
claim language was broad enough to encompass recording the user speaking
to the user's device Therefore, based on the record before us and the
Examiner's reliance on an incorrect claim construction, we disagree with the
Examiner, because the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence or
provided sufficient explanation as to how Phillips discloses "a recording, a
sampling, a parsing, or a combination thereof of at least an incoming portion
of one or more communication sessions associated with the one or more
incoming device events," as recited in claim 1. 3
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner's rejection of claim 1, along with the rejection of independent
claim 11, which recites limitations commensurate in scope to the disputed
limitation discussed above, and dependent claims 2-10 and 12-20 which
variously and ultimately depend therefrom.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner's decision rejecting
claims 1-2 0.
REVERSED
3 Because we agree with at least one of the dispositive arguments advanced
by Appellants, we need not reach the merits of Appellants' other arguments.
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